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Abstract 
This study surveys the security situation in the Horn of Africa and investigates 
why in the post-Cold War period conflict increased rather than decreased as 
anticipated by many leading academics and strategists. It has investigated the 
relevance of IR security theories in its endeavour to identify the causes of conflict in 
the sub-region. The study of conflict reveals that the factors of instability are so 
intertwined and interconnected that a single country's security problems cannot be 
diagnosed in isolation from those of its neighbours. 
This complex nature of conflict generally emanates from the tendency for 
domestic conflict to spill over national borders, and the Horn's geographical location 
that continues to attract the attention of outside actors with conflicting interests %% ho 
are only too anxious to maintain the momentum of instability in the sub-region as 
long as it serves their own national interests. As a result, insecurity has been revolving 
around a vicious circle engulfing the entire Horn, with very little hope of establishing 
an enduring peace in the foreseeable future. Efforts attempted so far have either been 
unsuccessful or at most have only been able to solicit and procure peace of short 
duration. 
The thesis's analysis has identified mistrust and suspicion between community 
groups and neighbouring states as the principal causes of instability and sees the 
primary task as the restoration of harmony. By way of a solution, this thesis suggests 
that the active participation of the diaspora in the politics of the sub-region by 
defusing existing hatred and bringing awareness of the benefit of taking a united stand 
could bridge the gap that at present separates adversaries -a vital role that could pave 
the way for a joint action by neighbouring states (considered to be intractable in the 
past) to create long-lasting stability in the sub-region. 
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Introduction 
Throughout the post-independence period the Horn of Africa has been afflicted by 
war. There were great hopes that the end of the Cold War would bring a breath of 
fresh air and release the region from a period of prolonged misery. To the dismay of 
its populace, the peace failed to materialise and conflict of a new and more vigorous 
dimension began to afflict the entire region. 
There is wide range of literature on the Horn of Africa, mostly focusing on 
isolated topics such as the challenge to inherited colonial borders, arms proliferation, 
superpowers' involvement in acquiring bases, activities of opposition movements, 
dictatorial rule, resource conflict, economic decline and environmental degradation. 
These are published in books, as articles in journals, periodicals, magazines, daily- and 
weekly newspapers, as official government publications, and as comments and reports 
in news agencies and yearbooks. 
Generally speaking, although the studies depict the sub-region as conflict-ridden, 
they fail to analyse in detail why it became prone to conflict and was unable to 
overcome the internal insecurity problems that seem to be perennial and continuously 
on the ascent. They principally focused on conflict in individual countries or isolated 
incidents and gave scant attention to analysing security issues from a regional 
perspective. In addition, as most publications by local authors often support national 
claims, others of opposite viewpoints tend to dismiss their opinions and theories as 
biased. Some foreign academics, too, are not immune from the charge of partiality, 
and their opinions are usually viewed with scepticism. Suspicion and lack of 
credibility, which has already significantly diminished the usefulness of regional 
academic studies, has prevented local actors from accepting them as a guide in 
resolving issues of regional insecurity. Quite the reverse, such studies have been used 
to justify and legitimise conflicting claims and in fact have significantly contributed to 
the deterioration of diplomatic relationships between nations and to instability in the 
region. Therefore, in the context of the Horn region, response to a broad-based 
impartial approach to security analysis that considers all views before making a 
judgement seems to be not only timely but also urgent. 
In the realisation of the above goal, the first step must be to conduct a brief 
survey of the causes of conflict in the region. This thesis will discuss the principal 
contributory factors underlying the decreasing stability in the region and will ignore 
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minor factors that may have an indirect effect elsewhere but are not particularly 
relevant to the Horn. These are highlighted below. 
Harmonious living in the area has been made more difficult by the fact that 
ethnic groups have been artificially divided into different countries as a result of the 
artificial national boundaries imposed in colonial times. It has also led to a tendency 
among the population to make social contact and interact across national borders 
without observing immigration controls. This, in turn, has created ideal conditions for 
illicit trading -a flourishing practice that often brings the local population into 
confrontation with customs and immigration officials. These activities, coupled with 
the long-standing practice of giving support to ethnic groups of the same origin 
whenever they are in difficulties, have contributed greatly to the undermining of 
government authority, particularly in the border areas. In these areas where ignorance 
about political awareness predominates, opposition forces tend to take advantage of 
such opportunities to establish relations with the locals by offering money, arms and 
ammunition - items that are in great demand by insurgents wishing to challenge 
government authority. Consequently, the role played by outside actors' interference in 
exacerbating the existing state of instability in individual countries has been 
substantial. Since conflicts that flared up in individual countries usually spill over 
national borders, outside actors' acts have indirectly contributed to destabilising 
neighbouring states. This spill-over characteristic of conflict in the Horn has extended 
the scope of security beyond the control and jurisdiction of the state, challenging the 
applicability of the realist's theory of state sovereignty (narrow-perspective) which 
was widely accepted and held as indisputable in the past. 
Basically, the region is divided into two climate zones - the highlands and the 
lowlands. The mild climate of the highlands, particularly its plateau, is an area suited 
to farming while the lowlands, with their hot and humid climate, is mostly suited to 
pastoral animal-rearing. As the semi-desert lowlands of the region, inhabited by 
nomadic pastoralists, are naturally deprived, clashes with settled farmers over the 
control of land resources are frequent occurrences. 
Furthermore, the Horn's geographic factor, particularly its strategic location, 
has made the area attractive to outsiders, which at various times have intervened 
extensively in the region's politics in order to further their own national interests. The 
region's strategic location even made it a periphery of the Cold War zone when the 
superpowers (the USA and the USSR) aligned themselves with opposing countries 
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(Ethiopia and Somalia) to acquire use of territory that could be utilised in their 
ideological competition for world domination. The Horn's strategic value has also at 
times been exploited by several of its leaders to bargain with the superpowers for a 
better deal and, in extreme cases, they have had no hesitation in shifting allegiances to 
maximise reward. The strategic factor has always played a crucial role in fuelling 
internal conflicts and instigating fresh ones; particularly guilty in this respect have 
been neighbouring Arab countries, which have intervened in support of associates and 
clients to weaken state authority and undermine the territorial integrity of those Horn 
countries which they considered to be hostile to their policies. Thus, the activities of 
outside forces exacerbated by a mutual distrust of neighbours, has made the security 
issue of the sub-region distinct from that of its surrounding areas. 
In general, the security problems of the Horn, emanating from multiple 
factors, such as demands for self-determination (to institute democratic rule or to form 
a breakaway state), opposition to dictatorial rule, human rights violations, border, 
resource, ethnic and religious conflicts, have led to inter-state and intra-state wars. 
However, in addition to such traditional causes of conflict, economic and 
environmental factors have also played a role in exacerbating instability. In recent 
times, too, the region has began to suffer from the cooling and sudden shutting down 
of close alliances and friendships -a phenomenon that had led to the resumption of 
senseless conflicts over trifling issues that do not warrant war. ' This multi- 
dimensional characteristic has not only transformed the nature of conflict in the sub- 
region but its complexity and interrelatedness has also given rise to an image of the 
Horn as a place of instability characterised by fleeing refugees and displaced people, 
commonly expressed as complex political emergencies (CPEs) the response to which 
frequently requires the implementation of actions in the crisis zone outside 
government control, further undermining internationally recognised sovereign power. 
In trying to answer the question why insecurity in the Horn has become 
perennial, we have to examine the virtues of orthodox realist theory (narrow- 
perspective) that puts the state as the epicentre of security studies -a theory which 
identifies threat as coming from outside national borders and suggests military power 
`Ethiopia's and Eritrea's forgotten wir, resumed: The two ex-allies, newly rearmed, are fighting bloodily, perhaps to the death* 
(The Economist, 20 May 2000), p. 93: `Africa in the 2(X)(s: Politics, Money, War and Peace' (Africa Confidential. Vol. 41. Na. 
9,2 May 2000), p. 2: William Minter, `America and Africa: Beyond the Double Standard ' (Current Histony. Vol 99, N70 617. 
May 2000), p. 206. Medhane Taddesse, The Eritrean-Ethiopian War: Retrospect and Prospects (Me to Prmtinpz Enter wi e. 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 1999), pp. 116-162. 
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as the only countermeasure that guarantees security. If the narrow perspectiN e does 
not conform to the realities of the Horn and fails to give satisfactory guidance. we are 
obliged to look beyond its bounds and explore regional and international levels of 
analyses (wider-perspective) to find out whether they are relevant to the sub-region's 
current security problems. In the context of the Horn region, an exploration of the 
regional and international perspectives is not only timely and appropriate but is also a 
challenge that is worth attempting. Thus, the study of security in the Horn offers a 
challenge to researchers who wish to unravel some of its complexities and contribute 
to the development of international relations. 
Method 
The method of analysis I have adopted is first to investigate the application of narrow- 
perspective and wider-perspective realist theory to security issues by conducting a 
detailed thematic case study of past and present conflicts. I will frame a feNN 
hypotheses to test both perspectives in order to discover whether they have any 
relevance to the sub-region's security issues. I will then comment on the merits of 
each and use the concepts they advance as a guide to my analysis. Finally, depending 
on the outcome of my analysis, I will draw a conclusion and forward my own 
recommendation in the hope that it might contribute to the study of international 
relations and be of service to those who seek to establish peace and security in the 
sub-region. 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis examines the problems of conflict in the Horn of Africa in substantial 
detail. Chapter 1 opens with a review of the state/security theories developed so far. 
Using these as a guide, it formulates several hypotheses that will be tested in relevant 
chapters to investigate whether theories of security advanced by International 
Relations are applicable to the particular issues of the Horn and will be of help in 
finding the remedies required to create peace in the sub-region 
Chapter 2 defines the geography of the Horn region. It also gives the historical 
background to the region and examines the nature of security before and during the 
Cold War eras by adopting three levels of analysis - international, regional and sub- 
state - to view both internal and external threats. 
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Chapter 3 deals with security problems in the post-Cold War era, 
concentrating on the internal dimension of conflict and the roles played by regional 
actors in the pursuit of national interest. It also discusses the involvement of outside 
actors - both superpowers and regional powers whose strategic interests in the region 
always took precedence over those of the Horn. The excessive amount of arms the 
superpowers supplied to their clients in exchange for rights to use territory as military 
bases became a source of inter-state conflict are also discussed. Furthermore. regional 
actors' devious assistance of insurgents against ruling regimes and frequent shifts of 
allegiance have complicated and exacerbated the nature of internal conflicts. This 
means that, in the context of the Horn, one cannot afford to ignore outside interests 
which, in one way or another, have to be accommodated. Since peaceful measures 
that exclude regional actors have always failed, the possibility of incorporating 
outsiders as an alternative measure is explored. 
Chapter 4 analyses the effect of economic factors in light of the Horn's 
situation. The fact that the region's regimes' priority is buying arms rather than 
investing their meagre resources on development has severely limited opportunities 
locally and has been the cause of considerable migration to the Middle East and 
Western counties. The `brain drain' and the flight of capital resulting from forced 
migration has left others to rule unchallenged as warlords or autocrats -a situation 
which has left the door open to inter-clan conflict and, in the worst scenarios, the 
collapse of states. 
Chapter 5 examines the effect of environmental degradation on security in the 
Horn region. Although study in this field is scant and inconclusive, there is evidence 
of continual clashes between pastoralists and farmers, highlanders and lowlanders 
over acquisition of fertile land. Recurring droughts have also brought severe famines 
that have forced people to cross national borders and settle in neighbouring countries, 
whose economies cannot support their own population let alone cater for a flood of 
refugees. These frequent migrations have been a source of rising social tensions and, 
in extreme cases, a cause of conflict. The experience of the Horn region could 
strengthen the argument that environmental degradation, in one way or another, 
contributes towards the deterioration of security. 
Finally, the last chapter analyses the role played by international, regional and 
non-governmental organisations and attempts to unravel the misconception of the 
inhabitants of the Horn who believe that the attainment of peace is outside their 
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control and rely wholly on outsiders and divine intervention instead of making, efforts 
of their own. This illusion has hindered all previous internal efforts to achie,, e peace. 
and this thesis argues in support of a vital and long overdue realisation that such a 
responsibility lies primarily on the local inhabitants' own doorstep. 
Sources 
As already noted, I have referred to a wide range of literature, both primary and 
secondary, and have conducted a number of interviews. As the topic of my study is 
sensitive and the interviewees are either still on government service or have held a 
sensitive post in the recent past, I am of the strong opinion that any release of 
information attributable to their names could expose them and their families to 
retaliation. 2 Therefore, I have to refer to most of their opinions, comments and 
suggestions as unattributable. Last but not least, my personal occupation as a former 
senior Ethiopian government official' has put me in a privileged position in terms of 
my knowledge about the region's security problems. In particular, it gave me the 
opportunity to travel widely in the region and discuss bilateral and regional security- 
related issues with my counterparts in neighbouring countries. 4 I believe such an 
experience has put me in a unique position to observe security issues of the Horn from 
close quarters - an advantage and a major factor that inspired me to do a research 
work on security problems of the sub-region. 
2 Their composition comprises academic. anilmssadtns, ministers. high-rant ng military officers (Lt. Generals. 
Major Generals, 
Brigadiers and Colonels), representatives and leaders of liberation movements. 
3 The government posts I held among others are Deputy Force Commander, Deputy Ground Forces 
Commander, Depot" Chief 
of Staff, Deputy Defence Minister, Member of the National Security Committee, Member of the National 
Congress and Member 
of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia. 
4 To mention few examples, I was a member of the Ethiopian delegation led by the Minister of 
Defence to Sudan to discuss 
peace with our counterparts in 1983 and in appreciation of our efforts and contribution each one of us v. ere presented 
to 
President Numerei with'Order of the Two Niles', one of the highest medal of the country. 
In 1988 I led the Ethiopian delegation 
which supervised the demilitarisation of border areas with the Somali delegation -a mission which vv a' succe sfulk 
accomplished and eased tension between the two countries. Again, towards the end of the year 
I led another delegation it, 
Somalia to conclude an agreement on exchange and release of prisoners numbering over 
four thousand- The agreement as 
finalised in Mogadishu and the process of transporting them to their respective countries 
bv air as put into opera lion in 
collaboration with the IRC (International Red Cross), an event that was reported widely 
by local and international pros 
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Chapter 1. 
Security Theory: Its Relation to Third World Countries 
This chapter will focus on the issues and factors considered by IR scholars while 
identifying the causes of threats to security in the Third World. Thereafter, by relating 
these to the problems currently facing the Horn, their theories' validity and application 
will be tested in subsequent chapters in order to select those that best serve the needs of 
the region. If there are some disparities or additional factors that need to be included, they 
will be discussed and presented as a recommendation. 
In the course of the IR scholars' studies, two differing views -a narrow 
perspective and a wider perspective - emerged, emanating from their perception of 
security. As a result, complete agreement on a common theory has so far proved elusive. 
While the realists claim that there is no credible alternative theory that could replace 
traditional realist theory, a minority of thinkers and academics challenged this view but 
were unable to attract attention until the demise of world communism in 1989. Only after 
the resurgence of ethnic conflict in the Yugoslav Republic, at the beginning of the 1990s, 
did arguments for a wider interpretation of security become viable and begin to more 
clearly merit redefinition. 
The principal problem of the realist argument stems from the autonomous right of 
state sovereignty. The dominance of the state in international relations has been the 
foundation of realistlneo-realist theories until the present time. In the absence of a world 
government, they claim that sovereignty is a privilege bestowed on the state, depicting it 
as the highest independent unit that is not subject to any higher authority in the hierarchy 
of power politics. It was this state-centric view that was challenged by a growing number 
of academics who considered that changing circumstances in international relations 
demanded a wider outlook beyond the state-centric view to address threats of insecurity. 
2 The debate between state-centrism and transnationalism is still going on. 
I Barry Buzm, People, States and Fear (Harvester Wheatsheaf Hemel Hampstead 1991), p- 67. 
Stew Smith, "I be Self-Images of a Discipline: A genealogy of International Relations TheotY' in Kea Booth and Stew Smith 
(ed. ), International Relaticros Theory T(Ajy (Polity Press, Cambridge 1995), pp. 1-31. 
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Definition of state 
According to the realists, national security concerns existential threats to the state whose 
reverent objects usually incorporate government, territory and society, thus making the 
state the central point of security studies. ' As we are living in an anarchical international 
system with no central body to control the system of states, the responsibility for ensuring 
national security is left to each individual state. This characteristic, and the state's socio- 
political centrality and military power, make it the most powerful unit in the international 
system. 4 According to Max Weber's definition, a state is: 'a corporate group that has 
compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organisation, and claims a monopoly of 
force over a territory and its population, including all action taking place in the area of its 
jurisdiction'. ' Ian Brownlie, a legal scholar, defines the state by putting an emphasis on 
the juridical attributes of statehood. He defines the state as `a legal person, recognised by 
international law with the following attributes: (a) a defined territory, (b) a permanent 
population, (c) an effective government, and (d) independence, or the right to enter 
relations with other states' 6 
The hallmarks of the state as defined above are: its sovereignty, with no higher 
body to contest its authority; its legitimacy, marked by its integration into a stable 
community, and its well-developed institutions and organisations. This is the ideal. 
However, these qualities are not enjoyed by all states of the international community. The 
process of state-building in the West took hundreds of years before these attributes were 
realised. In contrast, Third World states that have not completed the dual process of 
nation building and nation making have been recognised as juridical states. 7 
Independence was conferred on them at the end of the colonial era in the late 1950s and 
1960s. They achieved `quasi-state' status without achieving effective control within their 
own territories and could not enforce policies, laws and regulations over their people- 
However, despite this disadvantage, they have been recognised as independent bodies by 
other states within the international system-8 and were able to survive as states because the 
3 Barry Btzan People, States andFear (Harvester Wl eatsheaf, Hamel Hempstead, England 1991), p. 52. 
4 Ibid., pp_57-_58. 
S Max Weber, The Theo, of Social and Economic Organization- ed. (Free Press, New Y(nk 1964), p. 156- 
6 lan Brownlie, Princoles of Public Inlernwio ai Law, 3rd edsi (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1979), pp. 7: -76. 
7 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, -Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood 
(World Polities= Vol. 43,1982), pp. 4-16; Barry Buzau People, States and Fear (Harvester Wbeatsheaf. Hamel Hempstead.. 
England 1991), pp. ] 12-113. 
$ Christopher Clapham., Afr ica and the International SSvstem: The Politics if 
State Sta-viwzl (University Press, Cambridge 19%), p. I 
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juridical status recognised by the UN Charter acknowledges their right of sovereignty 
which upholds respect for territorial integrity and non-intervention in internal affairs - 
rights which African leaders have repeatedly invoked to legitimise the use of coercive 
action against their own people to safeguard their stay in power. 9 Thus, their status as 
states was more relevant outside the borders of their territory than within. 
Academic study has identified the root cause of security problems as inherent in 
the perception of the `state'. As disclosed in their arguments, the 'idea of the state' as 
understood by the developed Western world, on the one hand, and Third World countries 
on the other are different and incompatible. The prescription for one cannot heal the ills 
of the other. 
Despite this disadvantage, the African elite was forced to adopt Western 
government and administrative structures notwithstanding that their states lacked 
qualified personnel, finance and infrastructure, making reliance on outsiders, usually ex- 
colonisers, essential. This `top-down' nation-building, which excluded the representatives 
of the indigenous people from participation - an inherent weakness in the new African 
states - alienated African rulers from their people and became a major factor in internal 
insecurity. In their efforts to control internal problems, leaders of the new states relied on 
traditional orthodox thinking about the value of coercive power and formed patron-client 
alliances with their former colonial masters or one of the big powers to import arms and 
build their security forces. In practice, such recourse to traditional thinking helped 
African leaders to establish control within their territories even though it further distanced 
their relationship with their own people, particularly with the civil society. 10 
In addition, the deep entrenchment of patrimonialism in African politics - an 
inclination that favoured Africanism" - conflicted with the adopted Western model of 
the nation-state because of the absence of a well organised civil society and the 
modalities of its relation with the state. " Academics who perceived African political 
development along neo-patrimonialism emphasised the need to recognise African culture, 
9 Robert if Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, `Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood' 
(I orldPolitics, Vol. 27, October 1982), pp. 1-4. 
to Patrick Chabal, Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation (The Macmillan Press Ltd_, Lond(in 1992). p. 86. 
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in . 
Patrick; ('twbal 
and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (James Currey, Oxford 1999), p. 51 
12 
Patrick Chabal (ed. ), Political Damination in Africa. ' Reflections on the Limit of Power (Cambridge University Press, Cambndge 
1986), pp. 14-15. 
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which bases rationality on satisfying the need of the community, rather than that of the 
individual, and approves illicit acts as long as the ultimate beneficiary is always the 
community. In other words, in the African context, in circumstances where disorder 
becomes a resource, neo-patrimonialism is a concept which legitimises disorder by 
rejecting the Western model of accountability. 13 Academics such as Chabal and Daloz 
have proposed that the modernisation inherited from the West should be combined with 
the deep-rooted African cultural heritage (Africanisation) to create a new paradigm that 
offers a solution to Africa's crisis of insecurity. According to them, `in most African 
countries, the state is no more than a decor, a pseudo-Western facade masking the 
realities of deeply personalised political relations where legitimacy is firmly embedded in 
the patrimonial practices of patrons and their networks'" -a practice that further 
restrains the political liberalisation of the African state. 
Furthermore, because African states are heterogeneous in nature, the identity issue 
became an important factor in compounding the domestic difficulties faced by elite 
groups. The African state, like its predecessor the colonial state, could only maintain 
national unity through coercion and retaliation by force. '' The elite's reaction to 
disobedience and insurrection further alienated them from the people. 
In addition, border disputes, which intensified and increased in the aftermath of 
decolonisation, often ended in violent clashes, further exacerbating state insecurity. As a 
result, the new rulers had to operate under a precarious `security complex' in which 
political, societal, economic and environmental problems began to be considered as 
relevant to security issues. 
Defining security 
After defining the state and identifying its relationship to security, and before dealing 
with the subject proper, it is essential to fully comprehend the contentious 
definition of 
`security'. Security is a complex concept and academics and theoreticians disagree as to 
its definition. As noted above, when we speak- of security we are talking about security of 
13 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrumem (James Currey, Oxford 1999), p 162 
14 Ibid, p- 16. 
15 Patrick Chabail, Power in A, rIca: An Essur In Political Inthrpr etiuiort (The 
Macmillan Pros Ltd., Landen 1992), p- 5'_ 
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the state - an organ that is sovereign and whose authority is recognised by the 
contemporary international systems - and, as such, the sovereign territorial state 
shoulders the burden of responsibility for security. 
After heated debates on the definition of security two schools of thought emerged. 
The first group (narrow perspective), which has dominated the study of international 
relations since World War II, perceived security within a narrow parameter that focuses 
on the state while the second group (wider perspective) extended their outlook beyond the 
state and tried to conceptualise security from a wide angle. Below, we will survey each 
view in turn. 
Proponents of the narrow perspective 
Those who fall under this category include academics and political analysts, such as EJ-1. 
Can (1946), Kenneth Waltz (1959,1979), Colin Grey (1982,1997), Ayoob (1991), 
Steven David and Stephen Walt (1991), who attempted to accommodate domestic 
conflict within the parameters of traditional thinking by widening their sphere of analysis. 
E. H. Can, a realist, described national security in The Twenty Years 
1919-1939 (1946) as a Western concept based on assumptions of external threats 
relevant to the developed world. 16 This approach does not focus on security issues that 
emanate from domestically related problems such as technological and economic under- 
development, weak political structures, ethnic, religious and social cleavages that put 
pressure on normal rule and security in developing countries. 
Kenneth N. Waltz, a notable neo-realist, associated it closely with his structural 
theory of power politics and put security at the centre of state behaviour in an anarchic 
system. He said, `in an anarchy, security is the highest end. The goal the system 
encourages them [states] to seek is security-'" 
Stephen Walt, defines security as `the study of the threat, use, and control of 
military forces' and strongly argues that by `expanding "security studies" excessively', ... 
issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all 
be viewed 
16 Cited in Chris Brown, Understandrnglnternational Relations (Mac nillan Press Ltd-, London 1997), pp. 28-36. 
17 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theo y cflnterna1k, ialPditics (Addison-Welle! ', Reading, 
Mass. 1979), p. 126. 
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as threats to "security".... Defining the field in this way could destroy its intellectual 
coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to anv of these important 
problems. ' 8 
Colin Grey, another proponent with a Hobbesian outlook, argues on behalf of a 
narrower perspective by commenting: `the fact remains that the world of international 
politics is a jungle wherein the strong and ruthless devour the weak. '19 He believes that 
the domination of realism/neo-realism in security studies is appropriate, stating that 
`many approaches to the study of international relations are indeed possible and 
defensible, but there is only one approach that enables students to appreciate the essence 
of the field. The approach, for want of better terminology is power politics. ''" 
Steven David argued that the theory of balance of power could equally be 
applicable to domestic conflicts by giving a wider interpretation to the balance of power 
theory. He introduced 'omnibalancing' -a theory with a slight variation that shifts the 
threat of perception from the state to the leadership elite - and applied it to the security 
problems of Third World countries. He argues that, since the balance of power theory 
could address both internal and external threat issues, there is no need to widen the 
definition of security. To demonstrate the validity of his argument he referred to the 
action taken by Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia when he shifted his allegiance from the 
Americans to the Soviets. David argues that Mengistu did this in order to be able to 
contain not only the foreign aggression of Somalia, but also the internal dissent that 
threatened to break up Ethiopian territory into mini-states. He justifies his argument by 
referring to Mengistu's enemies as socialist-oriented and receiving aid from that camp 
and Mengistu's belief that association with the Soviets would tilt the balance in his 
21 favour. 
Another realist thinker, Ayoob, disagrees with all the theories and definitions so 
far offered, claiming that they fail to identify the principal cause of Third World conflict. 
He argues that his theory places the orthodox conception of security in a historical 
is Stephen M. Walt, The Renaissance of Security Studies' (IMernational Studies Qi terly, Vol. 35, No. 2,1991), p. 213. 
19 Colin Grey, Strategic Shxlies: A Critical Assessment (Greema ood Press, Westport, CN. 1982), p. -1. 
20 Cohn Grey, The Geopolitics ci%the Nuclear Area: Heartlands, Rimlan ds and the Technological 
Revolution (Russak and Co.. 
New York 1977), pp. 2-3. 
21 Steven David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment' (World Politics, Vol. 43, January 1991), pp. 245-248. 
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context that underlines its link to the evolution of the modern state . 
22Avoob attributes the 
cause of Third World states' failure to a short process of state-building. He considers 
`time' as the missing variable that is needed for the integration and acceptance of regime: 
by the population - that is, they need time to gain internal legitimacy. He points out that. 
in the case of the modern Western state, the internal dimension of conflict was resolved 
during the state-making process that took over 400 years to consolidate. As described by 
Tilly, the European experience of state-making and building: 
cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or 
labour. 
. -The 
fundamental reason for the high cost of European state-building was its beginning 
in the midst of a decentralised, largely peasant social structure. Building differentiated. 
autonomous, centralised organisations with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or 
subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities. Most of the European population resisted 
each phase of the creation of strong states. 23 
Consequently, Ayoob argues that Third World countries have been unfortunate in that 
they lack the time needed to complete the consolidation of the state. Indeed, they need 
even more time to deal with threats that could emerge from different directions - threats 
related to the movement of populations and ecological destruction. This disadvantage - 
the lack of time - puts `today's Third World state-makers under tremendous pressure to 
complete this extremely complicated and costly process in only three or four decades 
rather than three or four centuries'. 24 According to this analysis, if the demands of this 
variable are not adequately met, the consequence would be resorting to arbitrary military 
force `to meet what is essentially political challenges from disaffected groups within their 
25 population' . 
The rationale for the realist and neo-realist argument is based on the assumption 
that `threats to a state's security principally arise from outside its borders and that these 
threats are primarily, if not exclusively, military in nature and usually need a military 
response if the security of the target state is to be preserved '. 
20, According to this view, 
22 Mohammed Ayoob, The Security Problernatic of the Third Weald' (World Politics, Vol. 43, Januar-, 1991), p. 283. 
23 Charles Tilly, The Reflections on the History of European Slate Making' in The Formation of National 
State in Western 
Europe (ed. ), p. 71. 
`A Mohammed Ayouob, The Security Problematic of the Third Wald' (World Politics. Vol. 43, January 1991), p. 
269. 
25 Ibid., pp. 267-8. 
26 Ibid., p. 261. 
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security was perceived from a perspective revolving around the state. In other words, it 
was `state-centric' . 
Summary 
The realist arguments presented above emphasised state sovereignty and identified threats 
endangering national security as external - coming from outside territorial boundaries. 
The key assumption underlying this 'idea of the state' is Westphalian sovereign statehood 
(influenced by European history and culture) that is noted for being strong. undivided and 
economically viable with the capacity to sustain national livelihood and the capability to 
protect its people. In addition, it is also assumed that such a state is emancipated from 
internal disorder as a consequence of undergoing the calamities of numerous wars and 
conflicts, particularly internal strife, lasting over a number of centuries before achie%ing 
statehood. In general, the assumption that narrow-perspective realist theory can be useful 
in explaining how state security could be achieved in countries with similar backgrounds 
to the European nation-state where the population as a whole shares the 'idea of the state' 
will be tested to find out its applicability in the context of the Horn countries. This study 
will use three hypotheses to test the narrow-perspective assumptions which rely on 
external military threats as the cause of state insecurity. 
Hypothesis 1: Instability in the Horn is caused ky the activities of external actors. 
Positive Proof 
The hypothesis will be proved if external involvement encourages belligerent 
states of the Horn to enter into conflict that causes instability. 
Ne awe proof 
The hypothesis fails to prove that external actors cause threat to national integrity 
if instability in the Horn is mostly caused by domestic threat emanating from 
demands for self-determination, secession and the introduction of a functional 
democratic system. 
Hypothesis 2: Procurement of modern arms and build- up of strong military power 
maintained national sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Horn of Africa 
Positive proof 
The hypothesis will be proved if states of the region are able to maintain national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity by procuring modem arms and raising the 
combat capability of their armed forces. 
24 
Ne tive proof 
The above hypothesis would fail if the proliferation of arms in the sub-region 
enables dissenters (opposition forces) to confront government forces and form 
breakaway states (de jure and de facto), practise warlordism or encourages them 
to continue armed struggle until their goals are achieved. This will mean that 
conflict in the Horn is exacerbated not by external aggression as asserted by 
narrow-perspective thinkers but by the activities of internal forces. 
Hypothesis 3: 'Omnibalancing' (the act of balancing threat pressures against one 
another) counters all forms of threats to state security. 
Positive proof 
If regional states resort to 'omnibalancing' - playing off one superpower against 
the other in order to obtain armaments and military hardware - and this enables 
them to effectively maintain national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the 
above hypothesis could be proved. 
Negative proof 
The above hypothesis could be disproved if the practices of 'omnibalancing' fail to 
help regional actors combat destabilising threats of any nature that endangered 
national integrity. 
Proponents of a wider perspective 
Those thinkers who fall under this category, such as Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1977), 
Richard Ullman (1983), R. B. J. Walker (1988), Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon 
(1988), Joseph S. Nye (1989), Jessieca Tuchman Mathews (1989), Neta C. Crawford 
(1991), Barry Buzan (1991,1998), Ken Booth (1991,1995), Caroline Thomas (1992), 
Chris Brown (1992,1997), Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994), Richard Falk (1995), Steve 
Smith (1995) and J. Ann Tickner (1995), detached themselves from the narrow traditional 
military and state-centred perspective and developed alternative views to address 
domestic insecurity issues. In other words, this group went beyond the limited definition 
of security that focuses on the military aspect to include other 
factors such as political, 
economic, societal and environmental factors, and studied their relationship to security 
topics. They followed two different approaches of study by moving the level of analysis 
25 
from the state to the individual or the regionalinternational. Various views of some of the 
thinkers are discussed below. 
Joseph S. Nye, in his monograph `The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future 
Challenges' (1989), points out that the ethnocentrism and narrowness of strategic studies 
have hampered international relations from coming `fully to terms with the changing 
dimensions of international security problems'. He argues that the definition of strategic 
studies limited to military issues is `severely deficient' and proposes that the focus should 
be on `grand strategy' and international security and not on national security as the 
central concept. According to him, the future challenge is to add new dimensions 
without losing the old wisdom'. 27 Nye also indicates that greater attention should be 
given to the interaction between domestic politics and security affairs. 
The wider perspective is best expressed by Falk who considers sovereignty as the 
biggest obstacle in the struggle for humane governance. He describes sovereignty as 
something that has always been dominated by state-centrism that `operates internationally 
as both a blindfold (denying the contradictory practices of geopolitics) and a blinker 
(rendering conceptually invisible the transnational initiatives of civil society)' . 
211 To 
understand the views of the academics more clearly, the application of their conceptual 
framework that has become a concern of international security studies will be discussed 
further under the headings political, social, economic, and environment. 
Political 
Colonial legacy 
Almost all proponents of the wider perspective put the blame for internal conflict on 
colonial rule which failed to consider the nationalities of the inhabitants when defining 
their colonial state boundaries, so dividing members of the same ethnic groups into many 
states . 
29 I. M. Lewis, while discussing the general process of 'balkanization' of the 
African continent in which people were parcelled out among different colonial territories 
commented: 
It is a remarkable irony that the European powers who partitioned Africa in the late 190 century 
27 Joseph S. Nye, The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges' (Adelphi Papers, No. 235, London Sprang 1989). p 25. 
21$ Richard Fa1L On Human Governance - Toward a New Global Politics (Polity Press, Oxford 1995), p. 99. 29 Patric Chabal, Power in Africa:, nEssayinPoliticalInterpretation(The Macmillan Press Ltd.. L&cxi 1992). p 69 
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when the idea of the nation-state was paramount, should have created in Africa a whole series- of 
Hapsburg-style states, comprising a medley of peoples and ethnic groups lumped together within 
frontiers which paid no respect to traditional cultural contours. 
30 
Caroline Thomas is another of those who cites the artificial constructs of Third World 
states as a cause of present-day conflict. 31 She bases her argument on the premise that, on 
independence, in most Third World countries, a strong sense of ethno-nationalism flared 
up and the task of governments became that of combating secession to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the state. 32 
Complexity 
Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon in support of a wider interpretation of national 
security argue that the security issues of Third Word countries are diverse and complex. 
As a result, they consider other domestic factors such as 'legitimacy, integration, ideology 
and policy capacity which play important role in shaping the national security posture'.?? 
They identify these factors as 'software' which they consider to be useful components of 
security management `through which values are defined, threats and vulnerabilities are 
perceived and assessed, resources are allocated, and policies are screened, selected and 
implemented' 34' items which are treated as intangible sources of power by the realists. 
Legitimacy 
Government. legitimacy in a nation-state is often demonstrated by democratic practice 
where free local and national elections take place to elect representatives of the people. 
However, it should be noted that this system could `only work if and when the 
representative is taken to be and in fact is committed to national, rather than local, 
politics. This has rarely been the case in Africa'. 
35 
30 I. M. Lewis, Nationalism & Self DeterrmmnatIon in the Horn of=4frica (Ithaca Press, London 1983), p. 73. 
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Azar and Chung-in Moon argue that, often, leaders who lack legitimacy invoke 
external threats to divert the attention of the population and legitimise military 
mobilisation in order to prolong their stay in power - that is, diversionary theory. Realist 
theory, which makes no distinction between regime security and state security, allows 
illegitimate leaders to invoke the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity as 
an excuse to coerce the population in order to hold on power. 16 As a result, legitimacy, 
which is `the hallmark of the modem state, became ineffectual in that it has never been in 
the interest of. African political elites to work for the proper institutionalisation of the 
state apparatus. Or, to put it in another way, its usefulness is greatest when it is least 
institutionalised. The legitimacy of the African political elite, such as it is, derives from 
their ability to nourish the clientele on which their power rests. -37 
Integration 
Ann Tickner, focusing on the integration variable. points out that security threats more 
often arise, not from outside aggression, but from the failure to integrate diverse social 
groups into the political process. Deterrence against external attack is not an adequate 
representation of security goals when it is internal security that is the greatest threat. 38 
Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon's inclusion of the `integration variable' 
shaping the national security posture also has relevance for Third World security issues. 
As many Third World countries are composed of diverse etluiic, religious, linguistic and 
cultural communal groups (a colonial legacy), they argue that conflict in Third World 
countries generally arises as a consequence of lack of integration. The fragmentation of 
states and, in extreme cases, their collapse - which adds a new dimension to the complex 
security problem of the Third World - is deeply rooted in the people's loyalty to clan and 
ethnic groups rather than to the nation or the state. Domestic conflicts are often supported 
3 by outside actors, usually neighbouring states, further complicating the issue . 
ý' In fact the 
16 Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon (eds. ), 'Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The ' Soffivare' Side of World Nation 
Security' in Edwztrd E. Azar and Clhung-In Moon (eds. ), National Security in the Third Wiarid: The Management of Internal and 
External Threats (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Aldershot, England 1988), pp. 82-83. 
37 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works. - Disorder as Political Instrument (James Currey, Oxford 1999) p 1-4 
38 J. Ann Tickner, `Re-visioning Security' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds. ), International Relations The- 7 ixly ' (Polity Press, 
Cambridge 1995), p. 179. 
39 Ibid., pp. 86-88. 
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`integration variable' is considered by most in this group to be the dominant political 
cause of internal conflict in Third World countries. ' 
Policy capacity 
The concept of `policy capacity', which entails comprehensive and coherent decision- 
making and speedy and flexible implementation, is another variable of the -software' 
listed by Azar and Moon. They identify the degree of national consensus augmented by 
an able technocratic and meritocratic bureaucracy with a minimum of corruption as the 
essential ingredients of policy capacity and cite the state of Israel as a case in point. " 
In a situation where the concept of African civil society is watered down and 
`political actors, within both the "state" and "civil society", link up to sustain the vertical, 
infra-institutional and patrimonial network which underpin politics in the continent 42 
Azar and Moon argue that the policy capacity of a state needs rapid transformation. 
The 'policy capacity' factor is very relevant to Third World security problems as 
most of these countries suffer from bureaucratic indecision, inefficiency resulting from 
incompetence and excessive corruption. These are weaknesses that create discontent and 
could be exploited by individuals and organisations contending for state power. 
Individual emancipation 
Ken Booth argues that the state-centric outlook on security, which puts an emphasis on 
military power, serves autocratic leaders as a tool for control. Using the individual level 
of analysis, Booth describes how autocrats rely on sovereignty as a cloak for state 
oppression since threats to the state's well-being mostly come from within as a result of 
`economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the 
destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease. To countless millions of people in the 
world it is their own state, and not - the enemy - that is the primary threat. ' 
43 
Booth warns his readers that, unless action is taken to address the security 
40 E %vard E. Azar and Chung-In Moon (eels. ), `Legitimacy-. Integration and Policy Capacity: The -Software' Side of World National 
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problems confronting the developing world, `the repression of human rights, ethnic and 
religious rivalry, economic breakdown and so on can trigger dangerous instability at the 
domestic level'` In addition, he claims that individuals, not states, must be the central 
objects of security. By way of a solution to security problems arising out of under- 
development or oppression, he offers a new variable which he calls 'emancipation' that 
deals with human rights and justice for individuals. ' 
Booth has correctly identified the security problems that are currently bedeNiIIing 
Third World countries, particularly the continent of Africa. In particular, he argues that 
his 'emancipation' variable helps towards a better understanding of non-governmental 
organisations' (NGOs) involvement in Third World countries. At present, in areaswhere 
state power has collapsed and anarchy prevails (for example, Somalia), and intervention 
by the UN has failed to establish order, it is the work of NGOs - which operate under 
precarious conditions - that has helped alleviate some of the misery faced by the 
population. The participation of some NGOs in overseeing and monitoring the 
democratisation process and observance of human rights has given hope to the 
indigenous people who are struggling for emancipation, despite the fact that NG() 
activities have brought them into confrontation with some governments which still invoke 
the inviolable right of state sovereignty. Falk's argument on security, which also focuses 
on the individual and non-state actors, `' is educational for those who seek to establish 
peace and stability in Third World countries where the democratisation process is stifled 
and human rights violation and suppression of civil societies is widespread. 
J. Ann Tickner's argument on `how unequal social relations can make all 
individuals more insecure'47 is also highly relevant to security issues in the Third World 
where individual liberty is curtailed and human rights are grossly violated by the state 
machinery. However, both Tickner's and Falk's concept of identity should be treated 
with caution when applied to areas such as sub-Saharan Africa where `individual 
" Ken Booth, `Security and Emancipation' (Review of in emotional Studies, Vol. 17,1991), pp. 313-26. 
45 Ibid., pp. 313-26. 
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rationality is essentially based on communal logic and generally, relations of power are 
predicated on the shared belief that the political is communal'. 48 
Interdependence and interrelation 
Although at heart a realist, Barry Buzan defines insecurity as an existential threat that 
requires emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by 
a significant audience' 49 His perception of security goes beyond the national whose 
reverent object is the state. He puts a great weight on interdependence and enNisages 
security studies at the regional or international levels where the reverent object is 
humankind as opposed to the state. He strongly views interdependence as real and 
unavoidable and consequently argues that a regional system of analysis should be added 
to the sub-system and system analysis in security studies in order to fully comprehend the 
complexity of security issues resulting from. the changing circumstances in international 
politics. '" He argues that comprehensive security analysis requires one to: 
take particular care to investigate how the regional level mediates the interplay between states and 
the international system as a whole. Unless that level is comprehended, neither the position of the 
local states in relation to each other, nor the character of relations between the great powers and 
local states, can be understood properly. s' 
Buzan classifies regional security issues as security complexes and defines a security 
complex as `a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so 
interlinked that their national security cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart 
from one another' 52 Buzau's elaboration and clarification of the security complex theory 
- the regional analysis - is an important contribution to understanding the complicated 
nature of Third World security studies and should serve as a valuable guide to students 
undertaking research into area security. 
Caroline Thomas's analysis of the nature of interconnectedness of security 
problems in Third World countries also suggests that a solution to security problems 
48 Patrick Clmbal and Jean-Pascal Dakoz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Lisin neni (James Cu tey, Ox, - d 1999), p- 156. 
49 Bany Buzau, Ole Weaver rn d Jaap de Wilde. Securi(y: A . VewFramnewc)rkforAnah'sis (Lynne Rienner Publishers. Inc., 
Landon 1998), p. 27. 
50 Barr Buzan, People, State and Fear:, fin A nda f ar International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Hauaster 
Wheatshea f. Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire 1991), p187. 
51 Ibid., p. 188. 
52 Ibid., p. 190. 
31 
cannot be achieved individually. 53 Discussing the same topic in relation to Africa, Peter 
Woodward commented that the scale and intensity of the problems demanded 'the 
tackling of problems at a regional as well as state level'. 54 
Keohane and Nye have questioned the capacity of the state to control all 
activities. In their book Power and Independence (1977), they proposed complex 
interdependence as a new account of international relations to run alongside realism in 
order to cover the multiple channels of access between societies - in other words, acts 
conducted by non-state actors. 55 
Chris Brown has made a sustained powerful attack on the followers of a narrow 
perspective of international relation theory. He attributes the problem of international 
relations to the narrow state-focused definition of political theory, used by Wight, arguing 
that there is an overlap between political theory and international relations in which the 
latter discipline does not focus on the state. According to Brown, Wight has limited the 
scope of international relations theory and he attributes Wight's mistake to his highly 
contentious definition of political theory. 56 
Although Brown is sceptical about the formation of a universal world community 
that encompasses the whole of humanity, he is optimistic that an openness `to think in 
universal terms opens up the possibilities of a pluralistic conception of world order' that 
recognises and accepts difference. He believes that such an association, `which may 
actually signal a more practical and less ethno-centric understanding of human solidarity 
than conventional radicalism, could be based on the recognition of a general. duty to 
relieve suffering by mutual aid and assistance that would mandate substantial 
redistribution of income and wealth'. 57 In particular, his conviction that `the pursuit of 
social justice and a deeper sense of community is something that makes more sense 
locally than on a global scale ''s is highly relevant to the security problems of Third 
World countries, since most are instigated by the rulers' denial of justice. 
53 Caroline Thomas, The Enviro+nment in International Relations (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 1992), p_ 137 
54 Peter Woodward, The Horn of 4fiica State Politics and internatio al Relations (Tauris Academic Studies. London, 19%), 
p. 4. 
55 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and interdependence (Harper Collins, USA, 1989), pp. 23-37. 
56 Chris Bmwn, International Relations Theory: Vem, _V( rmative Appr ches (Harvester Wheasheaf, Hamel Hempstead 1992), 
pp. 6-7. 
57 Cs Bmwn, International Political Theor and the Idea of the World Community' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds. ), 
inie»tiorni Relations Theo i' Today (Polity Press, Cambridge 1995), p. 106. 
59 Ibid. 
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In his analysis of `The Future of International Relations Theory, ' Brown has 
emphasised the need `for International Relations to transform itself from being the hand- 
maiden of power to being its critic'. He suggested that `many of the resources needed for 
this transformation are available from within in the field itself, and not just from its long- 
rejected "utopian" and "idealist" past 59 
Social factors 
Identity 
While viewing politics from a cultural perspective, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz 
examined in some detail the issue of identity and religious beliefs in order to identify 
their relationship with violence. In the African context, contrary to Western practices, 
they ascertained that 'politicians, bureaucrats or military chiefs obligations are, first and 
foremost, to their kith and kin, their clients, their communities, their regions, or even their 
religion'`'" as opposed to their state. They singled out ethnicity to be the dominant 
variable in African societies and politics. This has led Africans to pursue a different 
modernisation process which, they suggest, Western societies need to make more effort 
61 to understand. 
Marysia Zatewski and Cynthia Enloe maintain that the realist world-view and its 
systemic theories focus on `central and important' issues only, causing issues such as 
ethnicity, religion, masculinity, femininity and sexuality to be sidelined and fail to get the 
attention they deserve. According to them, the realist/positivist core emphasises `the 
balance of power between states which do not seriously consider such "variables" as 
being relevant to the workings of the international system and international events' . 
62 
Social movements 
Falk and others, such as Walker (1988), strongly argue that security reform is most likely 
to come not from the state but from social movements that operate across national 
boundaries `which grow out of a concern for human security defined in economic and 
ecological as well as political/military terms.... Social movements from below, which 
54 Ibid_, p_ 245, 
60 Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Dak0z,. 4jrica Works: Disorder as Political Insmvnem (James CUITeV. Oxtürd 1999), p. 15 
61 Ibid-, p. 46-47. 
62 Marv sia Zalewsli and Cynthia Enloe, 'Questions about Identity- in Ken Booth and Steve Smith International Relations 
Theo Tcxlay (Polity Press, Cambridge 1995), p. 300. 
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are concerned with peace, the environment, democracy, human rights and feminism, have 
the potential to provide a vision of global security which assures the security' of all 
individuals. 563 Walker believes that worthwhile change can only come from below by 
associating security `with the valuations and understanding of social movements. 
activists, representatives of oppressed peoples, rather than with the assessments of 
64 experts, bureaucrats, politicians, media gurus' . 
Economic factors 
Almost all proponents who fall under the wider-perspective category have invoked the 
economic factor. Richard Ullman, who sees global insecurity as a consequence of 
continuous militarisation, relates rapid population growth to depleting resources and 
warns that shortages could degrade the quality of life and have many repercussions. He 
perceives events such as economic migration to urban areas and neighbouring states as 
having the potential to disrupt harmonious coexistence -a factor that could lead to 
unemployment and the breakdown of government authority. 65 Ullman's identification of 
the relationships between population growth and economic hardship is a wake-up call to 
alert Third World countries to take early appropriate action to avoid economic-related 
conflict.. 
Jessica Tuchman Mathews, in discussing the economic factor, draws attention to 
the impact of the misuse of natural resources on economic decline. On this issue she 
comments: 
Conditions in sub-Saharan Africa have reached catastrophic dimensions. In the first half of this 
decade export earning fell by almost one-third, foreign debt soared to 58 percent of GNP, food 
imports grew rapidly while consumption dropped, and per capita GNP fell by more than three 
percent. A large share of those woes can be traced to Africa's dependence on the fragile, 
mismanaged and over-stressed natural resource base. 
66 
Ann Tickner argues that the focus on the military dimension of security that operated 
during the Cold War era is outdated and that a new definition of security that addresses 
current security issues, such as the economic and ecological dimensions, is essential. She 
6' [bid-, p. 190. 
64 Richard Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward aN ew Global Politics (Polity Press, Cambridge 1995), p. 147. 
65 Richard H. Ullman, `Redefining Security' (In rna. 1ional SeC7111iv. Vol. 8, No. 1,1983), p. 1 4. 
66 Jessica Tuch hman Mathews., 'Redefining Security' (Foreign Af/afrs, Vol. 68, No. 11989), p. 167. 
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refers to the precarious economic situation in the South and the worries of economic 
vulnerabilities in the North as security threats that need to be tackled. 67 She claims that: 
an understanding of security more appropriate for the contemporary world requires a fundamental 
rethinking of the framing assumptions of realist analysis: in a highly interdependent world facing 
multiple security threats, critics of realism claim that state-centric analysis, which focuses 
exclusively on the political/military dimensions of security, is no longer adequate. 68 
Booth warns his readers, that unless action is taken to address the security problems 
confronting the developing world, `... economic breakdown can trigger dangerous 
instability at the domestic level' 69 . 
Caroline Thomas, in her analysis of the economic factor, refers to the unfair trade 
system and to the widening gap between rich and poor states as important factors and 
explains how they further exacerbate the weak economic conditions under which Third 
World countries operate. 70 
Richard Falk also considers the uneven development between North and South to 
be intolerable and describes the disparity as `global apartheid'. He views the globalisation 
of capital and the institution of policies preventing people from the south from emigrating 
to the north as a creation of the state system. 
Joseph S. Nye argues that more work needs to be done on the interrelationship 
between economic dimensions of power and conflict. He points out `not only, does 
economic interdependence affect the underlying basis of military power, but the 
manipulation of economic interdependence can be an instrument of power; as 
conventional issues have come to the fore, economics and demographics have become 
more important'. " 
Neta C. Crawford blames realistlneo-realist ethnocentrism for leading the world 
astray and failing to forecast the events that took place in Eastern Europe in late 1989 and 
the early 1990s. She comments that `the dominant paradigm is state focused, so we 
67 J. Ann Tier, `Re-visioning Security' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds. ), International Relations Theory Today (Polity 
Press, Cambridge 1995), p. 178. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ken Bo 
, -Security and 
Emancipation' (Review of bizenurtional Studies. Vol_ 17,1991), p. 318. 
70 Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relativ ns (Wheatsheaf Books Limited, Great 
Britain 1987), pp. 8-9- 
71 Jo h S. Nye, The Contribution of Strategic Staufies: Future Challenges' (Adelphi Papers, No. 235, Lt dcxi Spring 1989), p. 
29. 
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misread the legitimisation crisis brewing in the east. We could not see that strong 
economic forces were at work in fostering change in the Soviet Union. '72 -a statement 
which has an implication to the neglect of the economic factor that played a role in 
instigating resource conflicts between pastoralists and settled farmers that culminated in 
mass refugee migration in the Horn region. 
Environmental issues 
Jessica Mathews refers to the expansion of the definition of security and indicates that 
current global developments have demanded the `definition of national security to include 
resource, environmental and demographic issues' . 
73 She explains the impact of 
population growth on natural resources and warns of the adverse consequences resulting 
from deforestation and soil degradation. She highlights environmental degradation 
through overcultivation, overgrazing, erosion and salinity which is transforming once 
productive land into denuded barren land which cannot feed its population and indicates 
how `environmental decline occasionally leads directly into conflict, especially when 
'4 scarce water resources must be shared'. 
Richard Ullman in his article `Redefining Security' (1983) shares Mathews' view 
on the depletion of resources and includes the cutting down of tropical forests for 
firewood and farming plots, which erodes the soil, making the land unproductive. He also 
signals the potential danger of alternative threats to security resulting from a failure to 
'S 
establish effective resource management to reverse the deteriorating situation. 
Caroline Thomas, while discussing the relationship between environment and 
security, suggests that `strategic analysis must transcend the established concept of 
sovereign states as the centrepiece of international relations if our understanding of new 
threats and our readiness to meet them are to be advanced' . 
76 She singles out the strong 
`belief in the inability of the nation-state to solve environmental problems alone' as the 
common denominator that has united many analysts such as Thomas, Mathews, Ken 
72 Neta C. CrawfTd, 'Once and Future Security Studies' (Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2. Winter 1991), p. 303 
73 Jessica Tuciunan Mathews, `Redefrning Security' (Fore Tgn. sirs, Vol_ 68, Na. 2,1989), p. 162 
74 Ibid, p. 165-166. 
75 Richard H. Ullman, 'Redefining Security' (Imernntional Security, Vol. 8, No. 1,1983), p. 152. 
76 Caroline Tht nas, The Environment in International Relations (The Royal Institute of Intemati&' al Affairs, L& ii)n 1992), p 
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Booth, Richard Ullman and Homer-Dixon. 77 As the area of environmental-'security study 
is a very recent phenomenon she remarks that more case studies are needed to 
convincingly support the argument that environmental hazards are causes of insecurity, 
notwithstanding that some findings from a few individuals are available. Thomas 
identifies a range of environmental problems that have security implications, such as 
water shortages, deforestation, soil erosion and drought and claims that these are 
`transnational' in character, requiring regional and international effort to control. She 
cites Sub-Saharan Africa as a good example of an area experiencing environmental 
disaster where the effects of drought, in particular, have resulted in millions of 
environmental refugees. 78 
Thomas convincingly argues that shortage of water, accentuated by growth of 
population, is a potential threat to security. She cites the Nile -a river shared by as many 
as nine countries - as an example of a time bomb that could explode at any time, 
referring to Dr Butros Ghali who, as Egyptian Foreign Minister, commented that future 
wars in the region will be fought over water, not oil'. 
79 
Homer-Dixon is another thinker who argues that severe environmental scarcities 
play a role in motivating and exacerbating violent conflict. He identifies violence as 
usually occurring at sub-national level where `poor societies will be particularly affected 
since they are less able to buffer themselves from environmental scarcities and the social 
crisis they cause'. 8' 
In his research Homer-Dixon identified six types of environmental changes as 
plausible causes of violent inter-group conflict: 
" 'greenhouse`-induced climate change; 
" degradation and loss of good agricultural land; 
" degradation and removal of forests; 
" depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies; and 
77 Ibid., p 117. 
78 mid.. p 137. 
79 Cited in Ibid.. 139. 
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" depletion of fisheries. 8' 
To test his assumption, which concentrates on physically controllable environmental 
resources he uses three hypotheses: 
1. Decreasing supplies of water and good agricultural land will provoke resource wars. 
2. Large population movements caused by environmental stress will cause ethnic 
clashes. 
3. Severe environmental scarcity will increase economic deprivation and disnipt social 
institutions, thereby triggering civil strife and insurgency. 82 
His research suggests water as the most likely resource to stimulate inter-state wars and 
he offers the relationships between South Africa and Lesotho and between Egypt and 
Ethiopia as examples. 83 It also demonstrates that environinental scarcity is a cause of 
population movement which, in turn, can cause group-identity or intra-state conflicts. He 
gives the example of the inter-group conflict between the Lalung tribe in Assam and the 
Bengali Muslim migrants where `in the village of Nellie, Laung people massacred nearly 
1,700 Bengalis in one five hour rampage'. TM He also notes how land scarcity in 
Bangladesh as a result of population growth `has been a powerful force behind migration 
to neighbouring regions and communal conflict there' $5 
In relating environmental scarcity with economic deprivation Homer-Dixon 
emphasises that environmental scarcity produces economic deprivation, which in turn 
causes civil strife and insurgency. He also shows how the effects of environmental 
scarcity sharply weaken the capacity and legitimacy of poor states, making them prone to 
challenge by secessionist and liberation movements. 96 In circumstances where the state of 
the environmental change becomes irreversible, he argues that the consequence is either 
the fragmentation of the state or a more authoritarian regime. In both cases, the eruption 
of violence is inevitable. Homer-Dixon's findings are relevant to the Horn of Africa 
81 Ibid. 
x' Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
xz Ibid., p-19- 
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which is and and suffering from environmental stress. As a result, this study has allotted 
a chapter to the analysis of environmental effect on security. 
Summary 
The ideas developed by wider-perspective academics and IR scholars have indicated the 
need for the inclusion of other security factors besides military factors. During the debate 
all additional factors considered were not given equal priority by the authors. As already 
noted, some focused on 'identity' (ethnic, religion, culture and history), some on political 
aspects such as democratisation, leadership, legitimacy, integration, interrelation and 
interdependence while others concentrated on economic and environmental factors. 
Nevertheless, they all added extra elements to develop the concept of security beyond the 
military factor hitherto conceived as the sole cause for state insecurity. 
In the context of the Horn, a region which is continuously affected by recurring 
drought, the environmental factor resulting from scarcity of resources such as water, 
pasture and fertile agricultural land could be highly relevant in explaining the causes of 
insecurity as convincingly argued by Thomas Homer-Dixon and Caroline Thomas. 
Other elements, which deserve close attention, are the ethnic and religious 
differences between communities which could be ameliorated by introducing a 
democratisation process in which different ethnic groups with different beliefs are given 
equal opportunities and access to equal shares of national resources. Although 
democratisation is a long process, an overview of the studies indicates that there is no 
better alternative for attaining national harmony. The realisation of the time element 
required to establish a functional democracy should encourage us to fully appreciate the 
need for patience and a resolute effort if our goal is the establishment of a lasting peace. 
Perhaps the interdependence variable discussed by some scholars could be the 
most important factor for our analysis, as the Horn's security problems are both complex 
and highly interdependent. In this region, a solution sought by a single country - however 
efficient and meticulous the effort may be - cannot achieve a lasting peace unless the 
venture is a well-coordinated regional effort. Therefore, I will use three hypotheses to test 
the assumptions of the wider-perspective thinkers and academics that political, social, 
economic and environmental factors cause insecurity in the Horn of Africa: 
39 
Hypothesis 1: Distinct identities and divisions between communities within a nation or 
state -a domestic problem - can provoke civil war and, in extreme cases, the collapse 
of the state. 
Positive proof 
The hypothesis will be proved if sections of a population within a state, who claim 
distinct identity (language, history, culture, belief, colour of the skin) from the rest of 
society, resort to armed struggle to exercise their right to self-determination. The 
extreme case of state collapse could be proved if a heterogeneous state in the region 
enters into protracted internecine feuds at the lowest stratum of social division (clan 
and sub-clan) paralysing state machinery and ultimately bringing its collapse. 
Negative proof 
The above hypothesis would be disproved if distinct identities and divisions between 
communities do not cause conflicts in the region. 
Hypothesis 2: In economically and environmentally deprived areas acute shortage of 
resources provokes war. 
Positive Proof 
The above hypothesis could be proved if extensive population movements from 
deprived areas to rich but overpopulated agricultural areas to occupy land takes place 
within or beyond the boundaries of a state bringing the intruders and the local farmers 
to conflict. 
Negative proof 
The above hypothesis would be disproved if there are shortages but no war results that 
causes instability. 
Hypothesis 3: In circumstances where the security problems of a distinct area are 
complex and highly interrelate credible and satisfactory peace cannot be achieved 
unless governments at the regional level tackled the situation jointly. 
Positive proof 
The above hypothesis would be proved if a peace settlement that did not include all 
the neighbouring states fails. 
Negative proof 




The Nature of Security before, during and after the Cold War 
As a prelude to a discussion of the nature of security during the Cold War, this chapter 
will start by briefly surveying the general background of security-related issues and 
conflicts of the sub-region. It will also give a geographical description of the region 
and provide its own geographical version, as different studies have described it 
differently and there is no commonly accepted description. Thereafter, the contested 
historical perspective of the region will be analysed. The region's past history. which 
is interpreted differently by local and international historians to justify territorial 
rights/claims - the major underlying cause of conflict - will also be discussed. It will 
be followed by a global, regional and sub-state level analysis of events of the Cold 
War. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the nature of the conflicts that have 
led to the current security issues that are bedevilling the region. 
Antecedents 
The conflict in the Horn is not a legacy specifically derived from either the colonial or 
the Cold War era. It traces its origins a long way back in history, especially since the 
sixteenth century when Muslim expansionists penetrated East Africa and waged 
rigorous campaigns in the region. For example, the Abyssinian (Ethiopian) highlands, 
which afforded the Christians protection from outside penetration, became a primary 
target. The other point of conflict was over the control of the Nile basin, situated deep 
in the heart of Ethiopia. This brought the Dervishes of the Sudan into conflict with 
Ethiopia, culminating in the 1898 Ethio-Sudanese war. In addition, the religious war 
launched by Ahmed Gran brought most of Wollo and part of the Tigrai highland 
provinces under Muslim domination. Complete subjugation of the rest of the 
highland 
area was only averted by the intervention of the Portuguese, 
led by Christopher Da 
Gama, the son of the famous explorer Vasco Da Garca. 
' 
Geography 
Before dealing with security issues it would be appropriate to define the extent of 
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A. H. M. Jones and Elizabeth Monroe.. 4 History ofAbvssinia (C (, vrd Uni\ sjt% 
Press, London 1935), pp. 81-87; Richard Pankhurst. The Ethiopians (Blackwell Publishes 
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91Paul 
B. Henze, The Horn of Afiricafrom If ar to Peace, pp. 21-23. 
41 
the area on which the study concentrates. Defining the geographical scope of the Horn 
of Africa is problematic. Historically, when reference is made to the Horn of Africa, 
one is usually referring to Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia (see Map 1). 
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The expansion of conflict into the periphery has, however, drawn more 
countries on to the scene. Consequently, this study will, in addition, look into the 
security affairs of Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda, with particular reference to their 
involvement in the security of the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, intervention in the 
Horn by international actors, both regional and superpowers will also be discussed- 
42 
Although, in this respect, Egypt and Libya were conspicuous among regional powers, 
others were also involved in assisting traditional friends and allies with the aim of 
maintaining their national interests in the region. 2 
One of the characteristics of the Horn of Africa is that it is one of the largest 
traditional livestock producers in the world: `The states of the region - Sudan, 
Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya - rank first, third, fifth and sixth respectively in the 
world in terms of pastoralist population size'. 3 As a result, pastoralists inhabit large 
proportions of state territory - 52% in Ethiopia, 66% in Sudan, 72% in Kenya and 
75% in Somalia (see Map 2). 4 
Map 2. Modes of Production in the Horn of Africa 
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Source: John Markakis (cam. ), Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa (Macmillan Press Ltd., London 
1993), P. Xii_ 
Despite their predominance, pastoralists have not taken an active part in 
political life. Traditionally they have exercised political autonomy and have sought to 
avoid obligations such as taxation which they consider to be an infringement of their 
2 Peter Wxxxiti,. ard, The Horn ofAfrica: State Politics and International Relations (Taucis Academic Studies, London 199( p5 
o, 11, M alas (e&) , 
Conflict and the Decline gfPastoralism in the Horn oj. lfricv (Macnvllan Press Ltd. London 1993), p1 
4 Ibid_ 
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liberty. As a result, they have been marginalized from political activities and their 
interests have not been taken into account in development projects. As Markakis has 
noted, clashes over land use - forage versus agriculture - were quite common. What 
is more, the development of industrialised farms in the region has denied pastoralists 
access to water and pasture, leading to frequent clashes with security forces. 
To compound the issue, as already noted, writers have painted conflicting 
narratives of the origin of the Horn states and these have been used by politicians to 
provide a legal basis for their arguments to prove or disprove claims of territorial 
integrity. For example, by associating the existence of the Ethiopian state with a 
heterogeneous society for over 3000 years, Ethiopian writers and scholars such as 
Addis Hievet, ' Getachew Haile, 6 Andreas Eshete, ' Kifle Wodajo, 8 Melaku Tegene9 
and Mesfin Araya'° supported by foreign writers such as Donald Levine, " Sven 
Rubenson'2 and John Spencer, 13 contest any secession that bases its claim on different 
identity. Thus, they present Eritrea as part of the Ethiopian Empire and deny it a 
distinct identity of its own. 
Conversely, Eritrean scholars such as Bereket, 14 Tekie Fissehatzion, 15 
5emere16 and Okbazghi, '7 supported by foreign writers such as Davidson, C1itfe, ls 
Pool'9 and Sherman20 argue in favour of Eritrea's claim of a separate identity, 
depicting it as a colonial creation. They described the similarity of Eritrea's case with 
Addis Hievet, `Analysing the Ethiopian Revolution' (Review of_4frican Political Economy, Vol. 30,1984), pp. 32-37 
6 Getachew Haile, `The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia' (Journal of Modern African Studies, VoL 24, No. 3,1986), 
pp. 465-487. 
7 Andreas Eshete, `Beyond National Self-Determination: A Comment' in Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of. -lfrica. 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Hom of Africa (Center for the Study of the Horn of Africa, New 
York 1986), pp. 23-28. 
8 Kiffe Wodajo, `Redefining the Problems of the Horn of Africa' in Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of. Africa, 
Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Horn of Africa (Center for the Study of the Horn of Africa, New York 
1986), pp. 38-48. 
9 Melaku Tegegn, `Eritrea: Problems of the National Movement' in Conditions for the Possibility of Peace in the Horn of 
AN ca. Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on the Horn of Africa (Center for the Study of the Horn of Africa, 
New York 1989), pp. 134-156. 
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17 Okbazghi Yohannes, Eritrea. A Pawn in World Politics (University Presses of Florida, Gainesville 1991). 
18 Basil Davidson, Lionel Cliffe, and Bereket Habte Selassie (eds. ), Behind the War in Eritrea (Spoken, Nottingham 1980). 
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those territories that were granted independence during decolonisation in the late 
1950s and 1960s. In particular, they related claims to independence with those of 
`Namibia or Western Sahara former colonial territories where self-determination was 
denied and which were not termed secessionist'. 21 In short they treated the problem of 
Eritrea as an unresolved issue which needs to be addressed. In addition, Bereket 
considered the Ethiopians' historical claim to a rule which incorporated the Ogaden 
and beyond as a myth and described Ethiopia after the fall of Axum as ` ... a small 
highland kingdom with its centre limited to the central Shoan, Gondarian, and 
Tigrayan highlands. The outlying highlands, including the bulk of the areas inhibited 
by the Oromos and Somalis today, were not integrated into or ruled by the Christian 
kingdom. '" 
Somalian writers and historians also turned on Ethiopia and accused the 
Ethiopians of colonialism for seizing the Ogaden. Notwithstanding that Somalia failed 
to construct a political state, S. Samanter'23 Said Yusuf Abdi, 24 Abdi Sheikh Abdi25 
and Nurudin Farah26 argue that Somalia had existed as a nation throughout its history. 
Their argument is supported by foreign academics such as I. M. Lewis who asserted 
that the Somalis always constituted a nation but lacked political nationalism. 
According to Lewis, this attribute is due to the existence of `a common sentiment of 
Somaliness, accompanied by a virtually uniform national Somali culture, and 
reinforced by the strong adherence of all Somali to Islam , 27 -a fact which was 
exploited by Sayyid Mohammed Abdille (also known as the Mad Mullah), who 
`between 1900-1920, conducted a rebellion against the Christian colonisers, 
particularly Britain and Ethiopia' . 
28 
The Somalis, like the Eritreans, also base their irredentist claim on colonial 
history. They claim that, after his victory over the Italians in 1896 at Adowa, Menelik 
21 John Sorenson, Imagining Ethiopia: Snuggles forHistory andIdentity in the Horn of Africa (Rutgers Unis itv Press, New 
Jersey 1993), p. 56- 
22 Bereket Habte Selassie, 'The American Dilemma on the Horn' (The Journal ofModern Africa: Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2,1994). 
p. 254. 
23 Said S. Samatar, Oral Poetry and Scm ah : Nationalism: The Case for Sa) yid _4faiunnmad Abdille Has(m (Cambridge Uni versith 
Press, Cambridge 1982), pp. 91-136. 
24 Said Yusuf Abdi, `Self-Determination for Ogaden Somalis' (Thee Horn of, Ajrica, Vol. 1, No. 1, Janua y-/March 1978), pp. 20- 
25. 
25 Abdi Sheikh-Abdi, `Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassan and the Current Conflict in the Hom of Africa' (Horn of Africa, Vol. 
1, No. 2, A. pril/June 1978), PP. 61-68. 
26 Nur in Farah, `Which Way the Sea Please? ' (Horn of Africa, Vol. 1, No. 4, October/December 1')" 9), pp. 31-36. 
27 I. M Lewis. 'Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism' (The Journal of -tfodern . Jfr7CCDl 
Studies, Vol. l No. Z. 1963), p. 147. 
28 mid., 148. 
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II, whose sovereignty was recognised by the colonial powers, `projected his empire 
ever eastward, deeper into the Ogaden and Somali-occupied grazing areas.... it was 
left to Somali members of locally based tariga [Islamic Brotherhoods]. under the 
leadership of Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, to counter Menelik's increasing 
aggressive, tribute-seeking encroachments' . 
29 
Furthermore, Said Yusuf Abdi argues that the Ethiopians did not exercise full 
authority over the Ogaden throughout its occupation. He asserts that `the occupation 
of the Ogaden was incomplete, for their authority never extended far beyond the 
scattered military posts established throughout the region'. ( Another Somali writer. 
Abdi Sheikh-Abdi, argues that foreign domination by colonialists was fierceRR! 
contested and relates how `the Somalis managed to retain a modicum of independence 
and national integrity largely as a result of the exceptional leadership of Sayyid 
Mohamed Abdille Hassan' 
. 
31 
On the other hand, Ethiopian writers such as Mesfin Woldemariam, 32 Yonas 
Kebede33 and Getachew Haile34 dismiss Somali's historical claim as a myth 
unsubstantiated by empirical evidence and argue that Somalia never attained 
statehood before 1960. They invoke the international treaty of 1897 concluded 
between Ethiopia and the colonial powers of Britain, Italy and France, which included 
border agreements among other things, as legally binding on successive states and 
;5 governments. According to Mesfin Woldemariam: 
... the 
Somalis originally occupied only the Gulf of Aden coastal area east of Zella. The 
Danikils inhabited the region to the west, and in the past, according to some, as recently as 
150 years ago these non-Somali people extended to Zeila. The region immediately south of 
the Somali territory was known as H. aud, `the South, ' by the Somalis, who considered it their 
29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Somali Democratic Republic, Western Somalia andAbVssinicrn Colonialism (Mogadishu 1978); 
Anna Sinxnns, Networlºs of Dissolution:. omali Undone (Westtzew Press, Inc., Oxford 1995), p. 3 5: Terrence Lyons and 
Ahmed L Samater, Somalia:: State Collapse, MultilateralIntervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (The 
Brooking Institution, Washington DC 1995), p. 11. 
30 Said YusufAbdi, `Self-Determination for Ogaden Somalis' (Horn ofAfrica, Vol. 1. No. 1. January/March 1978). p. 20: 
31 Abdi Sheikh-Abdi, `Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassen and the Current Conflict in the Hom of Africa' (Horn of Africa. Vol. 
1, No. 2, April/June 1978), p. 61; An historical summary prepared by the staff of Africa Research, Ltd, Exeter `After the 
Referenduum: III Evolution of the Dispute' (Africa Report, April 1967), p. 45- 
32 Meson Woldemariam, The Background qf the Ehio, malian Boundary Dispute (Iournal of Alodern . African ltudies, Vol. 2. 
No. 2, July 1964), pp. 189-219. 
33 Y( mass Kebede. -The Legal Aspect of Ethiopian-Somali Dispute' (Horn of Africa. Vol. 1 No. 1, Janu: uy'%iarch 1978;. 1-ßp, 26- 
31. 
34 Getaehew Haile, `The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia' (Journal of tfodern. -3friccul Stulies, Vol. 24, No 3.1986), 
pp. 468-470. 
35 Yonas Kebede, `The Legal Aspects of Ethiopian-Somalian Dispute- (Horn ofAfrica. Vol. 1, No. 1,1978), pp. 26-31. 
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southern frontier. The southern region, comprising parts of British Somaliland, was inhabited 
primarily by Gallas [Oromo] who pushed southward the original Bantu populations. ' 
Foreign historians such as Richard F. Burton, 37 A. Cecchi38 and E. A. W. Budge39 
support Mesfin's claim that the Somalis are the most recent occupiers of Somaliland. 
Budge in particular agrees with Mesfin's assertion that the present Republic of 
Somalia formed part of ancient Ethiopia With reference to the King of Axum, he 
states that `the domination of the king who set up his throne at Adulis in the First 
Century A. D. extended from Axum in the north to Somaliland in the south and from 
the Nubian frontier on the east bank of the Nile to Himyar on the east coast of the Red 
Sea' 40 
The contested historical evidence has played an important role in sowing the 
seeds of animosity that triggered armed revolts in Eritrea by the ELF and in Ethiopia 
by the WSLF in 1961, all of which pre-date the superpowers' involvement in the Horn 
of Africa (the Second Cold War) . 
41 Thus we see how the historical factor was 
repeatedly manipulated by opposing sides to legitimise claims that served as excuses 
to conduct armed struggles that turned the region into a zone of instability and 
conflict. 
Various factors, such as control of water sources, inter-clan feuds over control 
of water holes and pasturelands, clashes between migrants and residents over 
occupation of fertile land, ethnic and tribal encounters, rivalry between Christians and 
Muslims to dominate political power, contributed greatly to making the Horn an area 
prone to conflict before the Cold War era. What the Cold War did was to exacerbate 
the existing violent situation when the superpowers, attracted by the geo-strategic 
location of the Horn, gained access to land in exchange for huge caches of modern 
conventional arms which enabled the recipients to initiate inter-state war. 
Pursuance of strategic, environmental and economic national interests also 
drew in regional actors to participate - in one form or another - in the conflict of the 
sub-region to support their allies. Furthermore, denial of justice, inequality and 
discrimination motivated various ethnic and religious groups within states to conduct 
36 Mesfm Woldeinariam, 'The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary Dispute' (The Journal of Modern African Studies. 
Vol. 2, No. 2,1964), p. 194; An historical summary prepared by the staff of Africa Research, Ltd, Exeter `After the 
Referendum: III. Evolution of the Dispute' (Africa Report, April 1967), pp. 42-44. 
37 Richard F. Burton, First Footsteps in EastAfrica (Landon, 1894), Vol. 1, p. 72. 
38 A. Cecchi, Da Zeila alle Fronliere del Ca fu (Rome, Vol. 1.1886), p. 38. 
49 E. A. W. Budge, A History ofEthiopia (London, 1928), p. 242. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (Verso, London 1986) 
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wars of secession. So, one can confidently say that the Horn was an area whose 
security was threatened by both inside and outside forces and its population often 
resorted to arms to pursue tribal, clan and national interests for generations long 
before the advent of the Cold War. 
The Cold War 
The Cold War is an era from 1946 until early 1989 that describes a state of affairs 
characterised by fears and mutual hostility emanating from political and ideological 
differences between the superpowers and their allies. 42 As expressed in the Truman 
Doctrine of 12 March 1947, it was `a world-wide commitment to resist Soviet 
expansionism wherever it appeared'. 43 Truman's proclamation departed from 
traditional American foreign policy and laid the foundation for the Cold War. 44 At the 
time of Truman's nationwide radio address, the Soviet threat was limited to Western 
Europe and Truman's declaration, which was made in response to Soviet 
intransigence, was aimed at stopping communist expansion and preserving Western 
democracy. However, as expressed by Rothchild, `The perceptions of interests and 
capabilities held by key U. S. decision makers in the formative years from 1946 to 
1976 led directly to policies of minimalism and caution toward Africa. 4-5 This 
negative impact of US commitment was emphatically expressed by `Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller (later vice-president) who, warning against overspending abroad, 
described the United States as "close to being dangerously over-committed". "" 
Nevertheless, during the second half of the 1970s and most of the 1980s, the 
second Cold War brought the Horn of Africa into the orbit of superpower rivalry. 
47 
The US policy of minimum engagement in Africa changed when Soviet influence in 
the continent grew. In particular, Soviet involvement in Angola, Ethiopia and Somalia 
in 1970s was viewed with concern. As Secretary of State Kissinger declared, 
if a continent such as Africa ... can 
be made the arena for greater power ambitions, if 
immense quantities of arms can affect far-off events, if large expeditionary forces can be 
42 Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics since 1945 (Longman Group UK Limited, Barlow, 1993), p. 3. 
43 Jahn Lewis Gaddis, Strategies ofCon tairmtent:: A Critical Appraisal of Post-war American Viation d Security Policy (C)x ford 
University Press, London, 1982), p. 22. 
44 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
'' Donald Rothchild, 'U. S. Policy Styles in Africa: From Minimal Engagement to Liberal Internationalism' in Eagle Engaged: 
t'. S. Foreign Policy in a Complex Wort! (Longman Inc., New York, 1979), pp. 305-306. 
46 lbid., p. 307. 
47 Fred Halliday, The Making of the cond Cold If-or (Biddles Ltd., London 1986), p. ' 1; Jeffery A. Lefebwe_ 'Middle East 
Conflicts and Middle Level Power Intervention in the Hom of Africa' (khak le East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3. Summer 199b). p- 
387. 
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transported at will to dominate virtually helpless people - then all we have hoped for in 
building a more stable and rational international order is in jeopardy. '" 
What is more, Kissinger expressed US foreign policy opposition to the deployment of 
Cuban forces in Angola by stating that global equilibrium between the superpowers 
had to be maintained and that `it became necessary for the United States, as the leader 
of the non-communist nations, to use its strength to back its allies within Angola' . 
49 
In order to address the security issues raised above, this chapter will examine 
the security of the sub-region at three levels of analysis - global (superpowers), 
regional (Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen etc. ) and sub-state 
(domestic opposition forces). 
The Global Dimension 
Background 
Despite the fact that state boundaries were delineated artificially, there was a regional 
consensus by the founders of the OAU to respect the existing international boundaries 
(the principle of uti possidetis) in order to defuse the numerous claims that they 
anticipated would follow after independence. '° The motive was to combat irredentism 
emanating from the desire to unite divided ethnic and religious groups to form their 
own nation-states. Thus, they found that the easy way out of this dilemma was to 
make claims of territory a taboo and manifest their exclusion in the charter. In other 
words, as claiming territory from another sovereign state contravened the OAU's and 
UN's conventions, the issue could no longer be resolved by legal and diplomatic 
means. 
However, the juridical state had no organic connection to the Horn of Africa 
because the arbitrarily drawn borders made no sense in terms of the clans and ethnic 
divisions of the region. This reality motivated some of the region's leaders to 
challenge the legitimacy of neighbouring states' territorial sovereignty by resorting to 
the use of force - an action which would require the possession or accumulation of 
arms. 
Conflict in the Horn of Africa started soon after former Italian Somaliland and 
British Somaliland united after gaining their independence in 1960 from Italy and 
48 Ibid., p. 310_ 
49 Ibid 
uj°Chganisation of African Unity: Basic Documents and Resolutims- (Published by the Provisional Secretariat of the OAU. 
Addis Ababa May 1963). 
49 .., 
Britain respectively. Skirmishes and border clashes with neighbouring Ethiopia began 
the following year, escalating in 1964 into a war that the Somalis lost. 51 The basis of 
the conflict was Somali irredentism. The five pointed stars engraved in the new 
national flag at independence were to remind Somalis that full independence would 
not be achieved as long as Somali nationals still remained under foreign domination - 
a view that has been reflected in official government publications. ' 
Furthermore, the constitution aspires to bring all Somali nationals under the 
banner of the Somali Republic. Article 6, paragraph 4 states: The Somali Republic 
shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali territories and 
encourage solidarity among the peoples of the world and in particular among Africans 
and Islamic peoples. ' Successive governments took this seriously, expressing their 
intentions on various occasions in official statements that have been quoted as 
`sayings of the year' that appeared in a publication by the Ministry of Information in 
April l965. sß 
In addition, the clan division (see Table 2.1), which is most conspicuous and 
vibrant in Somali society, could be harnessed only by pursuing an active irredentist 
claim. Previously, Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, who served as a source of 
inspiration, had been able to unite his countrymen against the colonialists from 1900 
until his death in 1920 simply because he gave them the hope of retrieving `lost' 
Somali territory from the occupiers. Even then, his effort was grossly undermined 
because `particularistic clan rivalries and jealousies rooted in the exigencies of the 
eternal struggle for access to pasture and water were too strongly entrenched to admit 
to the possibility of widespread cooperation' . 
544 After his death, when nobody emerged 
who could pursue his ideals with the same zeal, the sense of nationalism quickly 
receded to give way to the clan allegiance that has dominated local politics throughout 
the entire history of the Somalis. 
'1 Marina Ottaway, Soviet cued American Influence in the Horn of j erica (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982), p_ 24 
52Ministry 
of Information, Somalia: _4 
Divided : Nation Seeking Reunification (The Public Relations Senice. 
Ministry of 
Information, Mogadishu, Somali Republic, April 1965), p. 13_; Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa, p. 65_ 
Ibid., p ':. Some of the sayings, as presented on pages 48-49 of this publication, read as follows: 'Reunification of all 
Somalis is the very reason of life for our nation', President Ad= Abdulla Osman; `It is the basis of our foreign policy to obtain 
reunification of all Somalis now arbitrarily divide. by colonialists°, Foreign Minister Ahmed 
Yusuf Dualeh. To pretend that 
the status quo will endure for ever is to fly in the face of history', Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs- 
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Perhaps the British attitude prior to independence, manifested in the British 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin's proposal which inclined towards the formation of a 
Greater Somaliland Protectorate, had an indirect influence in motivating the Somali 
authorities to emulate and incorporate Somalia nationalism into their constitution. 4,5 
However, Britain backed down from the concept of Greater Somaliland by retaining 
the NFD (Northern Frontier District) and opting to hand over the contested territonv to 
the emerging Kenyan authorities who had unequivocally demonstrated their opinion 
that they would not accept a divided nation- When the Somali leaders tried to 
convince the Kenyans about the formation of a Greater Somalia, Jomo Kenyatta 
emphatically expressed the Kenyan view during his visit to Somalia for the 1962 July 
Independence Day celebrations. The fact that Jomo Kenyatta was presented with the 
Star of Somali Solidarity and his party was received with the utmost cordiality did not 
change his conviction- In fact to his hosts' disenchantment, 'in a number of 
discussions and public speeches, Jomo Kenyatta stated emphatically that he regarded 
the NFD as an inalienable part of Kenya and the whole issue as a domestic matter'. '' 
When Britain finally handed over the NFD to Kenya, the Somali government, in 
retaliation, broke off diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963. In the 1970s the 
Somalis sought to change this by reviving Somalian national aspirations and 
attempting to unite all Somalis under one banner. 
What was the attitude and response of Ethiopia to Somalia's irredentist claim 
in whose territory the largest area, the Ogaden, is located? Emperor Haile Selassie 
was aware of the sensitivity of his border with Somalia long before Somalia gained 
independence. After all, the cause of the Ethio-Italian war of 1936 was a dispute over 
the ownership of the Waloval cluster of wells, which according to the demarcation, are 
situated north-east of Warder some 60 limns deep inside Ethiopian territory (see Map 
3). The Italians used the incident as a pretext to conquer Ethiopia. So, after the 1941 
liberation of his territory, when the emperor became aware of Britain's desire to 
establish a Greater Somaliland that incorporated the Ogaden and the Haud grazing 
areas of Ethiopia, he began to look for a reliable patron -a patron that would not be 
tainted by colonial aspirations and would be willing to help build up his army so that 
it could maintain the territorial integrity of his country. The United States fitted the 
bill, and he immediately started to court US friendship. In 1945, he was able to sign 
55Ibid., p. 4126; Ernest Bevin, House of'C: omnions Debates, 4 June 1946, cols. 1840-1 
561bid., p. 190. 
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Map 3. Origins of the Ethio-Somali Border Dispute 
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an agreement with Trans-World Airlines (TWA) to set up Ethiopian Airlines. Again, 
while the British were still in control of the Ogaden, he granted a US company, 
Sinclair, a concession for oil exploration, undermining Britain's authority in the area. 
Finally, by 1954, his relentless diplomatic effort with Great Britain to keep his empire 
intact rewarded him with the complete control of the Ogaden and the Haud grazing 
areas six years before Somalia gained independence (see Map 4). 
57 
When the Somalia government became aware of Kenya's and Ethiopia's 
staunch resistance to its irredentist claim, it made continual efforts to seek supplies of 
arms from Western governments. To its dismay, it met with little success, principally 
because Somalia's demands exceeded the amount foreign governments were willing 
to underwrite. In addition, Somalia's severance of diplomatic relations with Britain 
5' Marina Ottawa,, Soviet and; lmerican Influence in the Horn oj_4frica, p. 19; Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn 
of Africa - The Diplomacy of 
Interºeention and Disengagement (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp- 34-35. 
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over the issue of the NFD, and Ethiopia's close tie with the US government, 
constituted obstacles that were difficult to overcome. The only offer Somalia received 
was a joint response from the USA, Italy and Germany agreeing to arm a 6000-strong 
internal security force with light arms . 
5" The proposed offer did not include major 
offensive weapons such as tanks, artillery and fighter aircraft which would enable the 
Somalis to confront the armies of neighbouring countries. 
Although geostrategic interest, which undermines national sovereignty, was the 
main attraction that lured the superpowers to the Horn, the ongoing dispute between 
Somalia and Ethiopia made gaining access easy. Signing treaties of Friendship and 
Co-operation with the superpowers was the easiest way for Somalia and Ethiopia to 
acquire the arms needed for such a venture. Thus, after each had bargained for a 
better deal, both countries signed agreements with the superpowers and traded access 
to facilities in their territories for arms. Despite the fact that there were disputes 
among the Horn states over territorial claims and the region was highly volatile, the 
superpowers preferred to keep their influence in the region and this brought the Horn 
into the periphery of the Cold War confrontation. Consequently, the type of Cold War 
involvement and intervention in the Horn of Africa began indirectly, with the 
superpowers providing military assistance to their respective clients in a zero-sum 
game of regional politics. A detailed investigation of the causes of involvement will 
clarify the impact it had on the intensity, complexity and longevity of indigenous 
conflict in the sub-region. 
US involvement in Ethiopia 
US involvement in the Horn stemmed from America's global commitment to contain 
communist intrusion and expansion. Christian Ethiopia's anticommunist stand and the 
suitability of its northern region, Asmara, to facilitating global communications were 
the prime factors that attracted the United States to forge a close relationship with 
Ethiopia. The US Ambassador to Ethiopia between 1963 and 1967 described the 
importance of the facility as `deemed then to be "strategically vital" to the United 
States, the only such military installation in Black Africa'. 59 
At the time, Ethiopia, for its part, was very worried about the formation of a 
future Greater Somaliland -a plan that would incorporate one-fifth of the Ethiopian 
'igPaul Henze, The Horn of Africa, p. iii. 
59 Cited in Fred Halliday, 'US Policy in the Harn of Africa: Abouila or Proxy Intervention? ' (Review of Afric(vn Political 
Economy, No. 10, September-Deceamber 1977), p. 28. 
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territory, the Ogaden. Emperor Haile Selassie, suspicious of Britain's intentions and 
anxiety to retain the territorial integrity of his country, perceived that the national 
interest of his country would be best served by forming an alliance with a major 
power. Thus, the interests of both the United States and Ethiopia coincided and, in 
1953, the two countries signed a 25-year agreement that allowed the US to use the 
communication centre situated in the suburb of Asmara, commonly known as Kagnew 
station-61 In return the Americans agreed to train and equip three divisions of the 
Ethiopian army, each comprising 6000 men- 62 
The cordial relationship between Ethiopia and the US continued without 
mishap until the US government recognised the unity between British and Italian 
Somalilands when they agreed to form the Republic of Somalia immediately after 
they gained independence in 1960 - an event which was not well received by the 
Ethiopians. To sound a warning signal to his newly acquired ally, in 1959 the emperor 
paid a visit to the Soviet Union and was consequently offered $100 million credit and 
a generous supply of arms - an equivocal move that put the US government in a 
dilemma. Some analysts have interpreted his visit as a political manoeuvre to block 
any support for pursuing irredentism that might have been solicited by Somalia upon 
gaining independence in 1960.63 If the Americans did not respond favourably, the 
Emperor could switch his loyalty for better terms in order to safeguard the territorial 
integrity of his country. Such a decision would mean the abrogation of the treaty 
signed in 1953, resulting in the unacceptable loss of Kagnew station. Consequently. 
the Americans concurred and the Ethiopian government became a major beneficiary 
of the revised agreement of 1960. Aid was not limited to military hardware alone; 
substantial financial aid was also channelled towards the economy - particularly 
towards the education sector. TM The amended version of the agreement raised the 
number of divisions to be supported from three to four, comprising a maximum 
60Robert G. Patman, Tice Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, p. 38; Ernest Bein, House of Commons Debates, 4 June 1946, cols. 
1840-1. 
61 Marina Ottavmay, Soviet and _A1merican 
Influence in the Horn of_Africa, p. 20; Robert G. Patman, p. 38. 
62 Ibid., p. 36-37. '; Peter Woodward, The Horn vf. Africa, p. 133-34; Fred Halliday, 'US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Abouiia 
(emphasis in original) or Proxy Intervention? ' (Review of. 1 fricrnr Political Economy, No. 10, September-December 1977), p. 10. 
63Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of_lfrica, pp. 44-45- Jeffrey A Lefebwe, The United States- Ethiopia and the 
1963 Somali-Soviet Arms Deal: Containment and the Balance of Power Dilemma in the Horn of Africa (Tire Journal of 
Modern . fricrarl 
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4,1998). pp. 616-618. 
64 Ibid.; Robert G. Patman, pp. 4445. 
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number of 40,000 which elevated Ethiopia to the strongest military power in sub- 
Saharan Africa, apart from South Africa. 65 
However, in the early 1970s US-Ethiopian relations began to deteriorate. Two 
factors could be identified as causes of this rift: first, technological developments in 
satellite communications which substantially reduced the importance of Kagnew 
station; and, second, the deterioration of security in the province of Eritrea where 
Kagnew station was situated, supplemented by the growing scepticism about the 
emperor's ability to continue holding power. The first sign of the cooling, relationship 
was the response given to the emperor's personal request to President Nixon, in May 
1973, for more arms including F-5E fighter planes and M-60 tanks to match his 
army's arsenal with that supplied to Somalia by the Soviets. `With the decision in 
October to phase out Kagnew and a limitation of military aid to Africa voted through 
Congress, the clear implication of the US decision was that Ethiopia was relegated to 
the outer perimeter of its defence priorities,. 66 Consequently, in order to disassociate 
itself from the Ethiopian government, the US government recalled its ambassador in 
January 1974 and assigned a mere charge d'affaires to perform his duties. It also 
began to reduce its personnel at Kagnew. 67 
US policy in Ethiopia in the early stages of the Ethiopian revolution (1974- 
1976) took a wait-and-see stance and continued with its economic aid. Its rationale for 
doing so was based on the assumption that if it cut off economic aid at a time when 
Ethiopia needed it most, Eritrean secession could materialise and the Red Sea could 
be transformed into an 'Arab Lake', a scenario that could be detrimental to America's 
close ally, Israel. The government also feared that the US's African policy would be 
damaged if it allowed an insurgent movement to break away from a sovereign state 
against a principle highly valued by the OAU. In addition, it assumed that US 
credibility would be adversely affected if it abandoned a client state when its 
adversary, Somalia, was being heavily armed by the Soviet Union to pursue 
irredentism. 68 
Furthermore, the majority in the US administration believed, that within the 
composition of the PMAC (Provisional Military Administration Committee - usually 
65 Ibid., p. 49. 
66 Fred Halliday, 'US Policy in the Hom of Africa: Abouila or Proxy Inte vention? ' (Review of , African Political Economy, No. 
10, September-December 1977), p. 14. 
67 Itiid. 
68 Ibid., p. 15-16. 
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referred to as the Derg), the elite officer corps favoured a close link with the US and, 
through their influence, they had hopes of `orienting the Derg in a pro-western 
direction'. 69 In fact, the government of Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger believed that 
people like General Amman with a moderate stance could be steered to follow the 
right track if handled properly. As a result, they limited their action against the new 
government to threats, warning their client that they would cut off military aid if the 
policies it adopted became harmful to US interests in the sub-region. They believed 
that continuous support to the regime would keep the USSR out of Ethiopia. "' This 
belief was substantiated by the reply Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
William Schaufele, gave to a Congressional Committee inquiry in August 1976: 
Although it [the Derg] is attempting to set up some kind of a leftist or socialist system in 
Ethiopia, however unfocused and disorganised it may be, it is not systematically or 
instinctively anti-United States. ... I 
don't find that the government, despite its sometimes- 
inconsistent attitudes, is basically anti-United States. " 
As a result, until the end of its term in 1976, the Republican administration adopted a 
policy of continuing to supply military aid to the Ethiopian government (see Table 
2.2 ). 
Table 2.2. US Military Assistance to Ethiopia (1970-1976) 
Year Grants in US$, 000s 
(current US$) 
Sales in US$, 000s 
(current US $) 
Personnel trained in USA 
1970 10,493 6 
1971 11,763 140 
1972 10,645 10 159 
1973 9,439 156 
1974 11,719 7,440 147 
1975 12,999 22,127 130 
1976 7,277 135,339 192 
Source: United States Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf acid the Red Sea Areas, pp. 1 J2,1 / ý. 
69 Ibid., p. 16, 
70 Peter Woodward, The Horn gf4frica, p. 137. 
71 Cited in Fred Halliday, 'US Policy in the Hom of Africa: Abouila or proxy Intervention? ' (Review ofA rican Political 
Economy, No. 10. September-December 1977). p. 17. 
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At the beginning of 1977, US policy towards Ethiopia changed dramaticalk. 
The reason for this could be partly attributable to changes that took place within the 
Derg to consolidate power - that is, its adoption of scientific-socialism as a policy, 
goal - and partly to Jimmy Carter's introduction of 'human rights' observance as a 
US condition in giving aid to Third World countries. 72 In addition, in the course of 
consolidating his power, Mengistu's elimination of those Derg members who 
favoured continuing a closer relationship with the United States weakened the 
argument of those who advised against a total break off of relationship kith the 
government of Ethiopia. Furthermore, there was increased pressure applied on the 
United States from Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan, which took an 
aggressive and active stand against the Derg to stop all forms of aid to Ethiopia. From 
the United States' point of view, cooperation with Ethiopia would also jeopardise its 
effort to wean Somalia from the Soviet Union. '' 
Convinced by the above factors - particularly the Derg's alleged `human 
rights' violations - in February 1977, Cyrus Vance, the new Secretary of State told a 
Senate Committee that military aid to Ethiopia would be reduced as of October 1977. 
On 23 April the Derg responded by ordering all US installations to close. Soon after, 
the US announced its willingness to sell arms to Ethiopia's rivals, Sudan and 
Somalia. 74 These incidents brought about a clean break in the US-Ethiopian military 
relationship which had been established in 1953, and opened the gate for the Soviet 
Union's entry into Ethiopia in place of the Americans. Thus, the military alliances that 
had drawn in the superpowers and had lasted for three decades came to an end, and 
new alliances with a shift of partners, which in turn resulted in a flood of excessive 
arms, took their place. 
Soviet involvement in Somalia 
The Soviets, like their US counterparts, were lured to the Horn area because of its 
strategic location. To the Soviets, getting a foothold in the strategic location of 
Somalia meant gaining easy access to the Gulf area and the Indian Ocean. Securing 
military facilities in Somalia would enable them to maintain and service their 
submarines operating in the region. The supplies they would receive from Somali 
bases would also help them increase their range of action, in time and scope, thus 
72 Peter Woodvý ird, The Horn o[A ric a. p. 13 7. 
73 Fred Halliday, pp. ] 8-19. 
74 ibid., 19-20. 
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Table 2.3. The Military Balance in the Horn of Africa (1973-1974) 
Category ! Ethiopia 
Population 26,500,000 
Estimated GNP 1972 $US 2.07 billion 
Total armed forces 44,570 
Estimated defence $US 40.5 million 
budget 1972 
Army 
Total strength 40,940 
4 infantry divisions of 8,000 men each 
I tank battalion 
1 airborne infantry battalion 
4 armoured car squadrons 
4 artillery battalions 
5 air defence batteries 
2 engineer battalions 
50 M-41 med. tanks 
20 M-24 It. tanks 
About 40 Armoured Personnel Carriers 






1 coastal minesweeper 
I training ship 
5 patrol boats 
4 harbour defence craft 
4 landing craft 
2,250 
37 combat aircraft 
I bomber squad. With 4 Canberra B-2 
I fighter-bomb. squad. with 12 F-86F 
I squad. with 6 T-28A 
I fighter squad. with 15 F-5. A, 
5 C-119G and 3 Dove 
3 train. squads. with 20 Safir, 15 T-28A and 
11T-33A 
5 Alouette II, " Mi-6,2 Mi-8 and 5 AA 204B 
helicopters 
Defence expenditure as 







4 tank battalions 
9 mech. Infantry battalions 
I commando battalion 
2 field art. battalions 
5AA art. battalions 
About 150 T-34 med. tanks 
60 BTR-40 and 250 BTR152 armoured 
personnel carriers 
300 
4 P-6 and 6 P-4 MTB (ex- Soviet) 
2,000 
21 combat aircraft 
Some 11-28 light bombers 
2 Mig-15 and 19 Mig-17 fighters 
Transports include I C-45,3 C-47,3 
An-2 and 1 An-24 
2 fig-15/-17,10 Piaggio P-148 and 
Yak trainers 
16% 
Srnurce: Adapted from The Military Balance, 1973-1974, London, Institute for Strategic Studies 1973, 
pp. 39-41. 
enhancing their surveillance activities in the region. Irrespective of a possible 
confrontation with the United States, which had already established a base in 
Ethiopia, the Soviets seized the opportunity and volunteered to supply a volume of 
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arms which was more than adequate to defend Somalia's national boundaries. '' In 
1963 they agreed to supply $30 million worth of equipment and to train the Somali 
army in return for use of Berbera as a base. 76 By 1970 the build-up of Somalian forces 
had grown so fast that it became the fourth largest army in sub-Saharan Africa, behind 
Nigeria, Ethiopia and Ghana. This increased tension in the Horn of Africa (see Table 
2.3). " 
Furthermore, the reliance of the Soviet Union on Somalian facilities grew after 
its ejection from Sudan in 1971 and Egypt in 1972. In 1974, to avoid the recurrence of 
a similar incident, the Soviet Union signed a full Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with Somalia which facilitated an increased Soviet arms commitment. 78 
The only justification for building an army supported by a large mechanised force (see 
Table 2.4) in relation to the size of the population, which amounted to only 3.5 
million, was to achieve the goal of pan-Somalia nationalism. 
According to Bane's assessment, it was a risk worth taking even if its 
outcome was detrimental to economic development. He was obsessed by the belief 
that an irredentist war was the only way to damp down clan rivalries and unite the 
country, thereby assisting him to prolong his stay in power. Thus, Barre plunged his 
country into war with his neighbouring country, Ethiopia. According to Ambassador 
Dualeh: 
The invasion was doomed from the beginning. It was a one man's war. It was Barre's war. He 
did not consult with the senior army officers, nor did he ask them to prepare an operational 
plan. As a matter of fact, the most senior Merehan officer in the army, General Omar Haji 
Masale, then assistant minister of defence and chief of staff of the army, advised him against 
the invasion warning him that it would eventually prove disastrous to his presidency and 
regime. Trusting nobody, Barre became the chief of operations of the whole invasion 
exercise. 79 
75 Marina Ottawas, Soviet and American Influence in the Horn pf. Afriea, pp. 6-7; Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union in the 
Honi of Africa, p. 37. 
76 Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn ofAfricca, p. 48-49. 
77 Richard Booth, 'The Armed Forces of African States' (43elphi Papers, No. 67, May 1970), pp. 18-2 l; Robert G. Patman, 
p. 49. 
78 Peter Woodward, The Horn of tErica, p. 137. 
719 Hussien Ali Dualeh, From Barre to 4vdeed -Somali: The Agony of a . 
'Tation (Stellagraphics Ltd., Nairobi, 1994), pp. 95-96. 
All Dualeh is an ex-ambassador to Kenya from December 1984 until the demise of Barre in 1990_ He held vanous govem- 
ment posts in Somalia. He also was Somalia's ambassador to China before he was transferred to Ken a. James 
Mah"all, 'Self- 
determination and the OAU' in I. M. Lewis (ed. ), Nationalism & Self Determination in the Horn of. 1rrica (Ithaca Pres.. 
London 1983), p. 86. 
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Table 2.4. The Military Balance in the Horn of Africa (1987-1988) 
Category Ethiopia Somalia 
Population 30,010,000 3,430,000 
Estimated GNP 1977 $2.9 billion $425 million 
Military service conscription voluntary 
Total armed forces 93500 51,500 
Para Military Forces 119,000 29,000 
Estimated defence 
expenditure 1978 $165 million $25 million 
Army 
Total strength 90,000 50,000 
8 infantry divisions 3 div HQ, 20 We HQ. 
3 lt divs. 7 tk bns, 8 mech inf bns; 14 mot inf 
2 para/cdo bdes. bns, 16 inf bns, 2 cdo bns; 13 fd, 
5 arty, 2 engr bns. IOAA arty bns. 
24 M-60,30 M-47,50 T-34,400 T-54/55 50 T-34,30 T54/55 medtks, BRDM-2 
med, 50 M-41 lt tks; 56 AML-60 armd scout cars: 50 BTR-40/-50/-60,100 
cars; BRDM-2 scout cars; BMP-1 MICV; BTR-152 APC; about 100 76mm, 
about 70 M-1 13,300 BTR-40/-60-152 85mm, 80 122mm, 130mm guns/how 
APC; 52 105mm, 150 122mm, 130mm, 81mm mor, 100mm ATK guns; 
152mm, 12 155mm towed, 12 M-109 106mm RCL, Mikan ATGW, 150 
155mm SP how; 82mm, 120mm, 280 M-2/- 14.5mm, 37mm 57mm and 100mm 
30 4.2in mor; BM-21 122mm RL; Sagger towed, ZSU-23-24 SP AA guns; SA- 
ATGW; ZU-23, ZU-57 AA guns. 2/-3 SAM. 
Navy 
Total strength 1,500 500 
1 coastal minesweeper (ex-Netherlands). 4 Mo/-class patrol craft (2 with torpedo 
I training ship (ex-US seaplane tender) tubes). 
9 large patrol craft (5 ex-US PGM, 4 ex-US 3 Osa-11-class FPBG with Styx SSM. 
Sewart-type, 1 ex-Yugoslav Kraljevica 6 large patrol craft (ex-Soviet Poluchat- 
Class. class). 
2 Osa-II class FPBG with Styx SSM. 4 MTB (ex-Soviet P-6-class) 
4 Swift-class FPB. I LCT (ex-Soviet Poluchat-class). 
4 coastal patrol craft (under 50 tons). 4 medium landing craft (ex-Soviet T-4 
4 landing craft ex-US, under 100 tons) class) 
Air Force 
Total strength 2,000 1,000 
99 combat aircraft 25 combat aircraft 
1 It bbr sqn with 2 Canberra B-2. 1 lt bbr sqn with 3 11-28 
6 FGA sqns: 2 with 14 F-5 A/E, I with 7 F-86F, 2 FAG sqns with 15 Mig-17 and Mig- 
2 with 50 MiG-21,1 with 20 Mig-23. 15UTI. 
1 coin sqn with 6 T-28 A I fighter sqn with 7 Mig-2IMF. 
1 tpt sqn with 5 C-47,2 C-54,7 C- 119G, 3 1 tpt sqn with 3 An-2.3 An-24, I C- 
Dove, 111-14,1 DHC-3,3 DHC-6, * An-12,4 45,6 P-148,15 Yak-l1,2 Do-28- 
An-22. 1 het sqn with 5 MI-4, MI-8, I AB- 
3 trg sqns with 20 Safir, T-28A/D, 11 T-33A, 204. 
2F-5B. AA-2 Atoll AAM. 
Hels incl. 10 AB-204,5 Alouette 111,30 Mi-8, 
Mi-6,10 UH-1K I Puma. 
Source: Adapted from Me Military Balance, 1 yt+ /-1 yi n, London, Institute tor strategic Ntuaies i 955, 
pp. 46&49. 
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The ultimate consequence was a failure that triggered a coup attempt and 
provoked the creation of multiple opposition movements based on clan lines that led 
to a vicious civil war. Eventually, inter-clan conflict caused the collapse of the Somali 
state and its replacement by the warlords' anarchic rule. 
Soviet involvement in Ethiopia 
The Ethiopian-Soviet relationship has a long history - pre-dating the extension of the 
Cold War to the region. In the fourteenth century contact was established between 
Ethiopian monks and Copts at Jerusalem. The relationship gained momentum when 
some Armenians journeyed to Ethiopia in the fifteenth century. The Russian Orthodox 
mission in Jerusalem also kept close contact and, through their recommendation, the 
Tsarist Empire became interested in Ethiopia. When Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. 
Russia's attention was drawn towards the source of the Nile; by controlling the flow 
of waters and putting the inhabitants living downstream at her mercy it believed it 
could gain leverage over Britain. During the reign of Emperor Menelik in the 1890s, 
Russia supplied the arms that ultimately helped the emperor consolidate his empire 
and obtain territorial recognition by means of a treaty concluded with the colonialists 
in 1897.80 
During the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie in the 1920s, Ethiopia was a 
sanctuary for Soviet emigres, some of whom served as advisers to the Crown. The 
USSR was amongst the first to denounce Italian aggression in 1935. R1 They 
maintained active diplomatic relations, administered a Hospital (Balcha) and kept a 
permanent exhibition in the capital, Addis Ababa. However, after 1953, the 
overwhelming US presence in Ethiopia and Haile Selassie's well established contact 
with successive US governments dwarfed this relationship. 
When, in 1974, Ethiopia staged a revolution ousting the autocratic ruler 
Emperor Haile Selassie and embraced the ideals of socialism, the Soviets pondered 
the wisdom of supporting the Somali regime any further to the detriment of another 
socialist-oriented country. The Soviets faced in a dilemma when Siad Barre 
unilaterally abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1974 
during a visit by Soviet President Podgomy, and expelled all Soviet advisers on 13 
80 Edward T. Wilson. Russia and Black erica Before World War 11 Holmes and Meier Publishers, London 1974). p. i7, Robert_ 
Patman, pp. 27-28. 
81 [bid-, Palm in, p. 32; Wilson, pp. 258-_2J9. 
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November 1977.82 They were especially angered by this development because 
Somalia had been the first black African country to sign such an agreement with the 
Soviet Union. 83 Their repeated ejection from the Horn Area, first by Sudan followed 
by Egypt and now by Somalia highlighted the weakness of Soviet relations in Third 
World countries. Thus, repairing the damage as soon as possible became a priority. 
The Soviets retaliated by despatching an enormous amount of arms by air and 
sea to Ethiopia, enabling the country to equip an army of more than 250,000 (see 
Table 2.4). The size of the airlift was unprecedented since the Berlin crisis, with some 
15,000 Cuban forces lifted from Cuba and Angola in just a few days. A good number 
of Soviet advisers expelled from Somalia were re-routed to help with training and 
organising the Ethiopian forces to handle the incoming weapons. Moreover, their up- 
to-date and detailed knowledge of the Somali armed forces was a great bonus for 
planning future operations. A small contingent force, to man a battalion of 122mm 
artillery and a battery of BM-21 rocket launchers (katushas), was also airlifted from 
Aden. The South Yemeni forces were immediately rushed into Kore, situated 40 km 
west of Jigjiga where the 3rd Division took a defensive position to stop further Somali 
advances, to assist in a counter-battery role to reduce the effectiveness of the Somali 
i artillery barrage. 85 With the help of Cuban forces and Soviet arms, Ethiopia was able 
to defeat the Somali army and regain its occupied Ogaden territory. 
The Soviet decision to establish a strong military relationship with Ethiopia 
demonstrated its willingness to take a risk in favour of a better opportunity. They 
considered Ethiopia to have more valuable assets than Somalia: Ethiopia had a bigger 
population and industrial base; its central location in African politics, due to the fact 
that the headquarters of the OAU was situated in its capital city of Addis Ababa which 
could serve as a base to influence African states, gave Ethiopia an edge over 
Somalia. 86 
US involvement in Somalia 
As noted above, Arab pressure to extract Somalia from the Soviet sphere of influence 
played a big role in President Carter's decision to sell American arms to Ethiopia's 
ibid, p. 113. 
&3 Steven David, `Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet Advantage' (bUernation al Securiv, Vol. 4. Fall 1979), p. 72. 
84 Ibid, p. 76- 
85 Davit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears, p. 41; Author's note, the author was chief operations officer of the 3rd Division at the tune 
and the Yemeni forces were under his direct connnand regarding operational duties. 
86 Ibid., p. 77. 
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rivals, Somalia and Sudan, soon after he came to office. 87 Attracted by Carter's offer, 
Barre instructed his ambassador to Washington to explore the extent of American 
commitment. After two meetings with President Carter in May-June. the ambassador 
affirmed that his view was favourable. Moreover, Carter sent a personal envoy, Dr. 
Kevin Cahill, who was a confidant of Bane, to deliver his readiness to give 
support. ss The Saudi government had also assured Bane of future support if it 
abrogated relations with the Soviets. Thus, hopeful of Western, American and Arab 
support and encouraged by Ethiopia's chaotic internal situation, Barre decided to 
capture the Ogaden by force of arms and ordered his troops to conduct a blitzkrieg 
operation in order to secure its occupation (see Map 5). 
However, after Bane resumed his attack, there is evidence to suggest that 
American policy towards Somalia shifted. The US administration reassessed the 
stance on giving military aid to Somalia and became convinced that its drawbacks 
outweighed its advantages, their main concern being that, if they supplied arms, the 
Somali government could use them to pursue its irredentist claim. Furthermore, 
Somalia's aggression against a sovereign state was heavily exploited by the Soviets 
to support their Cuban intervention in support of Ethiopia which they claimed to be 
the victim and not the aggressor. Such aggression on a member country contravened 
the OAU's Charter and any direct help given by the United States would not escape 
African condemnation. In addition, Kenya, a reliable Western ally, did not support a 
military treaty that would once again make Somalia strong enough to pursue its 
irredentist claim. Such a deal would endanger Kenya's territorial integrity, and it was 
anxious about the extent of the US's commitment. Some, such as US ambassador to 
the UN Andrew Young, saw the Soviet presence in Ethiopia as temporary and, 
believing that it would adjust itself in time, as previously witnessed in Sudan and 
Egypt, proposed against serious involvement in Somalia. 
89 By contrast, others were 
seriously concerned about the strong Soviet presence in the region. Soviet's 
entrenchment in Angola and now in Ethiopia, where the OAU headquarters was 
located, could be thought to reflect American policy weakness. Carter's National 
Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brezezinski, was prominent amongst those who 
favoured involvement. He related Soviet presence in the strategic area of the Horn 
97 Fred Halliday, 'US Policy in the Horn of Africa: Abouila or Proxy Intervention' (Review of. lfrican Political F_conomº. No. 
10, September-December 1977), pp, 18-19. 
88 Ibid, lip, 20-21. 
89 Ibid., p. 22. 
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with the view that regional security could not be treated in isolation from global 
security. He summed up his view by declaring that `SALT lies buried in the sands of 
the Ogaden'. `'' 
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After weighing the pros and cons of active involvement in Somalia the Carter 
administration became reluctant to sponsor an aggressor, as such an act would be in 
direct contradiction of American foreign policy. It decided to adopt a `wait and see' 
attitude and eventually made a decision in 1980 - two years after Somalia's defeat - 
and military aid was dispatched to Somalia only after Congress approved it in 
January 1981. 
Although Barre managed to occupy the entire Ogaden by utilising Soviet arms to 
their maximum capacity, his exit was also fast. The arms supplies, which Barre 
received from the Arabs, did not match those supplied to Ethiopia either in quality or 
quantity and, as a result, he was defeated in 1978 by a joint Cuban-Ethiopian force. 
The Soviets kept their promise by ensuring that the Ethio-Cuban forces did not cross 
the border to pursue retreating Somalian forces - an understanding reached between 
the Americans and the Soviets before the Ethiopian counter-offensive began - which 
proved the US politicians who opposed involvement in support of irredentism to 
have been right. 9' 
Barre's defeat set off a chain reaction in Somali politics. Irredentism as a 
unifying factor of the clan-divided society crumbled, clan politics was reinstated, 
opposition movements emerged and clan rivalry over the control of vital resources 
became a daily occurrence, which eventually led to the collapse of the state and rule 
by rival warlords. The implications of these developments will be discussed under 
`The Sub-state Dimension' on page 78. 
The outcome of the superpowers' involvement 
Both the US and the Soviet Union went into the Horn primarily to pursue national 
interests. As discussed earlier, they were interested only in acquiring a piece of 
territory that would serve them as a means towards attaining their global aims and, as 
such, were much less concerned about the consequences of their supply of arms. The 
USSR, in particular, signed the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in full 
awareness of Somalia's irredentist claims that directly contravened the OAU Charter. 
It did not limit its supply of arms to defensive weapons, as did its counterpart, the 
US, when they switched sides at a later date. 
91 Author's notes. He was fully aware of the restriction imposed on crossing the border as he was chief operations officer of the 
Eastern Front at the time and got his orders from Marshall Petrov, the then ground forces commander of the Soviet Armed 
Forces, who was sent by Brezshnev to assist Ethiopia in evicting the Somali forces from Ethiopian tccmt(, n-. His responsibility, 
during the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-78 is described in Africa c: onfdential, Vol. 29 No. 9,29 April 1988. 
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When competition for global power became too costly, untenable and 
economically ruinous, Gorbachev wisely decided to follow a sane policy that was 
accepted by his opposite number, President Reagan and, finally, when an agreement 
was reached to end the Cold War, the strategic value of the Horn declined. National 
interest predominated over treaty commitment and both superpowers pulled out of 
the Horn area, leaving their clients to solve their problems on their own. 
Before their departures both superpowers advised their clients to settle their 
differences by peaceful means through negotiation. 92 However, the advice was not 
heeded and, instead, the barrel of the gun and the law of the jungle became the 
decisive elements governing most of the Horn region. The only legacy the 
superpowers left behind was a huge cache of assorted arms sufficient to enable 
dissenters, or anyone with a grudge in the region, to conduct a prolonged 
insurrection. Ultimately, when their situations looked grim, both Barre and Mengistu 
attempted to introduce partial reforms that were considered to be too little and too 
late by their adversaries who, by this time, enjoyed the support of most of the 
population. 
There is no doubt that the arms supplied to the countries of the Horn enabled the 
' leaders to wage a war of aggression and deny their populations the right to 
democratic rule. Yet, it does not mean that peace would have reigned in the Horn had 
the superpowers not involved themselves in the region. The root causes of 
irredentism and claims to exercise the right to self-determination would still have 
prevailed. However, their range of arms would have been very limited, thus reducing 
the level of destruction to a much lower level than that witnessed in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
Did the Soviets benefit from supplying billions of dollars worth of arms to 
Ethiopia? Apart from money gained from the sale of arms, which is being paid over a 
prolonged period of time, the only noteworthy benefit they gained was the use of 
Nakura Island, situated at the southern tip of the Dahlak Archipelago, as a logistical 
base for facilitating the maintenance of, and supply to, their ships and submarines 
operating in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf The terms for use, which are 
specified in a protocol agreement signed between the two sides (Commodore Haile 
92 Mark Webber, `Soviet Policy in Sub-Sahara Africa: The Final Phase (The Journal of_tfodern Africc 'i Studies. Vol 30. No 1. 
1992), pp. 13-14, The Independent. 3 June 1989,16 March 1990 and 6 June 1990; 'USA/ The Horn: All Federalists No«' (. -lfrica 
Confidential, Vol. 31, No. 25, London 1990); John W. Harbeson, `Africa in World Politics Amid Rene«al, Deepening Cnsi: - in 
John Hnrbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds. ), Africa in World Politics: Post Cold 14'irr Challenges (Westvie%% 
Press. Inc, 
Colorado 1995); pp. 8-9; Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Orion in the Horn of. 1fiica, pp. 289-' , 06 
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Woldemanam on the Ethiopian side and a Soviet rear admiral on the Soviet side). 
clearly limits use of the base solely to logistic support. A platoon of Ethiopian 
infantry was stationed at the base to give local security and to monitor events on 
daily basis, while the Ethiopian navy was responsible for coastal defence. 9' 
The Soviet relationship with its client states was not always cordial. For 
example, in 1985, the Soviet mission head, dissatisfied by the limitation of power 
accorded by the protocol agreement, wanted to use the whole Dahlak Archipelago. 
Hoping that the government would mount no opposition, he instructed the Soviet base 
commander to harass the Ethiopian platoon stationed there by denying them fresh 
water supplies and telling them that their services were no longer required in the base. 
This incident triggered chain reactions involving senior defence officials of both 
governments. As the issue could not be settled amicably at ministries of defence level 
it was referred to the heads of government on both sides. Before any agreement could 
be reached, the Cold War ended and the Russians thereafter concerned themselves 
with withdrawing their forces from the region. 94 The resolve of the Ethiopian 
leadership, with regard to the Soviet demand, is clearly described by Patman who 
noted: 
Ethiopia steadfastly refused to give in to all of Moscow's military demands. This has been 
most strikingly shown in the case of the Soviet plea for a naval base at Massawa on mainland 
Ethiopia. On at least three occasions the Mengistu government has reportedly rejected 
approaches from senior Soviet military figures, including Admiral S. Gorshkov and Marshal 
V. Petrov, for such a base. 95 
Disagreement was also conspicuous within the Soviet-Somalia relationship. It 
surfaced when the Soviets offered an alternative to Somalia's irredentist claim after 
Ethiopia's leader Mengistu, in March 1977, pledged to follow `the principles of 
scientific socialism' as a guide to national policy. 
96 As a solution to end the conflict in 
the region, the Soviets suggested the formation of a Marxist-Leninist federation (Pax 
93Author's 
note: the author, who was head of the Operations Department in the Ministry' of National Defence had the second 
copy of the agreement in his office file. Furthermore, it was he and Major-General Sevoum 
Mekonnen- head of the Intelligence 
Department who, along with the Navy commander rear admiral Tesfaye Birhanu, were nominated by the Minister of 
Defence to 
investigate the Nakura debacle. 
94 The. author was head of the Operations Department of the Ministry of National Defence and was among the group of generals 
sent to investigate the case to Nakura Island. The team was accompanied 
by Major General Asrat Birru Commander of the 
Northern Army. The report of the generals is found in the top-secret document file kept in the office of the minister and a ci+p\ in 
the secret files of the operations department of the MOD. Both 
files bear the countersignature of the author and the other 
generals. 
511 Robert G Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa. p. 273. 
96 Ibid., p. 202. 
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Sovietica strategy) 97 that comprised Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen and Djibouti. 
They assigned the task to Fidel Castro who chaired a meeting between Mengistu and 
Barre in Aden on 16 March 1977. As an attraction, the Soviets promised economic 
and military assistance. Despite the fact that the Soviets were his principal arms 
suppliers, the Somali leader rejected the federal plan arguing that all the people of the 
region should be granted the right to national self-determination in advance before 
speculating on the idea of a federation. `In his view, Eritrea was entitled to be a 
member of the federation in its own right and the Ogaden or "Western Somalia" 
should have the option of joining either as an independent unit or as part of 
Somalia'. 98 As a warning signal, Barre joined the Arab League and sought assistance 
from Arab capitals, particularly Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt. 
These particular incidents have been mentioned to illustrate the fact that 
relations with the Soviets were not always cordial and, when extreme measures were 
taken to secure maximum advantage, the outcome depended on the moral strength and 
nationalistic feeling of the recipient partner as each incident unfolded - substantive 
qualities which were not lacking in the leadership of both Somalia and Ethiopia. 
From the above description we see how the influence of the superpowers was 
very limited and that all the deals they conducted to secure national interests were 
restricted to use of base facilities. A close relationship between partners continued as 
long as the national interest was not jeopardised. As soon as national interest faded, 
the norm was to abandon a client midstream, as clearly witnessed in the cases of 
Ethiopia and Somalia at the end of the Cold War. 
The regional dimension 
Following the withdrawal of the superpowers' support from the region, the vacuum 
created offered an opportunity for other outside actors to exploit. It should be noted 
that Middle East intervention in the Horn region is not a post-Cold War phenomenon. 
Although overshadowed by the superpowers' activities during the Cold War, `in the 
latter half of the 1950s, Egypt and Israel, followed latter by Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi 
Arabia, South Yemen and Syria, began meddling in the security affairs of the 
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the Nile, a long-standing interest of Israel and the Arab states of the Red Sea region, 
have tended `to influence the ideological or foreign policy orientation of local actors 
through arms, aid or subversion'. 100 
However, Arab pragmatic considerations were at times overshadowed by 
ideological considerations that often resulted in shifts of alliances. The conservative 
littoral states of the Red Sea followed a pragmatic approach to security while the 
radicals, who are situated outside the Red Sea littoral, intervened in the affairs of the 
Horn purely on ideological grounds. Their detailed involvement will be discussed 
below. 
Egypt 
Egypt, whose Horn foreign policy is centred on maintaining the continuous flow of 
the Nile waters, always considered its southern flank to be vulnerable to aggression. 
It was suspicious of any military and economic developments in Ethiopia and Sudan - 
a view that had repeatedly been expressed by Egypt's political leaders. This sceptical 
outlook led successive governments to ensure that hegemony did not emerge in the 
region. As a result, Egypt, to weaken Ethiopia, encouraged Somali irredentism and 
called for Eritrean independence through Radio Cairo and in September 1961 
permitted the ELF to establish its headquarters in its capital. 101 
However, Egypt's assistance to the ELF was curtailed to enable Nasser to 
pursue his African leadership ambitions which demanded that he had to toe the OAU 
line and moderate Egyptian foreign policy in the Horn' 102 and, as a result, he 
distanced Cairo from the Eritrean struggle. In June 1963, the ELF had to move its 
office to Damascus. 
Egypt, which maintained a close relationship with Nimeiri, concluded a 
defence agreement in 1976 and sent troops to Sudan to assist Nimeiri's army and 
security agencies immediately after the infiltration of the Ansar by the Libyans, which 
nearly brought his downfall. They had an interest in ensuring the security of the 
Jonglei canal -a joint venture with Sudan - then under construction in southern 
Sudan. This cordial relationship declined after Nimeiri's demise and crashed 
completely in 1995 when infiltrated Sudanese security personnel in Addis Ababa 
100 rbid_ 
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made an unsuccessful attempt in Mubarek' s life as he was travelling to the OAU 
conference from the airport. This incident clearly demonstrated the intentions of the 
radical Sudanese regime which had plans to destabilise secular governments of the 
region. Its aim was to substitute fundamentalist Islamic rule in their place -a goal 
which led Egypt to openly support the opposition NDA (National Democratic 
Alliance) and host John Garang's (leader of SPLA/SPLM) Visit. 103 
Besides water, to maintain its hegemony in the region, `Egypt's interests are to 
cut Ethiopia down to size and to `regain' its (mythical) control of Sudanese 
politics '. 104 Its interest in Somalia is to see a strong united Somalia as a 
counterbalance to Ethiopia, an ancient rival - an interest now supported by Eritrea - 
while Ethiopia's `long-term interest is, as always a weak and divided Somalia". 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia's intervention in the Horn emanated from ideological and pragmatic 
considerations. Ideologically it wanted to spread its own `modem' version of Islam in 
the region with the aim of promoting economic and strategic interests. Being a Red 
Sea littoral state, Saudi Arabia was greatly concerned about the close Israeli-Ethiopian 
relationship and the growing Soviet presence in Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia, which 
could restrict its freedom of movement in the Red Sea. In particular, `Israeli political- 
military presence in Ethiopia became a fixation and a target of their frustration'. 106 To 
extricate itself from threat, it pursued a political ambition, in consort with Egypt and 
Sudan, to transform the Red Sea into an `Arab Lake' 107 and thereby increase its 
regional power base in the area. To accomplish its aim it planned to assist all anti- 
communist and anti-Zionist movements in the Horn region. Saudi Arabia's financial 
clout after the oil boom in 1973 placed it in a better position than the other regional 
powers to influence the politics of the Horn. 
Saudi Arabia's emphasis on giving aid to Muslims was best demonstrated 
when it favoured the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) over the predominately 
Christian Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) when it split from the ELF in 
1970 fearing the possibility that the EPLF could be another South Yemen in the Red 
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Sea. 1"8 The Eritrian movement, the ELF, which identified itself as an Arab liberation 
movement, became one of Saudi Arabia's beneficiaries. Saudi Arabia's support to the 
ELF was substantially increased after 1975 when its security became threatened by 
Soviet and Arab radicalism in the region- To counter the threat, in 1976 it signed a 
defence pact with Egypt and Sudan 109 
The Saudis were very concerned about the Horn becoming an area of East- 
West confrontation because of the region's close proximity. They made King Kaled 
broker a rapprochement between Barre and Mot of Kenya in which Barre declared 
that any land claim would be settled by peaceful negotiation. They became Somalia's 
largest supporter when Somalia expelled the Russians in late 1977.110 Such a move, 
the Saudis believed, would keep superpower influence in the region to the minimum, 
as there would be no justification for intervention. "' After the 1977-78 Ogaden war, 
as well as increasing support to the ELF, it also financed Sudanese and Somali arms 
purchases. "2 Nevertheless it did not hesitate to terminate its aid to Somalia when the 
latter embraced scientific socialism as a guide to its policy, and aligned itself with the 
Soviet Union. 
Saudi Arabia's pragmatic considerations outweighed its ideological 
considerations whenever an opportunity was offered to serve national interests. It was 
political opportunism, rather than ideology, which dominated its foreign policy in the 
Horn. This is best demonstrated by Saudi Arabia's reversal of its aid policy in the 
region when, from its base in Sudan, radical Islam became a threat to stability. 
Reversing its previous stance, Riyadh became the EPLF's largest bilateral aid donor, 
when in 1994, the latter severed diplomatic relations with Sudan over Sudan's 
intrusive attempt to export Muslim fundamentalism to Eritrea. 113 
Libya 
Libya's involvement in Horn politics could be classified as opportunistic. It frequently 
switched sides and its foreign policy is labelled as erratic and unpredictable. 
114 Driven 
by the zeal for Islam, Libya gave aid to the ELF, in association with other Arab states. 
This aid was increased when Colonel Gaddafi and his fellow officers seized power in 
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1969. `Arms were transported to South Yemen, then whisked across the narrow sea to 
scattered points on the long Eritrean coast'. t'' However, Libya's commitment to the 
ELF was abandoned in favour of the new Ethiopian regime and a three-part` 
agreement, which included South Yemen, was signed in Aden in 1981. The agreement 
provided Ethiopia and Yemen with a generous supply of arms. ' 6 The Aden Treaty's 
intention was perceived to be hostile to both Somalia and Sudan: this raised US 
commitment to the region and led to President Carter's creation of the Rapid 
Deployment Force. ' 17 
Prior to the Ogaden war, Libya actively supported the Siad Barre regime. 
However, when Bane abandoned scientific socialism and associated his country with 
conservative Arab countries and the US, Libya withdrew its support and, from 1978 to 
1985, gave generous assistance to the SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Forces) in 
collaboration with Ethiopia. ' 1$ 
Libya's response to a changing situation and new opportunities was further 
demonstrated when it switched alliance to the SPLA in retaliation to Nimeiri's 
support of the Camp David Accord. However, it terminated its support after Nimeiri's 
downfall, and military and financial aid was switched to Sadiq-el-Mahdi when he 
returned to power as prime minister in 1986. In addition, Libyan fighter and bomber 
planes were reported to have participated in support of Sudanese army operations 
against the SPLA. ' 19 Enthusiasm for continuing a close relationship declined when 
Sadiq-el-Mahadi was overthrown by a coup d 'etat led by el Bashir in 1989. Recent 
beneficiaries of Libyan aid are Isayas Afworki of Eritrea and Aydeed of Somalia. The 
former was lured to join the Sahel regional organisation, COMSSS - an organisation 
believed to be financed by Gaddafi. 
Syria 
Syria, a radical Ba'thist state, entered into Horn politics primarily for ideological 
considerations. When the ELF declared itself as an Arab liberation movement fighting 
a reactionary Ethiopian pro-Israeli government, Syria offered assistance. In June 
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1963, it permitted the ELF to move its office from Cairo to Damascus when the 
reality of African politics pressurised Nasser to distance himself from secessionist 
movements. Its Muslim members were given military training at the Aleppo Military 
Academy. 120 Syria was the principal supplier of arms to the ELF before the 1967 
Arab-Israeli war. 121 
Although the supply of arms from Syria was limited, it is assumed by some 
that they were forwarded to the ELF with the consent of the Soviet Union, as the 
states of the arms' origin were Russia and Czechoslovakia. 122 Unlike Egypt, Syria 
was a non-Red Sea littoral state and this advantage enabled it to transgress the bounds 
of the OAU, as the OAU restrictions on interference in the territorial integrity of 
African states were not applicable. With Syrian arms, the ELF was able to transform 
its few hundred ill-equipped rebels into a 2000-strong guerrilla force. 123 
Iraq 
Iraq, another Ba'thist state like Syria, also supplied arms to the ELF through Sudan 
for ideological reasons, 124 as well as supplying Somalia with some Soviet-built 
arms. 125 In late 1987 and early 1988 Iraq supplied Sudan with large quantities of 
heavy weapons that included `rockets, rocket launchers, heavy guns and 
warplanes' 126 
After the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 Iraq, along with Libya and the US, 
was a major arms supplier to the Sudan. 12 7 Iraq's commitment continued until the 
beginning of the Gulf War in 1990. In response to Iraq's assistance, Sudan 
demonstrated its loyalty by supporting its benefactor when Iraq invaded Kuwait and 
paid the price of regional and international isolation. The precarious situation in which 
Sudan found itself gave Iran an opportunity to step in to replace Iraq. 
Iran 
In contrast to the Middle Eastern states, Iran is a latecomer to the intervention game. 
Even if it wanted to intervene, the presence of its opponent, Iraq, in the region would 
have been a significant obstacle. It was Sudan's isolation by its Arab neighbours and 
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the West that opened the door in 1992 for Iran to enter into the politics of the Horn as 
a major regional actor. 
To receive arms and oil supply Sudan had to pay a heavy price: it had to be 
prepared to promote the Islamic revolution from bases in its territory. This venture not 
only identified the INF (National Islamic Front) regime as a proponent of terrorism 
but also implicated Sudan as the breeding ground of international terrorists. It also 
threatened the neighbouring states of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya with the 
export of Muslim fundamentalism into their territories, a destabilising factor that 
would inflame the existing internal conflict in the region. In return for Sudan's 
collaboration, Iran agreed to finance $300 million worth of armaments from China. ' 2' 
In addition, Iran also provided military and financial assistance to Aydeed's faction 
the SNA (Somali National Alliance) 129 which was of concern to Ethiopia regarding its 
eastern border. 
Sudan's collaboration with Iran resulted in the severance of diplomatic 
relations by Eritrea in December 1994 and its offer to the opposition movement, 
NDA, (National Democratic Alliance) to establish its headquarters in the buildings of 
the Sudanese embassy in its capital, Asmara. 130 It also led to a decline in its 
relationship with Ethiopia and the reinstatement of SPLA bases inside Ethiopian 
territory. Of more concern to the Sudan was the formation of an anti-Sudan alliance 
by three of its neighbours supported by the US. Its sponsorship of international 
terrorism and its alleged production of chemical weapons in industries located close to 
Khartoum led the US government to respond with the firing of cruise missiles in 
1998. Iran's involvement in the Sudan has greatly heightened the tension of inter-state 
conflict in the Horn region. 
Israel 
Apart from its historical connection with the Ethiopian people, Israel's interest in the 
Horn of Africa stemmed from its geographical location in the Red Sea. Egyptian 
attempts to blockade the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, the southern entrance to the Red 
Sea, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war convinced Israel that forming a friendly alliance 
of some sort with a Red Sea littoral state was an issue of priority. Ethiopia, a Christian 
country and a Red Sea littoral state at the time, also felt threatened by Arab 
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encirclement and was anxious to maintain a close relationship with Israel which was 
in a similar predicament. As a result, by the mid-1950s, the two non-Arab countries 
on the Red Sea coast, `both Israel and Ethiopia had come to view the other as a 
natural ally against pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism' 131 and formed a tacit alliance to 
coordinate their activities in order to counter Arab encirclement. 
Israel's interest in the region emanated from her concerns about guarding 
access to the Red Sea. It considered Eritrea's breakaway from Ethiopia as too 
detrimental to its security to be ignored, realising that the success of the insurgents 
would put Eritrea in the Arab camp either as a fully-fledged member or as a satellite. 
Such a move would bring into reality the dream of the Arab countries to rename the 
Red Sea as the Arabian Sea and to have full control over the entire passage and its 
outlet to the Indian Ocean. Arab ambition over the dominance of the Red Sea was 
echoed by Mohammed Hassan Haikal, editor of Egypt's Al Ahram, on 4 July 1969 in 
an article in which he declared `the Red Sea ought to become an `Arab Lake'. Later in 
the same paper (27 October 1972), he proposed `the establishment of an Arab naval 
command to control this waterway'. 132 Israel's fear of the closure of the Red Sea is 
best expressed by a Pravda article of 4 May 1977: 
The ELF's exploitation of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic rhetoric, in the 1960s, led strategic 
analysts on the Arab and Israeli sides to assume that an independent Eritrean state would align 
itself with the Arab world. If so, according to Israeli perception, the Red Sea would become an 
Arab lake, providing the Arab states with the capability to threaten Israeli shipping in the 
southern Red Sea region. ... 
Israel took this threat seriously. ... 
Thus, in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s the war in Eritrea was viewed by Israel as well as the Arabs as a southerly 
extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 133 
Stopping the Arabs from turning the Red Sea into an `Arab lake' became a priority for 
the Israelis. Israel's military support, which was second to that of the US, 
concentrated on counter-insurgency training for the Ethiopian special forces and 
sharing intelligence on Arab activities in the Horn region. In addition, it participated 
actively in the establishment and training of the airborne unit at Debre Zeit in the 
vicinity of the main air base situated fifty kilometres South-east of Addis Ababa along 
the railway line to Djibouti. It has also given commando training to some battalions of 
the 3rd Infantry Division, stationed mostly in the Ogaden region of Harar. The 
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training of the 5th Commando Battalion is particularly noteworthy because it was the 
elite strike force of the command. 134 In return, `Israel was allowed to establish a naval 
base on the Dahlek islands from which it could contribute to the free flow of Israeli 
shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb straights'. 135 This close relationship was 
maintained even when Ethiopia was pressurised by the regional initiative of African 
states to sever diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973. During the 1977-78 Ogaden 
war when the Carter administration cut off the arms supply to Ethiopia on the grounds 
of human rights violations by the Derg regime, Israel supplied vital spare parts for the 
US-supplied weapons. 136 
Furthermore, from 1967 Israel was involved in assisting the Anya Nya 
guerrillas via Uganda to further weaken Arab unity and strength. By exploiting this 
option Israel estimated that it could at least tie down Sudanese troops - which, during 
the Six Day War, were occupying positions along the Suez Canal - to fighting 
insurgents within Sudanese territory. 137 
The sub-state dimension 
As noted earlier, sub-state actors were operating domestically prior to the involvement 
of global and regional actors in the region in pursuit of exercising democratic rights or 
achievement of self-determination by movements such as the ELF in Eritrea, Anya 
Nya in the Sudan and the WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front) in Ethiopia. 
However, opposition to undemocratic central rule gained momentum and the numbers 
of anti-government movements increased when authoritarian governments, which put 
complete reliance on arms to solve national problems, ascended to power in Sudan, 
Ethiopia and Somalia. The liberation and secessionist movements mentioned below 
are not the only ones that operated in the sub-region during the Cold War. The 
discussion will focus on the major opposition and secessionist movements that have 
relevance to the power politics in the region. 
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The ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) 
The ELF was established in 1961, preceded by meetings of its founding members held 
in Cairo and Saudi Arabia in 1960138 in opposition to the Emperor's harsh rule and 
repressive policies towards Eritrea. The ELF was a predominantly Muslim 
organisation with strong pro-Arab sentiments. Its leaders came from the tribes living 
in Eritrea's western lowlands adjoining the Sudan_ As the time of its formation 
coincided with the rise of pan-Arabism under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nassar, 
the ELF benefited from Arab assistance from states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Iraq and Kuwait and the Eritrean community living in Arab countries. 139 
However, due to its pro-Arab policy and its declaration as an Arab liberation 
movement, the ELF failed to attract the sympathy of Christian highlanders and was 
unable to establish its presence in the economically rewarding areas of population. As 
a result, its military operations were limited to small-scale attacks against isolated 
border posts from its rear bases in Sudan. 
The ELF's fighting ability grew when radical Christian intellectuals joined its 
ranks in opposition to Haile Selassie's unilateral abrogation of the federation in 1962 
- an act which reduced Enrea's status `to a mere province 
in a centralised 
kingdom'. '`" This advantage, however, had drawbacks. The ELF's pro-Arabism 
policy was challenged by the growing number of radical students with Marxist 
leanings who demanded a revision of policy based on ideology. When the leadership 
reacted by suppressing and, in extreme cases, eliminating the radicals, the 
movement's main occupation became fighting factionalism rather than the Ethiopian 
security forces. '41 Factionalism grew as more support came from China and Cuba. 
Ultimately the movement was split into the ELF and PLF in 1968. A further split of 
the PLF came about when some 300 Christian members were purged, leading to the 
formation of the EPLF in 1972.142 
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The EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) 
The EPLF was formed in October 1972 resulting from an amalgamation of the PLF 
(People's Liberation Forces) mostly Muslims, and highland Christian guerrillas 
operating around Asmara, mostly known as the Ala group. 143 Uniting the two forces 
was a difficult task as their programmes of action differed widely and were 
incompatible. The former followed a religion-oriented policy while the latter pursued 
an ideology-based one. The strong stand of the Ala group on a policy based on 
ideology is best reflected in Isayas's remark made against the policy of the ELF: 
Should one opt to face butchery because one was born a Christian or should one surrender to 
the enemy? Both are abominable ... 
both mean death. To make neither choice is tantamount to 
sitting on the edge of a sharp blade. We are the fighters who chose to sit on the edge of the 
sharp blade. ... We are 
freedom fighters not preachers of the gospel. ' 44 
It adopted Marxist ideology and its guerrilla fighters were trained in Syria, China and 
by Cubans in South Yemen. 145 This approach alienated it from. conservative Arab 
governments such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait which feared that the influence 
of communism in neighbouring areas could affect their societies. However, whenever 
opportunity and pragmatism demanded, as noted earlier, countries such as Saudi 
Arabia assisted the EPLF. 
The EPLF's rationale for waging an armed struggle was to attain self- 
determination, which was denied to the Eritrean people prior to the abrogation of the 
federation in 1962. Their argument opened a debate on the issue of territorial integrity 
vis-a-vis the right to self-determination. Politically, they argued that their case did not 
contravene the territorial right of a sovereign state, as Ethiopia illegally annexed 
Eritrea against the expressed wish of the people. As the international community 
failed to protect their right of self-determination, the EPLF argue that they were 
forced to Win their right through the force of arms. They stressed that their case did 
not fall strictly within the parameters of the Ethiopian territorial state. 
146 On the other 
hand, the Ethiopian government invoked its right to territorial integrity and 
suppressed dissent by force. In this endeavour it was assisted by arms supplied by the 
superpowers to maintain national integrity both against foreign aggression and 
143 David Pool, The Eritrean People's Liberation Movement' in Christopher Clapham (ed ), African Guerrillti' (James 
Currey Ltd, Oxford 1998), p. 24. 
144 Cited in ibid., p. 24. A translated text in Liberation, published by Eritrean for Liberation in North America (Bent(-vn. 'March 
1973). 
145 John Young, 'The Tigray and Eritrean People's Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism' (Die Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, Cambridge 1998), p. 109. 
146 Ruth Iyob, 'Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa' (The Journal of. 1lodern of African 
Studies. Vol. 31, No. 2.1993), pp. 270-273. 
80 
internal dissent. So, the issue became a conundrum that could not be solved peacefully 
unless the contending sides changed their policies and agreed to solve the complex 
security problem that was adversely affecting the lives of the civilian population. 
Ethiopia's territorial integrity claim was weakened by the policies it adopted to 
administer Eritrea while it was under federal rule. Instead of winning the hearts and 
minds of the Eritrean population it implemented policies that alienated the population 
from the Ethiopian central government. The Emperor's government failed to realise 
that, during the ten-year federal government, the Eritrean people had enjoyed a 
parliamentary tradition in which parties functioned without fear of interference from 
the administrative powers. The federal administration performed its internal tasks 
independently of the central government which itself was only responsible for defence 
and foreign affairs; it ran its own judiciary and police force and the citizens were fully 
aware of their democratic rights -a privilege they exercised for the ten years of 
federal rule. 
When Haile Selassie abolished the federation without the prior consent of the 
Eritrean population, all the democratic rights and privileges that they had previously 
enjoyed were automatically cancelled. It was not lack of understanding of the 
sensitivity of the issue at stake that led the Emperor to rely on force but fear of the 
challenges coming from the rest of the Ethiopian people. Loss of authority was not a 
prospect that could be entertained and he preferred to continue with his autocratic 
feudal rule and to apply the same over annexed Eritrea. Like all dictators, Selassie's 
main interest was focused on obtaining support for building a strong force in the 
region in order to prevent his citizens from challenging his authority and to keep 
intact the territorial integrity of his state. He was encouraged by a US response of 
military aid and diplomatic support. Dawit Wolde Giorgis described the untimely step 
taken to abrogate Eritrea's federal status by commenting: 
Haile Selassie set out at once to turn federalism into complete reunification. He did nothing to 
ensure Eritrea's special status.... He attempted to rule Eritrea as he did the rest of the country. 
Political parties and trade unions were banned. The Ethiopian flag replaced the Eritrean flag, 
and Ethiopian law was introduced. Even before reunification, the government was called the 
Eritrean administration under Haile Selassie. ' 
147 
This short-sighted act sowed the seeds of dissent, leaving dissidents with no other 
choice except to challenge the government's authority by waging an armed struggle to 
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reinstate federal rights to the Eritrean people. John Markakis, an authority on the 
region, described the reaction to forced integration as follows: 
Ethiopia's imperial regime saw federation as the first step towards annexation. ... 
In a 
relentless campaign that involved intrigue, extortion, bribery and naked force, the imperial 
regime emasculated Eritrea's autonomy, demolished the democratic experiment, destroyed its 
own ally, the Unionist Party, and finally annexed Eritrea in 1962. The first resistance 
movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), had been founded two years earlier. t" 
The Emperor's failure to perceive the true nature and cause of the ensuing problem, 
worked in favour of his enemies. It helped the liberation movements win the 
sympathy of the majority of the population. It enabled them to mobilise public 
support, attract large numbers of volunteers, persevere and thrive. Before abolishing 
the status of the federation, had he given democratic rights to his countrymen, he 
could have eliminated the cause of resentment and would have been able to rally the 
support of the majority of the Eritrean people on his side. Thus, the Emperor missed a 
golden opportunity. '49 
A second opportunity to settle the civil war in Eritrea was missed by the Derg 
in 1974. General Amman, an Eritrean and a highly popular military figure, who was 
appointed as head of the provisional military government, was in an ideal position to 
bring peace to the country. On taking office he gave top priority to the Eritrean issue 
and, accompanied by a team of government officials, flew to Asmara to address the 
people and propose a peaceful solution. He strongly believed that negotiation was the 
way forward. Besides the capital city of the province Asmara, he visited Keren, 
Akordat, Tessenei and Massawa and talked to many people. He conducted long 
discussions with prominent and influential elders who were very open in expressing 
their views because, being an offspring of the region, they trusted him and accepted 
him as their own son. The insurgents appreciated his approach and were willing to 
enter into serious talks. However, he, and his plans for Eritrea, fell victim to the power 
politics within the Derg and Mengistu's climb to power. Unfortunately, his good 
intention was misconstrued by some overambitious reactionary Derg members 
(mostly NCOs) with Mengistu at the helm, and Amman was obstructed from pursuing 
his aim at a time when much hope was in prospect. 
i5' 
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His ethnic origin was exploited to the maximum in order to bring about his 
untimely downfall, and he was maliciously accused of supporting the secession of 
Eritrea from Ethiopia. When he resigned his post and stayed at home in his residence, 
those Derg members who instigated his demise, anticipated the possibility of a coup 
d' etas staged by the army in the general's support as very likely. Out of fright and in 
desperation they took a hurried decision to execute him and 59 high officials of the 
past regime. The general died in a gun battle resisting arrest at his residence. The 
political prisoners who were kept in a special converted prison which once served as a 
cellar of the old palace (within the Derg s Headquarters) while awaiting trail, were 
executed on the same day by a firing squad. l5' 
Thereafter, the Christian population, which has a strong traditional and 
cultural tie with the Ethiopian highlanders, lost hope of solving the Eritrean debacle 
through negotiation and pinned its hope on the EPLF and joined its ranks en masse. 
The iron-fist rule applied in the province, and the conviction that peace could only be 
attained through force of arms exacerbated the existing fragile situation and 
contributed greatly to eroding further the loyalty of the highlanders who initially 
supported the federal unity of Eritrea and Ethiopia. ' 52 
The internecine struggle for dominance that erupted between the ELF and the 
EPLF further exacerbated instability in the region by bringing liberated areas under 
fierce internecine fighting and prolonging the struggle for self-determination. Their 
programme of action cannot be reconciled as they were pursuing two opposed policies 
and, as a result, their internal struggle, which was bloody, continued until the EPLF 
defeated the ELF and by the early 1980s became the dominant force in the struggle 
for independence. 153 
Notwithstanding that Sudan favoured the ELF over the EPLF on ideological 
grounds it took a pragmatic approach and continued its collaboration with the EPLF, 
allowing the latter to use Sudanese territory as a safe haven, recruiting and training 
151 Day: -it Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears, p. 19; David A. Koran, Ethiopic, the United States and the Soviet Union, 1974-19S5 
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ground of its forces until it defeated the Ethiopian army in battle and occupied the 
capital city of Asmara in May 1991 by defying `the old nostrum that Civil wars in 
Africa were rarely won' , 
154 
By the 1980s the EPLF's strength had grown and, after establishing a firm 
base in Nakfa, it began pursuing a conventional war. This strategy, which entailed a 
higher casualty rate, demanded the forging of an alliance with the TPLF to fight a 
common enemy, the Derg. The alliance they formed was a `marriage of convenience' 
as both organisations had different outlooks on a number of issues such as strategy, 
training methods, recruitment policy, policy on prisoners and, most importantly. the 
interpretation of self-determination. In fact, the issue of self-determination became a 
bone of contention that ended harmonious ties from June 1985 to April 1988. 's' The 
EPLF was waging a war of liberation and not a struggle for representation. »)6 
However, when the situation deteriorated within the Derg army, pragmatism prevailed 
and `the politburos of the EPLF and the TPLF decided to coordinate their struggle on 
the basis of common views and aims. ' 157 The TPLF had to pay a price that it could 
regret in the future. Irrespective of different political outlooks, the opportunity to 
defeat the Derg army in cooperation with the EPLF and the possibility of seizing 
government power was so tempting, it became a factor that greatly influenced the 
TPLF to recognise the EPLF's demand for Eritrea's independence upon defeating the 
Derg army. This political difference, which was highlighted during the days of 
struggle, may somehow have contributed to the Bademe debacle which brought the 
two states to war in May 1998 - an incident which will be covered in some detail in 
the next chapter. 
The TPLF (Tegrean People's 
. 
'beration Front) 
The TPLF was formed as a partnership between peasants and students in Tigrai 
province in February 1975 as a result of the perception that Tigreans were not granted 
equal opportunities in the central government. Its emphasis lay on national, rather 
than class, representation. 158 
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It was a Marxist organisation which adopted the Albanian revolution as its 
principal guideline and remained as a minor guerrilla force until 1984. Its principal 
supporter was the EPLF which acted as the senior partner throughout the duration of 
the struggle. Both closely co-ordinated their operations until they jointly defeated the 
Derg army in 1991. Although the TPLF differed on a number of issues with the 
EPLF, as noted above, its lack of resources prevented it from fighting the Derg army 
independently. It benefited a great deal when Ethiopian forces defected in great 
numbers after the 1984 famine. Its major strength was its ability to rally the support of 
the peasants in the zone of its control by winning their hearts and minds. Like the 
other anti-revolutionary movements, its members were also given sanctuary in the 
Sudan. Towards the end of the struggle it formed surrogate movements, such as the 
EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement), OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) 
and the FOM (Free Officers' Movement) to beef up its strength and to enable it 
operate outside Tigrai province. Finally, to convince the Ethiopian population of its 
intentions, it transformed itself to embrace all nationalities and adopted a new name - 
the EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front). This strategy 
worked in its favour and in 1989, with the help of its surrogate movements, the TPLF 
was able to operate in the Wollo, Gondar and northern Shoa regions. ' )9 This is the 
current ruling party and it has been in power since May 1991. This organisation will 
be discussed further in Chapter 3 when dealing with events that took place in the 
region at the end of the Cold War. 
The Anya Nya 
In 1955 the government of Khartoum, fearing that the continued stationing of south 
Sudanese forces in the south would be detrimental to Sudan's unity, devised a plan to 
transfer some of the troops to the north and replace them with northerners. On 28 
August 1955 the troops at Tont mutinied and some of them went to the bush with 
their arms and started disorganised guerrilla activities. When other forces in the 
districts of Juba, Yei, Yambio and Maridi followed suit, the government was forced to 
move forces to the south to apprehend the deserters and bring the rebellion under 
control. 160 Further repression by government forces aligned prominent southern 
leaders in exile to form the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union 
(SACDNU) at Kinshasa in Zaire (then the Belgian Congo) in 1962 where, at the time, 
159 Ibid., pp. 392-93 
160 Ibid., p. 40; Edgar O'Balance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-72. (Faber and Faber Limited., London 1977), p. 41. 
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UN forces were deployed to stop the country's disintegration. The SACDNU, later 
changed to the SAND, appealed to the UN and OAU but received no response. 
On 19 September 1963, while the quarrel among southern politicians was 
diverting their attention from events in the field, a group of guerrilla leaders held a 
conference at a forest camp and agreed to form a united front under the leadership of 
`Major-General' Emilio Tafeng, a former lieutenant in the Sudanese Defence Forces 
(SDF). They named their organisation Anya Nya, which in the local languages of 
Madi, Moru and Lotuko languages means `snake poison '. 161 
In November 1964, the raids they subsequently conducted against government 
forces in the south led to the resignation of the military government of President 
Abboud, 162 a situation which paved the way for outside intervention forces - Egypt 
and the Soviet Union (a major arms supplier since 1969) on the government side, and 
Israel and Ethiopia on the Anya Nya side. The latter two governments assisted in 
training and supplied arms, each motivated by the promotion of national interest. 
Israel's intervention stemmed from the military support given by Sudan to Egypt 
during the Six Day War of 1967 and the role it played in organising a conference in 
Khartoum immediately afterwards to coordinate Arab action against Israel, 163 
notwithstanding that the contingent of one battalion Sudan sent to the Suez Canal area 
never saw action because of its late arrival. 164 
Ethiopia's intervention, which mostly involved facilitating the delivery of 
Israeli weapons and allowing training bases inside its territory, 165 took place in 
retaliation to the support given to the ELF by Sudan. An ideal training base inside 
Ethiopia was given to them at a place called Bilpham, situated in an isolated location 
by the river Barro some 30 kms west of Garnbella town, where facilities for fishing 
and river communication were excellent. In addition, sufficient financial and material 
assistance was given by the Haile Selassie government to Anya Nya fighters to enable 
them to do sufficient damage to act as a leverage and threaten further escalation in 
order to force the Sudanese government to stop helping and harbouring Eritrean 
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insurgents. Once the destabilising effect of Anya Nya was fully recognised by the 
Sudanese government, Emperor Haile Selassie was in a favourable position to broker 
a peace agreement between Anya Nya and the Sudanese government in Addis Ababa 
in 1972.166 In return, the emperor's effort was rewarded by an agreement concluded 
with Ga'afar al-Numeiri whereby his government promised to refrain from supporting 
Eritrean insurgents. Thus the civil war in the south and the era of the Anya Nya ended 
peacefully and Sudan had the opportunity to focus on development and economic 
growth until a decade later, in 1983, the Addis Ababa peace agreement was revoked 
by Numeiri and a second civil war broke out. 
The SPLA/SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement) 
As noted above, the revocation of the Addis Ababa agreement and the introduction of 
the September Laws (Sharia), which denied the southerners the practice of their 
democratic rights, sparked a second round of civil war. Numeiri retracted from his 
peaceful policies of the 1970s to conform to events happening in the region at the 
time. A brief survey of the political situation would therefore be appropriate before 
analysing the SPLAISPLM to clearly understand the change in circumstances. 
Although there was no inter-state conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia per se 
and peaceful diplomatic relations existed between the two countries for a long time, it 
does not mean that their relationship was always amicable. Specifically, differences 
over security issues, which were matters of grave concern, existed throughout the 
Cold War era. Maintaining a continuous diplomatic relationship was a matter of 
outward appearances -a picture which both governments wanted to portray. When 
challenged, the support given to opposing liberation movements by both states was 
simply dismissed as humanitarian acts limited to harbouring refugees and no more -a 
gesture, which all states of the international community, are expected to extend. 
By this time, a socialist-oriented military government that attracted Soviet 
attention in the area had replaced Haile Selassie's government. Sudan, which had 
broken off its relationship with the Soviet Union and was now enjoying a good 
relationship with the US, did not like the build-up of Soviet influence in a 
neighbouring country. Furthermore, it was under pressure from Arab countries to 
resume helping the Eritrean liberation movements in order to destabilise the pro- 
166 John Markakis. Resource Conflict in the Horn of Ifricm, pp. 118-119. 
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communist regime of Addis Ababa while it was still in its infancy and before it 
endangered Arab and Western interests in the region. 
One important marker was the Aden Treaty of 1981 linking Libya, Ethiopia and South 
Yemen (all armed by the Soviet Union) into a pattern of superpower checkers on the board of 
north-east Africa, with the USA supporting Egypt, Sudan and Somalia. In the following years 
Sudan was to become an ever more important base. The EPLF's use of the route from Port 
Sudan as well as the camps in eastern Sudan was not just known but well publicised. '`' 
Ga'afar al-Numeiri, fully confident of his American and Arab allies' support, not only 
resumed helping the Eritrean liberation movements as instructed, but went beyond 
and introduced Sharia law - an act which demanded the initiation of constitutional 
changes to facilitate the establishment of the Islamic republic. His rationale was based 
on drawing the support of the traditional parties of the north, completely overlooking 
the sensitive issue that his act was likely to provoke bitter opposition amongst the 
South Sudanese population. 168 He also planned to transport the oil, discovered in 
Bentiu, by pipeline to the north, denying the southerners the benefit of employment 
and their fair share of the profits. Further, he started building the Jonglai canal 
between Pibor and Malakal in cooperation with the Egyptians whose objective was to 
drain the marshland and turn it into a modem agricultural enterprise by settling 
Egyptians and North Sudanese who were either unemployed or were desperate to 
acquire suitable agricultural land. This meant pushing the displaced South Sudanese 
further south and changing the lifestyle of the inhabitants and the ecology of the area. 
During the dry season the marshland is a great attraction for a variety of wildlife 
which migrates from as far south as Kenya and Uganda in search of grazing land. 
Once the marshland was drained, the southerners feared that tampering with the 
ecosystem would bring environmental changes that would force the native population 
to abandon cattle raising and wild game hunting for food, their main occupation-'69 
The area's potential as a future tourist attraction would also diminish. This act of 
President Numeiri not only infuriated the southerners but also convinced them that the 
only option left at their disposal was to take up arms and stop the plans of the 
northerners without delay. 170 
167 Peter Woodward. Te Horn ofA frica. p. 122- 
168 John Marl akis, Resource C: onflict in the Horn of_4frica. p. 121. 
169 INd., p. 66. 170 Author's notes: The point was raised by SPLA/M leadership in 1983 upon their arrival in Ethiopia when they presented their 
case to the government to allow them the use of a base to conduct an armed struggle. The author was present at the meeting 
representing the ministry of defence. It should be noted that the leader of SPLA/SPLM, Colonel John Garang did his PhD 
thesis on the ecosystem of the kmglai canal; The SPLA in Focus' (frica Confidential, Vol. 2 9, No. 8,15 Apn1 1988 1 
88 
Before their indignation faded out, scores of South Sudanese politicians, 
government officials, civil servants and military commanders crossed into Ethiopia 
and sought refuge there in 1983. They organised themselves and created the 
SPLA/SPLM movement, under the leadership of Colonel John Garang de Mabior. to 
wage armed struggle inside South Sudan. What differentiated the SPLA/SPLM from 
its predecessor, the Anya Nya, was its military objective -a complete break with the 
past and a new approach. `Ideologically, the most notable feature of the movement 
was its aim not of secession for the south, but for a radical "New Sudan". ' "' As 
presented in the SPLM manifesto, Sudan's repressive rule did not limit itself to South 
Sudan; other groups were in the same predicament and the solution perceived by the 
SPLM leadership was to aim for `national unity' and forge an alliance of all dissident 
elements under the banner of a real democratic Sudan. The other rationale for 
adopting such a policy was to rally support from neighbouring countries which 
strongly opposed secession because they were waging war against secessionist forces 
within their territory. Woodward rightly commented that `opponents of Numeiri in the 
north and outside Sudan could be involved in the attack on his weakening position, 
while the SPLA's Ethiopian hosts would hardly be favourable to succession in view 
of the wars in Eritrea and Tigrai' provinces. ' 72 
The Derg agreed with the SPLA's national political objective, seized the 
opportunity and started assisting and organising them to counter Numeiri's assistance 
and coordination of Arab support to the Eritrean liberation movements. The only 
exception among the Arab countries in the region was Gaddafi, who was enraged by 
`Sudan's continuing connection with Egypt, the outcast of the Arab world''" 
preferred to help Numeiri's opponents by aligning his strategy with the rulers of 
Ethiopia. Gaddafi was only too eager to exploit the situation that occurred in South 
Sudan by giving material and financial assistance to the SPLA/SPLM. Earlier on in 
1976, he also supported the aborted coup against Numein. 
The Ethiopian village of Itang, situated some 50 kms from the border post, 
which was flooded with Sudanese refugees, became the major source of manpower 
supply. As the aim of all the refugees was to take up arms, return to their villages and 
drive Numeiri's soldiers from their territory, there was no need for the SPLA/ SPLM 
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to politicise its recruits. They were already fuelled with anger and indignation at the 
suffering they had already gone through as a result of Numeiri's discriminatory 
policy. With assistance and support from Ethiopia and Libya, unlimited and 
committed human resources waiting for an invitation to be utilised, and with a 
sufficient number of experienced officers available to take up leadership posts, the 
only remaining factor that needed attention was the exploitation of the ideal 
opportunity. The movement was lucky in having Colonel (Dr. ) John Garang, an 
experienced military leader and an intellectual, who seized the opportunity, trained 
and organised his men and continued the military struggle in the shortest possible time 
after purging some dissident elements who tried to polarise the movement by 
introducing factionalism. 
Libya, one of SPLA's main supporters withdrew its support after the demise of 
Nimeiri and switched sides to assist Mahadi's government in the Sudan as already 
noted earlier. Iran, a latecomer to the region also gave substantial help to the el-Bashir 
Islamic government in the early 1990s. Furthermore, Garang lost the assistance and 
base facilities of his main backer, Ethiopia, when the Mengistu regime was ousted in 
May 1991. This series of mishaps incited internal upheavals that culminated in a 
challenge to the leadership and a split of the movement into tribal factions -a 
drawback which forced the SPLA to change its strategy from the offensive to the 
defensive. It has now recovered and its struggle has achieved rapid progress since it 
formed an alliance with the leading northern Sudanese opposition parties, the Umma 
and the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party). 
The WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front) 
The WSLF is a guerrilla organisation of the Ogaden nomads formed in 1961, shortly 
after Somalia's independence, by Ethiopian Ogadenis who are part of the grand 
Darod 
family of Somali clans (see Table 2.1, p. 51) with a programme of freeing 'West 
Somalia from Ethiopian colonialism' instigated by pan-Somalia propaganda. The 
origin of the WSLF's struggle stemmed from the five pointed stars engraved 
in the 
Somali Republic flag, which purports the unity of all Somali inhabited areas, out of 
which the Ogaden is one. 
174 The organisation had a double character. The first 
coincided with its primary aim, the restoration of the Ogden, which 
fell within the 
umbrella of Somalia irredentism. As a surrogate organisation the 
WSLF was 
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encouraged and supported by the Somali government with the aim of mobilising and 
preparing it for an armed struggle against Ethiopia, primarily with the object of 
paving the way for a united homogeneous Somalia. '75 Its second role was to serve as a 
cover for the Somali government, showing the WSLF as a movement that struggled 
for liberation by the Ogadeni Somali inhabitants without implicating Somalia in the 
pursuit of irredentism. 176 As noted by Marina Ottaway: 
The concentration of many Ogadeni nomads in Somali government famine-relief camps 
facilitated a WSLF recruitment drive. The revamped WSLF began to receive arms and 
training from Somalia. The latter also arranged for some WSLF members to receive 
instruction abroad - in the Soviet Union, Cuba and North Korea. 77 
The WSLF activities in Ethiopia were curtailed during 1967-68 when the Shermarke- 
Egal administration distanced itself from irredentism. It pursued a policy of tMtente 
with Ethiopia and Kenya and normalised relations by stopping hostile propaganda 
against both states and resumed trade, air and communication links with Ethiopia. 178 
This decision had challenged the essence of irredentism and rationale for maintaining 
the WSLF. However, when pressure mounted on the reinstatement of past activities 
and the response was negative, the government was overthrown by a military coup in 
1969 that brought Siad Barre to power. 
Barre continued with the pan-Somalia policy, the only unifying factor that 
stops the nation from going back to traditional clannism. When the situation in 
Ethiopia became unstable after the 1974 revolution, he took advantage of the 
circumstances and in 1975 permitted the WSLF to operate from Somalian territory, 
allowing his soldiers to fight with the front until they jointly captured the whole of the 
Ogden in 1977.179 However, the war that brought the Ogden under Barre rule was 
reversed when the Ethiopians, with the help of Soviet armaments and Cuban troops, 
defeated Barre in 1978 -a major setback for the WSLF. 
The importance of the WSLF during the Cold War was its impact as a lever to 
put pressure on successive Somali governments to practise irredentism irrespective of 
its negative consequences both internally and internationally. As noted above, it was 
mostly WSLF pressure that ended the detente policy pursued by the Shermarke-Egal 
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government. Bane considered the Ogadenis as loyal forces and some of its members 
such as Defence Minister Major-General Adan Abdullah Nuur Gabiyu, attained the 
highest military positions. ls" The coup attempt after Barre's defeat was partly in 
response to Bane's failure to unite the Ogden with its motherland, Somalia. In 
Somalia, support for the WSLF - which, in other words, means the pursuit of 
irredentism - was essential for any government if it wanted to stay in power. Even 
after defeat, Bane had no alternative but to continue with his support for the WSLF 
against the advice of the Carter government. '8' In retaliation to Barre's support, the 
Ethiopian government took advantage of the existing circumstances and supported 
anti-Bane movements such as the SSDF and SNM. Their activities forced Barre to 
negotiate with Mengistu and sign a peace agreement in 1988 -a death warrant to the 
WSLF, which abrogates all forms of relationship with its patron, Somalia. In 
response, opposition movements within Ethiopia moved into Somalia and started 
fighting a ferocious battle for survival against government forces -a venture that 
ultimately brought about Barre's downfall, a return to clan idealism and, through its 
practice, the collapse of the Somali state. 
The SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Forces) 
The SSDF was formed after an attempted coup on Siad Barre by a group of senior 
officers in Somalia was foiled before it was put into action. Although many of the 
leading participants were captured, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf who, during the 1977-78 
Ethio-Somali war was a field commander heading the Southern Command, 
182 
managed to escape by crossing the border into Kenya and later on moved to Ethiopia 
to form the SSDF. In response to Barre's assistance to the WSLF, Ethiopia was 
willing to assist him in training and arming his forces. 
'83 Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, 
being a Majerteen was mostly only able to attract members of his own clan, a 
disadvantage that restricted his areas of operations inside Somalia. 
The Libyans, who initially supported Barre when he was preparing to invade 
Ethiopian territory to occupy the Ogaden, were offended when he changed 
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superpower backers and turned to the Americans for help. In retaliation, Libya 
abandoned Barre and became eager to help his opponents, specially the SSDF. From 
1980 until 1985, the SSDF was armed and financed by Gaddafi. 1M Libya supplied 
Colonel Abdullahi's forces with T-54 tanks, BM-13 rockets, 85mm artillery pieces, 
BTR-40 personnel carriers, mortars and small arms of different types. 18 Its initial 
operations, conducted from its bases at Warder and Gelladi inside Ethiopian Ogaden, 
were quite effective. However, when Bane retaliated by ordering his forces to operate 
indiscriminately against the entire Majerteen clan the movement was seriously 
handicapped and divisions within its rank created. Despite this disadvantage, it 
continued to harass government forces that were loyal to Barre. l8( ' 
The SNM (Somali National Movement) 
The SNM, like its associate the SSDF, was organised mostly from the Isaac clan that 
predominantly inhabits Northern Somalia. It did not enjoy the support enjoyed by the 
SSDF from Arab countries, relying mainly on finance from the worldwide Issaq 
diaspora and the Ethiopian army from 1984-88 until terminated by Mengistu after the 
1988 Peace Agreement with Siad Barre. 187 
This faction was able to attract some of the best officers of the army from the 
Isaac clan and enjoyed the full support of the northern population. Within a few 
months of its inception, the SNM was able to force Barre to shift most of his forces 
from the south to the northern region to tackle its incursions. This northward troop 
movement benefited other southern opposing forces by allowing them to operate 
much more freely within the periphery of their clan areas. 
SNM forces had collaborators within the Bane forces stationed in the north 
and, as a result, in 1986 were able to free all their comrades from the high-security 
prison situated inside Hargeisa town and assassinate key government officials. The 
assassination in December 1986 of the chief of security, in the North Western 
regional capital of Hargeisa, and, throughout 1986, the fierce military struggle that 
184 Christopher Clapham, African Guerrillas, p. 79; Hussien M. Adam, `Somali Civil Wars' in Taisier M. All and Robert 0. 
Matthews (eds), Civil F 'ar in Africa (McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal 1999), p. 188; Author's notes: the author 
was head of the Operations Department of the Ministry of Defence at the time and the SSDF, SNM and SPLA and others %%ere 
supervised, monitored and supported by a special sub-department of the Operations Department. The SSDF troops who were 
stationed at Warder were under the local command of the Ethiopian I1 th division commander -. c--ho has 
been visited by the 
author at least three times. In addition, Colonel Abduullahi, commander of SSDF, who resides in Addis Ababa had day-today 
contact with the author's office. 
185A 
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was waged in Hargeisa and other northern towns such as Burao, were made possible 
due to the collaboration of the Issac clan. Again on the evening of 27 May 1988, in 
collaboration with the people, `SNM guerrillas entered the city of Burao and 
assassinated all senior government and military ofcials. ' 88 
The movement faced a dilemma when a rapprochement was agreed between 
Barre and Mengistu -a choice between taking a swift action to occupy strategic areas 
in Somaliland or abandon their struggle. They chose the former: 
Anticipating expulsion from Ethiopia as a result of the agreement, the SNM launched a daring 
attack against the main towns of northern Somalia.... What shocked the Issac profoundly, and 
sealed their alienation from the Somali state, was the use of foreign mercenaries to fly the 
bombing raids that levelled the northern towns. " 
When Bane's troops failed to eliminate the SNM, Barre's rage became 
uncontrollable. The unswerving loyalty of the Issac clan to the SNM provoked Siad 
Barre's unrelenting `scorched earth' policy that gave authority to his forces to destroy 
Issac clan members and their property indiscriminately. ' 90 This had the opposite effect 
to that intended. 19' It hardened the will of the people and increased their commitment 
to rally around SNM causes. With the support of the people, it could confidently be 
said that the SNM played the leading role in eroding Siad Bane's power and 
facilitating his downfall. 
The United Somali Congress (USC) 
The USC cane late to the scene and was founded in Rome in 1989 by Ali Wardhigley 
who, until 1987, served as vice-president of the SNM. The USC has never been a 
united organisation. From its inception it lacked cohesion. It had two headquarters - 
one in Rome and another in London. At a later stage, the London group was 
represented by Mahadi, a rich merchant and leader of the Manifesto Group which 
tried to convince Barre to introduce reform but failed. Aydeed, who avoided joining 
USC-Rome, led the latter. He assembled a congress near the border town of Mustahil 
in June 1990, formed his own faction of the USC and established his headquarters in 
the area. Although the Derg government supported the USC, the division between the 
two groups prevented it from establishing a strong and unified leadership. 192 
199 Ibid, `Somalia: Showdown in the North' (Africa Confidential, Vol. 29, No. 15,29 July 1988). 
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Nevertheless, the importance of this movement lies in the fact that it was mostly 
composed of the Haweyi clan which lives in and around Mogadishu, an area where 
the SSDF and SNM were unable to operate because it lay outside their clan area. 
When the movement entered the Haweyi territory it won the support of its entire clan 
including that of the citizens of Mogadishu. Their involvement left Bane relying on 
his clan, the Marehans, who live far away from Mogadishu. 
The USC's effort was also assisted by the SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement). 
led by Colonel Omar Jess, which started operating in the Kismayo area with Ogaden 
soldiers who had deserted Barre after the rapprochement with Mengistu in 1989. 
Another element claimed the SPM label and formed its own front. It was headed by 
one of Siad Barre's former defence ministers, General Adan Abdullahi (`Gebivu') 
assisted by his son-in-law Colonel Bililigo. '93 Their entry into the struggle assisted the 
USC substantially and gave them room for manoeuvre. As a result, the USC was able 
to deliver the final coup de grace that ousted Siad Bane from power. 
However, once Barre was driven out of the country, the conflict changed its 
dimension and became centred on a power struggle between Aydeed and Al Mahadi 
(both Haweyies but from different sub-clans). They contended for the presidency and 
control of the capital city. The USC which comprised Haweyies, was divided into two 
sub-clan groups. Soon after, a third group led by Oto, another member of the 
Manifesto Group, who initially joined Aydeed and acted as his principal financier, 
emerged after breaking away from Aydeed's faction as a result of a row between him 
and Aydeed over the apportionment of finance. Despite the USC's victory and its 
control of the capital city, it could not exploit its hard won-victory, as it was 
embroiled in inter-sub-clan rivalry. Its centrality, if properly exploited, could have 
enabled it to form a broad-based national government that could have brought an end 
to the present suffering of the Somali people and the reincarnation of the Somali state. 
The Ethio-Eritrean 1998-2000 War 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Horn of Africa is noted not only for being an 
arena of consistent civil conflicts but also for staging an inter-state war. In May 1988, 
a border dispute over a barren land called Badme brought Ethiopia and Eritrea into an 
open conflict where vast numbers of troops and arsenals of modem weapons were 
19-3 Charles Gurdon (ed. ), The Horn ofA rica, p. 52. 
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employed on both sides. '94 Markets for more weapons were explored and new 
weapons of Russian origin were purchased from Soviet Union, former East European 
countries and China to strengthen firepower and maintain dominance over the 
battlefield. '95Among those purchased are modern tanks, artillery, multiple rockets 
(Stalin organ/BM-21), armed helicopters and planes (Mig-29, Su-27). '% Old Migs 
were despatched to Israel for upgrade and refurbishment. 197 Some analysts described 
the war as the biggest conflict since the Second World War in which over 500,000 
troops were deployed to fight. 198 Foreign military advisers and mercenaries were hired 
to man and maintain planes and sophisticated weapons that contributed in increasing 
the amount of destruction and giving a new dimension to the conflict in the sub- 
region. 199 UN's arms embargo against Ethiopia and Eritrea had no effect whatsoever 
for these two countries were the most militarised in the region and -had ample time to 
equip their armed forces before hostilities resumed in May 1999. '2 o) 
Although the governments in Asmara and Addis Ababa have been closely 
linked since their joint victory over the regime of ex-president Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, close scrutiny of events predating the Badme incident denotes that factors 
other than the border dispute were significant in eroding the amicable relationship that 
existed between the leadership of the two movements during the struggle against the 
Derg regime and in the early days of ascension to power. The causes of conflict are 
multiple. `01Several of these are discussed below. 
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Port blockage 
Prior to the Badme debacle, there was a serious complaint from Ethiopian 
businessmen regarding difficulties encountered while using the port of Assab. After 
failure to come to terms with their Eritrean counterparts, the delegation which was led 
by the secretary general of Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, Shiferaw Bekele, 
reported to the Ethiopian government that: 
Assab port officials do not respect international port regulations, notably in supplying 
importers with delivery waybills for merchandise.... The businessmen attacked the Eritreans' 
refusal to allow their agents access to the port premises and said the refusal prevented them 
from checking loading and unloading of their merchandise, resulting in loss, damage and even 
destruction of the merchandise. 202 
According to their estimate $285,000 worth of goods were frozen at Assab port. In 
addition, Ethiopia was annoyed about increased port charges. Because of the tension 
between Asmara and Addis Ababa, in mid-May 1997, Ethiopia re-routed its maritime 
trade via Djibouti, a move which exacerbated the already strained relations. 203 
Closure of Assab refinery 
In addition, the closure of the Assab refinery increased Ethiopia's motor fuel shortage. 
Securing an alternate reliable route to import fuel became mandatory and the 
Ethiopian government was quick to divert its maritime gateway to Djibouti; a move 
that was resented by Eritrea. Djibouti for its part welcomed the Ethiopian move 
because it allowed Djibouti to benefit from servicing Ethiopian import/export trade. 204 
Repatriation of troops 
Another cause of contention was the withdrawal by Eritrea of `several thousands of its 
solders still serving in the EPRDF armed forces, whereas Meles says he still needs 
them, notably in south-eastern Ethiopia where in recent months fundamental Islamic 
guerrillas have stepped up the rhythm of their activities. '205 At a time when Ethiopia 
needed the support of Eritrean troops, withdrawing them from sensitive areas meant 
putting Ethiopia's national security in great danger - an action that infuriated the 
Ethiopian authorities and contributed to the deterioration of bilateral relations. 
202 Jbid; `Ethiopia/Eritrea: Not happy «ith Assab' (The Indian Ocean . 
\'ewsletter. No. 758,22 March 1997). 
203 Ibid. 
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205 Ibid. 
97 
Introduction of the nakfa currency 
Since 1993 (the year Eritrea gained independence), Issayas Afeworki, the Eritrean 
President has sought to boost Eritrea's identity and sovereignty status at even, 
opportunity. One of the means he used was to introduce an independent currency. In 
November 1997, believing that an independent currency would Increase Eritrean 
autonomy and push the Addis Ababa authorities into assuming alone the charges of 
Ethiopia's debt (part of which is theoretically at least also owed by Eritrea)'206 Issayas 
introduced the nakfa after using the Ethiopian Birr for four years. This created a clash 
in economic interests that Widened the gulf between the two countries. Each side had 
different expectations about what the new Eritrean currency would mean for their 
bilateral trade. `While Eritrean officials wanted Ethiopia to accept the Nakfa in a one- 
to-one exchange rate with the Bin, Ethiopian officials instead demanded that Eritrea 
pay for all its goods in US dollars or in other hard currency which both sides 
lacked. '207 
Eritrea found Ethiopia's response to be `draconian and sudden'- a measure 
that took Eritrea by complete surprise. In particular, the imposition of payment in hard 
currency208on imports such as agricultural products essential to feed the population 
put Eritrea in an unbearable economic situation, a burden whose effects could not be 
tolerated. As Africa Research Bulletin expressed it, Ethiopia's action had the look of 
a vendetta. '209 
Eritrea responded by expelling 'Ethiopian officials from the lifeline ports of 
Assab and Massawa. In particular, the loss of Assab, which made Ethiopia a 
landlocked county, was highly disputed by the Ethiopian people. Amazed by the loss 
of Assab to Ethiopia a. senior US Defense Department official commented: `I know 
of no other country which voluntarily and amicably gave up its entire coastline. '210 
Telephone calls, this time, did not produce harmony. Small border disputes broke out, 
culminating, on May 6, in armed clashes. 
211 
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Eritrea, too, has suffered from the closure of Assab port. Ethiopia's boycotting 
of use of Assab port and directing its shippers to unload goods further south at 
Djibouti port `hurts Eritrea more than it does Ethiopia, as 18 per cent of Eritrea 's total 
revenues had been coming from duties and fees levied on Ethiopian goods coming 
through Assab. Eritrea is suffering even more from the conflict, which has suspended 
nearly all trade between the two countries. '212 In return, Ethiopia expelled several 
thousand Eritreans from its north-western province. 
Deportation of foreign nationals 
To eliminate the danger of fifth columnists, to deny enemy's nationals from benefiting 
in economic interests, both countries resorted to ethnic cleansing by harassing and 
expelling their opponent's nationals. Initially it started with the expulsion of Ethiopian 
nationals from Assab when the port was closed at a time when `Ethiopia allowed its 
300,000 or so Eritrean residents access to jobs, even in government; Eritrea in practice 
refuses reciprocity. ' 213 
Pressure by the Ethiopian War Council forced Meles Zenawi to act robustly 
against Eritrea. The council decided on the expulsion of Eritreans and a military 
build-up. They justified expulsion by arguing that `the expulsion of thousands of 
Eritreans opens job vacancies' -a policy which was popular and gained some ground 
for Meles who in the past was despised of favouring Eritreans to Ethiopian nationals 
by giving them access at all levels. 214 When on 21 May it was reported that Eritrean 
troops were taking up positions along the disputed border, the Ethiopian government 
focused attention on Eritreans living in Ethiopia and taking economic sanctions. 215 On 
26 May, `Eritrea accused Ethiopia of taking economic sanctions (diverting Ethiopian 
shipping to the port of Djibouti, halting flights by Ethiopian Airlines into Asmara, and 
banning short-wave communications with Eritrea). 7216 
The expulsion programme continued with zeal. Ethiopian officials accused 
Eritreans living in Ethiopia: 
of spying or raising funds for Eritrea's war effort. Most are Ethiopian citizens, with tenuous 
Eritrean links.... many speak no Eritrean language. Africa Confidential met deportees born in 
Ethiopia, some third generation Ethiopians who rarely if ever visited Eritrea. Children of eight 
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are deported on their own, others have been left behind as their parents were sent over the 
border; people in their eighties have been deported. 2 ' 
Bank accounts were frozen and business licences were revoked and at the initial stage 
deportation focused on businessmen, traders and owners of private enterprises, people 
who possessed properties. They were only allowed a few items of clothing that they 
could carry in a bag and a sum of money amounting to 2000 Birr (8 Bin = $1). 218 
Uncompromising leadership 
In the pursuit of boosting national sovereignty, Issayas, the Eritrean leader, relied on 
military force rather than peaceful means in resolving issues of contention. This has 
been manifested by confrontation with Yemen over the sovereignty of Hannish 
islands and the border dispute with Djibouti. Believing that his army is invincible and 
appreciating that `Ethiopia is more weaker and divided because most Ethiopians 
won't support what they see as a war prosecuted in the interests of Premier Meles 
Zenawi's Tigrayan-dominated government', `' 19 he favoured a military solution 
notwithstanding that the Badete border dispute was at the time under review by a joint 
border commission. In addition, the loss of a favourable trade that put his country in 
economic chaos as a result of a draconian action taken by Ethiopia, his problems with 
the army and opposition which encouraged challenge to his political power220 needed 
a quick diversionary action to rally national support. A border incursion at Badme 
that puts the blame on Ethiopia seemed to offer a solution. Ethiopia retaliated by 
fielding a larger force and the conflict at Badme spread like bushfire covering the 
entire 1000 Km. long borderline. 
Summary 
The Horn region was a volatile area long before its strategic location attracted 
superpower attention when it became a reservoir of lethal modem arms in exchange 
for the right to construct base facilities to assist the patrons in their competition for 
global hegemony. As the region is mostly semi-arid and partly falls within the Sahel 
belt, inhabitants of the sub-region were fighting over scarce resources such as water. 
pasture and arable land for sustenance. Furthermore, the delineation of colonial 
borders which divided some ethnic groups into different countries became a cause for 
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irredentist claims that led to inter-state war when the colonialists departed. Religious 
domination and disregard for secularism was another factor that brought differing 
religious groups to conflict. Others were motivated to fight wars of liberation claiming 
self-determination. As a result, prior to superpower involvement, ethnic, religious, 
secession, resource and rebellion conflicts were quite common to the Horn region, 
helping it become an arena of violent conflict. 
These factors were not introduced by the superpowers; they were already in 
existence when they arrived. Control of territorial integrity demanded reasonable 
control of events to ensure security. To do so required building strong security forces 
that could suppress dissent and insurrection. It is worth noting that the autocratic 
leaders' wish to amass arms to suppress internal and external opposition coincided 
with the superpowers' interest in possessing pieces of land in their territories. Thus, 
they concluded friendship and cooperation agreements to safeguard mutual interests 
and the effect of superpower involvement was to enable autocratic leaders to suppress 
their people and prolong their stay in power by flooding the area with arms. 
The superpowers' main interest was the unimpeded right to use facilities that 
were guaranteed by agreement. They did not attempt to put pressure on the autocrats 
to reform their governments, a venture that could entail the revocation of the 
agreements they signed. A change of heart only came when technological 
developments greatly reduced the importance of the obtained facilities. After winning 
election President Carter declared human rights observance as a criterion for receiving 
aid_ Mikhail Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985 and his introduction of glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (restructuring) reduced confrontation, and cooperation on 
Third World policies became possible. This event, which ultimately led to the end of 
the Cold War in 1989, was followed by the superpowers' withdrawal from the Horn - 
an event that left the autocrats weak and unable to control insurrections within their 
territorial borders. 
However, the superpowers' withdrawal from the region did not mean an end to 
foreign intervention. Regional actors, who actively participated in the Horn politics 
during the pre-Cold War era, 
_did 
not totally abandon involvement during the Cold 
War period either. They, too, had national interests to pursue in the region, both 
economic and strategic. Although their activities during the Cold War were 
overshadowed by the superpowers' glaring participation, their interest did not wane as 
did that of the superpowers when the demise of the Cold War ended global 
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confrontation- In fact, the regional powers doubled their efforts to retain influence in 
the region, although their aid was insufficient to guarantee the leaders' stay in power. 
What is more, the regional actors' allegiance was not limited to agreements 
between states since their involvement in the region often worked against the leaders' 
interests. Depending on national interest, they also gave support to insurgents to 
topple leaders. In contrast to policies of the superpowers, the beneficiaries of regional 
actors' aid were mostly the insurgents and not governments. In fact, their aid 
contributed to the deterioration of security in the region whereas, during the Cold 
War, insurrection was suppressed through the force of (superpower supplied) arms. 
The political reality in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa is: 
I. the decline of centralised state power; 
2. the decline in external superpower patronage that led to the prominence of sub- 
state actors emanating from the nature of the African state system (quasi-states). 
The consequence of this dominant factor was the breakaway of states, state collapse, 
population displacement, mass migration of refugees and violent internecine fighting. 
What is more, as seen in the case of the Eritrian/Ethiopian war of 1998-2000, 
the threat was military coming from outside. The real cause of conflict, however, is 
not a border dispute as purported by the media and its explanation is found by close 
analysis of events that preceded the Badme conflict - events such as the closure of 
the Assab refinery, the repatriation of troops while they were in great need, 
introduction of the nakfa, port blockage, deportations and uncompromising leadership 
- factors that could be adequately explained by narrow-view realist security theory. 
As stated by Africa Research Bulletin `The disputed territory is not the real issue. 
More important is the fact that Ethiopia, big, ancient and proud, has its main access to 
the outside world controlled by small, new, feisty Eritrea. This has snapped the bonds 
forged in war. , 221 What classic realist theory fails to adequately explain is the causes 
of civil conflict that are ravaging the region, and in some cases as in Somalia, have 
brought the state system to collapse. 
Ethiopians gave full support to Meles not to recover the barren land of Badme 
but because they assumed that the war would be prosecuted to its logical conclusion, 
that is, the repossession of Assab port which they argue was presented to Issayas on a 
silver plate in 1993 before Eritrea gained its independence in recognition to the 
221; Eritrea-Ethiopia: Border Conflict' (, i jrica Research Bulletin, May 16-June 1 ý, 1998), p. 13460. 
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support he received from the EPLF. 222 It should be noted that prior to the signing 
ceremony in Algiers, in dire contrast to previous perceptions, Meles Zenawi was 
quoted in the Ethiopian press as saying `normalisation of relations is normal upon 
signing peace treaties, but a relation of good neighbourliness is unbelievable and not 
foreseeable with the incumbent government of Eritrea 223 
Although, international pressure, assisted by Eri. trea's disadvantaged military 
position brought the two countries to agree on a peace accord. propaganda war and 
proxy wars are still prosecuted by both countries. 224 As new events denote, 'the Addis 
government is moving Ethiopian families into the Badme area, where the conflict 
escalated into war in May 1998 and which both governments still claim after an 
ambiguous ruling by the International Boundary Commission. This could lay the 
background for a future conflict, as the proxy war continues by other means. ' 
This trend does not encourage one to take an optimistic view about security in 
the sub-region. Only if other causes of conflict outside military threats are addressed 
can one envisage a better chance for peace and stability to materialise between the 
two states which are competing for hegemony in the Horn; thus proving the theory of 
the wider-view security theory that claims threat to national security comes from 
multi-dimensional factors and is not limited to that of outside military threat alone. It 
is most perplexing to envisage deployment of such a huge number of forces and an 
array of weapons in a war that cost 100,000 lives, displaced over 600,000 people and 
drained the economy of both countries over trifling issues that do not warrant conflict 
-a conflict that could have been easily solved by negotiation or arbitration. 
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Chapter 3. 
The Political Elements of Conflict in the Region 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with a number of political issues and analyses each under section 
headings relating them to security problems of the region. The titles discussed are: 
ethnicity its effect on state-building, nationalism/ethno-nationalism and ethnicity, 
the effect of religious expansion in the sub-region, leadership, decline of state power 
and dissolution of states, state-building in the Horn and democratisation. 
In order to test the validity of the wider perspective Realist theories the 
discussion focuses mainly on social factors such as distinct identities, division 
between communities, complexity and interrelatedness of security problems that 
played a role in fuelling domestic conflicts, provoking civil war, deteriorating 
relations between neighbour states and under extreme circumstances precipitated state 
collapse. The hypotheses tested are: 
Hypothesis L Distinct identities and divisions between communities within a 
nation or state -a domestic problem - can provoke civil war and, in extreme 
cases, the collapse of the state. 
Hypothesis 2: In circumstances where the security problems of a distinct area 
are complex and highly interrelated, credible and satisfactory peace cannot be 
achieved unless governments tackled the situation jointly at the regional level. 
There was much hope and anticipation that the end of the Cold War would 
improve the nature of security in the Horn of Africa. Before departing from the Horn, 
the superpowers advised their clients, Somalia and Ethiopia, to seek a peaceful 
political solution to their problems. 61 As they had terminated the supply of arms, they 
imagined that the possibility of a prolonged inter-state war between their former 
clients would be quite remote. Their calculation was based on avoiding any inter-state 
war that could endanger regional stability, as had the Ethio-Somalia war of 1977- 
1978, which they were fully aware, could not have materialised without their active 
involvement. However, one factor they had overlooked was that, in the wake of their 
departure, they would be leaving states that would be too weak to control their 
territories -a phenomenon masked by Cold War aid and arms - that paves the way 
for civil war. With armaments strewn all over the place and cheaply available in local 
61John W. Harbescin and Donald Rothchild (eds), Africa in W oriel Politics - Post Cold liar C: hauenges (Westview Press 
hic.. Oxford 1995), p. R. 
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markets, there was nothing whatsoever to restrain adversaries from jumping on the 
bandwagon of sectarian or inter-clan wars as long as a cause for internal conflict 
existed. This is clearly manifested in the Somali debacle where cohesion within 
groups was limited and `the warlords by no means were in full control of their armed 
young followers, for whom guns from a variety of sources across the ravaged Horn, 
and outside, were easily available'. 62 It was civil war that hereafter became the centre 
point of instability in the sub-region -a new dimension, which dragged 22,000 US 
troops and 7,000 soldiers from other countries to intervene on humanitarian grounds 
in Somalia in December 1992.63 
As noted above, the Horn of Africa, apart from Somalia, is a model of the 
multi-nation-state as opposed to the nation-state. Because such states lack `a natural 
unifying principle, ' they become vulnerable to a host of factors such as secession and 
state collapse and more prone to intervention than nation-states. In addition, they 
comprise multi-religious societies, a factor that makes it all the more difficult to build 
a cohesive peaceful state. TM In other words, if the state fails to deliver a fair and just 
system of government that guarantees equality between groups and assures its citizens 
of a better quality of life, the chances of constructing a peaceful state becomes very 
remote- The detrimental impact on security is felt more in developing countries such 
as the Horn where economic growth is in rapid decline. The real issue regarding 
security in `quasi-states' has become the ability of state institutions to maintain a 
stable political and social order before launching on ambitious transformation 
programmes of democratisation. Samuel Huntington emphatically expressed this 
viewpoint in 1968 when he explained that the significant distinction among countries 
lies not in the type of government they have but in their institutions' stage of 
development. He indicated `lag in development of political institutions behind social 
and economic change' as the primary problem of political instability and disorder. 
65 
Michael Chege vividly describes the peculiarity and complexity of Africa's 
institutional development problem as follows: 
What most distinguishes Sub-Saharan Africa's ethnic pluralism from ethnicity elsewhere is its 
unusually vast cultural, linguistic and geographic bases. This variety multiplies the manner 
in 
which ethnic identity may be invoked in social conflict or collaboration. African ethnicity 
is 
62Peter Woodwarr, 77ie Horn of Africa (Tauas Academic Studies, London, 1996), p. 73. 
63 h, Lowkcil- 'Resolution 794 (1992), (http: //www. un_or /Does/ ; Ken Menkhaus and Terry e 
Lvons, What are the 
Lessons Learned from Somalia`'' (CSLSAfrica \-ote. s. No. 144, January 1993), p. 4. 
64 Bam Bozen, Peoyde. State arf Fear (f ester Wheat_ f Hamel Hemzstead, Hettfttdsttre 1991). p. 76. 
65 finmuei Nwtüngton, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale Uni` ity Press, Ne'. ' Haven 1968), pp. 4-5. 
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also marked by a weakness of secondary bases of identity - class, profession, vocation - that 
arise with industrialisation and the spread of secular values. These two factors complicate 
national political management of civil society by materially poor and weak states" 
Ethnicity - its effect on state-building 
Anthony Smith defines `ethnic community' as `a named human population with a 
myth of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link With a 
historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidaritv'. 67 According to this 
definition six criteria must be met before a group can be identified as an ethnic 
community. These are as follows: 
1. It must have a name which identifies it from the rest. 
2. The group must believe in a common ancestry. 
3. Its members must share historical memories, often emanating from legends passed 
from generation to generation by word of mouth in accordance with tradition. 
4. The group must have a shared culture expressed in the form of language. religion, 
laws, customs, music, crafts, food etc. 
5. It must have an attachment to a specific territory. 
6. The group must have a sense of belonging or a self-awareness of their common 
ethnicity. 
Most African countries comprise different ethnic groups and 'diversity of identity is a 
pervading reality of the African state'`'' (see Map 6). One of the few exceptions in the 
continent, and the only one in the Horn, is Somalia. 10 Homogeneity is usually 
considered as a precursor to establishing a stable state in Africa and, accordingly, 
Botswana is often referred to as a relatively peaceful society. On the other hand, 
Somalia `considered as one of the most homogeneous countries in Africa from the 
point of View of ethnicity, language, culture, and religion"' has fostered an aspiration 
for a `Greater Somalia' that has threatened neighbouring colonial borders and caused 
instability in the sub-region. Its division into many clans and sub-clans, irrespective 
of the homogeneity factor, has eroded the power base of the ethnic group in favour of 
66 Mich el Chege, `Remembenng Africa' (Foreign Airs, Vol. 71 No. 1,1991), pp. 1 i0-151. 
67 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism' in Michael E. Brown (ed. ), Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security (Prince on Uni rsitc Press, Princeton, Nerv Jersey 1993), pp. 28-29. 
" Francis Dnig, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild and William Zartman, Sovereýgnty As Respoºuibilin": 
Conflict ýiliwgernent in 
Africa (The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1996), p_ 61. 
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the clan. `As Somalia has so dramatically demonstrated, even differences among clans 
and, indeed, lineages or families, in a society that is otherwise homogeneous can be 
most violent and threatening to the survival of the state and society'. 12 In Somalian 




Ethnicity and clan divisions did not play an important role during the colonial 
era as all clans and ethnic groups were under the strict domination of foreign rule and 
they all rallied under the banner of nationalism to oust the foreign master and liberate 
themselves. Soon after gaining independence, however, circumstances changed and 
ethnicity's relevance came to the fore when the battle for power to control state 
machinery became a priority. The importance of nationalism (ethnic nationalism) 
further increased after the Cold War when democratisation in its varied forms was 
introduced throughout the continent- 
Being multi-ethnic multi-clan societies, African countries have not been able 
to form nation-states. Historically, state building has always preceded 
democratisation. However, in the case of the Horn, as in other African states, the 
democratisation process has been implemented years before the completion of the 
state formation process. The principal factor behind this could be attributed to the 
developing countries' need to conform to the demands of the new world order or else 
face exclusion from the benefit of international and donor aid, democratisation being a 
principal precondition. This raises the question of how ethno-nationalism -a major 
component of ethnicity - could operate in the countries of the Horn. To what degree 
do the leaders of the region evaluate it as a threat and what remedies do they prescribe 
to enhance peace and security in their respective countries and in the sub-region as a 
whole? These issues will be discussed in the following sections. 
Nationaiism/ethno-nationalism and ethnicity 
Stephen Van Evers defines nationalism as having two c acteristics: 
1. individual members give their primary loyalty to their ethnic or national 
community; this loyalty supersedes ideology and 
'3 these ethnic or national communities desire their own state. 2. 
Others, such as A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, disagree that ethnic conflicts occur as 
a result of inter-group differences and feuds resulting from ancient hatred. Instead, 
they argue that intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears of the 
future. '4 In a democratic society such fears are combated peacefully through 
established political channels. In states where democracy has not been frilly 
13 Stephen Van E. v=cra., `I-I. vpot s cut Nationalism and War' is N icbael E. Brown, Owen R Cote Jr.. Sean Nt Lynn-hone? and 
St venE. Miller (eds. ). Nationalism trill 
Ethnic Conflict (Ile MIT Pres. Cambridge. Massachusetts, 1997) p. 27. 
14 D id A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, `Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflicts' in ibid., p. W. 
108 
established and the power of the state is weak the tendency is to pursue a group's 
interest - autonomous government or secession - through armed struggle. In the 
academic discourse the domestic dimension has been identified as the major cause of 
ethnic conflict with the external factor taking a secondary role. However, as the case 
of the Horn will show below, the external factor also played a significant part by 
availing a huge cache of arms to neighbouring states, sufficient to enable the 
combatants to wage inter-state war. Indeed, the Horn could be an exception to the 
above hypothesis because, in areas where superpower involvement was negligible, the 
opposite situation pertained. 
Ethno-nationalism. its roots and extent 
In Ethiopia, only a few areas, such as Tigrai, Afar and the Ogaden, enjoy ethnic 
homogeneity. A considerable population movement from north to south has taken 
place due to land degradation and the search for economic opportunity. This 
movement has been described by lohn Markakis as `an age-old process whose 
influence may be discerned in the southward drift of the Abyssinians over the 
centuries.... Northerners have moved to the southern plateau in a steady stream, a 
spontaneous movement designed to ease population pressure on the exhausted land of 
the northern plateau'-15 The Tigreans, the Wollo Amharas, the Guragies and 
WoIlayitas are the pioneers and can be found in large numbers in many of the 
unexplored regions of the south. 
In addition, over and above those that have settled in the south, members of 
the first two ethnic groups usually migrate southwards during the harvest and coffee- 
picking seasons to seek temporary employment In some regions the new state 
structure (ethnic federal states) has been an impediment to movement and settlement 
in that it has developed and encouraged an antagonistic attitude towards non-ethnic 
nationals. Christopher Clapham, one of the leading authorities on the region, writing 
about the conflict in the Hom of Africa, has described the ethnic population issue in 
Ethiopia as follows: 
In the new structure, people who found themselves in `their own' nationality region were 
favoured over nationals, and there has been plausible reports of what we have come to know 
as `ethnic cleansing', especially from , Arsi. In a country where economic opportunities are 
15 John Mark-akis, Resource Conflict in the Horn ofAfrica, p. 153%. 
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very unevenly distributed, and some areas are quite unable even to produce the means of their 
own subsistence, the ethnicisation of government creates considerable dangers. 16 
Peter Woodward, another authority on the area, warned of the danger of active 
participation of ethnic groups in politics. He said, `the promotion of ethnic 
nationalities could have dangerous consequences for the state as well as for the 
emergence of a democratic form of government at the level of the whole of the 
coLi 1%ý 
17 
The case of the Oro mos, the largest ethnic group in the country, is even worse. 
With over 30% of the population falling under this category and a constitution that 
permits them to secede, they stand a better chance of declaring independence and 
forming their own state. Such a state could be economically viable as the nch 
agricultural land - particularly the coffee plantations whose revenue amounts to 60010 
of national exports - and the prospective gold mines are situated in the Oromo 
habitation area. The prospect of gaining control of vital national resources is an 
additional factor that encourages them in their aspirations. 
The case of the Ogadenis, though still vibrant, is disadvantaged by the 
situation in Somalia. In the past, the WSLF movement was supported by Somalia's 
Irredentist claim. This advantage does not currently exist. However, irrespective of the 
consequences, the Al Itihad faction in Somalia, composed mostly of Ogadems, has 
also started operating across the border into Ethiopia. It was this organisation which 
conducted bomb attacks in hotels in Addis Ababa'8and attempted to assassinate Abdul 
Majeed Hussein, Ethiopia's Transport and Communication Minister of Somali origin 
on 8 July 1996. The assassination attempt was in response to Hussein's collaboration 
with, and participation in, the federal government of Ethiopia from which the faction 
is struggling to liberate the Ogaden people. `Abdul Kadir Mohammed Dhague, 
spokesman for secessionist Al Itahad, said it was responsible' 
19 
In addition, Al Itahad's adoption of the Sharki law as a policy guide has 
gained it favour with Iran and Sudan, and the faction has become a fertile ground for 
sow g and spreading the seeds of Muslim fundamentalism to the territories of 
Sudan's neighbours, this time from the opposite direction - from the East: -Ads 
Ababa thinks Sudan is behind Itahad's activities in Ethiopia operating through 
16 Christopher Clapham, 'The Horn of Africa: A Conflict Zone' in Oliver Furley (ed. ), Conflict in Africa, p_ fßä. 
17 Peter Woodward, The Hone of A ricer. p. 196. 
18 , Ethiopia/Somalia: Warning from Addis' (African Confidential, Vol. 37, No. 17,23 August 1966). 
19 Cafe Assassins' (ifricaC: oiyyic al, Vol. 37, No. 15,19 Adv 1996). 
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Avdeed'. 20 Since the Ogadenis and the Oromos, who live in Eastern and southern 
Ethiopia, are all Muslims, there cannot be a more suitable platform from which to 
launch Turabi's expansionist religious project than that of western Somalia_ As a 
result, an alliance of these groups, under the auspices of Sudan was formed to exert 
co-ordinated pressure against their common enemy, Ethiopia. 21 
The ethnic problems, which are haunting the whole continent, have led 
Ethiopia to look at the issue from a different angle. Its controversial approach was to 
recognise ethnicity and allow its participation in political affairs. Perhaps the 
disintegration of the Soviet Republic and the formation of a loose federation of 
autonomous republics based on democratic principles after the end of the Cold War 
devised to satisfy the demand of societies might have inspired the ruling Ethiopian 
government to adopt such a formula -a formula which has yet to pass the test of time. 
If it works, it will be a prescription that could redeem not only the Horn of Africa, but 
also the entire continent and the Third World in general. However, self-determination, 
based on religion and ethnicity, is a potentially divisive element that encourages the 
break-up of nations into mini-states. As Amitai Etzioni commented, once set in 
motion, it does not seem to stop: it is a continuous and never-ending process: 
As most drives to break away from existing states or coalesce in new ones advance, groups 
line up to tear the emergent state into segments. New divisions often take place long before 
ethnic groups accord the new entity even a limited opportunity to develop a responsive, 
democratic government. 22 
William Pfaff commenting on the reality of an ethno-nationalist state has succinctly 
stated: 'the ethnic state is a product of the political imagination; it does not exit in 
reality. The idea of the ethnic nation is a permanent provocation to war'. 23 
In the case of Somalia, a country with a homogenous society, clan rivalry now 
dominates the political scene and state machinery has totally collapsed. The clan 
factor is well exhibited in the formation of group forces under the leadership of 
warlords. When the national army disintegrated its individual members headed for 
their clan area with their personal weapons and joined the forces led by warlords of 
their kin. Furthermore, owning a weapon is associated with manhood and this `Qun 
culture' is deeply embedded in the minds of the Somalis, particularly the pastorals. In 
20 `Harn. of Africa: A111MIces' (. fricaCogfwkw k'J, Vol. 38, No. 4,14 February 1997). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Amitai Etzioni, `The Evils of 5elf-deiecminatiou' (Foreign Policy, No_ 89, Winter 1992-199- ;, pp. 27-28, 
23 William Mff, 'Invitation to War- (Foreign. 4ffiuirc, Vol. 72, No. 3, Sm mer 199' ), pp. 99-101. 
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addition, the fact that weapons were in abundance and their cost price was `sometimes 
cheaper than ammunition724 became a major hindrance in the implementation of 
disarmament and, consequently, an obstacle to achieving peace- 
After the state machinery collapsed, it is the `technicals' organised on clan 
basis - mostly ex-combatants armed with mounted machine-guns on four-wheel drive 
vehicles - who are terrorising the Somalian population by looting and collecting taxes 
and protection money indiscriminately. They have even tooted from aid agencies 
which are there to supply food to those who are starving- They have taken up banditry 
as an occupation and an easy way of accumulating money. It has now become an 
established culture that will be difficult to eradicate in the future. 
In Ethiopia, the ethnic configuration has been used by the ruling regime during 
demobilisation. The EPRDF regime utilised demobilisation to ensure that the majority 
of its armed forces comprised mostly Tigrean peasant guerrilla forces and key 
command posts are reserved for TPLF combatants. No credible integration of the 
army has taken place and members of the old army have been dismissed and denied 
any eligibility to their pension rights. When the toll of the dependants is added to that 
of the ex-combatants it should not be difficult to discern the pressure on society. This 
practice has resulted in many disgruntled ex army officers and soldiers, some of 
whom have returned to their villages of origin and joined anti-government forces such 
as the QLF and ONLF out of desperation. Their usefulness was only recognised when 
the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea soured and the two previously friendly 
countries went to war over an alleged border dispute. The government is now courting 
the skilled and professional element of the ex-combatants, especially the fighter pilots, 
and has invited them to return to service. Very few have accepted the call, and the 
majority, who are still in prison, have demanded the prior official declaration of their 
innocence through the media and backdated pay of nine years' salary since dismissal. 
The resentment of the ex-combatants has left the country in dire consequences and is 
endangering national security. Had proper demobilisation, which takes merit, skill and 
knowledge into consideration, been implemented, the resentment of the ex- 
combatants would not have become a serious factor that puts national security at risk. 
Thus, in the case of Ethiopia, inadequate demobilisation has put state security at a 
24 Hussejji AZ. Awn, ' Somah Civil Wiz' in Taisier M. Al, and Robert O. Matthews, Civil Wart in Africa (McGM4- een's 
Unie-etnity Press, Montreal 1999) p. 170. 
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high risk and led to the importation of foreign military specialists, such as pilots and 
artillery experts, as a substitute for qualified nationals whose loyalty is doubted by the 
ruling regime- 
In reality, the Ethiopian population is a product of ethnic mixtures and it 
would be virtually impossible to claim ethnic purity and demand self-determination 
based on any criteria of separateness. If we closely analyse the ethnic composition and 
fabric of Emperor Haile Selassie's family, which is widely depicted as a core Amhara, 
we see that most of his grandchildren and four of his children were married to other 
ethnic members. The ethnic groups could be identified as Oromos, Tigreans, Gurages 
and Eritreans - ethnic groups that are rivals for power. While the true nature of the 
royal family, whose ethnic group is associated with the Amhara, is as shown in the 
family tree in Fig. 3. I, it should not be difficult to discern that intermarriage is 
widespread among common citizens for whom the taboo on mixed marriages is less 
accentuated. Close investigation of the roots of the present rulers of both Ethiopia and 
Eritrea also show that they are half Ethiopians (Tigreans) and half Eritreans. Meles 
Zenawi`s mother is an Eritrean while Isayas Afworki°s mother is a Tigrean. The 
former is the Ethiopian Prime Minister while the latter is the President of Eritrea. It is 
paradoxical, if not farcical, for both leaders to act as architects of ethnic-cleansing and 
deport large numbers of the population - people who have no lesser claim to chose 
their country of abode than the leaders themselves - against their will, simply on the 
basis of ethnic purity. Because the Ethiopian population is so intermingled, 
introducing the ethnic-based parties to solve social problems would not only be a far- 
fetched solution but would also be unimaginative, dangerous and inviting instability. 
The observation of The Economist International regarding the success of the 
Ethiopian model six years after its introduction, is discouraging. It depicts it as a 
system that is unconvincing, unworkable and a sham. According to the journal's 
sources, the traditional parties are marginalized and, in reality, the system has become 
that of one-party rule. 
The EPRDF set up People's Democratic Organisations, local versions of the ruling party, 
which squeezed out traditional parties. Of the 546 members of parliament, only seven are not 
lt? 
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EPRDF members.... People unwilling to join the EPRDF, let alone those known to favour 
secession, are described as `narrow nationalists'. They are often imprisoned and their meetings 
banned, In the Oromia and Somali regions, human rights groups have documented hundreds of 
disappearances. " 
The Ethiopian prescription might stand a better chance of survival in industrialised 
countries where tribal belief is diffused by class and professional interest. The fact 
that it works harmoniously in Switzerland, which is composed of different ethnic 
groups, does not necessarily mean that it works well in Third World countries. Indeed, 
even in Switzerland, a harmonious society has taken a long time to develop: 
Switzerland, now held up as a model of a country containing people of different origins, 
ethnicity, languages and cultures, was possible only after the ethnic groups that fought each 
26 other for nearly 1,000 years were able to agree on a common democratic government. 
In light of the above observation and the prevailing circumstances of Ethiopia where 
ethnic groups have demanded the right to self-determination, the question is what 
chance of success would the Ethiopian prescription have`? Although more time is 
needed to make a judgement; the indications so far do not seem favourable. How do 
Ethiopia's neighbours, particularly Uganda and Eritrea, perceive the Ethiopian 
approach to ethnicity? 
The Ugandan and Eritrean approach to ethnicity 
Uganda and Eritrea, unlike Ethiopia, see ethnic nationalism as a great danger with the 
potential to cause violent conflict and disintegration that could possibly lead to state 
collapse. In addition to the ethnic problem, Ethiopia and its neighbours suffer from 
institutional weakness and lack of political culture which are the cornerstones on 
which democracy could be built. Where these factors are lacking, the democratisation 
process stands no chance of survival. Without a thriving democracy in the sub-region 
it would be difficult to assume that peace would prevail in the area of the Horn where- 
... . 
luny of the preconditions frequently associated with effectively 
functioning democracies, 
including widespread literacy, a high level of per capita income; a sizeable middle class: a 
vibrant and organised civil society; strong public institutions independent of one another; 
nationally based political parties with differentiated programs; and a political culture of 
tolerance, debate, and compromise are lacking in sub-Saharan Africa today. 27 
The rationale for both Isayas Afworki of Eritrea and Museveni of Uganda for 
deviating from the Ethiopian approach is based on the fact that their countries' present 
`i `Ethiopia: Federal Sham' (Tile Econ10mist Intern aiio ul 16 August 1997), p. 51. 
26 4mitsi Etzioni, The Evils of Selfdetermination'> pp. 
27 Carol Lancaster, `)emocraev in Africa' (Foreign Policy, Winter 1991-I992), p. 157. 
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stage of development does not allow them to take a laisse, faire attitude towards 
democratisation. To ensure stability, which is the basis for building democracy, they 
argue that some measure of control that keeps the country united is necessary; 
otherwise, it will break up into pieces and finally collapse, as witnessed in Somalia. 
The choice is either federal or unitary or, in the extreme case, federation with the right 
to secede. It is fear of the outcome of uncontrolled democracy that forced Third World 
countries - Africans in particular - to exclude ethnic-oriented parties from 
participating in politics. No country as yet seems to have found the answer on how to 
halt and bring vibrant ethnic problems under full control. Ethiopia's attempt is the 
only exception. Only time Will tell whether Ethiopia's prescription is going to enhance 
or retard democratisation. However, one thing is crystal clear. In the sub-region there 
are two conflicting views and approaches that are incompatible and irreconcilable. 
The opposing views are likely to clash ands if they do, the consequences will have a 
damaging effect on the security of the Horn of Africa. 
Ethnicity: Its relation to civil war in Djibouti 
Djibouti is a tiny country with a population of less than 500 000, mostly composed of 
two ethnic groups known as the Afar and Issa, the majority of whom live in Ethiopia. 
Furthermore, both ethnic groups straddle the borders of neighbouring countries 
Somalia and Eritrea thus raising the probability that any conflict between them will 
take on a regional dimension: 
About four-fifths of the Afars live in Ethiopia and Eritrea,., while three-fifth of the Issas live in 
Ethiopia and about one-fifth live in Somalia, leaving only a fifth of each population in 
Djibouti. In addition, the population of Djibouti comprises other Somali and Ethiopian ethnic 
groups as well as Arabs and French-21' 
Before independence in 1977, Djibouti changed its name to that of Afar and Issa 
territory to dissociate the territory from any connection with Somalia, particularly 
from its irredentist claim. It is strategically placed in that the port of Djibouti and the 
single railway line stretching to Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, serves the latter 
as a gateway to the outside world. Djibouti's importance, however, declined when 
Ethiopia gained sea access as a result of Eritrea's incorporation into a federation. 
However, when Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia in 1993 and Ethiopia once again 
became landlocked, it regained its former strategic importance. Furthermore, before 
and after independence, the port and airport of Djibouti had served the French as a 
Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons. Donald Rothchild and William Zatman, &wereignn" as Respomihiliiy 
Con%licr Afimagement in Äfrica (Rhe Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1996), p- 93. 
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base for an airmobile rapid deployment force of about 4,000, whose mission was to 
look after French interests in the sub-region and in their former colonies in Africa. 
Under a renewed agreement, this force still resides in Djibouti, and its presence is not 
limited to guaranteeing the security of the state. The French expenditure on the force, 
its families and expatriates is a major contributor to the economy. Moreover, Djibouti 
has benefited materially from the presence of a foreign power in its territory since it 
cannot afford to maintain a security force of its own, which is capable of defending its 
national boundaries- As a result, it became the only country in the Horn of Africa that 
was not embroiled in an inter-state or intra-state conflict during the Cold War period. 
In fact, because of its tranquillity it became known as `an oasis of peace'. 29 
The fact that peace predominated in Djibouti during the Cold War did not 
necessarily mean that absolute peace reigned in the country. Now and again, 
intermittent clashes broke out between the two tribes of Afar and Issa, and a new, 
perhaps more apropos metaphor - `boiling cauldron'- was coined by a French 
journalist in 1992. The basic idea behind this metaphor is that there have always been 
significant tensions, particularly ethnic, just below the surface of this seemingly calm 
society. ° 
The situation after the Cold War changed in Djibouti when differences 
between the Issas and Afars, which in the past had been muted, gradually started to 
gain momentum. A 1986 study by the French Foundation for National Defence 
Studies, commented: 
The hostility between Afars and Issas is one of the most serious factors leading to instability in 
the Republic of Djibouti. This factor is reinforced by the overwhelming domination wielded 
by the Issas since independence and their virtual monopoly in the higher levels of the 
administration and the government even though the Afars inhabit most of the country and 
were more numerous for a long time. 31 
The emergence of FRLJD (Front pour la Restauration de 1 'Unite et la Democracie) as 
a united front for three opposition parties in 1991 enabled it to confront the 
RPP 
(Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progres), Hassan Gouled's (Djibouti's president) 
ruling party which had held a monopoly on power since independence. 
'` When the 
government refused F RUD's offer of a dialogue, and all efforts by the latter to make a 
29`Soin 1i-style Disintegration', (11236 -AfricaReserm: hBulletin, Vol. 30, No. 12, December 1993). 
34) Peter J. Schraeder, `Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From "Eve of the Hurricane" to `Boiling Cauldron- c4 jrican Affairs, Vol_ 92. 
April 19931- P- 203_ 
31 Cited - NR+am d Kadwtbeýy, `Dfitxiuti: Between War and Peace' (Review t (African Political Eccmoniv, V(A. 23. No. 
December 1996), P. 518, 
32 tbic. t, P. 516 
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convincing case through peaceful negotiations failed, it decided to wage an armed 
struggle. Its sole aim thereafter focused on bringing down Hassan Gouled's 
government by rebellion and replacing it with a broad-based representative 
government of the people. 33 
Initially, the government's propaganda effort, which associated FRUD's 
awned struggle with the establishment of a `Greater Afar State', received acceptance 
by the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia and Eritrea. They collaborated by closing 
their side of the border and deploying 1,500 troops each to strategic positions in order 
to block the insurgents' exit route. When this action aroused the indignation and anger 
of the Afar populations residing in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the governments changed 
their minds, removed their troops from the border, started mediation and offered their 
good offices to end the conflict peacefully. Nevertheless, since 1991 security 
problems in Afar-inhabited territories have drawn the governments of Ethiopia and 
Djibouti much closer. Various reports indicate that Ethiopian forces have been 
operating inside Djibouti territory and: 
... according to other sources, 
an Ethiopian military liaison office has been opened in Djibouti 
town, and a second one is now at Dtkhil, close to the Ethiopian frontier and a five-man 
Ethiopian unit billeted in the ND barracks is deployed every morning on the escarpment 
overlooking the town to set up radio communications. 34 
How far a military solution that excludes the process of democratisation would 
contribute towards attaining stability is yet to be seen; however, lessons drawn in the 
past, as seen in the Ethiopian and Somali cases, clearly indicate that such measures 
ultimately end in a catastrophic disaster. 
Although in 1992 Hassan Gouled tried to introduce some measure of 
democracy in response to pressure applied by France and the neighbouring countries, 
he refrained from extending the right to equal opportunity - especially the right to 
work and share power - to the Afar group. The limited opportunity offered did attract 
a splinter group from FRUD but failed to attract the hard core of the movement and, 
as a result, the organisation is still active and vibrant. Recently, it renewed its offer to 
solve the problem by dialogue but received no response. Ahmed Dim- the FRUD 
leader, gave a strong warning that hesitation and reluctance to look for a peaceful 
solution through negotiation is likely to lead to a total state collapse. What is more, 
33 Ibid., pp. 519-520. 
"14 `DJIBC)UTI: What Price the Ethiopian Army? ' (The Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 785, Faris. November 1997), p. 2. 
118 
the problem was aggravated when President Gouled tried to use the `clan card' to 
tighten his hold on power at the wrong time. The inter-clan feud among the Issa, his 
supporters, worked to his disadvantage. His ability to rely on the Issa community as a 
social base further declined when members of the inner circle of his party opposed to 
his policy defected to join the opposition group and appealed for the support of the 
population: 
in a statement issued on 25 May 1996 Ismael Gueddi, director of the Presidential Cabinet and 
Moumin Bahdon Farah, secretary general of the RPP, called for unity of all the people of 
Djibouti to oppose oppression by a dictatorship. 35 
The Afar and Issa feud is not limited to Afar and Issa territory; it also engulfs those 
living across the border in Ethiopia and Eritrea. As Map 7 shows, the Afars (also 
known as the Danakil) share a large part of central Eastern Ethiopia. Both groups 
lead pastoral lifestyles and have been enemies for hundreds of years, clashing 
frequently over the control of grazing land and waterholes. Cattle rustling and armed 
raids resulting in numerous deaths are quite common. Disputes are usually settled, in 
accordance with traditional practice, by payment of `blood money'. Appreciating the 
magnitude and complexity of the problem, the Ethiopian government authority has, in 
the past, fully recognised their right to resort to such traditional practices. The Ugas" 
(a religious and ethnic leader of all Issas nominated according to custom) and the 
Sultan (holding the same status as the Ugas but a leader of all Afars) play a leading 
role in regulating the level of tension between respective followers. For example, 
IIgas Ali Hassen who resides in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, presides over most of the 
adjudication that affects Issa interests, while his compatriot Sultan All Mirah who also 
resides in his traditional palace amongst his tribe in Assaieta, Ethiopia, enjoys a 
similar privilege throughout Afar territory. Their authority is not constrained by 
national boundaries. It is transnational in that it extends over the ethnic group 
wherever it may reside. Customary law and traditional practice have wide ethnic 
acceptance while traditional leaders enjoy transnational respect and influence. The 
handling of both the Ugas and the Sultan requires foresight and good leadership by 
the region's statesmen since mishandling traditional leaders could easily exacerbate 
the security situation of the sub-region. With the internal conflict of Djibouti still far 
35 R)id., p. 521. 
36 Peter I Schraedcr, 'Ethnic Politics is Djibouti: From "Eve of the Hurricane" to `Boiling Cauldron " (Afric a Affwrs, Vol. 92 
April 199.3) , p. 
204. 
37 lbid, p. 2( . 
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from reaching a peaceful settlement, the Afar problem in Ethiopia and Eritrea still 
simmering and the ambition to create a united Afar state through self-determination 
120 
not yet extinguished, the role of traditional leaders in the maintenance of peace and 
security should not be underestimated _38 
Thus the Djibouti case also has demonstrated how ethnicity has become a 
principal cause of conflict in a small country where further division of the state could 
undermine the viability and the very existence of the state itself The outcome of 
future events in Djibouti in particular could play a large role in either defusing or 
inflaming the security situation in the Horn of Africa. If the outcome is negative, the 
possibility of a conflict that could involve Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea 
should not be ruled out or dismissed as unlikely. 
The effect of religious expansion in the sub-region 
Ballah, who noted the difficulty of defining religion three decades ago, describes it as 
'a set of symbolic forms and acts that relate man to the ultimate conditions of his 
existence' _39 
In general terms one can conclude that belief is at the core of religion, 
leaving no room for compromise. Political thinkers since Aristotle have identified 
`religious homogeneity as a condition of political stability within a polity'. `"' Although 
there is disagreement among academics as to the relationship between religion and 
security issues, in a heterogeneous religious society where opposing beliefs cross the 
threshold and enter the political arena, there is a general consensus that it is a serious 
security threat. According to Mitra, the religious violence becomes more likely when 
`specific role is attributed to religion in the constitutional framework and the social 
meaning is attached to it'. 4' 
`Essentialist' academics such as Bernard Lewis, Daniel Pipes, Martin Indyk 
and Samuel Huntington, who identify Islam as a force in global politics, consider it as 
a threat to 'the continued dominance of Western democratic norms in shaping the 
political, economic, social and cultural of the vast regions of the planet . 
42 For 
39 The author's father has spent most of his government service in the Ogaden and Adal and lssa region. He was police 
commissioner of the region for over 16 Years before he refired. Through his father the author had contact with both traditional 
leaders, developed since schooldays, and continued with Ugas Hassen in particular when he was head of Operations of the 
Eastern Command, During the Ethio-Somali war of 1977-78 the security situation of the region brought them into close contact 
and the author has greatly benefited from the open and fatherly advice he received. He values the t: gas s advice as valuable and 
profitable. The father and son relationship that was built over a long period has disclosed to the author the importance and value 
of traditional chiefs if handled wisely and respectfully. 
R Hellau, `Religious Evolution' cited in Jeff Haynes, `Religion Secularism and Politics: A Postmodem Conspectus' (Third 
World Ouarterh=, Vol. 18 No. 4,19.97), p. 709. 
40 Ibid., p. 711. 
41 S. K. Mitra, 'Disclaiming the state: religion and politics in India after independence' (Comparutn c Studies in Sock tt, l 
HistoM Vol. 33, No. 4), p. 758_ 
42 Michael E. Salta, Political Islam in the West: a New Cold War or Convergence? ' (Third 14 or&1 Quarter, Vol. i -S. No. 4. 
1997), p. 729. 
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example, Samuel Huntington's theory of the cause of future war is based on culture 
and civilisational differences rather than on ideology. When discussing civilisation he 
claims that `religion is a central defining characteristic of civilisations"- 4' In addition- 
when commenting on the relevance of Islam on state building he says: 
The idea of sovereign nation states is incompatible with belief in the sovereignty of Allah and 
the primacy of the ummah_ As a revolutionary movement, Islamist fundamentalism rejects the 
nation state in favour of the unity of Islam just as Marxism rejected it in favour of the unity of 
the international proletariat. ' 
Islam believes that the concept of umma could only materialise when `religious and 
political leadership - the caliphate and the sultanate - have been combined in a single 
ruling institution', 45 an ideology and principle which negates and confronts the 
establishment of secular states. 
On the other hand, `contingencists' such as John Esposito, Edward Said and 
James Piscatori, disagree with any conceptual framework that identifies religion as 
having a universal application. In fact, some of them argue that a close relationship 
between religion and state could serve as a factor that creates unity and foster 
understanding among different groups of the community. 
If we try to apply the two differing theories in the context of the Horn of 
Africa we can observe the `essentialists' theory to be more applicable than that of the 
`contingencists'. In the Horn, historical evidence shows us how religion, like 
ethnicity, became a factor that has been invoked time and again as a tool to 
accomplish state building through Islamisation and assimilation (Arabisation) of the 
indigenous African population who are either Christians or animists. The English 
historian, Edward Gibbon, described Ethiopia in a memorable and frequently quoted 
phrase as a state `encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their religion, the 
Aethiopians slept near a thousand years, forgetful of the world by whom they were 
forgotten'. 4" Samuel Huntington describes it as a `lane country' which is culturally 
isolated from its neighbours. 47 Although past Ethiopian history is closely associated 
with religious struggle between Christians and Muslims for the domination of the 
Ethiopian highlands, the current area of religious conflict is mostly concentrated 
43 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World order, p. 47_ 
44 Ibid., p. 175. 
45 Ibid, p. 177. 
4' Edward Gibbon, cited in Wilfred T esiger, The Life of t, Choice (Wiliam Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., London 1987), p. 32 
47 Samuel Huntington, p. 136. 
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within the enclaves of Sudanese territory where civil war `has gone on for decades 
between the Muslim north and the largely Christian south -). 48 
The norm in Sudan, since independence in 1955; became a struggle for the 
preservation of cultural identity by the south¬rners and an imposition of the Sharia 
law [the Qur'an is a sacred text that hinders the process of secularisation] throughout 
Sudan by the government (composed of northerners) in order to form an Islamic state. 
It also stretched its tentacles across national boundaries to influence the politics of 
neighbouring states- As a result, the Muslim-Christian conflict in the Sudan began to 
have a regional dimension. Sudan regularly helped the Muslim Eritrean rebels 
fighting Ethiopia and, in retaliation, Ethiopia supplied logistic and sanctuary support 
to the rebel Christians fighting Sudan. Similarly the rebels received aid from Uganda, 
`reflecting in part its strong religious, racial, and ethnic ties to the Sudanese rebels. 
The Sudanese government, on the other hand, got $300 million in Chinese arms from 
Iran and training from Iranian military advisers, which enabled it to launch a major 
offensive against the rebels in 1992 . 
44 
The struggle for independence gained momentum after the Al Bashir military 
regime came to power in the Sudan in 1989 and overtly adopted Muslim 
fundamentalist Sý'haria law as the basis of its policy; subsequently, religion became a 
central regional security issue of grave concern. To enhance its policy, Sudan 
outlawed all political parties. When it assumed full control, it reinstated the NIF 
(National Islamic Front) in power and started operating under the guidance of the 
latter. The man who is covertly ruling Sudan is Hassen Turabi, leader of the NIF, and 
not President Omer el Bashir, 5° 
Taking full advantage of the free access of movement over Ethiopian territory, 
el Bashir was able to weaken the SPLA's force after the latter was denied the use of 
Ethiopian territory as a sanctuary. 't Consequently, the Sudanese forces, in close 
alliance with Iran, launched a major operation in South Sudan supported by 
indiscriminate air bombardment of towns and villages: 
48 Ibid., I37 ; Sharon E. Hutchinson, 'A curse from God? Religious and political dimensions of the post-1.991 rise of ethnic 
violence in South Sudan' (77e Journal of dfixfem, 4 rican Studies, Vol. 39, No 2,2001), pp. 307-331. 
49 Ibid. -, p. 
275. 
`How the NIF runs Sudan: Lieutenant General Omer el Bashir is nominal national President while the real ruler is Turabi, 
head of the National Islamic Front. ' (Ajil a Co, fdential, Vol. 3¬ No. 14,7 July V)95) ; lurk Hubard, `African States Face 
Islamic Revolution Plot' (The Observer, World News, Sunday 25 June 1995). 
51 '8v 199' Meles Zenawi (then President) . as allowing Sudan's army to cross Ethiopian soil to attack the SPLA at Pochalla as 
a reward for the help the Sudanese government extended to the TPLF during its struggle to overthrow the 
Mengistu regime-. 
'Talk in New York, War in the Horn' ( frica Confidential, Vol. 37. No. 8,12 April 1996). 
1? 3 
The government's Islamist fervour has now earned it massive support from Iran. Tehran is 
financing huge military supplies from China, to be used in the South, say sources close to the 
Sudan government . 
According to Arab press reports, these include the free supply of one 
million tonnes of petroleum a year until the war in the south ends. ... 
Much of the arms 
agreement has already gone through, and some of the reported 18 F-7 and F-8 fighter aircraft 
have been deployed in bombing Darfur and the South, where there have been regular raids on 
Bor and Torfit this month. The consignment also reportedly includes 160 T-54, T-59 and T-70 
tanks, 270 armoured cars, and multiple rocket launchers and artiliery. 52 
In a very short time the el Bashir government was able to regain most of the territorv 
under SPLA control. A programme of Islamisation of the indigenous south 
accompanied the fighting, which is traditionally either Christian or animist. El Bashir 
was also aided by opportunist SPLA splinter groups, which volunteered their 
assistance as surrogate forces in return for reward. The Sudan government exploited 
its `divide and rule' strategy to the maximum by supplying arms to the rebel 
factions. 53 The success el Bashir achieved, as a result of changed circumstances, 
encouraged him to pursue other ambitious programmes, which had hitherto not been 
tenable. As disclosed by Mohamed Ahmed Abdelgadir Al-Arabab, a former minister 
who was responsible for preparing training camps for Sudanese and foreign Islamists 
and is now hiding in exile: 
... 
The front has a long-term plan which will mean that all Ministers, state officials and 
soldiers will be Front members by ? 00?. It intends to be the leader of the Islamic world by 
then, It. has targeted 10 African countries for military action by fundamentalist groups, which 
are being trained at eight different camps in Sudan. The targeted countries are Sudan's 
neighbours, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Central African Republic and 
Chad as well as Djibouti, with a total population of 200 million. 
'' 
This ambitious venture focused on exporting Turabi's version of Muslim 
fundamentalism deep into the heart of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. As expressed by 
Mark Hubard, in the region `there is open hostility to the increasingly isolated 
government of Major-General Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Uganda accuse it of backing militant groups intent on installing Islamic governments 
in their countries'. 53 The programme also included the training of fundamentalist 
52 `Sudan: Guns Not Butter' (frica Co?! denial, Vol. 32, No. ? 5,20 December 1991). 
53 `The aims supplied to the different rebel factions by I . rtaoum 
include small amts, ammunition, and 105mm artillery pieces 
wilkh ha-vw Iused to batter } saht alsa t4)ß by rival tribes groups'; Sam 
CIF in Ichart, `Khartoum Supplying 
Chin to Inflame Rebel Infighting' (The Times, 5 Member 1994). 
54 Mark Hubard, 'Sudan is Masterminding a Secret Guerrilla Campaign to lie Fundamentalism on its Neighbours' (77re 
Observrr, World Newa , 
Sunday 'j June 1995). 
55 Mark Hubard, `Sudan's Terrorist Haven Alarms its Neighbours' (North Africa Correspondent, The Dimes, Frida' 30 August 
199(-. ). 
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mujehadins from Islamic countries in the art of terrorism in order to eliminate national 
leaders who oppose the institutionalisation of the Sharia law as the basis of national 
policy- Leaders such as Mubarek, on whose life an assassination attempt was made in 
Addis, fall into this category. % 
The Sudanese authorities misconstrued the collaboration of President Metes of 
Ethiopia and took it as a carte blanche to use Ethiopian territory for tracking and 
eliminating their enemies. During the June 1995 OAU meeting they clandestinely 
moved a group of terrorists into Addis Ababa and attempted to assassinate the 
Egyptian leader Mubarek on his way from the airport to the meeting. Luckily, he 
narrowly escaped death and was able to make his way back to the airport and board a 
flight back to Cairo. To the Sudanese government's astonishment the Ethiopian 
government reacted and demanded the handover of the terrorists who made their 
escape back to Khartoum. El Bashir's government denied involvement and the issue 
of the assassination attempt in the Ethiopian capital soured the previously cordial 
relationship. Khartoum has now become a threat to peace and stability as it has 
become the new training centre of international terrorists. According to The Duily 
Telegraph, `following the demise of Lebanon as a fertile nursery for would be 
terrorists, Teheran has been scouring the Middle East for a new bedding ground. In 
Sudan, the Ayatollahs have found the perfect location and have lost no time to nurture 
it'. 57 
Interference in neighbouring countries' domestic affairs resulted in the 
severing of diplomatic relations by Uganda and Eritrea in opposition to Sudan's 
support of the Lord's Resistance Army and Eritrean Jihad Islamia rebel movements 
respectively. They also gave assistance to the Somali faction known as Al Itahad, a 
movement that adopted fundamentalism, guided by the Sharia law, as a policy goal. 
As mentioned earlier, this faction was involved in the terrorist bomb attacks on hotels 
in Addis Ababa and an assassination attempt on an Ethiopian cabinet minister. 58 
Ethiopia assumed that the terrorists were trained in Sudan and the el Bashir/Turabi 
government was closely associated with the scheme of destabilising the Ethiopian 
regime. 
56, Sudan- Cairn Stec the Same Cow-se' (Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 786,8 November 1997), I 
57 
P. 
Ccm Coughlin, `Sudan Trams Terrorism's New Generation' (Chief Foreign Correspondent, The Daily Telegraph, 15 May, 
1). 
58 'Ethiopia: Cafe Assassins' (Africa Confidential, Vol. 37, No- 15, July 1996); 'EthiopialSomalia: Warning from AciL1is' (. -lfrica 
(., onfidential, Vol. 37, No. 17,23 August 1996)- 
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After realising the impending danger to the security of their countries, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda decided to retaliate by assisting the SPLA and the 
opposition alliance (NDA) against the fundamentalist government of Sudan. The 
Eritrean government offered the rebel movements the use of the Sudanese embassy in 
Asmara. It also assisted by organising a conference of all opposition parties to form a 
united front, the IBA. (National Democratic Alliance), to confront the regime in 
Khartoum. Th. e US government, which believes the militant Islamic regime to be a 
key sponsor of international terrorism, decided to help the neighbouring countries in 
their confrontation with the Sudanese government. According to the Herald Tribune a 
government official disclosed that `Dearly $20 million in surplus US military 
equipment will be sent to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, countries that support 
Sudanese opposition groups preparing a joint offensive to topple the Khartoum 
government' 60 The complexity of the regional problem drew different actors to the 
region- The involvement of the US, though indirect, has encouraged the SPLA and 
NDA to take the offensive. 
Subsequently, Colonel John Garang, head of the military command of NDA 
forces, conducted a coordinated military offensive. The attack was directed at Kurmuk 
and. Geissan in the Blue Nile region, situated on the Ethiopian border, and at border 
posts in the Kassala area bordering Eritrea. Both objectives were captured with little 
difficulty and the assault from Kurmuk and Geissan continued until it reached within 
50 kilometres of Demazin, a highly sensitive and strategic target where a huge dam, 
Sudan's only source of hydroelectricity, supplying over 80% of Khartoum's power 
requirement, is located. The opposition forces, aware that a head-on collision with the 
government's security forces, well supplied by Iran and China, would not work in 
their favour, decided on a twofold strategy : `attrition and to draw government forces 
out of the towns to enable an uprising protected by arms'6' that avoided marching into 
Khartoum. instead, the SPLA and NDA opted to create sufficient threat and pressure 
on Sudanese security forces to pave the way for a civilian uprising against the military 
regime. 
59 
, SurJari's Old ssionisis Try aNew Stuief{y' (T7re F, corrnrriis4 9 December, ±9905 F- C, 3; `E. ritres: Sudanese F. uzbassv 
Building Handed to Rebels' (East . Afric(7 Review. Febniuy-March 19%). 
60 David B. Oita iy, 'Vim: HS, Angry With Khartoum Over Terror. Sch hfihtar Aid to Neighbor State ;' (Washington Post 
Service, Herald Tribune, I1 November 19%); 'ins against a sea of troubles' (Africa C: onfiken1iaJ Vol. 37, No. 23,15 
November 1996). 
61 -Sudan: The Countdown Begins- Northern and Southern Oppositions Have Seized Territory from the Government and I. ook 
Capable of Staying in the Offensive' (4frica Confidential: Vol. 38, No. 3, Januare, 1997). 
126 
The Sudanese government accused its neighbours of participating in the 
fighting, declared Jihad and launched a diplomatic offensive led by Vice-president Al- 
Zubair Mohamed Saleh in Arab capitals to rally support- He even pleaded for arms 
from Mubarek despite the fact that Mubarek held el Bashir responsible for the 
assassination attempt made on his life in Addis Ababa. 62 This action clearly shows the 
extent of el Bashir's desperation. President Husni Mubarek dismissed el Bashir°s 
allegation of Ethiopian and Eritrean involvement as false and tried to persuade other 
Arab countries not to become involved in Sudan's domestic affairs. King Fahad also 
turned a deaf ear to Al-Zubair Mohammad Saleh's plea for help. AI-Ryad, the Saudi 
daily newspaper, which normally reflects official opinion, commented that `any Arab 
action would have no effect since reconciliation among Sudan is an affair which 
concerns the Sudanese'. 63 This statement was further reinforced by Sadiq Al Mahadi, 
the former ruler of Sudan before he was ousted from office in a coup d 'etas staged by 
el Bashir. 
Upon his arrival in Eritrea following his escape from Sudan, Sadiq Al Mahadi 
declared his support for the NDA and shortly started travelling between Arab capitals 
to counter vice-president Saleh's plea and explain the `true" nature of the security 
problem in the Sudan, Although Iraq, Qatar, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, and the United 
Arab Emirates, plus some extreme fundamentalist Arab groups, have expressed their 
sympathy, none has so far entered into serious involvement in Sudan. `M 
From the above course of events, it is possible to discern how a forced 
imposition of the Sharia law over nationals who do not practise the Muslim religion 
could spark off a domestic conflict Denial of practising their choice of religion and 
tampering with their culture led the people of South Sudan to rebellion. Furthermore, 
an obsession with fundamentalism drove Turabi and el Bashir to look beyond 
Sudanese territory and export their version of Muslim fundamentalism to 
neighbouring countries. The reaction brought them into conflict with other states and 
has drawn the sub-region to the brink of war. Only time will tell how long the el 
Bashir! Turabi regime will survive the subsequent political and economic alienation. 
The ousting of the Turabi/el Bashir regime would not necessarily mean an end 
to Sudan's security problems. The NDA is a loose alliance with inner contradictions 
62 `Sudan: Cairo Steers the Same Course' (ln than Ocean Newsletter, No. 786.8 November 1997), p. 2. 
63 `Sudan - Jihad' (Africa Research Bulletin, 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Vol. 34, No. 1,1-31 January 1997). 
64 [bid 
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and competition that could not be easily reconciled by the parties. For example, the 
DUP and Umma parties are traditional enemies with opposing policies. The former 
favours unity and close association with Egypt while the latter is anti-Egyptian and 
staunchly opposes unification with Egypt. 65 The Umma party has close associations 
with Libya. "6 
A common idea, on which both opposition parties agreed in the past, was 
acceptance of the application of the Sharia law throughout the country. Although 
Jefar Al Numerie instituted it in 1983, deepening the south's alienation, they neither 
condemned it nor tried to strike it off by legislation when they were in power. This 
raises the question: is there now a change of heart and a desire to introduce a 
democracy that embraces secular government? So far, no debate has taken place or 
decision made amongst NDA members on this important issue. They may refrain 
from interfering in the domestic affairs of neighbouring countries but will they 
abrogate the Sharia law? If they do not, how are they going to promote democracy in 
Sudan? Samuel Huntington's hypothesis 'the fundamental source of conflict in this 
New World will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great 
divisions amongst mankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural )67 
may have some relevance to the new dimension of security emerging in the sub- 
region - particularly as religious rivalry that pre-dates the Cold War has been a 
common cause of conflict in most countries of the Horn. If the traditional parties are 
not willing to abrogate the ýSharia law there should be no reason to doubt that security 
will still be a problem, since the issue of religion - the principal cause of conflict in 
the Sudan - has not yet been properly addressed. 
From the above account we can see how religion, like ethnicity, became the 
cause of conflict that triggered war between neighbouring states of the Horn - Sudan 
against Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda. The creation of a Muslim state administered by 
the Aaria law is considered by the ruling Sudanese regime as the right course of state 
formation that could enhance peace and security in the sub-region. Factions, such as 
Al Itahad in Somalia, have also emphatically declared that the solution to the 
Somalian security problem could be resolved only by adopting the Sharia law. 
Proponents of this theory, such as Turabi, preach that the region would be prone to 
6 Peter W4, w dc-, urd, The Harre ofAfrica (aucis Academic Studies. London. 1996). p. 151. 
66 1b1i& pt 159. 
67 `Calash of Civilizations' (Foreign4fairs, Vol. 72, No. 3,1993), p. 22. 
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conflict if Islamic law fails to become dominant. The Islarnisätion programme - 
conversion of the Christians and animists of the South into Islam - is being launched 
with this objective in mind. 
Leadership, decline of state power and dissolution of states 
According to critics such as Mariam Fendius Elmar, formulating an aggressive or 
defensive foreign policy does not depend on the type of government regime. She cites 
Israel's war against Lebanon in 1982 as example showing that, when democracy 
remains stable it is change in leadership that leads to changes in foreign policy: The 
ruling coalition that came to power in Israel following the 1981 elections perceived 
the use of force as legitimate, and it initiated crisis to advance its conception of 
national security -. 68 Christopher Layne, while refuting the democratic peace theory, 
argued that, even in democratic countries, individual leaders remain crucial in shaping 
foreign policy outcomes. He pointed out that individual leaders made a difference in 
determining whether Anglo-French relations were conflictual or harmonious: The 
presence of Lord Palmerston in the British Foreign Office increased cross-Channel 
friction': 69 When Lord Aberdeen; his replacement, who had a more collegial approach 
to diplomacy came to office, the tense relationship shifted to one of conciliation and 
cooperation. 
From the above arguments, it should not be difficult to discern the potential 
influence of leadership in undemocratic countries where leaders face fewer constraints 
and have a much freer hand to implement foreign policy. Leadership of the elite plays 
a more prominent role in weak states where ideas and institutions `are internally. 
contested to the point of violence they are not national in scope, and do not offer clear 
referents as objects of national security'. 
70 Under such circumstances leaders 
discovered, through experience, that the only means of maintaining state power was 
by coercion or instituting an iron-fist rule. Jackson and Rosberg accurately described 
this characteristic of African regimes when they remarked that `African politics are 
most often a personal or factional struggle to control the national government or to 
influence it: a struggle that is restrained by private and tacit agreements, prudential 
68 Mariam Fendius Elmsn (ed), Path to Peace: Is Lk_moc. rL v the answer? (MIT Press, Harvard University. Cambridge 1997), 
p. 333. 
69 IiA- i T, 3-9.1-3,84. 
70 Barry BUZan, People, States & Fear (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hamel Hampsstead 1991), p. 10 1_ 
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concerns, and personal ties and dependencies than by public rules and institutions. '" 
According to them the key features of personal rule were: 
the absence of effective institutionalised rules and the establishment of a political 
practice in which individuals and factions struggle for power and place and not 
compete for policies 
" patron-client relationships between rulers and ruled thrive in which support is 
achieved by financial rewards and access to power and privileged positions 
" uncontested supremacy of personal rulers seldom subject to constitutional time 
limits on their incumbency, enjoying unrivalled power, prestige, wealth and honour 
" inherently authoritarian rule, monopolising power, eliminating constitutional checks 
and balances, centralising state power and limiting political rights. 72 
General 
In addition to holding political power they also control religious and cultural life as 
well. The citizens are left with no rights that they can value and call their own. As a 
result, security in weak states should be viewed as a matter of contention between 
opposing groups, organisations and individuals for the control of power. From the 
above definition it becomes obvious that the need for strong leadership is more 
pronounced in the Horn of Africa where the state apparatus is weak and living under 
the umbrella of conflict has become a norm. In the paragraphs below, we will discuss 
the role leadership played in exacerbating the security situation of the region- 
In the eighteenth century, nation-building in Europe was preceded by over a 
hundred years of fighting among different ethnic groups. As mentioned earlier, civil 
war in the Horn of Africa is being waged among ethnic groups to bring about the 
realisation of the nation-state. The means favoured by the leadership to ensure that the 
status of the multinational state is preserved without being f ? ented was to utilise 
the security forces unsparingly in coercing their nationals to toe the line of 
government policies. Constitutions were revoked and emergency laws enacted to 
obtain legitimacy. Often, the excuse made for taking such measures was the threat to 
territorial integrity. Rule by decree, after empowerment by coup d etat or revolution, 
brought harsh dictators to the realm of power in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan_ The 
dictators' desire and determination to impose control surpassed any moral 
71 R_H Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Afric x Autocrat, Prophet 
Berkeley, California 1982). p. 1. 
, 
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considerations. 73 The legacy of the authoritarian regimes of Mengistu, Barre and al- 
Numerei, which ruled without constraints, brought misery and destruction to the 
region and their respective individual countries- 74 Their dictatorship is a glaring 
example that shows the part leadership could play in exacerbating state insecurity in 
undemocratic countries. 
Ethiopia 
Out of the Horn countries, Somalia and Ethiopia were most affected by this 
phenomenon- Since 1960 Eritreans have been engaged in armed struggle in a bid to 
seek independence after Emperor Haile Selassie dissolved the federal government of 
Eritrea without consultation and incorporated it into Ethiopia as an additional 
province of that country. The Eritreans perceive their case as an issue inherited from 
the colonial era and not as an ethnic one. Ni Crawford Young, an expert who has 
conducted a detailed study of the sub-region, described the process of transformation 
from federation to unity as follows: 
Despite the fact that Ethiopia progressively dismantled the federal institutions during the 
1950s, in clear contravention of its international commitments and then abrogated them 
altogether in 1962, reducing Eritrea to the status of a mere province in a centralised kingdom, 
the UN gave the tacit consent of silence to these violations. The final parody was a flimsy 
charade of self-determination whereby an Eritrean assembly far less representative than that 
elected in 1952 applauded the proclamation of full incorporation read by an Ethiopian 
governor in an assembly hall surrounded by the army.... With nimble Ethiopian diplomacy 
both at the UN and in African not to mention American patronage, Ethiopia seized the 
international legal high ground for its annexation. 75 
The Derg's uncompromising rule eroded people's confidence in the leadership and 
encouraged them to associate themselves with opposition movements such as the 
EPLF, EPRDF and the Orono. Mengistu's character was revealed in the dire 
moments of the regime's struggle for survival when he demonstrated his deplorable 
task of leadership quality by secretly fleeing the country, abandoning his forces and 
countrymen. Mengistu, who was the commander of the armed forces, scheduled a 
visit to a military training centre called Belatte situated 50 kms south west of Awasa 
where about 20,000 trainees were undergoing crash training. He was supposed to 
73 Christopher Clapham, The Horn of Africa: A Conflict Zone - The emergence of radical militarism' in OliX)er Furl. e%, 
Conflict rn, -1. Hca (Taucis Ac adernic Studies, London 1995), pp. 76-77. 
74 pawl Henze, 'The primacy of economies for the future of the Horn of Africa: The legacy of authoritarian regimes' in Charles 
Gurdon (cd, ), The Horn of Africa (UCL Press, Univcrsity College of London, London 1994), pp. 9-1U_ 
75 Few Wood%wd, The Horn of 4frica, p. 31; M. Crawford Young, in Conflict in the Horn of. Africa by Georges Nz(mgola- 
Ntalaja (ed. ), p. 57. 
131 
address them before they were dispatched to the war fronts. Early in the morning of 
21 May 1991 he flew from Addis in a D-5 fixed wing aircraft unaccompanied by 
defence officials responsible for training as he normally does. His entourage consisted 
of five bodyguards only. Even his ADC was not present on this visit. A guard of 
honour was awaiting his arrival at the training centre. When the pilot approached the 
airfield Mengistu instructed him to continue flying and told him to head for Nairobi 
which was in the general direction of the planned flight. When the pilot pointed out 
that he did not have the necessary maps, he was told to use the road to Nairobi as a 
guideline and, without any official's knowledge of his escape plan, Mengistu landed 
at Nairobi airport . 
76 Mengistu's flight from his capital to Zimbabwe was the final 
straw. When the troops heard the tragic news they panicked. Finally, command and 
control collapsed as the northern army commander, Major General Hussein Ahmed, 
accompanied by his senior staff of icers, followed suit and fled by helicopter to Saudi 
Arabia, abandoning his forces. Thereafter the EPLF found the capture of Asmara 
plain sailing. 77 
While the struggle to capture Asmara and its surrounding area was taking 
place, the offensive to capture Addis Ababa, the capital, by EPRDF forces supported 
by elite EPLF forces, was in progress meeting little opposition- Although the 
Ethiopian forces were superior in number, their loyalty and dedication to the Mengistu 
regime had been spiralling downwards a long time before the rebels' offensive began. 
Most of the conscripts, who comprised over half of the fighting force, were drafted 
against their will and, at the first opportunity, defected and joined the opposition 
forces. Thus while the strength of government forces was dwindling, inversely the 
forces of the opposition were growing by the same proportion -a significant factor 
contributing towards Mengistu's defeat. In addition, the field commanders at all 
levels, who had a grudge against the national leader for stripping them of their power 
in favour of his political cadres, were indifferent to the outcome of the war, causing 
them to make only half-hearted efforts to exercise leadership. 
76 Author's notes: the author who was head of training and administration of the armed forces on normal circumstances used to 
accompany him dUd Visits to training centres ; on this c $ion he did not because he did not know about the visit. The detailed 
inc den i ff the flight was reported to him in the presence of Major-GeneM Sevtsum Mekonnen, deputy chief of staff for 
o ons and intelligence by Maier De ue e Banjaw, (me of the h< -mords who, upon discoe ng Meigistu'; plam was 
disgusted and returned with the pilot to Ethiopia the following day. The briefing was given in the author's office on 23rd tii. n 
1991 the airy Barnjaw returned to Ethiopia. The author flew to L, c n on 25th May as a member of a high level peace delegation 
arranged by Undtr-Secrctary Haman Chocn of the State Department accompanying Prime Minister Tesfave Dinka; Alc-x Dc 
Waal, 'Rethinking Ethiopia: An o ervww of events since May 1991' in Charles Gordon (ed-), The Horn of Africa. p. 26. 
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Politically, the leadership missed many opportunities to resolve the problem 
peacefully. The obstinate and irreconcilable stand of the Ethiopian leader and his few 
associates became an obstacle. Mengistu was opposed to reconciliation, believing 
only in a military solution. He considered negotiating with opposition leaders and 
representatives as lowering his status and a tacit acceptance of their claim. Dawwit who 
was a high-level party and government official describes Mengistu's obstinacy as 
follows: 
It is absurd for the government to continue branding the Eritrean fighters as bandits. They are 
powerful forces which have won pitched battles, launched successful propaganda campaigns, 
mobilised support from the international community, forced the government to spend three 
fourths of its national budget on the war effort, and inspired the birth of the other insurgent 
movements.... If most of us are reluctant at first to admit these realities, the ensuing years 
should have taught us a lesson. But in meetings that were held in Berlin and more recently in 
Rome and Aden, the Ethiopian government still refused to recognise the legitimacy of the 
rebel forces. All ten meetings failed even before agendas could be agreed on.... Mengistu does 
not understand the meaning of self-determination, either historically or in the abstract. He 
cannot conceive of a nation as anything but an absolute centralised authority, totalitarianism, 
for his rule is nothing less than that now. 78 
Mengistu's insatiable desire to hold on power blinded him from responding to reality. 
His obsession with clinging on: 
... 
is evident in CPEs even where the regime has lost control of much of the territory, there is 
a permanent war climate, and the capital is surrounded or the armies are on the brink of defeat. 
Mengistu clung on to power in Ethiopia until the month the rebels entered Addis Ababa; 
eschewing many earlier opportunities for negotiations, so did Siad Barre in Somalia and 
Mobutu in Zaire. 79 
Even the fall of the Berlin Wall and the advice and warning given by Gorbachev 
failed to clear Mengistu's vision and put him on the right track. Gorbachev informed 
Mengistu that he would no longer `continue unqualified military and economic 
support'8° for his regime. Gorbachev's line of thought was clearly expressed by Lev 
Zaikov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the politburo, in a 
78 Dawit Woiäe Giorgis., Red Tears, pp. 111-112; Author's lea; Sionw national 5liengo (Congress) members raised the e 
and proposed that more effort should be made on reconciliation through negotiation. They suggested that selection of me nbers 
people with proven biiity who represent different social gr rather than be picked at random. They said sj u in J-ude- 
that since those representatives who were dealing with negotiation so far have failed, a fresh start with new faces should be 
auempted- They were rem for their 
i sigent a: Ui: bjd and insubordinate beha. iour. I lei of a person who was 
admonished in private after the conference ended. 
79 Lionel Cli e& Robin Luck-ham 'Como lex Political Emergencies and the State: Failure and the Fate of the State' (Third 
World Quarterly Vol. 20 No. 1,1997), p. 45; Peter Woodward, The Horn o/"Africa, pp. 70=71. 
Edmond J. Keller, Africa in ºhe New International Order (Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.. London 199%), p. 8_ 
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speech he delivered in Addis Ababa on 10 September 1987 in the presence of most 
African leaders marking the proclamation of the PIERE. He stated: 
As has been repeatedly declared at the most authoritative level. ... 
We are opposed to the 
transformation of Africa into an arena of confrontation. In this region of the world we firmly 
uphold the principle of political settlement of regional conflicts. We are resolutely opposed to 
the outbreak of so-called low-intensity wars on the African continent. 8' 
Furthermore, the misleading reports which Mengistu received from regional party 
offices and the national security office, frequently depicting him as the population's 
beloved leader, blinded him to reality. Those who dared to voice a contrary opinion 
were removed from office, given a position without authority or pensioned off. The 
disfavoured were usually informed of their redundancy publicly through the media. 
Their demise would be announced sympathetically, their past deeds praised 
emphatically and they would be wished good health and a speedy recovery. They 
were not told of their fate in person either orally or through a formal letter -a 
procedure that could have greatly reduced embarrassment. The rest, taking heed of 
their compatriots' fate, took a `wait and see' stance and refrained from giving genuine 
advice -a course of action that was detrimental to the smooth functioning of the 
government. 82 
His obstinacy and rigid belief in military power alone as a solution to the 
country's security problems that obstructed the possibility of a peaceful settlement 
subsequently became the cause of his fall from power. It should, however, be 
emphatically noted that the Mengistu regime, which had raised over 400,000 fighting 
men and possessed a very efficient air force, was not defeated because of lack of 
military power, but because it was pursuing a policy which was strongly detested by 
the population and the majority of the fighting forces. However, it was able to survive 
for 17 years due to its adaptation of the Leninist system of organisation in its armed 
forces which stripped commanders at all levels of their power and made them 
impotent. 43 The fact that commanders had to obtain the approval and consent of their 
political cadres and the intelligence representatives who were assigned to their 
headquarters - organisations which have a separate chain of command linking them to 
the office of the head of state - before issuing orders or instructions, hindered them 
R1 Robert G_ Paiman.; The Soviet Union in 
the Hohl of Arica. pp_ 290-29L 
82 Record of author's notes: The tragedy is those who were humiliated by undergoing such tribulations are hmgwshing in prison 
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from effectively executing their day-to-day duties. Nevertheless, this system 
prolonged the regime's stay in office by preventing coup attempts from being 
hatched; however, it dramatically and adversely affected efficiency and the proper 
functioning of the command and control of troops. 
It should be noted that the US government helped Emperor Haile Selassie to 
take control of Eritrea in pursuance of national interest; this was clearly expressed by 
the then US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who stated that `From the point of 
view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive consideration. 
Nevertheless, the strategic interest of the United States in the Red Sea basin and 
consideration of security and world peace make it necessary that the country has to be 
linked with our ally, Ethiopia'. TM 
However, the US government was reluctant to pursue its earlier doctrine when 
its interest in the region waned at the end of the Cold War_ In fact, in contradiction to 
earlier US policy, Under Secretary Cohen expressed his country's present policy in 
May 1991 when he addressed the new Ethiopian government by saying `the United 
States favours an act of self-determination by the people of Eritrea who have never 
been consulted on their desires. 's5 As the act of holding a referendum had the blessing 
of the ruling Ethiopian government, the issue of legitimacy was solved amicably and 
Eritrea became the 186th member state of the United Nations without much ado. This 
precedent is likely to encourage secessionists in other parts of Africa. But it should be 
noted that `any movement wanting independence will have to overcome two 
conditions that allowed the world community to accept Eritrea: the fact that the ruling 
government in Ethiopia agreed to Eritrea's breakaway and that the EPLF held a UN- 
monitored referendum. Not many other movements in the region are in a position to 
do this'. 86 
Confidence-building takes time. Patience, tolerance, honest dealings, close 
cultural ties and hard work by those at the epicentre of power in particular are very 
important. Unfortunately, the relationship built at the leadership level did not flourish 
at the lower level, the events that took place in Assab - the dissatisfaction of 
Ethiopian businessmen who complained about the bureaucracy of Assab port 
management and accused port officials of not complying with international port 
84 Cited in Berelcet H. Selassie, Conflict am""Intervention p. 
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regulations - being a bad indicator which deserves prompt attention- News of such an 
incident is widely welcomed in neighbouring Djibouti which is currently facing 
insurmountable economic difficulties and has been seeking to recover the transit trade 
to Ethiopia which it used to enjoy before it was taken over by Assab. 87 Furthermore, 
the closure of the Assab refinery and the availability of better and improved port 
facilities at Djibouti, especially in handling containerised traffic, has made the latter 
more attractive to Ethiopian external trade. 
Collaboration between Ethiopia and Djibouti on security matters has also 
brought the two countries' relationship much closer. As the Indian Ocean Newsletter 
has noted, `Djibouti could become a more serious competitor in the long term or even 
in the medium term if PAID [Port Autonome International de Djibouti] managed to 
capture a bit more container traffic from Ethiopia should port operations in Assab 
deteriorate seriously. '84 Additionally, the announcement by the government-controlled 
radio of Addis Ababa stating that, as of 22 November 1997, Ethiopia and Eritrea 
would use foreign currency in their trade and service transactions seems to keep the 
formerly close relationship established between the two countries more distant than at 
any time since Eritrea's independence. It should be noted that `in the past, both 
countries used the hrrr (Ethiopian currency) as a common currency' 89 
Somalia 
The unification of former British and Italian Somalilands, immediately upon gaining 
independence, did not win unanimous support from the nationals of the north. During 
the colonial days both entities were functioning under different administrations which 
were not easy to harmonise. The fact that Mogadishu was chosen as the capital and all 
infrastructures and development were concentrated in the south became a cause of 
resentment. In December 1961 the marginalisation of the north led a group of 
Sandhurst-trained northern junior officers to attempt a revolt to break off from 
southern Somalia- They resented serving under Italian-trained southern senior officers 
and, as Lewis stated: 
... these 
British-trained junior officers quietly arrested their southern superiors whom they 
regarded as unjustly promoted over their heads. They then gave out publicly that, following 
9 'E hiopia/Eritrea Not very happy with Assab' (The Irrt Ocean N'ewsleuer, No. 758,2.2 March 1997). p. 7; 'Erixrean 
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widespread rioting against the government in Mogadishu and elsewhere, General Da'ud, 
commandant of the national army, had assumed control of the state. 'j 
They were unsuccessful and their attempt was ruthlessly crushed. 
Bane's effort at building Somali nationalism was eroded when his Irredentist 
venture failed. Clannism, which he tried to eradicate, revived. When opposition 
groups were formed to oust him they resorted to the time-tested social fabric of 
clannism and organised themselves accordingly. For example, the SSDF was mostly 
composed of Majerteens while the S NM and USC were composed of Issacs and 
Haweyies respectively. When Barre saw national loyalty being eroded and replaced 
by clannism he realised that the only remaining alternative left to him, if he was to 
continue to cling to power, was to resort to the time-proven traditional method of clan 
loyalty as his opponents already had. Consequently, he started building his inner 
ruling circle, security and defence apparatus centred on his clan family, the Darod, 
mainly relying on the Marihan (his own clan), the Ogadeni (lineage on his mother's 
line) and the Dolbahante (the clan of his son-in-law), sub-clans which were usually 
referred to as the MOD. Out of the Darod sub-clans, he marginalised the Majerteens 
and treated them with impunity because they supported his arch-enemy Colonel 
Abdullahi Yusuf who formed the first armed opposition force, the SSDF, with the aim 
of ousting him from office. 
`Divide and rule' became Barre's strategy at which he proved to be an expert. 
Through its manipulation he managed to hold on to power for over ten years. He lost 
power when, in 1988, he offended his Ogadeni supporters by normalising relations in 
a rapprochement with Mengistu of Ethiopia - an act which demanded of him the 
payment of a heavy price, namely the abandonment of the Ogadeni cause. Barre was 
prepared to offend his loyal supporters the Ogadenis by signing an agreement with 
Mengistu which surrendered Somali pride. As mentioned earlier, Barre concluded the 
rapprochement with Mengistu in 1988 with the sole aim of obtaining an assurance 
from Ethiopia that they would stop giving assistance to the SNA/I. With the extra 
forces freed from the border in the south he planned to conduct a major operation in 
the north in order to crush the SNM movement. Although the peace deal with Ethiopia 
enabled him to shift his forces to the north, the harsh and indiscriminate measures 
taken on the Isaac clan as a whole proved counter-productive and had the opposite 
90 1. M. Lewis, The .1 toduni 
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effect to what it was intended to accomplish-91 The rapprochement had a mixed effect. 
`The growing Somali opposition linked the accord to the Hitler Stalin pact of 1940'. 92 
Despite repeated warnings and advice, he implemented all the obligations specified 
under the agreement and, as a result, Barre's `clan card' crumpled when members of 
his loyal and trusted Ogadeni forces withdrew their support and joined the ranks of 
opposition elements. In addition, the demotion and arrest of the Ogadeni Defence 
Minister General Gabyo infuriated the entire clan and drove it to wage an armed 
struggle against Siad Barre_ A group known as the SPM (Somali Patriotic Movement) 
organised itself under the leadership of Omar Jesse and began operations in the 
Southwest of the country, bordering Ethiopia. It benefited from the dispatch of Somali 
troops to the north and, using the vacated camps on the Ethiopian border as its base, it 
was able to move quite freely with little restriction. The defection of the Ogadenis: 
became the thin end of the wedge between Siad Barre and members of his mother's Ogaden 
clan - whose core territory was the Ogaden. This region had formerly offered Siad Barre 
considerable numerical strength, particularly since his own clan (the Marehan) was so small 
and a significant portion of the army was Ogadeni. 93 
A factor of the highest importance was the joining of Haweyis' entry into the struggle, 
which shook the Barre regime to its very foundations. Mogadishu, the seat of the 
government, and its surrounding area is situated in Haweyi clan territory and all 
important military installations and the elite unit of the presidential guard are located 
within the Haweyi clan zone. The support of its clan enabled the USC to bring the 
fighting right into the capital and into the presidential palace area. A few days' 
incursion was sufficient to force Barre to flee from the capital and seek refuge 
amongst his clan, the Marihans, near the Kenyan border. The participation of the 
Haweyies around Mogadishu also forced Bane to withdraw some of his forces 
from 
the north in his endeavour to reinforce his position in the capital -a move which gave 
the SNM a respite which they skilfully and hurriedly turned to their advantage. 
Generally, the situation worked in favour of the SNM and, when Barre's 
forces started withdrawing southwards towards the capital, they were at 
last able to 
easily defeat them and bring the entire Somaliland territory under their total control. 
94 
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Immediately, they declared independence and started running a de facto state. They 
were indifferent to the civil war in south Somalia. Some even were happy and 
expressed their view by saying `the southerners are getting a taste of what we have 
had to live with during the past ten years, because of them' . 
9' 
Since the right to self-determination tampers with the inviolable sovereign 
right of the state, and both the charters of the UN and the OAU uphold this principle, 
to date no country has been willing to give overt recognition to the self-declared 
independent state of Somaliland. However, there is evidence of covert deals with 
some countries: the sheep and cattle trade - the main export - seems to operate 
without any problem and the security situation is much more stable compared to that 
of the south. 
Somaliland 
Recent developments also show that Mohammed Egal's (a well known leader for his 
broad and pragmatic views on foreign policy and a prominent figure for implementing 
a detente policy in 1967-68 until removed from office as Somalia's Prime Minister in 
1969 by a coup d'etat)96 effort to gain recognition seems to have paid off. After 
monitoring events in Somalia for over six years and following its failure to broker 
peace amongst their neighbours, the Djibouti government has at last agreed to grant 
Somaliland an office in Djibouti in May 1997. `After accepting the deal, President 
Egal dispatched Abdullahi Hussein Imam, the minister for rehabilitation, repatriation 
and reconstruction, to Djibouti to open Somaliland's first diplomatic mission 
abroad'. 97 Good-neighbour relations between Djibouti and Somaliland `went a step 
further with the arrival in Djibouti Town on November 28 of Somaliland's 
representative, Omar Mohamoud. Earlier in his career, he was a civil servant 
in 
Somalia's foreign ministry and working in the Arab Emirates'. 
98 This act amounts to 
partial recognition. Encouraged by his success in Djibouti, Egal has 
dispatched his 
minister for culture and tourism, All Sheikh Ibrahim with a personal message to 
Hassan Gouled (President of Djibouti), Meles Zenawi (Prime Minister of Ethiopia), 
Isayas Afworki (President of Eritrea) and Salim Ahmed Salim, the secretary general 
for the organization of African Unity. He has also been given the additional duty of 
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contacting the French authorities in Djibouti. `' However, this does not mean that 
Somaliland is free from clan-related problems. Although the Issacs form the majority' 
of the population, the non-Issac minority, particularly the Gadabursi (of the Dir clan), 
the Warsangali and Dolbahante (both of the Darod clan), have resisted the breakaway 
of the Somali state. 10° Mohamed Ibrahim Egal is not only facing the problem of 
international recognition but also has to contend with the demands of opposition 
elements. This makes his case more difficult than that of Eritrea, which managed to 
secure the accord of the Ethiopian government and was able to conduct a UN- 
monitored referendum to vote for independence. 
The relentless effort made by the Egal government to form a close association 
with Somaliland's neighbours, which has shown some positive response, is 
minimising the possibility of Somalia reverting to its nation-state status of the Barre 
era_ Coupled with the Eritrean experience it may encourage other movements such as 
the Afars, whose territory is partitioned among three neighbouring states and who at 
present are struggling for self-determination, to continue with the civil war. 
South Somalia 
The south, after Bane's demise in 1991, became the scene of internecine strife. In 
particular, the competition between Aydeed and Al Mebadi for leadership divided the 
USC into sub-clan factions - namely, the Haber Gedir and the Abgal led by Aydeed 
and Al Mahadi respectively. The root of conflict between the two sub-clans is mainly 
based on the leadership contest between Aydeed and Al Mahadi. The latter, a rich 
businessman and a latecomer to the struggle, who enjoyed the support of a small 
group of the Manifesto politicians, declared himself as the interim president of the 
Republic of Somalia without the consent and prior approval of Aydeed, the SNM, 
SSDF and SPM. '°" Although it was Al Mahadi's supporters who delivered the final 
putsch at Bane's palace that forced him to flee from Mogadishu, his self-declaration 
as an interim president was not cordially received and, from some quarters, has earned 
him the label of a usurper. The fighting for the capital could not be won by either of 
the contenders and finally they have had to settle for a share of the city of Mogadishu 
which was divided into two halves, demarcated by a line known as the Green Line, 
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Aydeed controlling the southern part and Al Mahadi controlling the northern sector. 
The airport and seaport, which are situated in the south, give Aydeed a strategic and 
economic advantage over Al Mahadi. The situation was further aggravated when Oto 
broke away from Aydeed and formed a new faction under his leadership. 10' Hence, 
the contest for the seat of presidency and control of Mogadishu has become more 
entwined and complicated. 
The consequences of state collapse 
The dissolution of states in the Horn of Africa has led to a new phenomenon- In both 
Ethiopia and Somalia its legacy was the breakaway of Ethiopia and Somalia and the 
formation of the new states of Eritrea and Somaliland. As discussed in the last 
chapter, it had taken a great deal of diplomatic effort, support of the US government 
and the application of force to integrate Eritrea with Ethiopia. The denial of the people 
to exercise their choice through a referendum became the major cause of dissent that 
led to thirty years of war. When state power collapsed, the insurgents found it easy to 
claim their right to self-determination and, as a result of a referendum held in April 
1993, they were able to form an independent nation. In the case of Somalia, too, the 
people of the north did not vote for unity since there was no referendum held prior to 
the formation of the union.. Although an attempted coup d 'etat by northern officers to 
dissolve unity was crushed, the resentment of the Issaq clan was vibrant. When Barre 
was dethroned the choice of the northerners was not for progressive democratic 
government but for the formation of an independent Somaliland. As a result, they 
declared a can facto independence in 1991 and are still awaiting recognition. 
Nevertheless, two new states have emerged in the Horn and a third, the south 
Sudanese movement, has now invoked self-determination and is waging its struggle 
for independence. 
The events in the Horn have raised an important question in international 
relations. Should invoking ethnic commonality or distinct identity be recognised as 
legitimate causes that enable dissidents to claim independence or grant an unfettered 
right to self-determination? What would be the reaction of the regional organisation, 
the (>AU, whose rock foundation is based on state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity? Article III of the Charter of the OAU, adopting the principles of the UN, 
clearly spells out its stand on this matter: 
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OAU member states affirm and declare their adherence to... the sovereignty of all member 
states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, respect for the sovereigntyy and 
territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence, peaceful 
settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation or arbitration. t63 
Will embracing the principles of self-determination pave the way for peace and 
security or will it exacerbate the existing situation? Does implementation require the 
Charter of the OAU to be amended in order to accommodate the principles of self= 
determination? Is it feasible in the near future? In general, it raises a host of questions 
that are difficult to answer or predict. 
Furthermore, the new world order concept of achieving peace and stability in 
underdeveloped countries is through democratisation -a theory that upholds popular 
representation and majority rule. It advocates the spread of the market economy 
believing that free trade is the only way to bridge the gaps existing between states. 
This is the ideology which Western countries, particularly the G-8, want to impose on 
the world of the future. The implication of this trend on the Horn region is a question 
which has to be addressed. 
Debate. over Democratisation 
When considering state-building in Africa three types of state structure are on offer: 
1. liberal democracy that recognises self-determination 
2. no-party democracy which embraces representation but denies the 
implementation of a multi-party system 
3. custom my democracy -a theory that has not yet been developed but 
is widely 
supported. 
A growing number of academics and political thinkers argue that an African solution 
should be sought to African problems. Any theory that can offer a solution to African 
conflicts has to look for an insight into African culture, customs and traditional mode 
of community rule. Proponents of this approach argue by saying that the sanctity of 
the rule by the elders, which pre-dates colonialism, should 
be exploited alongside 
other legacies and heritage to serve as a base to an African 
democracy that can resolve 
current security problems. 
Due to the fact that it is still not fully developed, the third structure - customary 
democracy - could not serve as a guide to seeking a solution 
to current secunty 
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problems. This leaves us with the first two structures noted above. However. as these 
two structures are incompatible, their application creates more problems rather than 
offering a solution to the regional security issue. Nevertheless, different countries of 
the Horn have applied one or the other, and their incompatible nature does seem to 
have exacerbated the region's security problem. The first state structure is based on 
the Democratic Peace Theory, which advocates that peace and security could be 
attained through democratisation. One proponent of this theory is Ethiopia which has 
adopted the federal system as a means to peace- The second structure is a non-party 
democracy, also known as a `measured' democracy. Proponents of this structure are 
Isayas Afworki of Eritrea1°4 and Museveni of Uganda. 105 Their rationale for adopting 
this structure is their opposition to democratisation in a non-nation state (multi-ethnic 
society). They argue that the outcome of a full application of democratisation in the 
context of the Horn of Africa would be fragmentation and that extreme caution should 
be taken before adopting it as a remedy to conflict. Although they support the wisdom 
of democracy, they believe that its regional application under prevailing 
circumstances should be partial and gradual. This division in perspective raises the 
issue of what type of state formation should be adopted by the Horn countries in order 
to enhance peace and stability in the region. As has been noted above, the Horn region 
is heading towards fragmentation rather than an integration that will lead to regional 
unity. Ethiopia has split into two and opposition movements such as the OLF, ONLF, 
and the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) are waging armed struggle to achieve self- 
determination -a destiny that they perceive could only be realised through a 
referendum. Somaliland broke away in 1991, declared independence and formed a de 
_facto 
state. However, loyalty to the sacrosanct inviolable right of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity became a rigid obstacle to the recognition of de facto states by the 
world community and the state of Somaliland had to face the consequences of non- 
recognition. 
In the Somalian case, state sovereignty prevailed even in the absence of a state - 
an entity that collapsed with the demise of Siad Barre in 1991. The UN intervened 
with humanitarian relief to save human lives and, when state formation was attempted 
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and the cost in human lives proved to be high, the mission was abandoned- As a 
result, clan loyalty and clan conflict now dominate Somalian politics. South Sudan is 
still fighting for self-determination- Similarly, an ethnic war is going on between the 
Afar and the Issa in Djibouti. In general ethnic motivated conflict, which leads 
towards further fragmentation, is ravaging the sub-region. The outcome of further 
division of a state is fragmentation at the cost of creating economically non-viable 
mini-states. 
The principal divisive elements of society in the Horn, as already noted, are 
ethno-nationalism, clannism, religious rivalry and competition for resources. These 
factors have kept the momentum of internal conflict going Without interruption. 
Whenever their effect crosses national borders, either the conflict is transformed into 
an inter-state one or neighbouring states are encouraged to intervene. Their restraining 
power on the progress of democratisation has also been enormous. An understanding 
of the vital role these variables play before seeking a solution to the peace and 
security issue of the sub-region, therefore, becomes essential. These roles will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The spread of democracy in Third World countries, particularly in Africa, took 
place at a time when the relationship between conflict and democracy became the 
subject of a pervasive discourse among theoretical analysts and IR scholars. The 
debate is between realists and liberals. The liberal view is that democracies rarely 
fight each other because they believe that the cultural norm and the regime structure 
which they share in common acts as a constraint. They argue that if democracies have 
a disagreement they are likely to resort to peaceful means such as negotiation, 
mediation or arbitration in resolving their conflict. They say that world peace could be 
established by promoting democracy worldwide. Leading proponents of this 
`Democratic Peace Theory' are Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett, James Lee Ray, 
Francis Fukumaya, John M. Owen, Harvey Starr, Reinhard Wolf, Erich Weede, 
Andrew J. Enterline and Zeev Maoz who tried to justify their case by putting it under 
different tests and providing some empirical evidence to support its validity. 
Consequently, this proposition has emerged as the conventional wisdom of the 1990s 
and has been the cornerstone of US foreign policy. It was expressed 
in President 
Clinton's 1994 State of the Union address where he invoked the absence of war 
between democracies as a justification for promoting democratisation around the 
globe. Anthony Lake, his 
National Security Adviser, in a speech that he made after 
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the US landing in Haiti, reiterated it. He said, `spreading democracy 
... serves our interest because democracies tend not to abuse their citizens' right or wage war on 
one another'- 106 
Nevertheless, the liberal proposition has failed to gain universal acceptance. 
Its main critics come from the Realist camp who strongly oppose the Democratic 
Peace Theory and try to justify their viewpoint by claiming that the definitions used to 
describe democracy and war have been tailored to fit liberal conceptions. They argue 
that a proper definition of democracy and war nullifies the liberal theory. David E_ 
Spiro argues that the study on which liberal theorists base their argument is confined 
to a narrow definition of war to prove their theory that democracies never fight. He 
nullifies the theory by remarking that: 
This study is concerned only with interstate wars, which excludes lower levels of international 
conflicts and civil wars. Civil wars are excluded because we need to distinguish between 
domestic violence and interstate conflict. This exclusion has the unfortunate consequence of 
removing from consideration one of the bloodiest conflicts in history, the American Civil 
Way. 107 
Critics of the Democratic Peace Theory such as David E_ Spiro and Edward D. 
Mansfield are fully convinced that international relations are still governed by the 
systemic level which is anarchic and, as yet, there is no international body that 
controls international events. According to their argument, international relations are 
still governed, as in the past, by national interest and the balance of power theory. 
They present examples in which democracies have come to the brink of wars and 
show, in four cases, that it was not democratic norms and culture that averted war but, 
rather, strategic and national interest considerations. Leading critics of the Democratic 
Peace Theory are Christopher Layne, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, David 
E. Spiro, Kenneth N. Waltz, Colin Elman and Mariam Fendius Elman. Professor 
Layne concludes his analysis of the Democratic Peace Theory declaring it-- 
based on hope not fact- In the final analysis, the world remains what it always has been: 
international politics continues to occur in an anarchic, competitive, self-help realm. This 
reality must be confronted, because it cannot be transcended. '0" 
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder qualified their remarks on the Democratic 
Peace Theory by focusing on democratisation rather than on democracy -a 
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proposition which is more applicable to situations in Africa as all states which have 
embraced the democratic peace process are still in their early stages of development. 
Mansfield and Snyder argue that the transitional phase of democratisation is a bumpy 
ride that is prone to conflict. They say: 
... countries do not come mature democracies overnight. More typically, they go through a 
rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is partial, where mass 
politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democratisation, 
suffers reversals. In this transitional phase of democratisation, countries become more 
aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. 109 
'brie above observation seems to be borne out very vividly in the Horn region. The 
conflicts between Sudan versus Eritrea, Uganda and Ethiopia, between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, between Eritrea and Yemen, and the recent severance of diplomatic relations 
between Eritrea and Djibouti over Eritrea's accusation that Djibouti was supporting 
Ethiopia while Eritrea and Ethiopia were in a state of war, are cases in point, as all 
these countries claim to be in a process of democratisation. What is more, the 
Democratic Peace Theory, according to Spiro, deals only with inter-state conflicts and 
totally neglects the crucial issue of instability emanating from the civil wars that are 
bedevilling Third World countries, particularly those in the Horn of Africa. 
The ideological climate of the 1990s was favourable to democratic change in 
Africa. Everywhere constitutions were revised to allow the formation of multiple 
political parties, and competitive presidential and parliamentary multiparty elections 
were held in over 30 countries. 11° But the transition to democracy is a complex and 
difficult process that needs time and effort to mature. Democracy has taken ages to 
consolidate in European countries. Moreover, it was not achieved peacefully. Most of 
the time it was preceded by violent conflict. For example: 
Democratisation in France entailed a revolution and then long decades of political turmoil and 
deep socio-economic change before political stability was established. Democracy in the 
United States emerged from a war of independence, a civil war and a slow process of 
evolution. ... 
In Germany and Japan it took a major military defeat before democratic 
transformation occurred. The list could continue. ' 11 
Countries have no guiding formula to help them achieve democracy instantaneous] ý 
nor has international relations theory yet devised a universally accepted theory 
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African countries are currently following this difficult path. Marina Ottaway explains 
its complexity more vividly: 
Democratisation is proving to be complex and at times stormy process, as is to be expected 
given the complexity of the transformation. Political openings have indeed taken place in 
many countries, as shown by constitutional reform, the organisation of new political parties, 
the growth of independent media, the strengthening of voluntary organisations, or the holding 
of `national conferences' and election. Nevertheless, it is far too early to talk of democracy in 
Africa. At best, these changes will prove to be the beginning of a long, rocky process 
eventually leading to democracy -a process that entails not only the consolidation of 
institutions, but also a change in the political culture. ' 12 
As a result, awareness of the difficulties encountered during the democratisation 
process has compelled Western countries to accept half-measured democracies in 
their dealings With African countries. 113 
The transformation from autocracy to democracy requires the transfer of 
power from autocrats to the representatives of the people. This transfer of power does 
not come voluntarily. It is achieved only through struggle. In the course of the 
struggle, the role of the civil society and the availability of a trained and experienced 
civil service to effectively run the government machinery are vital. Under current 
conditions throughout the Horn, there is an acute shortage of trained and experienced 
manpower. Even if availability is assured, the populations of civil society and the civil 
service have been polarised by the endemic ethnic cleavages and are unable to assist 
in dislodging power from dictators and transferring it to the people. As Ottaway has 
noted, a meaningful democratisation process requires `an active rather than a passive 
population or, in the current parlance, an engaged civil society. 1a 
Power, as Samuel Huntington described it three decades ago, is not `something 
which may be lying around on the floor of the capitol or the presidential palace, and 
that a group of conspirators may sneak- in and run off with it.... The problem is not to 
seize power, but to make power, to mobilise groups into politics and to organise their 
participation in politics ,. 113 Pluralism, a principal element of democratisation, is also 
affected by the shortage of trained and experienced men. Not only must 
it contend 
with second-class leadership, it has also been forced to rely on ethnic and clan 
loyalty 
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to rally support during elections. This factor has forced parties to organise themselves 
along ethnic lines. ' 16 
Democratisation in the Horn 
The transition to democracy in Africa is taking place at a time when its relevancy to 
stability is in doubt since the dictum `democracies do not fight each other' is still 
academically contested. One cannot dismiss the proliferation of some of the opposing 
views in Horn politics. Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, which have appreciated the 
dangers of ethnicity, have tried to tackle the problem by introducing democratisation, 
but have differed on the type and level of democracy deemed to inoculate their 
countries against the cancerous epidemic of ethnicity. 
Countries like Ethiopia, in their attempt to create new balance between state 
and society, have taken extreme measures by recognising ethnicity as a major cause of 
past domestic conflicts. The ruling regime of Ethiopia (EPRDF), whose country 
comprises some 70 ethnic groups, was convinced that ethnicity was the principal 
cause of Ethiopia's instability. According to its vision, only acknowledging 
ethnicity's importance and allowing its proper participation in politics could achieve 
stability. The government's policy is clearly expressed by Abdul Majid Hussein, one 
of Ethiopia's more influential ministers, who said 'Our ethnic experiment has never 
been tried before in Africa. We have grabbed the bull by the horns: Instead of 
pretending that ethnicity doesn't exist, we are prepared to face it'. 117 
In order to accommodate ethnic demands, the Ethiopian government divided 
the country into nine major ethnic groups and granted them federal status with the 
right to self-determination that is embodied in Article 39 of the new 1994 constitution. 
It `grants every nation, nationality and people the right to full measure of self- 
government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the 
territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in regional and national 
affairs. 5} 1s However, such extensive rights that encourage fragmentation of the state 
have now been revoked to prevent the division of the state, and public officials have 
taken strong measures to ensure that central control is maintained. Taking the 
Ethiopian case as a model, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild remarked: 
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Despite efforts to decentralise power in South Africa and Ethiopia, the fiscal dominance of the 
political centre has tended to undercut the significance of regional authorities. Moreover, 
efforts to delineate boundaries have increased conflict between ethno-regional identity groups 
... 
In Ethiopia, the regional boundaries set up by the government appear to favour Tigrav and 
the Afars, at the expense of the formerly dominant Amhara and the Somali Issas in the Awash 
valleyland. Unless carefully crafted, decentralisation schemes may worsen rather than improve 
inter-ethnic relations. '19 
On the other hand, Eritrea, which also comprises nine ethnic groups, takes an 
alternative view. Although it recognises the right of ethnic and religious groups to 
practise their language and culture, in contrast to Ethiopia, it has denied them the right 
to organise as political parties and take an active role in politics. Eritrea believes in a 
unitary state that embraces all ethnic and religious groups equally without distinction, 
the rationale being that it has already developed the culture through its 30 years of 
struggle without encountering serious difficulty. 
in a conference organised by Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 
the theme `Building Political Stability in m uh-,, Saharan Africa', Issayas Afeworki took 
part as an invited guest speaker where he explained the rationale behind his concept of 
democracy - what he calls `participating' democracy which does not go so far as to 
include the holding of elections among its basic democratic principles. He said, `the 
democratic process takes time and it is necessary to allow young nations the time 
needed to involve and educate the population in order to avoid the transfer of political 
and institutional models inherited from bygone colonial powers. '' 20 In a state which 
comprises over eight different ethnic entities practising their own languages and 
customs, and where neighbouring Sudan is actively destabilising government power 
by calling for a rally under the banner of the Muslim faith, he envisaged that he would 
be inviting chaos if he were to allow the introduction of democratic pluralism under 
circumstances in which civil society and political consciousness is virtually non- 
existent or, at best, only at an embryonic stage. Peter Woodward, commenting on the 
Eritrean view, comments: 
Eritrea's leader Isayas Afewerki, has been the most outspoken, indicating that the kind of 
democracy towards which Eritrea is moving will not be one that permits the basing of political 
parties on ethnic or religious lines, thus suggesting at best the eventual introduction of some 
form of `guided' or `semi-democracy'. The success of this will depend largely on the skill and 
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determination of those in power, for the limitations on free political organisation will provide 
some critic. 121 
As its organisation is built on strong discipline, Eritrea envisages no conflict in the 
future either. Eritrea believes that it is the denial of participation and representation of 
the people in the political life of their country as an entity that always lies at the root 
cause of discontent and instability. At this stage, those in authority argue that what is 
relevant is to allow a restricted and, controlled participation and representation of the 
population. In their view, a full-fledged democratic right that embraces all aspects and 
ingredients would not be justifiable in a state where ethnicity is rife and there is an 
acute lack of qualified personnel. If the democratisation process is not gradual, they 
argue that the effect is bound to be counterproductive, as witnessed in many Third 
World countries. 
The Eritrean draft constitution, which was presented to the people for debate 
in 1993, embraces the above justification. It is assumed that the actual constitution, 
when promulgated, will embrace the above focal points. Abba Gebre Yesus trifle, a 
distinguished theologian and historian, in his unpublished book, Eritrean History and 
Culture, has shown how the country, prior to falling victim to foreign rule, had lived 
as a separate entity having its own law, culture and tradition which made it different 
from its neighbours. He argues that, historically, ethnic conflict was always 
manageable and did not cause the disintegration of the state; and as long as tradition 
and culture are respected and integrated with good governance he does not envisage 
that the ethnic problem will be a factor in Eritrea. 
As the time for ratification of the draft constitution by the National Assembly 
is approaching, however, criticism about the exclusion of pluralism from its content is 
gathering momentum. The draft constitution has deliberately avoided the issue of 
multiparty politics by not mentioning it at all. According to an interview carried out 
by New Africa with Dr Bereket, Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, he 
justified the proposition of exclusion in lieu of inclusion of political parties to contest 
in elections by saying. - 
... there will 
be political forums that will act as `think tanks or `research bodies'. We are 
leaving the legislation on political patties to the national assembly. ... 
If we relied on the 
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people to vote in the government we would miss having skilled people.... It is to ensure that 
we get the best people. We might need technocrat&. 123 
Mr Seyoum Iqubamicheal, member of the Executive Committee of the ELF and head 
of foreign relations, in an exclusive interview with Thopia magazine, published in 
Amharic, rejected the Eritrean draft constitution on the grounds that political parties 
including those which came into being before the EPLF had been excluded in order to 
pave the way for the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) -a political 
party formed from the ELF's arch-enemy, the EPLF. He claimed that the one-party 
system was unrepresentative of the people, as all other parties, apart from the PFDJ, 
were excluded from participating in the election of members to the National 
Assembly. In other words, he argued that, as members of the National Assembly were 
also members of PFDJ party, they could not represent the people as a whole and 
warned that his organisation would be forced to resort to armed struggle to put 
democratisation back on track. '24 
The opposition forces' grievance is the ruling party's denial of multiparty 
participation in the democratisation process. The government has refused their 
demand on the grounds that the ethnic and religious factors will be at the forefront of 
party formations and, if their demand were allowed, it would weaken the state, as 
described above. Irrespective of the aim of struggle-pursued - ethnic or religious - 
opposition forces have been able to secure a safe base from which to operate. The 
new anti-Sudan alignment of forces formed in the region by Sudan's neighbours in 
order to safeguard national sovereignty against fundamentalist encroachments has 
increased the level of support that anti-government Eritrean forces might receive from 
the fundamentalist regime of Sudan. Sudan is already assisting Jihad Islamic Eritrea 
(as the name denotes, its ideology is based on religion) and applying pressure on 
Eritrean refugees still living in Sudan to join this organisation which has started low- 
level incursions on government forces and establishments situated near the border 
area. Such a move would not allow Eritrea to carry on with the demobilisation of its 
fighting forces and concentrate on reconstructing its infrastructure and economy in 
order to speed up the democratisation process and meet the demands of its expectant 
and war-weary population. 
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Musevini's theory of non-party democracy is quite similar to that of Eritreas 
concept of democracy. In a country where 92% of the people are peasants it is argued 
that it is not possible to build a sustainable multi-party democracy. In his 
autobiography, This Is My Life, he attributes the causes of conflict and the constraint 
to launching a full-scale democratisation programme in Uganda as follows: 
In my view, between 1962 and 1966, the political crisis of Uganda was characterised by two 
related problems - sectarianism and socio-economic underdevelopment. Sectarianism is a 
consequence of an incomplete social metamorphosis. In other countries, society has been 
changing continually.... Both the feudal and artisan classes in Uganda effectively regressed 
into becoming an almost exclusively peasant society. The situation now is that 92% of the 
population are peasants. 125 
He believes that the stage of development and growth achieved in the fields of 
education, the civil service and civil society does not permit a country divided by 
ethnic and religious rivalry to embrace pluralism, which if introduced ahead of time, 
would be detrimental. Consequently, he opts for a measured `consultative 
democracy' 126 that focuses on the decentralisation of power and the participation of 
the people in the political affairs of the nation as a solution to the problems currently 
facing his country. 
If we take the case of Sudan and observe the way in which democracy was 
organised, we see the two major parties, the Umma and the DUP, to be sectarian, 
rather than secular. The followers of the Umma party are the Ansar sect while those of 
the DUR are the Khatmiyya sect. Sectarian interest has always taken precedence over 
national interest and, as a result, it has not been possible to create a government that 
could achieve national unity. Sudan's President Numeiri, correctly assessing the 
danger of ethnic hegemony of the Muslim north in the politics of the Sudan, declared 
the south as an autonomous region in 1972. Through the Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement he was able to establish peace in the south. However, when he 
backtracked and revoked the peace deal in 1982 `to placate hard-line, Muslim 
elements within the government, Numeiri intervened in southern regional elections, 
changed regional boundaries, re-divided the southern region, applied Sharia law to 
nonMuslims, and ultimately abrogated the agreement itself. It provoked 
insurgency 
led by Colonel John Garang and the country has been at war ever since'. 
127 
125 Excerpt from This Is _11v 
Life (. '4`ew4frican, IC Publications, No. 350, London, March 1997). 
126 Dat, E. Ater. `De11X)Cracy for Uganda: A Case for Comparison (Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 2. Tg 199f>) , pp. 
174-)9, ), 
1-)7 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, (International Security, Vol. ^ 1, No. 2, Fall 1996), p. 62. 
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Furthermore, Sudan associated more closely with Middle Eastern countries than with 
the continent of Africa. It is a member of the Arab League and mostly tries to resolve 
its security problems in this forum rather than through the OAU_ This practice and 
attitude is not supported by the south. M. Louise Pirouet highlighted the issue as a 
core problem: 
... 
in some respects Sudan belongs to the Middle East rather than to Africa, but that is not true 
of southern Sudan, which is very different in character from the north, and this is the root of 
one of Sudan's major problems. The north, too, is torn apart by what is happening, for Islamic 
fundamentalism is far from the liberal and humane spirit of many northern Sudanese, though 
they seem powerless to resist it for the time being. '28 
The end result of such a type of government is a weak leadership that is very 
susceptible to military intervention that takes power into its own hands and institutes 
autocratic rule in its place. The successive attempted coups d 'etat in many African 
countries, particularly those in West and Central Africa, such as Nigeria, Ghana, 
Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda.. could serve as good examples. 
The other relevant example would be that of Somalia. As has been pointed out 
in a preceding section, prior to independence Somalia's social structure was based on 
the clan. After independence, during Siad Barre's rule, one of the rationales for 
introducing socialism was to eradicate clan loyalty and affinity and strengthen loyalty 
to the state. Despite its dangerous consequences, Barre pursued the policy of 
irredentism in order to keep his nationals under the banner of Greater Somalia -a 
decision that ultimately led to his downfall. Since Barre's overthrow in 1991, clan 
dominance has returned and has become the principal factor eroding state power. The 
state system has collapsed and people are living under the umbrella of warlords who 
have taken the law into their hands. They conduct internecine wars to enrich 
themselves and to ensure that their clan gets hold of resources and is not dominated by 
other clans. All reconciliation measures taken by the international community to unite 
them under a representative democratic government have failed so far. A state of 
anarchy still prevails in Somalia. 
In their efforts to seek a solution leading to a lasting stability, some of the new 
leaders of the sub-region resorted to democratisation as the criteria of the New World 
order demanded. However, in pursuit of democratisation they did not adopt the raw 
128. LcxtiW Pircuet, ` Fine Effects Of C'c lic t, 1: Human Rights and Refugees' in Oliver Furled, Cc» flrct in. yi-k11, (7auns 
Academic Studies, London, 1995), p. 28-4. 
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model of liberal democracy. They differed in their approach to democracy as noted 
above and, as a result, adopted different models that suit their preference. The 
differences in approach, based on their past experiences, emanated from their different 
perceptions as to what form a state should take in order to enhance stability. In the 
African context, the gravity and entrenchment of the ethnic and religious factors at the 
grassroots level play an important role in determining the structure of a state. When 
these pervasive facts were considered, some perceived the state's interest to be best 
served by adopting a unitary secular system while others saw the federal approach, 
which embraces self-determination, as a better choice. This diversified and 
incompatible view to the structure of the state seems to have incited and triggered the 
revival of competition between ethnic and religious groups and demands for active 
participation in politics. These problems persist today. 
Unless some cohesive measure that binds regional groups together is urgently 
found, the present trend could lead to a further break-up of states. Invoking the right 
to self-determination -a principal element of democracy - is a detrimental factor that 
has introduced yet another new dimension to the conflicts of the Horn of Africa. As 
noted above, academics differ on the type of democracy that is suitable to African 
countries. Some argue for popular democracy while others favour liberal democracy 
as a solution to its current problems of instability and sustainable economic growth. In 
Africa, where state-building has not yet been achieved - it is still in the process of 
transformation - one can not isolate democratisation from state-building, as the 
former is a process which enables state formation to achieve transparency and 
accountability, Nevertheless, specialists on the region, such as Marina Ottaway, warn 
of the dangers of the application of unrestricted liberal democracy in the context of 
developing countries riven with ethnic conflicts. According to Ottaway: 
The major threat to the integrity of existing states does not come from the outside, from 
neighbouring countries aspiring to more territory and seeking to modify existing borders. 
Rather, it is coming from the inside, from the growing force of ethnic conflict and ethnic 
nationalism. This rise of ethnic nationalism, with its destructive potential, has been triggered, 
in many cases, by a promising development, namely, the opening up of authoritarian political 
systems and the beginning of a democratic transition. ''9 
On the other hand, proponents of popular democracy such as Mohamed Hassen favour 
the full implementation of democracy and do not consider ethnicity as an impediment 
t 29 Marina Ottawav, 'Nation Building and State Disintegration in Kidane Mengisteab and CyýnI Daddieh (edJ, Slate am! 
Democratization in . Africa (Preger 
Publishers, Westport USA, 1999), p. 83. 
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to state building. They argue that lack of stability in Africa as a direct result of 
tampering with group rights which should be put under the test of self-determination 
through a referendum for the people to determine their destiny- Hassan stresses how a 
government should be responsive to the preferences of its citizens and quotes Georg 
Sorenson's criteria for responsiveness which requires that citizens must have 
opportunities to., 
1. formulate their preferences 
2_ signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual 
and collective action, 
3. have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government as 
basic. l3° 
Mohamed Hassen bases his argument on the case of Ethiopia and shows how the 
democratic right of the majority was stifled by the TPLF (Tigrean People's Liberation 
Front) which at present is at the helm of power in Ethiopia. In particular, he points out 
how parties that could have won the election, or least those which could have created 
a strong opposition, were alienated both from contesting in elections and drafting the 
constitution -a constitution which is noted for the absence of separation of powers 
and which does not even contain clauses for the minimal checks and balances between 
the legislative, the executive and the judiciary and yet one that has been highly 
acclaimed as democratic. He states: 
Like previous Ethiopian Constitutions, it will remain on paper. The reason for this is obvious. 
It was a constitution single-handedly produced by one organisation and its partners. 
Independent organisations, which represent probably 80 percent of the population, were not 
party to the drafting of the Constitution. It lost legitimacy before it was even ratified. 
'3' 
From the above description we clearly perceive two conflicting views adopted for the 
promotion of democracy in the Horn of Africa. The remedies they sought and 
prescribed differ widely and are incompatible. If the problem of ethnicity did not 
exist, the diversity of approaches towards democratisation would not be a problem. 
Since all countries share the same endemic ethnic problem, the democratisation 
processes in the sub-region really matters and should be an issue of great concern. 
130 Gig Sorenson, Demo racy and Dentxrcuizalion: Dilemmru in World Politics (Boulder CO, Wcshvicw Press, 1993), p. 12, 
1-i1 Mohammed Hassan, Ethiopia: Missed Opportunities for Peaceful Democratic Process in Kidane Mengisteab and C\ rit 
Daddich (a), State Building emd Democratisation in Africa (Praeger Publishers, Westport USA. 1999), p. 253; Author-: 
obserNmtion: this view is strongly supported by opposition forces in Ethiopia both residing at 
home and abroad- It is a common 
topic of discussion among refugees. 
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Summary 
Since the end of the Cold War, the security situation in the Horn region, as discussed 
above, deteriorated instead of showing sips of improvement- The presence of the 
superpowers in the area had some restraining power over the actions of the leaders as 
they used arms supply and aid as a leverage. When that leverage was lifted the leaders 
were free to pursue policies that conformed to personal ambition and national interest. 
Ambitious leaders, aiming to retain an uncontested reign of power, reactivated past 
causes of conflict that were dormant. In order to accomplish their aims leaders and 
contestants have unreservedly used divide and rule tactics to weaken their enemies. 
Ethnic affiliation became a cheap propaganda weapon to incite and mobilise forces. 
Inter-clan and inter-ethnic feuds became frequent. State power declined and civil war 
became the order of the day. 
Ethno-nationalism was not the only factor that inflamed civil war. Religious 
expansion, as shown in the case of Sudan, became the principal cause of decades-long 
conflict. Islamisation of the Christians and animists of the south became a national 
policy. The expansion of the Islam religion was not limited to the Sudanese 
population. Attempts were also made to export it to neighbouring countries, an act 
that infuriated formerly friendly leaders and resulted in the severance of diplomatic 
relations and offers of assistance to opposition movements to pursue armed struggle. 
The new world order, which emphasises the introduction of democratic rule by 
Third World countries as a prerequisite for the receipt of foreign aid, has also created 
some difficulty from the perspective of the recipient countries. The democratisation 
process does not progress easily in countries that are not nation-states. In a region 
such as the Horn, which is composed of multi-ethnic societies and where civil society 
is in its infancy, the result of free election and formation of parties when put into 
practice has shown an adverse effect. The priority in nation-states is on building a 
coherent ethnic society -a process, which if not handled carefully and skilfully, 
encourages demand for self-determination with a possible consequence of 
disintegration of the state. Scepticism of the virtues of unrestricted liberal 
democratisation has convinced leaders such as Museveni of Uganda and Isavas 
A. fworki of Eritrea to opt for a gradual process that favours no-party democracy but 
allows participation of the people in politics through their representatives. On the 
other hand, leaders of Ethiopia who appreciate the dangers and sensitivity of ethnicity 
wanted to handle the issue by recognising the ethnic factor and allowing it to take an 
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active role in politics. As a result, they re-divided the Ethiopian territory into ethnic 
areas and allowed ethnic groups to form parties. The country is now divided into 
ethnic federal states with some of the opposition groups demanding self-determination 
to form their own mini-states. The demands of the OLF, OAF and the Afars signify. 
further fragmentation of the country. 
Ethnic and religion analysis of the Horn countries discussed above has proved 
beyond doubt the validity of Hypothesis! that states: Distinct identities and 
divisions between communities within a nation or state -a domestic problem - 
can provoke civil war and, in extreme cases, the collapse of the state. 
The issue that is now facing the sub-region is how to create a stability that will 
permit the implementation of unimpeded democratisation in heterogeneous societies 
where the process of nation-building is incomplete, and in most cases has only just 
began- Could such a venture be achievable at national level acting independently 
outside a regional framework? It raises the question of the merits of a measured 
democracy as an alternative to democratisation based on liberal democracy principles. 
It also raises another question that bases its rationale on customary democracy -a 
democracy that is built on African heritage, custom, traditional rule and law. Such a 
democracy would give special consideration to the sanctity of elders and traditional 
leaders, an area which has not yet been developed and needs extensive research before 
being offered as a solution. 
As the problems of the Horn countries are so integrated and intertwined, Horn 
countries could not solve the security dilemma of their sub-region on their own 
without external assistance. First and foremost, it requires the coordination and active 
participation of the leaders of the region in seeking a regional solution. Institutions 
like the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), which have signalled 
some hope in their attempt to solve the South Sudanese and Somalian problems by 
serving as forums for negotiation, should have the full support of regional leaders and 
international organisations. Unfortunately, the IGAD's influence has been reduced to 
a state of near-redundancy due to the fact that `members of the IGAD committee 
(except Kenya) were indirectly at war with Khartoum from 1995-96. ' I 32 Besides, 
outside organisations such as the Arab League and an assorted number of independent 
countries are competing by meddling unilaterally in the affairs of the Horn to maintain 
132 "Sudan/Ethiopia, Blow up' (Africa Conjidential, Vol. 40, No. 19,24 September 1999), p. 5_ 
157 
their national interests in the region, an act which has added to the complexity of the 
already existing problems of the IGAD proving the validity of Hypothesis 2 that 
states: In circumstances where the security problems of a distinct area are 
complex and highly interrelated; credible and satisfactory peace cannot be 
achieved unless governments tackled the situation jointly at the regional level. 
The issue has now become how the IGAD could revive its regional role of handling 
economical and political issues. 
Furthermore, the multiplicity of the factors that confront the multinational 
state in the post-Cold War era has made security such a complex and apparently 
irresolvable issue that some local elders, out of desperation, describe the situation 
facing them today as a curse from above and place their hopes on divine intervention. 
Political thinkers and academics in their endeavour to unravel the complexity of civil 
war issues, were compelled to take a pragmatic approach and introduced new phrases 
to describe the new phenomenon - phrases such as CPE (complex political 
emergencies) that incorporate within their definition the multi-dimensional nature of 
the crisis. Prominent amongst these terms are `profound human suffering', 
`secessions, `self-determination; and `state collapse'. The in depth study of such 
topics enables the identification of the practical lessons that could be of assistance for 
humanitarian intervention, relief supplies, peacemaking, reconciliation, rehabilitation 
and development. 133 
The following two chapters will discuss the application of CPE theories 
developed by academics and political analysts by relating them to the current security 
problems of the Horn countries with the aim of testing the hypotheses that state: 
Economic and environmental factors contribute in exacerbating insecurity in the 
Horn region. 
133 D. Eade (cd. ), De elopement in States of War (Oxford: Oxfam, 19961, p-5- 
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Chapter 4. 
The Effect of an. Underdeveloped Economy on Security 
Introduction 
Economics and politics issues of instability are so closely associated and interrelated 
that it becomes very difficult to make a clear demarcation between the two and 
distinguish one from the other when considering their relevance to security matters in 
the Horn. While this chapter's aim is to deal specifically with economic issues, it 
nevertheless will have to refer to issues of politics, such as bad governance and 
absence of democracy, which were discussed in the last chapter. However, it is 
important to understand, at the outset, that both factors are complementary and play a 
prominent role in defining the state of security in any country. 
Economics relationship to security 
While defining the relationship of economics to security many academics have 
identified the existence of close relationship between them. In particular they 
discovered that a sustainable economic performance could not be accomplished in 
places where reasonable security is not assured. John Healy and Mark Robinson, in 
seeking to find empirical evidence on the relationship between instability, political 
participation and economic performance, remarked that economic development 
cannot be achieved without `reasonable peace, law and order, authority to enforce 
contracts and to permit the functioning of markets, trade, production and investment. ' 1 
Tenets in a major empirical work (1966) dealing with the association 
between economic performance, stability and political structure, commented: 
Political instability, and non-representativeness of the regime combined with an authoritarian 
structure dominated by personalist leaders and backed by familiar and ethnic ties and police 
are harclly7 favourable conditions for economic growth - even in the early phases of transition 
from traditional pre-modern economic society. 2 
More recently, empirical evidence from Africa covering the 1956-84 period, has been 
offered by McGowan and Johnson to show that frequent changes of regimes resulting 
from coup d 'etuts and military intervention inhibit economic growth and that in turn 
causes instability. 3 Barro also found a negative relationship between political 
John Healer and Mark Robinson, Deusocracy, Governance and Economic Polic-L,: Sub-Saharan Africa in (: ornparaliv 
Perspective (Overseas Development Institute, Regent's College, London, 1994), p. 98. 
2 S. Kttznets, modern Economic Grow & Rate, Structure exid Spread (Yale University Press, New Hawn CT, 1966), p. 453. 
P. McGowan and J. H. Johnson, `Military Coup d'Etats and Underdevelopment' (Journal of MfodernAfrican Studies, Vol. 22, 
No. 4,1985), pp. 633-667. 
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instability and economic growth and investment for a larger and wider sample of 
countries over the period 1960-85. ý 
The 1990 International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery 
and Development Process in Africa, organised by the Economic Commission for 
Africa in collaboration with other United Nations organs, painted a glaring picture of 
the economic situation in Africa. It emphatically highlighted the suffering, hardship 
and impoverishment of the vast majority of the African people.? Furthermore- 
economic factors, such as low incomes, population growth, level of industrialisation 
and debt burden, have been identified by academics as the main indicators denoting 
the level of security in developing countries. Scholars have also identified additional 
factors, such as economic mismanagement, political instability and defence 
expenditure, as exacerbating state insecurity particularly in `juridical states' where 
instability is often due to lack of control over national territory by the governments in 
office. 6 In order to test the relevance of economic factors to instability this chapter 
will test the wider perspective hypothesis framed in Chapter 1 that states: In 
economically deprived areas shortage of resources provokes war. 
Although the economic variable has been significant since the end of 
colonisation and the emergence of independent African states in early 1960s, its 
relevance to security issues has been more pronounced in the post-Cold War era. 
Okafor and Tella singled out the African continent as the leading area where `the 
lever of economic well being is an important variable of national security' 
7. They 
justified their case by pointing out that the ever-deteriorating economy is finding 
expression in anti-social behaviour which, when exploited, is capable of adversely 
affecting national security. The gravity of violence is likely to increase when 
international organisations such as the I and the World Bank impose conditions on 
poor states to enforce structural adjustment. They justify their action as the only 
possible way of lifting nations in difficulties out of economic misery - but the 
conditions laid down demand budget tightening, and cancellation of subsidies on vital 
items such as food and reduction in wages. The downhill slide is accelerated in 
countries where unemployment is the highest and where its consequences have been 
R. J. Barro, `Economic Growth in a Cross-section of Countries' (4uarterh, Journal of Economics, Mai. 1991). 
US Central Intelligence Agency, Te ii'orld Facibook 1988 (Washington, DC, 1988) 
6 Vieh-sr C)guejinTtor Okafor and Sherifideen Fella, 'Economic Development and the Prospect for Economic Security in Afrtc 
in Adeb: ayo O_yebade and Abiodun Alao, Africa After the Cold War (Africa World Press, Asmara, 
Eritrea, 1998)_ pp. 18-25. 
Ibid. 
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already identified as a cause of grave social problems. The complexity of the 
economic problem is further compounded by ever-growing corruption and resource 
mismanagement. In weak countries, which do not have full control of their territories 
and are shouldering a heavy burden of imposed economic conditions, the attempt to 
create sustainable democratic forms of government -a requirement for stability and 
economic growth - would be a nightmare. 
If we relate these factors to the economic realities of the Horn countries, we 
observe that they are heavily debt-ridden, are suffering from a population explosion 
and the continuous depletion of rare natural resources. The area is well known for 
having one of the highest rates of population growth. In circumstances where there is 
no balance between economic and population growth, the output rate per person falls 
continuously unless a remedial means is sought promptly. There should be no 
misapprehensions; the consequence is an obvious increase in the level of poverty - in 
other words, the economic situation will deteriorate from bad to worse if the rate of 
the annual economic growth happens to be lower than the average population growth 
(3%) as shown in Table 4. I. 
Table 4.1 Basic Economic indicators 
GNP p er capita Life Total 
Av. annual expectancy 
Population Land area Atlas percentage at birth net ODA 
Country mid-I997 (thousands of dollars growth (years) per capita 
(millions) square km. ) 1997 1987-97 1996 1996 
Ujibuuti 0.6 23 .. .. 
50 157 
Eritrea 3.8 lot 210 .. 
55 43 
Ethiopia 60.1 1000 110 0.5 49 15 
Kenya 28.0 569 330 0.0 58 22 
Somalia 10.1 627 .. .. 
49 9 
Sudan 27.9 2,376 280 1.7 54 8 
Uganda 20.3 200 330 3.3 43 35 
, Source: The World Bank, 
`mean Development Indicators 1998199' (The International Batik 
for Reconstruction and Develaprnent-Tie World Bcnrk, Washington DC, 1998), p. 6. 
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All the Horn countries are rated amongst the poorest in the world and they rely 
heavily on foreign assistance to remain viable as states. Their average income per 
capita is about $180 per annum -a figure that is declining from year to years (see 
Table 4.2). Poverty of such magnitude plays a marked role in exacerbating poor social 
conditions. The military spending of the Horn countries further exacerbates this 
situation by consuming a large portion of their national budget, leaving them with 
scarcely any financial resources to invest in development. 
Table 4.2. GNP Per Capita 
'ýr atxý 1980 1988 1989 
US dollars, Allas method 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Djibouti -. 
Eritrea 180 180 200 210 
Ethiopia 180 170 160 120 110 120 110 110 110 110 
Kenya 359 311 304 296 268 266 176 213 285 283 324 
Somalia 100 130 120 110 
Sudan 430 590 540 430 360 320 .. 
280 
Uganda 424 330 262 195 163 177 206 278 293 298 
Source. The World Bank, `Af ican Development Indicators 1998/99' (The International Batik 
for Reconstruction and Development4'he World Bank, Washington DC 1998) 
The Horn of Africa is a sub-region whose economy is shattered and whose 
existing infrastructure is facing heavy reconstruction work. When it lost its strategic 
importance during the post-Cold War era, the amount of US aid allocated by the Bush 
administration to sub-Saharan Africa in 1991 was $800 million, `equivalent to only 
one third of US aid to Bg6ypt alone; although some congressmen and African 
development experts consider the amount disproportionately small compared to the 
continent's enormous humanitarian and development needs'. 
9 To extricate themselves 
8FJS Cet> I Intelligence Agency., The Work! Facthot* 198 (Washington, DC, 198S1 
Michael Chege, 'Reinem vying Africa', (Foreign A airs, Vol. 71. No. 1, I992), p. 156. 
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from this dilemma - the decrease of economic assistance by Western countries due to 
their new commitment to former communist East European countries - the inhabitants 
of the Horn countries had to adopt political and economic policies which would 
enable them to solve their internal problems peacefully. If they could manage to end 
conflict peacefully the money saved from cutting the defence budget could be spent 
on economic development programmes, thereby allowing them to embark on a route 
towards sustainable growth. However, as Tables 4.5 and 4.6 clearly show, some 
countries of the region were importing arms to such a degree that the cost could not be 
covered by their total revenues from exports, thus leaving them no money to spend on 
development or even on basic social needs such as medicine and education. In some 
cases, the figures also show that money spent on buying arms exceeded that spent on 
importing commercial items. They were able to survive as states only because of 
outside aid. 
During the Cold War, countries of the Horn of Africa enjoyed considerable 
economic aid from the superpowers. The mere fact that the superpowers were 
contesting for control over the strategic area of the sub-region made all types of aid 
request acceptable. Other regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Libya, reflecting 
their national interests in the region, also gave moderate assistance to their respective 
associates. That is why Ethiopia and Somalia in particular were able to sustain a 
prolonged costly and destructive war (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). However, this privilege 
was short-lived and came to an end when the Cold War ended and the superpowers 
pulled out of the area. This change in circumstances has put the countries of the Horn 
on an equal footing with other non-favoured states and, as a result, they have since 
had to abide by the rules of the New World Order, which requires them to promote 
democratisation to qualify for aid. In addition, the existing structural adjustment 
criteria of privatisation and practising a market economy have been supplemented by 
demands for the observance of human rights, good governance, respect for 
international law and the settlement of disputes through negotiation rather than 
through the force of arms as conditions for attracting aid and economic assistance (see 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Foreign aid was withdrawn from those who did not abide by the 
rules of the new world order. Thus conditionality has become a political, as well as an 
economic, instrument. 
The new political conditions were spelt out by Douglas Hurd, the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in a speech he delivered in 
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Table 4.3. Development Assistance Received, 1979 1987 
(net disbursements from all official sources in millions of USS) 
Year I Ethiopia I Kenya I Somalia I Sudan 
1979 191 351 194 687 
1980 212 397 433 583 
1981 245 449 375 632 
1982 200 485 462 740 
1983 339 401 327 957 
1984 364 411 363 617 
1985 710 439 354 1,129 
1986 636 455 511 945 
1987 635 565 580 902 
Total 3,532 3,953 3,599 7,192 
% of GNP, 1987 11.8"/0 7°ßu 57% 10.5% 
per capita, 1985 $16.80 $21.50 $65.70 $51.50 
per capita, 1987 $ 14.17 $25.57 $101.75 $39.05 
source: Paul Henze, The Horn of Africa p. 125. 
Table 4.4. USSRIUS Arms Deliveries to the Horn, 1967-1987 in Millions of US$ 
(not including Kenya) 
Year I Total I USSR I USA I Oder I% USSR I% USA I% other 
1967-76 468 246 136 
1975-79 2,695 1,720 210 
1978-82 3,520 2,205 160 
1993-87 4,975 4,200 180 
86 53% 18% Z9% 
765 6457o 8'/0 28'/0 
1,155 63% 5% 32% 
495 86"/e 4°/s 10o/s 
Source: Paul Henze, The Horn of Africa, p. 119. 
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Table 4.5. Arms Imports as a Percentage of Exports, 1981-1987 
All Africa Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan 
1981 8.4 108.0 13.4 39.1 22.8 
1982 9.0 142.5 3.8 46.2 48.1 
1983 8.9 258.7 5.1 65.3 16.1 
1984 10.1 288.1 0.4 158.3 17.5 
1985 7.2 232.9 0.5 33.0 10.6 
1986 5.9 72.6 0.8 20.6 15.1 
1987 6.7 256.4 1.0 
Source: Paul Henze, The Horn of Africa, p. 121. 
Table 4.6. Arms Imports as a Percentage of Commercial Imports, 1981-1987 
A11 Africa Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan 
1981 73 56.8 7.7 1147 9.7 
1982 8.5 73.2 2.4 49.2 18.7 
1983 8.8 111.3 3.7 20.2 7.4 
1984 10.8 129.3 0.3 68.0 9.6 
1985 8.3 78.0 0.3 26.8 5.2 
1986 6.9 29.9 0.6 5.5 5.2 
1987 7.3 111.1 0.6 
Source: Paul Henze, The Horn QfAf ica, p. 120. 
1990 while on an official visit to West Africa. He warned that potential recipients of 
Western aid would be countries `tending towards pluralism, public accountability, 
respect for the rule of law, human rights and market principles', adding that 
governments which persist with `repression, corrupt management, or with wasteful 
and discredited economic policies should not expect us to support their folly, with 
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scarce resources which could be used better elsewhere. 10 The approach spread like 
wildfire among donors. The US government endorsed the new consensus in 1990-9 1, 
the European Community signed a charter in November 1991, linking aid to respect 
for human rights, democratisation, a free press and probity in aid recipient countries. 
Japan, the world's largest aid donor, followed suit. " 
It therefore became mandatory to abide by the new world order and fulfil the 
preconditions of eligibility for IMF, World Bank and Western aid and loans - 
requirements that could not be achieved overnight- The imposition of these conditions 
did not take into account the generous economic assistance desperately needed to 
carry out unpopular programmes of economic liberalisation. African countries were 
expected to fulfil the conditions without additional help. As Sandbrook expressed it 
`to democratise in the midst of severe economic deprivation is a daunting task, even 
for the well-intentioned'. 12 In addition, the interest of the Western industrial powers 
has shifted towards the former communist states. The opening up of new markets in 
Eastern Europe and in the states of former Soviet Union following the end of the Cold 
War `further challenged the capacity of the African countries to compete in global 
markets and attract flows of development aid and private investment'. ''' 
The marginalization of Africa is deeply resented by almost all African 
politicians who have indignantly voiced their sentiments on various occasions. 
Nigerian leader Olusegun Osobanjeo has claimed, that as a consequence, Africans 
have become the 'Cold War's victims just as Africa was its pawn. The turn of events 
since the end of the Cold War suggests that Africa has been discarded like banana 
peels' 14 
The liberalisation of former communist states' economies required enormous 
economic assistance, at least on a scale comparable with that of the Marshall Plan 
introduced by the US government to rehabilitate the economies of the Western 
countries at the end of the Second World War. Without economic assistance, the 
possibility of a return to communism remained a threat that could not be ignored. In 
the perception of the Western industrialised nations, the only means of countering a 
to Cited in WestAfrica Magazine, 25 June-I July 1990, p. 1077. 
ii Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of: 4frica's Economic Recovery (Cambridge. University Press, Cambridge, 1993), p. 3. 
12 Ibid., p, 103. 
13John it Harbcson, 'Introduction'in John H. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild 'cd), Africa it World Politics - Past-Cold War 
Challenges (Westview Press Inc., Oxford, 1935), pp. 8-9. 
14 ()1usegun C)sobanjeo, `A Balance Sheet of the African Region and the Cold War' in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild 
(eds. ).: 4frica in the . 
Vew International Order. Rethinking State Sovereignty c Regional Security (Lynne Rienner Pubiisherý,. 
London, 1996), p. 24. 
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potential backslide was by making sufficient aid available to East European countries. 
An economic venture on such a grand scale naturally required the reassessment of 
past priorities - in particular, aid assistance to Third World countries. Any aid given 
to Eastern European countries had to be quite substantial in order to strengthen the 
political and economic restructuring that was taking place there. Consequently, the 
formerly privileged countries of the Horn now not only had to compete with the East 
Europeans who had circumstances on their side, but also had to meet the tough criteria 
laid out as preconditions by the World Bank, IMF and Western industrialised 
countries to qualify for financial aid or else had to be prepared to face the calamity of 
exclusion as beneficiaries. 
Table 4.7. Third World Debt: The Horn Countries 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 






Source: The Independent on Sunday, 26 September 1999, p. 18. 
Countries whose total debt 
exceeds their annual income 
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All the countries of the Horn apart from Eritrea, a country which gained 
independence in 1993, have been classified as HIPCs (Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries). A 1999 statistical data that appeared in the Independent on Sunday shows 
the countries of the Horn having a gross imbalance between what they earn and what 
they owe. As Table 4.7 indicates, the total debt of Ethiopia and Sudan now exceeds 
their annual income. ' 5 The fragility of their economies has placed African countries in 
a weak position in their dealings with industrial countries. Out of desperation, they 
had to accept the goals and policies defined by others as prescriptions for sustainable 
15 Editorial, Focus; Third World Debt' (Th Indrependent on &ind v, 26 September 1999), p- I8_ 
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economic growth. However, enforcing the new measures proved to be less simple 
than expected by the donor countries. Because of the poor state of African countries' 
economies, implementation of the conditions had adverse consequences- It entailed 
taking draconian steps such as privatisation and curbing government spending by 
imposing fiscal austerity on education, health and other socially-related subsidies -a 
burden which is not welcomed by most of their citizens. It also required combating 
corruption, which is widespread and has extended its tentacles down to grassroots 
level- The following paragraphs will examine how each country of the Horn tried to 
meet the harsh requirements set by the international institutions and, in particular, the 
effect that the economic factor has so far had on exacerbating national and. regional 
insecurity and the prospects for the area in the future. Each country will be discussed 




Somalia is a country whose economy is predominantly pastoral. In the south, in the 
area of the inter-riverine valley, which lies between the two rivers of Wabi Shebelle 
and Juba, settled agriculture is practised on a substantial scale. Banana, a major export 
is grown in this area. Another notable export is live cattle, goats, sheep and camels to 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. These animals are mostly reared outside the 
riverine area, where water and pasture is scarce and the pastorals seasonally migrate at 
will into Ethiopia (the Haud reserved area) to graze and water their livestock. '6 This 
income is augmented by remittances sent by Somali nationals working in the Middle 
East and Western industrial countries. 
The problem 
In times of drought, shortage of these vital resources forces them to penetrate deep 
into Ethiopian territory (outside the Haud area as far as the permanent waterholes of 
Hora Kallifo and Durwalle) situated about 20 kilometres south of the regional capital, 
Jigjiga.. The other areas of refuge are the Bullale waterholes and their surroundings in 
the north and the Wabi Shebelle and Genalte valleys in the south. Overcrowding of 
animals at water points usually disrupts the frequency of visits normally enjoyed by 
'6Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa, p. 1 3, 
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the local nomads, and disagreement over the priority of access to water often leads to 
clashes. Unfortunately, this meagre amount - income from export and remittance - 
has been insufficient to cover the needs of the entire country and has had to be 
subsidised by foreign aid and assistance. Furthermore, drought, which frequently hits 
the sub-region, exacerbates the poor economic conditions and makes reliance on 
foreign subsidy essential. As mentioned earlier, Somalia's strategic location was a 
powerful lure for both superpowers who, in return for the use of its territory, were 
ready to give generous assistance- Successive Somalian and Ethiopian governments 
repeatedly and skilfully used the trump card of playing one superpower against the 
other to gain the best possible advantage. Although assistance focused on military 
hardware, a priority choice of the Barre and Mengistu regimes, the economic aid 
received from donor countries and international organisations was sufficient to keep 
their nations afloat throughout the Cold War era- Table 4.3 shows the amount received 
during this period. 
The consequences 
After the superpowers withdrew from the region at the end of the Cold War, 
government coffers were insufficient to support administrative organs properly, let 
alone finance a prolonged civil war that erupted virtually throughout the length and 
breadth of Somalia. As a result, government power collapsed under the weight of the 
protracted civil war. Somalia then descended into a state of anarchy and, as yet, has 
been unable to find a solution from within as state of anarchy opened an opportunity 
to those who exploited the situation to enrich themselves at the expense of misery, 
dislocation and refuge of the majority of the population. 
One of the principal attributed causes of failure to establish stability by the 
warring factions in Somalia is lack of sufficient economic resources. The anti- 
government forces, organised under various clan-oriented movements, were unable to 
reconcile their differences and form a broad-based national government because their 
primary aim was to control economic resources in order to sustain their needs and 
those of their clans. As resources were very limited, warlords clashed over possession, 
those with the greater military might usually being rewarded with a greater proportion 
of the spoils. Since clan survival depended heavily on maintaining the equilibrium, 
which was a sine qua non to stability, alliances were formed to counter homogeneity. 
As a result, no single group was able to emerge victorious and form a national 
government. 
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Most of the fighting was centred on the capital city, Mogadishu, and the 
plantations in the riverine areas. The main targets in Mogadishu were the airport and 
seaport, entry points for aid materials and the export point for local products- The 
inter-riverine area, inhabited and owned by the Rahweyenes, was occupied by the 
USC (Aydeed faction), SPM and SNF factions and its inhabitants dispossessed of 
their land. In order to repossess lost property and protect what they still retained, the 
Rahweyenes were left with no option but to jump on to the bandwagon of inter-clan 
competition by forming their own factional movement known as the SDM. Recently, 
the USC split into two parts when its main financier, Oto, clashed with Aydeed over 
control of power which, in reality, meant economic power. Thus we see how a clan, 
the Haweyie, was divided into three factions and fought a sub-clan war for control of 
territory in order to satisfy their economic needs. Thus, inter-clan resource conflict 
became a principal factor that obstructed stability in Somalia- 
The rapid deterioration of security warranted intervention and the UN dispatched 
a military peace-enforcing task force to restore order and assist in establishing a 
functional state. As the Horn area is infested with various types of small armament, 
UNISOM"s attempt to disarm the warlords was not only a failure but left in its wake a 
serious doubt as to its future usefulness in tackling security issues in the region- The 
end result was state collapse and the rule of anarchy -a factor that has an indirect 
bearing on economic degradation. 
The financial and material resources extorted from areas of control were not 
sufficient for various factions' needs and had to be augmented by other means such as 
demanding protection money from aid agencies for escort services: `Towards the end 
of 1992 it was being reported that up to 80 per cent of aid was being looted by armed 
gangs, apparently associated with the rival factions' . 
l' It would be very difficult to 
dislodge the recalcitrant warlords from their position of absolute power, which 
enables them to gain a lucrative income from looting and extortion rackets. The clan 
supports their action because it receives an equitable share from the proceeds. Under 
these circumstances it would be a quite difficult task to reconcile the warring parties 
and form a national government that could reinstate law and order. 
17 Peter Woodward, The Horn oj'Afii a, p. 183. 
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One of the main reasons why Somaliland broke off from Somalia is because 
its economy suffered as a result of its political union with the south. The north was 
marginalised and all development schemes were concentrated in the south- 
The concentration of authority in Mogadishu.. 1500 miles from Hargeisa in the North (the 
same distance as London is to Moscow), became an intolerable burden both physically and 
financially for citizens to travel these vast distances by road to the capital. Any 'service', 
however small, had its unofficial price - at military road barriers, the passport office; the 
central bank for Letters of Credit; license offices for every conceivable mode of transaction. '8 
In addition, the prospect of oil reserves in the north has also given an additional 
impetus of a bright future ahead - an income which it will not have to share with the 
south and which it believes will help it build its economy. 
There was deep resentment among the northern population. and all efforts to 
break away from the south with the aim of forming an independent Somaliland were 
severely dealt with by the central government of Mogadishu. When state power 
collapsed in 1991, the SNM seized the opportunity and declared northern Somalia's 
(Somaliland's) independence. 
Since the economic advantage of separation grossly outweighs that of unity 
with the south, it would be very difficult to envisage a voluntary union-taking place 
while the majority of the northerners perceive unity as a liability. Regarding the 
consequences of the breakaway Drysdale comments. 
Mogadishu would, without the north, lose out on traditional sources of income, namely, 
foreign aid and, indirectly, the purchasing power of remittances which gave Mogadishu in its 
hay day a spurious appearance of influence. Southern Somalia would wish to share the 
foreign currency earnings enjoyed by the north. Some 70 per cent of Somalia's officially 
recorded export earnings used to be met from the north's exports of livestock. The remainder, 
30 per cent, was made up of livestock exports from southern Somalia and exports of bananas 
to Italy. '9 
The f uture 
The official statement justifying Somaliland's right to independence denounces the 
`emptiness and insignificance' of the slogan `Somali Unity is Sacred and dismiss 
southerners' bogus claim of unity by stating: `there is nothing sacred about something 
that does not exist and we reject them with their childish slogan and their evil blood- 
stained leadership ' 2" 
18 john Drysdale, Somaliland The Anatonn, (? f Secession, pp. 17-18- 
19 Ibid., p. 34. 
20Declaration of Independence made by the Government of the Republic of Somaliland in 1991, (Renaissance Publishers, East 
African Review, Issue No. 121, London, 19977), p. 11. 
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Somaliland's development programme envisages restructuring pastoralism on 
the basis of scientific ecological knowledge and making financial loans available for 
improving livestock and pastureland- They declared their intention as follows: 
We intend to survey the whole country for underground and surface waters and then zone our 
pastoral land into seasonal zones. We shall then establish scientifically which livestock each 
zone can sustain. The trans-human movement of our pastoral community will be limited to 
two moves per year. 21 
Somaliland's principal major exports, sheep and cattle, are reared in the Haud area of 
Ethiopia to which it has access by virtue of an agreement signed between the 
Ethiopian and British government in London on November 29,1954 while the 
Emperor was on a projected state visit, 22 thus making it more dependent on Ethiopia 
than on Somalia. Moreover, supplies of the highly sought=after narcotic khat, 
vegetables and grain come from Ethiopia in exchange for cheap smuggled items such 
as cloth, watches, electronics and matches from the Gulf area or Asia. As long as 
Somaliland maintains a peaceful relationship with Ethiopia, it could even benefit from 
a transit service from Berbera port which is ideally situated to handle exports and 
imports to the Eastern region of Ethiopia, particularly the Ogaden. In exchange, it can 
import cheap hydroelectric power from Ethiopia -a venture that only requires a less 
than 100 kilometre power line extension from the town of Jijiga situated near the 
border. 
This economic vision of restructured pastoralism will make them heavily 
dependent on the Haud grazing areas situated inside Ethiopia -a circumstance which 
requires a good neighbourly relationship. The fact that they have categorically 
denounced the concept of a 'Greater Somalia' will undoubtedly be much appreciated 
by the neighbouring states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti which are all opposed to 
Somalia's irredentist claim. Such a measure is likely to open up the venue towards 
confidence building and close economic ties with a close neighbour Ethiopia. Mutual 
economic interest is bound to tighten their relationship, while their relationship with 
former Italian Somaliland (the south of Somalia) is bound to decline. Thus, we see 
how economic factors have played an important role in Somaliland's decision to take 
a firm stand against the reinstitution of the Somali state -a decision which is bound to 
contribute towards the deterioration of stability in the sub-region unless southern 
`t Ibid_ 
22 John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (Published by the Pall Mall Press Ltd, London, 1964), pp. 74-83. The agreement was 
signed bww foreign minister Ato Aklilou and 
Mr. Eden. 
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Somalia decides to take a realistic approach and renounces its irrederrtist claim over 
the territories of the three neighbouring states and participate actively in the 




Ethiopia, like its neighbour Somalia, is also a very poor country with an unexplored 
economic potential. It is heavily dependant on the export of coffee (which comprises 
60%). The other major export is hides and skin, which is heavily dependant on 
pastoralism. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia totally depends on its neighbours' 
ports (Eritrea and Djibouti) for exporting these items -a circumstance which has led 
it to adopt an active foreign policy to acquire its own ports or have unrestricted use of 
its neighbours' ports facilities. This drawback has forced successive Ethiopian 
governments to build strong armed forces to maintain territorial integrity and subdue 
liberal attitudes of their citizens -a venture which the national economy could not 
sustain. 
The problem 
Such a stance, which gave precedence to military build-up than economic 
development, hampered it from building a strong political structure throughout the 
empire -a necessary pre-condition to establish a secure and stable state. When the 
Eritrean secessionist movement, the ELF, challenged the central government's 
authority in 1961, its rebellion had an economic, as well as political, basis. The 
industries built by the Italians were not encouraged to flourish. When West Germany, 
attracted by the location, proximity and convenience of the port of Masawa, showed 
interest in constructing a Volkswagen assembly plant at Dekemhare (situated some 30 
kilometres south east of Asmara) at a time when Eritrea enjoyed a federal status, the 
Addis Ababa government blocked the deal. Instead, it recommended Nazreth - an 
area situated some 90 kilometres east of Addis Ababa, mostly owned by the 
aristocracy and which did not satisfy the requirements of the investors. As a result, an 
opportunity, which could have increased employment, was lost due to the regressive 
policy of the central government that favoured the interest of the aristocracy over that 
of the state and its citizens. The news of this unfortunate incident was widely 
circulated and created deep resentment among the Eritreans. This error is not an 
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isolated incident. In fact the Eritrean province became marginalised, and new 
industries which should have replaced the old ones were built in the vicinity of the 
capital, Addis Ababa, causing the industrial workforce to migrate southwards to look 
for employment. Regarding the failure of the government, Christopher Clapham 
commented: 
Haile Selassie's major failure was in Eritrea, where his subversion of the federal system 
created in 1952 helped to prompt a reaction first from the Muslim elements and then 
increasingly from the population as a whole, including Christians whose support for federation 
had been eroded by economic decay and the high-handed actions of the central government. 
The emperor, highly adept at the traditional politics of factional manipulation, lacked the 
ability to manage a region which, alone in Ethiopia, had been mobilised into party politics. 2 
During the emperor's reign, Ethiopia's economic and social system was centred on 
land that was mostly owned by noblemen and landlords. Although a ministry 
responsible for land policy and distribution was instituted to conduct studies of the 
existing land tenure system, its recommendations failed to bear fruit because it 
aroused animosity and angered the nobility. The feasibility study was put aside and 
finally dumped into the archives because its implementation demanded a social 
structure change that was not acceptable to the aristocrats and noblemen who held the 
key positions of power_24 As a result of government inactions opposition elements 
amongst the intellectuals and university students grew from day to day. Thereafter, 
demonstrations against the government's outdated land policy became frequent, the 
students' principal slogan being "Land for the Tiller'. The opposition reached its 
climax when famine in Wollo province wiped out thousands and most of the able 
survivors began to migrate southwards. The government was not fully aware of the 
magnitude and gravity of the situation even by the time the first batch arrived on the 
outskirts of Addis Ababa, and this weakness was effectively used as propaganda 
material by the opposing forces. 
Eritrea" s breakaway from Ethiopia, which has left the latter as the largest 
landlocked country in the world, is not viewed without misgivings. Although prior to 
the border dispute that ended in conflict Ethiopian access to the ports has been 
guaranteed by the Eritrean government, its dependency on a foreign country for 
23Christophcr Clapham, 'Thc Horn of Africa. A Conflict Zone' in Conflict in Africa by Oliver Furlcv (od. ), p. 76. Christophcr 
Chqjmm `The Structure of Regional Conflict in Africa' in Michael Twadd1(ed. ), hnjriahsm. the State mki the Third ff'6rL1 
(British Academic Press, London, 19921), pp. 268-269. 
24Author's notes: reflecting a discussion he held with a close friend, Nfr. Belave At-eve, the then minister responsible for land 
reform in the Haile Selassie government some six months 
before its doxvntäll in 1974. 
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access to its entire import and export trade is something which is deeply resented by 
many Ethiopians. 
The consequences 
The governmment's land policy shortfall was fully exploited by the university students 
who displayed their anger by conducting successive demonstrations. Their actions 
inspired the population and assisted in hastening the downfall of the emperor's 
regime. The famine in WoIlo, whose dismal consequence could have been avoided or 
minimised by the government's quick response or an appeal for help to the 
international community, aroused the population's indignation against the emperor. 
The regime's inaction was due to its unwillingness to admit the existence of famine, 
which it feared would depict the country as poor, and might consequently implicate its 
inefficiency and weakness in administration. The choice of a hypocritical approach as 
a solution to the famine of 1974 resulted in irreparable damage that led to the 
government's downfall. 
One of the first daring measures taken by the military regime, the Derg, on 
coming to power, was to enact a law that dealt with the controversial problem of land 
reform: 
The rural land reform, by far the most drastic measure of revolutionary transformation 
instituted by the new regime, was implemented with remarkably little violence, given the scale 
of the operation and the centrality of land holding to the Ethiopian economy and its social 
structure. It also did much to defuse the deep-seated tensions in southern Ethiopia that had 
resulted from central conquest and land alienation, and goes far to explain why, despite the 
brutality of the Mengistu government and the opposition that it aroused= most of agricultural 
southern Ethiopia remained quiescent right up to the overthrow of the regime in 1991.25 
Although the principal cause of Mengistu's regime failure was political, his economic 
policy equally contributed in hastening its downfall. The villagisation programme; 
introduction of state farms, allocation of grain quotas to peasant associations and 
delivery of the same at fixed low prices lowered the incentives for farmers to raise 
production and hindered development. In fact it was counterproductive and reduced 
the grain supply. Moreover, the forced conscription of peasants further diminished 
peasant support and participation in the armed struggle. Had the regime refrained 
from intrusion, the peasant conscripts could have contributed more in raising 
production that could have led towards a sustainable economic growth. 
26 
`5C hristopher Clapham , 'The 
Horn of Africa: A Conflict Zorze' in Conflict nr Africa tw Oliver Furlev (: d. ), p. 81 . 
26peter Woodward, The Hora of Africa. p. 94. 
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When the Mengistu regime was faced with both civil war and Somalian 
aggression, it had to depend on foreign assistance to keep its regime in power. That is 
why, when the US government refused to deliver the necessary arms that at least 
would have put it on equal footing with Somalia, Mengistu had to appeal to the 
Russians to give him the arms he desperately needed. The Soviet military aid, 
amounting to $7 billion, came to his rescue at a crucial moment (is discussed in 
Chapter 2). Had he not received Soviet aid, his power would have crumbled long 
before, as the national economy was unable to resist the calamity of drought, let alone 
manage to conduct a prolonged full-scale war against well-armed Somalian forces 
reinforced by a high-intensity domestic insurrection. It was through Soviet aid that the 
Derg managed to reverse the situation in its favour. The EPLF/ELF and TPLF 
insurgents were able to wage a protracted armed struggle against the heavily armed 
Ethiopian forces because they were also able to obtain extensive foreign assistance- 
By the fall of 1969 Eritrean insurgents had shifted from assassinations, raids, kidnappings and 
aircraft hijackings to serious military operations as weapons and supplies poured across the 
Sudanese border and the rebels made free use of Sudan as a safe haven. The total amount of 
support Eritrean insurgents received during this period is unknowable with any exactitude and 
not all of it can be charged to Soviet or Chinese accounts, for some Arabs (such as Qaddafy) 
had their own money. Sudan, however, did not, and neither did poverty-stricken North and 
South Yemen, who also served as a funnel for both Soviet and Chinese arms and supplies to 
Eritrea. '" 
At the end of the Cold War, when the superpowers pulled out of the Horn and 
withheld their economic assistance, Ethiopia could not support its army which was 
still fighting a fully fledged internal war. Consequently, morale in Mengistu's army 
sagged and his forces disintegrated. The insurgents, on the other hand, were able to 
sustain their insurrection due to the flow of foreign assistance and growing local 
support and participation. When the situation reached an irreversible state, Mengistu 
fled the country and sought refuge in Zimbabwe where he still resides. 
The recent fall out between the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments over the 
alleged border dispute has further distanced economic relations. While denying 
Ethiopia an exit to its products it also disadvantaged Eritrea from becoming a 
beneficiary of port services. The fact that Djibouti -a country which has a rail and 
road link to Ethiopia - is very anxious to offer the services of its facilities and may 
77 Paul B. Henze. The Horn ofAfrica: From Wirr to Peace, p. 86. 
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offer even better terms and services, thereby encouraging Ethiopia to switch over its 
allegiance, is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. As both countries need close 
economic ties with Ethiopia, there will always be a lively competition to attract and 
win this client. In addition, Somaliland, which is in dire need of foreign currency, can 
offer the services of its port facilities at Barbara thus availing Ethiopia of an 
alternative choice, and intensifying the competition amongst Eritrea, Djibouti and 
Somaliland to attract Ethiopia""' (see Map 8). 
Map 8. Alternative Sea-route Access to Ethiopia 




29 Husten M. Adam, 'Stmna1i Civil Wars' in Taisier M. Ah and Ra t 0. Matthefts (eds. ). Civil Wars in. Ajrica (McGill- 
Queen's University: ' Press, Montreal 1999), p. 190 
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The future 
We have seen how a Third World country with a weak economy like Ethiopia, cannot 
sustain a prolonged conflict unless assisted by a substantial foreign military and 
financial aid. Ethiopia's troubles were further exacerbated when the regime 
obstinately refused to search for a peaceful solution.. A military solution, as witnessed 
in the Ethiopian and Somali cases, only creates a rift between the ruling element and 
the population and makes peace untenable. Harsh retaliatory measures, taken to 
subdue the opposition, as seen in Ethiopia, only alienate the citizens, ultimately 
forcing them to take up arms against the government in power and participate in 
insurrections either covertly or overtly - an act that further weakens the security of the 
state and the sub-region. The answer to Ethiopia's economic prospect lies in forging a 
sound economic agreement with its neighbouring states under the guidance of the sub- 
region's economic organisation IGAD_ Economic cooperation that envisages mutual 
benefit for all states of the region will open the road towards a healthy political 
relationship (confederation of Horn states). Such a stance will make military build-up 
redundant and will gear all states to focus on economic development the main 
objective of the IGAD - an action that guarantees stability in the region. 
Sudan 
The economy 
Sudan, the largest African country, is mostly dependant on agricultural products such 
as cotton, gum Arabic and cattle for exports. The recent discovery of oil in the south 
(a war torn area) has raised its potential to become an economically viable state. Since 
the Nile flow stretches throughout the length of the country it is suitable for irrigation. 
This advantage has attracted Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and 
Iraq to invest on multi-million sugar plantations such as the Kanana project. 
The problem 
Despite its immense potential Sudan is another Horn country whose economy is in 
absolute turmoil. The security situation of its own creation has hampered any 
form of 
development which could have improved the economic condition of its citizens. 
Despite the fact that, at independence, Sudan's economy compared favourably with 
that of South Korea and was much better than that of India, 
due to prolonged civil 
war, it experienced a downward economic decline which 
became the principal reason 
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for it being identified as one of the heavily indebted states of the world (see Table 
4.7). 
The consequences 
The concentration of development projects in the north has widened the rift created by 
the political marginalisation of the south. The discovery of oil in Bentiu province in 
the south and the decision to build the refinery at Kosti, which would deny access to 
local employment, was seen by southerners as a usurpation of their highly valued 
natural resource. There was also a strong contention over the construction of the 
Jonglai canal, a joint Sudo-Egyptian project, whose purpose, as declared officially, 
was to drain the marshland of the Sudd into the White Nile so that water which would 
otherwise be lost by evaporation would be saved to add to the quantity of water 
flowing northwards to Khartoum and the Mediterranean delta. 29 In the eyes of the 
South Sudanese, such a venture would not only deny the people of the area from 
recourse to grazing land during the dry season, a means on which their survival 
heavily depends, but also lead to a forced evacuation and abandonment of the land of 
their forefathers. Such a move would entail yielding empty irrigable space to 
newcomers scheduled to settle from the land-hungry north. According to informed 
inner circle officials of the SPLA/SPLVi, it was this economic development scheme, 
targeted at accommodating the interest of the northerners coupled with the 
enforcement of the Sharia law in the south that motivated them to take up armed 
struggle against the central government in Khartoum. " 
Likewise, relocation from their homeland, the mountainous area, to places 
which are not suitable to agricultural production, has motivated the Nuba to join ranks 
with SPLA forces, the rationale of joining the SPLAISPLM being the recovery of the 
dispossessed land on which their economic existence is founded: 
Between 1991 and 1993 an estimated 2O-30, OOO Nuba were deported from the Nuba 
mountains to semi--desert areas largely not conducive to agricultural production. ... Other 
deportees are forced to work in the large-scale mechanized scbe in agricultural lands 
which originally belonged to them, before their distribution by the government to wealthy 
Jellaba and Bag ara. 3' 
29 4-" . a, pp. 49-50. Peter Woodvvaid,, The Harn i f:. 4 
30 Author's discussion with SPL 4/SPLM officials on a number of occasions, 
MPeter Verney et at, , Sudan: Conflict and 
finorities (MFP[sign and Print, UK, August IW5), p. 34. 
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Even the Nuba Muslims who happen to be of African origin have not been spared 
from eviction. Khalid Medani, in an article in Current History, gives the venture a 
connotation of racism and describes the operation as ethnic cleansing- 
In the central portion of the country; it [Iranian armed supports has enabled Khartoum to carry 
out against the Muslims of the Nuba Mountains what Amnesty International has termed as 
`ethnic cleansing, ' involving widespread arrests, killings, and the forced relocation of 
hundreds of thousands from their fertile and much coveted ancestral lands. 32 
Had government policy not disturbed the Nuba's economic means of existence, it 
would have had fewer enemy forces to contend with, which would have helped defuse 
the deteriorating security situation. 
The utilisation of the slave trade by the Beshir regime as a tool to weaken the 
animist and Christian south has also played a role in hardening southerners' bitterness 
and strengthening their resolve to fight for liberty= 
The National Islamic Movement (N IF) regime has used the slave trade as a policy for dividing 
and ruling the tribes in the border areas between the North and the South. The Arab tribes 
have been encouraged to take slaves from the South on the basis that the people are infidels 
and therefore fair game for a Moslem. Children and woman have been the particular targets of 
the trade. Slaves have been taken from the Nuba Mountains, the Ingessina Hills, Southern 
Sudan and now even from the Beja tribal lands in Eastern Sudan. The main perpetrators of this 
crime against humanity have been the regime's so-called Popular Defence Force (PDF). 33 
This strategy has had a dual impact. While it helped the government ensure the 
domination of the south it also paved the way for traders to amass financial benefit 
from lucrative slave trade transaction- Cash payments made by Christian Solidarity 
International (CSI) to redeem slaves from their captors give ample testimony to how 
the slave trade in South Sudan has attained an economic value. The CSI delegation 
sent to investigate the existence of slavery in South Sudan travelled discreetly to the 
village of Manyiel in the province of Bahr EI Ghazal and redeemed 58 slaves on 30 
October 1996 by paying `an Arab trader named "Nur" 2,000,000 Sudanese pounds to 
free them. The 50,000 Sudanese pound price for each slave is roughly the equivalent 
of the local cost of two or three cows'. 34 The source discloses that the value of some 
of the slave girls who are rated suitable to serve as a concubine or a wife soars up to 
200,000 Sudanese pounds. 
32Khalid Medani, 'Sudan's Human and Political Crisis' (Current History, May 1993), p. 203. 
33$<xts l aiwal, The Enduring Legacy c? ¬ModetrtChattelSlavery in Islamic Sudan' (Sudral Lkwfteýratrc G zrfte, No. 7',, 
Oxford December 1996), p. 1. 
34 Ibid., p_6. 
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The future 
The problem of Sudan is a self-inflicted wound. Unlike its neighbours the demand of 
its insurgents is not a challenge to dismember the unity of the Sudan state and form an 
independent state of their own. Their demand is the establishment of a secular 
democratic state in which equal rights and opportunities are properly exercised. It is 
denial of these rights that has forced them to rebel. If the ruling regime abrogates the 
ýharia as the law that governs the state and replaces it with a conventional law based 
on the rule of law the prospect of maintaining a united Sudan would be more feasible. 
In addition, it would deny interventionists the opportunity to destabilise the security of 
Sudan by exploiting social division within societies that are the principal causes of 
domestic conflict. Furthermore, if Sudan manages to find a peaceful solution to its 
domestic political problems the prospect of building a structure that leads to 
sustainable economic development and growth is viable. 
Djibouti 
The economy 
Servicing is the mainstay of Djibouti's economy. The income from French 
expatriates, its well equipped port that serves as a transit outlet to neighbouring 
Ethiopia and the jointly owned railway system which it shares with the latter accounts 
for half of its GNP. The rest of the GNP is dependent on French subsidies. As the and 
semi-desert land is hardly suitable for agriculture, most of its food is imported. 
Foreign assistance since the end of the Cold War is showing a continuous 
decline. The Indian Ocean Newsletter describes the decline as follows: 
The total amount of direct budget transfers of France, which was around UTS$50 million 
annually since the independence of Djibouti in 1977, declined to $43 million in 1993 before 
falling to $24 million in 1994, $27 million in 1995, and then $21 million in 1996. Andirect 
financing linked to the French military and diplomatic presence in Djibouti (in the form of 
investments or operating costs) has also diminishcd. 35 
Although it collects about 14 million francs from tax on the narcotic khat consumed 
by 80% of its population, it pays 34 million francs in hard currency to Ethiopia from 
where it is imported. Successive attempts to control the importation of this narcotic 
has failed as most of the consumers are addicted to it and there seems to be no easy 
way of restricting importation and saving valuable and badly needed foreign 
35'Djibouti: 'Roctc-bottom is Reilly BotkMn' (The Indian Ocean _i ewsletter, 
NO. 74& 11 January 1997), p. 6. 
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exchange. In 1997 about 20,000 out of a population of 500,000 (4%) were 
36 beneficiaries of the khat business and their livelihood totally depended on it. 
The problem 
The impact of khat on. unemployment is self-evident, and this delicate issue has to be 
handled with care. When the Ethiopian government attempted to impose strict border 
controls to clamp down on smuggling at the end of the Ethio-Somalia war of 1977-78, 
the response by the local population, the Issa, was to bring the rail services between 
Ethiopia and Djibouti to a complete standstill- 
The consequences 
The effect of imposition of strict border control on the economy was so devastating 
that the government was forced to back down and ease off border controls. The 
reaction was instantaneous. Stability returned and trains services resumed according 
to schedule without incident. 37 
The future 
As was seen in the Djibouti case, in areas of hardship where livelihood largely depend 
on cross-border trade and the enforcement of custom regulations is harsh and does not 
conform with reality, controlling smuggling created an insurmountable economic 
burden on the population that left them with no other choice but to rebel, as already 
witnessed on both sides of Ethiopia's and Djibouti's borders. Besides, lack of 
resources, unemployment and acute shortage of food supply can drive Djiboutians 
into economic hardship, exacerbating the existing situation and forcing them to live in 
a state of anarchy. If an alternative solution is not found, economic problems coupled 
with ethnic rivalry are bound to lead towards an instability that could easily spill over 
into neighbouring countries. 
Eritrea 
The economy 
Although Eritrea is a pastoral and agricultural country like other Horn countries its 
agricultural produce is not able to feed its population. It has been dependant on both 
Ethiopia and Sudan. Due to its lack of suitable agricultural land Eritrea relies mostly 
on industrial products which are heavily dependent on Ethiopian markets and 
-6 'Djibouti: The Burden of Khat' (The Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 759,29 March 1997). 
37Au 's notes: the author was Head of Operations of the Eastern Command at the time of the incident and the secunn of the 
railway lines was a concern of his department. 
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resources: `Salt is the country's largest export, followed by beverages, soap. 
detergents, hides and skins, candles, matches, bottles, shoes and textiles. Almost 90% ö 
of exports go to Ethiopia, while about 30% of Eritrean imports come from Ethiopia-'-; 8 
The problem 
It has already been mentioned in a preceding section how the curbing of economic 
expansion in Eritrea, and the shifting of industrial concentration to the south around 
the capital Addis Ababa by Emperor Haile Sellassie created hardships and forced the 
trained workforce to either migrate or, through frustration, join the rebel forces 
fighting for secession. By reinforcing the position of political dissenters who have 
already taken up armed struggle as an option, destitution and unemployment - the 
consequences of a poor economic policy - became additional causes inspiring further 
rebellion. 
When Eritrea introduced the nakfa as its own currency, it assumed that it 
would be exchangeable at parity. However, to its dismay: 
Ethiopian traders gave a rate closer to one birr for five iiakfa. At home and abroad, critics 
suggested the nakfa was a devise to conceal near-bankruptcy and there were fears Eritreans 
might buy up scarce Ethiopian foreign exchange at the regular foreign exchange auctions. 
Ethiopia therefore decreed that all trade between the two countries be in hard currency - in 
practice, in US dollars. 39 
The economic row has created a ritt between the two countries, infuriating Eritrea 
because: 
-it 
is desperately short of hard currency and would have profited from a bilateral payment 
arrangement. ... Ethiopian officials at the 
four designated crossing points often insist on 
permits and refuse to allow trade in some main goods, including coffee, cattle, hides and skins, 
oil seeds and pulses. In Asmara markets, there have been sharp rises in the prices of Ethiopian 
food imports. Eritreans have been looking to Djibouti and Yemen for vegetable 40 
The consequences 
As far as security of the region is concerned, the introduction of different new 
currencies by both Ethiopia and Eritrea is not a step in the right direction. Although 
time is needed to ascertain its full effect, the establishment of border customs posts to 
enforce control on all cross-border trade items is a bit of a nuisance to the population. 
Applying strict laws to ensure that the transaction of even local produce such as grain 
38lecuiie Street, `SpecinI Report: Eritrea - Rebuilding the Economy' (African Business No. 2_' 1, IC Publications Limited, London- 
May I997), pp-33-34- , 
E: Cautious but we ed - Economics Intemipt the Honeymoon with Eritrea but the Balancing Act Goes on' Opla, 
(Africa Confidential, Vol. 39, No. 2,2 January 1998), pp. 2=3. 
40 Ibid. 
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and perishable food items, including vegetables, be concluded through hard currency, 
has plunged the people living on both sides of the border into desperation and utter 
confusion -a situation never experienced during the lifetime of the present 
generation. Reports from reliable sources indicate that the scarcity of foreign currency 
has forced truck drivers to carry sufficient food for working visit to the neighbouring 
country. For example, the border custom officers impose restrictions with such zeal 
that, at the border post on the Addis-Assab road, an Eritrean national travelling with a 
few kilos of oranges intended for his own consumption was asked to prove that he had 
bought the items in foreign currency. Bewildered by the question, he replied that he 
had never been required to meet rigid formalities of such a nature in his numerous 
trips in the past. He was advised to either eat them or hand them over before he 
crossed the border. In indignation he strewed them on the road and destroyed them by 
running his truck over them. He was then detained for unbecoming behaviour-`' 
The economic row has also created tension in border areas by raising the 
sensitive issue of nationality which demands that Eritreans who have settled in the 
Sheraro area of Western Tigrai for a number of generations to either take Ethiopian 
nationality or go home. This encroachment has questioned the legitimacy of the 
agreed principle of dual nationality so far observed in practice. If it is enforced, it is 
also going to affect those Eritreans living in other parts of Ethiopia who happen to 
possess a lot of property and business enterprises. `In 1996, the arrest (formally on 
corruption charges) of former Deputy Prime Minister Tamrat Layne was widely 
believed to have been prompted in part because, like many Ethiopians, he objected to 
the agreements allowing dual nationality to both Ethiopians and Eritreans' 42 In 
retaliation, 
Eritrea doubled its port charges and expelled Ethiopian customs officials from Assab and 
Massawa. Some have been detained and efforts by Ethiopian Ambassador Girma Asmerom 
failed to get them out. In late December, there was a military confrontation around an Eritrean 
army post, which Ethiopia claimed was on its side of a poorly defined section of the border in 
northern Dankalia, in the Biru Sultanite. This is close to where the Ethiopian opposition party, 
the Afar Revolutionary Democratic United Front, and the Afar Ugugumo (Revolution) militia 
operate, and where there is resistance to Eritrean national service recruitment. It took personal 
persuasion by Meles to get Issayas to order his troops to withdraw- 43 
41An 
ewnt related to the author by a close and reliable friend from Ethiopia on 3 January 1998 in London. 
42 
J. l 
frica C: onfidential Vol. 19 No. ?, -13 January' 1999. 
43 Ibid. 
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This untimely measure, taken by the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia, has 
widened the gulf in their existing relationship. Such incidents are a bad omen and, 
unless both countries make a serious positive effort, the rift that has already emerged 
could widen to such an extent that it could not be easily mended and, in the long run, 
would threaten the security of the sub-region- Unless the existing relationship is built 
on a mutual trust supported by the populace of both countries, this sensitive issue 
could, in due course, develop into a bone of contention and jeopardise the existing 
harmonious relationship between the leaderships. Lessons should be drawn from the 
effect of the economic row which, to say the least, has interrupted Ethiopia's 
honeymoon with Eritrea, and swift corrective measures should be taken to bridge the 
gap that has already been created. 
The future 
Although Eritrea is endowed with an industrious population, its limited resources will 
not allow it to achieve sustainable economic growth unless it is able to discover 
valuable mineral resources in a quantity sufficient to make the country commercially 
viable. It is known that: 
The Danikel desert, between Massawa and Assab, is home to the junction where the African 
Rift Valley, the Gulf of Aden Rift and the Red Sea meet. The geological patchwork gives rise 
to several types of mineralisation. ... 
Aside from the world's favourite yellow metal, Eritrea's 
Asmara region boasts the base metals, copper, zinc and lead. Iron associated with beach-sand 
occurs in various coastal area. 44 
The alternative to sustainable economic growth would be to achieve reliable stability 
free from internal and external threat so that the created conducive atmosphere could 
be exploited to attract foreign investors who are interested in building industries that 
would make the country highly competitive in world markets. Eritrea's geographical 
location and the availability of a highly disciplined and cheap labour force could be a 
great bonus for investors. If it manages to attract investors, it could build an enviable 
tiger economy similar to that flourishing in South-East Asia - an economy that has 
been the dream of all Third World countries. However, the possibility of economic 
growth and a bright future is heavily dependent on maintaining stability within the 
country and in the sub-region as a whole. It also requires a clear vision, good 
leadership, high diplomatic skill, courage, commitment, an unremitting effort towards 
achieving peace, and above all, patience and tolerance. 
44 Jane Borges, 'Pockets of Potential in the Hom' (Aficwi Business No. 222, IC Publications Ltd, London, June 1 99 7), p 16 
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It is a well-known fact that the Eritrean expatriates living in Ethiopia control a 
large portion of the business enterprises. As unemployment is an acute problem in the 
whole Horn of Africa region, the money which the expatriates send home in the form 
of remittance to support their families and their continuous occupation of numerous 
lucrative jobs in a variety of fields has provoked deep resentment on the part of a 
growing number of Ethiopians. Many local newspapers have focused their attention 
on this sensitive issue and have given it extensive coverage. Some have compared and 
contrasted the privilege bestowed on Eritrean nationals with the eviction and loss of 
property experienced by Ethiopian nationals residing in Eritrea. The Ethiopian 
Register describes the issue by saying `... all Ethiopians resident in Eritrea for decades 
were summarily evicted from the region with hardly their clothes on their backs while 
Eritreans continue to lord it in the rest of Ethiopia and play havoc with the politics, 
economy and destiny of the Ethiopian people even as the "proud" viceroy in Addis 
Ababa viscerally defends this double standard as the right cause' . 
`' The tone of the 
above description portrays a bitter resentment inculcated in people's minds that would 
require a great deal of effort to defuse. Practical confidence-building measures should 
therefore be implemented without delay. Unless some form of economic integration, 
on a bilateral or regional basis (IGAD1, `6 founded on mutual trust and respect, takes 
place for the benefit of member countries, the existing system which favours national 
sovereignty could, if allowed to continue without intervention, hamper economic 
development and, in extreme cases, may even become a cause of misunderstanding 
and conflict that could lead to instability. 
The effect of World Bank/IMF policy on stability in the Horn 
Ethiopian Prime Minister Kieles Zena%vi's government economic policy has been 
acclaimed as a success by Western ambassadors who, until now, have avoided 
commenting on its human rights record. Based on their recommendation, the fMf and 
World Hams made available substantial funds to Ethiopia. However, the IMF, which 
gives considerable attention to development projects, has departed from its former 
policy centred on economic structural adjustment and, in addition, in 1997 introduced 
a new criterion: 
45 WcxkuAberr `Etlmiei :Te Jdeoko; o¬a Worin State' (EdtiopiRegister , 
Vol. +. No, 5. Avon MN, May 1997), p. 29 
46 Husien M. Adam, `Somali Civil Wars' in Taisier M. All and RCiba r 0. Mattheý%s (eds. ), p. 190. 
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the Fund publicly issued guidelines to its staff on `governance': a word which the rich world 
now uses to describe how well or badly poor countries are ruled.... The new guidelines limit 
the IMiF's involvement in governance to its economic aspects. tax collection, the use of public 
funds and so on. But they urge staff to raise corruption issues with the authorities. We won't 
interfere in domestic politics, says the M ff, but we may suspend or delay loans to a 
government unless it makes changes in management of public institutions and ... the removal 
of individuals. 47 
It has warned its staff to be prepared to face some tension as there is a likelihood that 
the working relationship with country authorities would not always be smooth, as 
evidenced in Kenya where `some IMF staff and consultants, bent on implementing 
reforms from Nairobi, have received anonymous threats and have been quietly 
spirited out of Kenya' 48 
The strict criteria laid out by the Bretton Woods institutions have not only 
hastened the introduction of democracy all over Africa, but also put a strain on the 
smooth transition to peace and stability in most countries. Living up to the standards 
of all the conditions has meant the immediate and unreserved application of pluralism 
in the countries' systems of government. In the Horn countries, where ethnic and clan 
rivalries play a prominent role, accepting pluralism prior to solving the clan and 
nationality problem meant allowing parties to organise on ethnic basis. Pluralism of 
such a nature exacerbates existing ethnic divisions instead of bringing people closer 
together. It encourages self-determination, which in reality means the acceptance of a 
further break-up of a nation. The Ethiopian case could serve as a good example. Its 
impact on security is very obvious. At a time when developed economies and those 
striving to build a better economy are forming economic unions on regional and 
global basis, the break-up of a state into minute mini-states clearly entails moving in 
the opposite direction, which will undoubtedly weaken the economy rather than 
contribute towards its enhancement. A weak economy cannot satisfy the demands of 
the population. On the other hand, out of utter desolation, it could pave the way 
towards a state of anarchy and instability. 
Those who disagree with the Ethiopian prescription have avoided introducing 
pluralism in favour of achieving stability. They have, however, introduced the other 
conditions such as democratic governance, which they were convinced would not 
adversely affect stability. Museveni of Uganda and Isayas Afworki of Eritrea are 
47& Cher the Border. INlF'$ Anti-eomiption Guidelines' (The F onromz3l Ilniemational, 16 August 1997), p. 51. 
48 `Kenya; A Sweet Tooth' (Africa C: onjidential, Vol . 
38, No. 18,12 September 1997), p. 3. 
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prominent in this approach. Other leaders, like Moi of Kenya, have been reluctant to 
introduce pluralism so that they can retain and prolong their hold on power. However, 
when IMF/World Bank pressure forced President Moi to permit pluralism in 1992, he 
managed to keep himself and his party in power up to the present time by skilfully 
using divide-and-rule tactics to create a gulf between parties. 
As a result of human rights violations and a disinclination to introduce 
democratisation, development money has been withheld from Kenya, a one-time 
favourite client which is now: 
being punished for being quarter-hearted and the government is trying to curb the theft and 
corruption that goes on at high levels. On August Ist the IMF suspended a loan programme, 
worth $220tn. This is a cruel blow to Daniel arap Moi, already under pressure from his 
political rivals to scrap the laws that have helped to sustain him and his party in power. 49 
Although. Somali raids in border areas are now under control due to government 
forces response, an escalating crime rate and increases in attacks on foreigners in 
major cities and towns became unmanageable and are affecting tourism: The golden 
goose of the Kenyan economy and until just a few years ago the country's biggest 
foreign exchange earner is facing hard times. Kenya's tourist reputation has been 
seriously tarnished by reports of widespread crime and ethnic clashes. 50 The 
economic problems, compounded by a high level of corruption, gross 
mismanagement, racial tensions and a leadership that is hesitant to take measures that 
could assuage the, rising discontent seem to offer bleak prospects for future stability in 
Kenya. Moi should have learnt a lesson from his close associate, Mobutu, who was 
ousted from office after trying to stay in power by manipulating ethnic divisions. Moi 
believes in the same doctrine and, unless he introduces the necessary change soon, his 
fate may be the same as that of Mobutu. 
The economic success of 7% growth per annum in Uganda, achieved as a 
result of good governance and the people's participation in government, has 
persuaded donor countries to ease off the strict application of all the preconditions set 
to all beneficiaries. There seems to be an understanding and recognition of the African 
preference to defer pluralism to a later date in favour of stability. As long as good 
governance is able to achieve a higher economic growth that benefits the population, 
it must be taken into consideration. 
49 'Kenya: The Big Sqt=ze' (The Economist, Nairobi, 9 4ugtut 1997?, p. 48. 
50 Simon Baynham, C: onflict Studies 297-Ke va: Prospects of Pence crud Sfabilih, (Research Institute for the Study of Conflict 
and Terrorism, London March 199T). p. 
12. 
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During his East African tour in February this year, EU [European Union] Commissioner 
Pinheiro was more than happy to discover the commendable achievements made in Uganda. 
In 1995/96, inflation was only 5% and its GDP grew by 3.5%, growth for 1996/1997, though a 
little lower, is expected to reach a healthy 7%_ The Ugandan Government and the 
Commissioner discovered a mutual understanding over the need to accelerate Africa's 
regional integration so that its economies can participate on a global level. 5' 
To boost bilateral cooperation, EU Commissioner Jacques Santer invited Yoweri 
Museveni to Brussels. European businessmen from Holland, Italy and Germany, 
along with representatives of some 30 Ugandan corporations from both public and 
private sectors, were present: 
Delegates at the forum heard Commissioner Pinheiro pay tribute to the East African state's 
'remarkable progress as regards democracy, good governance and human rights'. He praised 
Uganda and its neighbours for creating `the right climate for regional integration' and advised 
the European contingent to explore opportunities on offer from the European Investment Bank 
(TEIB) and the ACP-EU Centre for the Development of Industry. 52 
If this positive attitude persists and is extended to the rest of the Horn countries, 
economic growth in the sub-region could lead towards economic integration and an 
eventual political union that could promote peace and stability. 
Conclusion 
The above sections clearly denote the role that was and is played by economic factors 
in exacerbating 1. inter-state wars 2. intra-state wars in the Horn countries. The 
Ogaden war of 1977-78 was fought with the aim of securing rich pastoral areas such 
as the Haud and the fertile riverine valley of the Wabi Shebelle. Ethiopia did not want 
to lose an area that amounted to about one-fifth of its territory - an area which has a 
potential for large-scale agriculture along the Wabi Shebelle riverine area and is a 
good prospect for the discovery of oil. Already a substantial amount of gas has been 
discovered in the Kalub and Lemma Shellendi areas. At present, a number of Western 
oil companies are conducting exploration work in the Ogaden. According to a text 
report by the Xinhua news agency, in 1997 a gas production accord was signed with 
Chinese firms: 
Addis Ababa, 16th May: A Chinese firm today reached a 5.63m US-dollar accord with an 
Ethiopian company on the production of condensate gas in the Ogaden [the] Somali region of 
Ethiopia. The agreement was signed here between the Chinese Zhongyuan Petroleum 
frtcal &rsmecs. o. 222, IC Pubheatitms SiFraNOIS Riss, 'Letter from Bnc, se1 : Mu ewui's European Charm Off ens ive' (. 4 
Lit- , 
London, June 1997), p. 18. 
52 Ibid. 
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Exploration Bureau and Ethiopia's Kalub Gas Share Company. Under the agreement, the 
Chinese enterprise will undertake work on eight of the 10 wells, which will enable Ethiopia U) 
produce for the first time gas, diesel, kerosene and petroleum. The project will be completed 
in eight months [startingi from 15th August 1997. The project was launched in September 
1996 with 66.6m US dollars from loans of the World Bank and about 15 m dollars from the 
Ethiopian government and private shareholders. 53 
Likewise, the long-lasting war fought in South Sudan was for control of rich 
agricultural land such as the Ingessina Hills, the drained marshland situated on the 
banks of Jonglai canal (the Sudd) for conservation of water, settlement of land-hungry 
northerners, access to timber and control of B¬ntiu oil resources. 54 The objective of 
religious expansionism - Islamising the whole of the Christian and animist south - 
was to ensure that the northerners remained in full and uncontested control of the 
entire resources of the south. In retaliation, the SPLAISPLM was formed to counter 
displacement and dispossession as well as to preserve indigenous culture and identity. 
At the end of the colonial era, Eritrea's Christian population, which shares the 
same history, culture and tradition with those of Ethiopia, favoured unity with the 
mainland. However, on discovering that the objective of Haile Sellasie's government 
policy was centred on the denial of political liberty and suppression of economic 
growth in Eritrea with the aim of bringing it to an equal level with the rest of the 
empire, they changed their outlook and began to oppose the government. Their 
response to unemployment and economic degradation was to either migrate or join the 
liberation movements in the field. Disenchantment with economic policies gave an 
added weight to the political cause whose demand was self-determination. Similarly, 
Ethiopia's rationale for denying the right of self-determination to the Eritrean people 
was based entirely on securing a guaranteed outlet to the sea. It did not want to remain 
landlocked without access to its own port. The leadership has, however, failed to 
comprehend that there was an easier and less expensive option at its disposal to attain 
its goal. Introducing good governance and allowing the existing liberalised system 
that operated in Eritrea during the federal administration to continue without 
intervention would have done the trick. It should have refrained from stifling the 
liberties that were enjoyed by the Eritrean people during the era of federation. 
Economic interest, in an area where resources are limited and meagre, pushed 
Horn countries to fight both inter-state and internal civil wars that cost thousands of 
53 BBC SWR, Text of Report by- bra News Agenqv (ALW/0 WA/4,271 May 1997). 
54 ` War, Famine and Oil in Sudan' (The Economist, 14 April 210)1), p. 61. 
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lives and caused an incalculable loss of property. The end result was famine, 
displacement and migration. Ethiopia and Somalia were able to conduct inter-state 
and internal wars because their requests for arms were readily granted by the 
superpowers who were convinced that control of the sub-region was crucial to their 
overall global strategy. According to their calculations, fulfilling the demands of their 
clients was a worthwhile price to pay. Raymond W. Copson estimates that the cost of 
the war to the Ethiopian government was roughly. 
... 
between $750 million and $1 billion annually. One billion dollars was more than the 
development assistance, food aid emergency relief given by the United States in all of sub- 
Saharan Africa in 1987, and it is an amount that would have contributed significantly to 
Ethiopia's development purposes. 55 
Disruptions to transportation, industry and agriculture, declining terms of trade, the 
high cost of capital and debt servicing obligations further drained the economies of 
Horn countries. As soon as the patrons pulled out of the region, the war ended and the 
power of the dictators collapsed both Mengistu and Siad Barre had to flee their home 
countries. 
The above economic analysis of the Horn region clearly proves the hypothesis 
set out at the beginning of the chapter that states: In economically deprived areas 
shortage/scarcity of resources provokes war. 
The future 
We have seen how a Third World country with a weak economy cannot sustain a 
prolonged conflict unless assisted by a substantial foreign military and financial aid. 
The region's security problems were further exacerbated when the regime obstinately 
refused to search for a peaceful solution. A military solution, as witnessed in the 
Ethiopian and Somali cases, only creates a rift between the ruling element and the 
population and makes peace untenable. Harsh retaliatory measures, taken to subdue 
the opposition, as seen in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti only alienates the 
citizens, ultimately forcing them to take up arms against the government in power and 
participate in insurrections either covertly or overtly - an act which 
further weakens 
the security of the state and the sub-region. 
The answer to the region's economic prospect lies in forging a sound 
economic agreement under the guidance of the sub-region's organisation 
IGAD. 
Economic cooperation that envisages mutual benefit for all states of the region will 
55RHymLmnd W. CoPuon, . 3frica 'c 
if irr and Prospects for Pence (M. E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, 1994), p. 15. 
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open the road towards a healthy political relationship (confederation of Horn states). 
Such a stance will make military build-up redundant and will gear all states to focus 
attention on economic development that guarantees stability in the region - the main 
objective of the IGAD. 
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Chapter 5. 
Environmental Effects on Security 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, when inter-state conflicts faded away to give 
precedence to internal conflicts, scholars were inspired by a fresh outlook to expand 
the realm of security studies so that it addresses domestic conflicts which have 
become the major concern of Third World countries. In the course of their 
investigation, in addition to political and economic factors, they also studied 
environmental factors as causes of conflict. Based on the findings of the scholars this 
chapter will discuss environmental issues of the Horn region under different sections. 
These are: climate, population growth and movement, water, drought, desertification, 
pastoralsm, deforestation, famine, pests and diseases. 
As noted in the Introduction, proponents of the environmental factor as a cause 
of insecurity, such as Homer-Dixon., have identified environmental scarcities 
contributing to violent conflict. The impact of scarcities is more serious in poor 
countries as they are seriously handicapped in tackling problems arising from 
environmental hazards. Shortages of water, arable land and depletion of forests have 
been identified as major causes. ' The economy of Africa is primarily based on 
traditional agriculture and pastoralism, modes of production heavily dependent on the 
environment. Productivity is easily affected by climatic changes, soil productivity and 
overuse of resources as a result of population explosions, all of which are caused by 
mishandling the environment. The destruction of forests to clear fields for agriculture, 
firewood and construction, shortage of rainfall and, in worst cases, droughts which 
prevent the growth of sufficient food and fodder, are environmental hazards that 
have 
an impact on security. Abioun Alao referring to the environmental factor as a security 
threat has rightly highlighted the `strong triangular link between environment, 
ý2 economy and security . 
In relating environmental issues to African security problems 
Mao identified five 
factors as predominant. ' These are: 
" the problem of population explosion 
I Abiodun Al. ao, 'The Environment and African Security' 
in Adebayo Ovebade and Abiodun Alao (eds. ), Africa After the Cold 
jW'ar: The Chi nging Perspeclivt'. s on Security (Africa 
World Press, Inc., Asmara, Eritrea, 1998), p. 68. 
'" Ri. 
3 Ibid., p. 72. 
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" the struggle over water resources 
" the continent's refugee problem 
" the degradation of the environment as a result of exploration for natural resources 
" and pollution caused by toxic waste disposal. 




and water Annual Annual Annual 
wood- resources fresh water withdrawals rate of rate of CO2 Loss 
Land land per capita defores- refores- emissions of 
area (as % of (cubic metres As % of water Per capita tation tation per capita mangroves 
(1,000 ha) land area) per year) resources (cubic metres) (%) (%) (metric tons) (%) 
1995 1995 1998 1987-95 1987-95 1990-95 1980-90 1995 1980-90 
Djibouti 2,320 .. .. .... 0 (. ) 70 
Eritrea 10,000 789,00 .. .... .. .. 
Ethiopia 110,000 12.30 1,771 2.0 51 0.5 10 0.7 0 
Kenya 56,914 23.00 693 10.2 87 0.3 1 0.6 78 
Sudan 237,600 17.5 1,227 50.9 666 0.8 6 0.1 0 
Uganda 19,965 30.6 1,829 0.5 20 0.9 .. (.. ) 0 
Source: Africa Development Indicatory 1998,99, World Bank, Washington DC, p. 181. 
If we relate these factors to the Horn area we see that, apart from toxic waste 
disposal, they are all relevant. Even pollution from toxic waste disposal cannot be 
excluded outright. A recent appeal to the OAU, UN and IGAD by a representative of 
the Somali Consultative Council reveals that `thousands of dead fish and other sea 
creatures have been washed onto the beaches between Mogadishu and Galguduud 
Region [central Somalial as a result of nuclear waste which had been dumped in 
Somalia's territorial waters by a foreign country' .4 
`Fliese facts depict the Horn of 
Africa as the best region to undertake an investigation in order to ascertain whether 
environmental degradation plays a role in exacerbating instability (see Table 5.1). 
4 BBC^, WB, AL13626 A/1,30 August 1999. Source: 'Qaran', Mogadishu, in Somali, 25 August 1999. 
194 
Desertification, soil degradation, depletion of forests, exposure to catastrophic 
droughts, the migration of refugees, and clashes over water resources, arable and 
pastureland are factors which have contributed to the deterioration of security in the J 
sub-region. Close observation and study of the sub-region reveals that environmental 
degradation caused by overcultivation, overgrazing, deforestation, uncontrolled 
population growth and poor irrigation has precipitated famine and forced the 
population to migrate into adjoining territories. When movement of those in peril has 
been perceived by the host population to be of a permanent nature, refugees have been 
received with strong reservations, being viewed as threats rather than as victims. 
Usually they have been regarded as hostile intruders undeserving of sympathy, with 
the result that the relationship between the countries involved has often ended in 
clashes, raising tension and ultimately contributing towards regional instability as the 
relationship between the Bagarra nomads and the Dinka tribe has shown in the Sudan. 
This chapter will investigate these factors by relating them to both the narrow and 
wider views to see if they could explain the relevance of environmental factors to 
security problems of the Horn by testing the hypotheses framed in Chapter 1. These 
are: 1. Instability in the Horn is caused by the activities of external actors. 
2. In environmentally deprived areas shortage of resources provokes war. 
Climate 
The fact that almost all countries in the Horn of Africa have some territories that fall 
within the Sahel belt, an area mostly frequented by drought and famine, has further 
increased the value of water in the sub-region (see Map 9). As some of the countries, 
especially those nearer the coast, are poorer in natural resources, the environmental 
degradation there has been much worse compared with inland areas where rivers are 
plentiful. In the highland areas rainfall, though seasonal and dependent on the 
monsoon, is quite sufficient and much more regular, the only exception being during 
periods of drought. This disparity in resources and their subjugation to harsh climatic 
conditions in and areas has forced inhabitants of the Horn countries to adopt differing 
life-styles. Those on the plateau and mountainous areas, where rainfall is generally 
ample, are agriculturists while those living in the and savannah near the coast are 
pastorals whose chief occupation is rearing cattle, camels, sheep and goats. 
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Key: Bold crosses - very high risk; closely sp aced clots Thigh risk; widely spaced dots -tedium risk. 
Source: A. T. Grove, The Changing Geography of, 4 iea (Oxford University Press, fiord, 
1996), p. 220. 
Population growth and movement 
Uncontrolled population growth, both human and animal, has also contributed to the 
dwindling of meagre resources and degradation of the environment. The region's rate 
of population growth, which is significantly higher than income per capita growth and 
is one of the highest in the African continent (Ethiopia producing the highest, 
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followed by Sudan)5 has contributed towards the depletion of bushland and forests 
with trees being felled for firewood and ever more open space being cleared in order 
to establish new camps and plots to increase food production to meet growing 
demand. The situation is always exacerbated in periods of drought when 
circumstances force populations to seek refuge in neighbouring territories. This forced 
migration usually brings the pastoralists into conflict with the settled farmers 
whenever their hungry herds get out of control and end up damaging or destroying 
plantations on which the survival of the farmers entirely depends. 
The prevailing political and economic factors, discussed in Chapter 4, which 
seemed to motivate and nurture internecine conflict, also play a significant role in 
driving the inhabitants to move from place to place looking for a safer place of abode. 
This uncontrolled mass movement, emanating from a desperate desire to survive, 
forces desolate people to trample over, or destroy, their environment- Thus we see 
how the instinct for survival becomes yet another factor that makes clashes between 
settled farmers and pastorals unavoidable. 
Lack of education and financial resources have likewise prevented the 
inhabitants of the sub-region from abandoning their present mode of living and 
changing to a different life-style -a development that could have assisted in 
protecting the environment. As a matter of fact, the environment has become one of 
the principal causes of conflict in the region - an issue that has become insoluble at 
national level and requires a regional solution. 
Water 
General 
Excluding Antarctica, approximately 47% of the land area of the world falls within 
international water basins shared by two or more countries. In the past people 
assumed that there would be enough water for all and, as such, it was not a 
burning 
issue generating conflict. However, with the alarming growth of the world population, 
and the diminution in the quality and quantity of water, the issue of water 
has become 
a great concern that demands the control of population growth. 
6 Its proper use and 
apportionment demands the establishment of close cooperation among riparian 
(river 
basin) owners. 
5 A. T. Grove, The Chmrgntg Geography of Africa (C)-, did 
University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 73. 
Strategic Comments, Global if ester Shortages: Root of Future 
Conflicts? (Vol. 5. Issue No. 6.6 July 1999), pp. 1-2. 611S. 3 
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The management and administration of surface and underground international 
waters is one of the many thorny issues which has not, as yet, been agreed by the 
community of states- On 8 December 1970 the UN General Assembly- through 
Resolution No. 2669 (XIV), recommended that the International Law Commission 
(ILC) should `take up the study of the law of the non-navigational watercourses with 
the view to its progressive development and codification'. Subsequently, the ILC 
circulated a questionnaire comprising nine questions. 7 Viewpoints on the issue were 
divided- Many of the member states were not concerned with the issue as the subject 
matter was not directly relevant to them and did not threaten their national interest. As 
a result, they did not actively participate in the debate nor did they respond to the 
questionnaire. 
The failure of member states to respond and come to agreement convinced the 
ILC in 1976 that the only way forward was to refrain from `determining the scope of 
the term "international watercourses" at the outset of the work". Instead they agreed 
that `attention should be devoted to beginning the formulation of general principles 
applicable to legal aspects of the uses of those watercourses'. s 
In 1996 the International Law Association agreed on a set of rules dealing with 
international watercourses which it recommended to the UN for implementation - the 
best document on non-navigational uses of international watercourses which contains 
32 articles. As the study group was composed of experts and did not represent 
member states, and countries such as France felt such an approach would amount to 
an encroachment on national sovereignty, the rules were not adopted. 
9 This draft law, 
which still awaits approval followed by ratification, is based on two fundamental 
principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation and the obligation not to cause 
appreciable harm. These principles appear in Articles 5 and 7 respectively. 
1° 
The value of water increased all the more when the population began to grow 
at the rate of 3.5% pa (see Table 5.2) and life expectancy was extended as a result of 
the availability of medical treatment to the community at large. With more mouths to 
feed, an increase in food production meant more use of water. In the context of the 
Ibid., p. 193. 
8 lbi . 9 Mit K. B-iswss (ed 1. Intern iOfld Wafers of the Middle Eexsf From Euphrates. Tigris to Nile (C)xf rd 
i nit ity Prc , 
Bornb ty, 1994), p. 192. 
1o Ibid., pp. 198-99. 
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Table 5.2. Population: Selected Background Data 
Average annual 
trillions of people Percentage growth 
1980 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 75-84 85-89 9P AIR 
Djibouti 0.28 0.47 0.49 0.. 52 0.. 53 0.. 55 0.. 57 0.. 58 0.60 0.62 0.64 6.7 6.1 3.2 
Eritrea 
.. 
2.96 3.05 3.14 3.22 3.. 31 3.. 39 3.48 3.57 3.70 3.83 
.. 3.0 2.8 
Ethiopia 37.72 47.64 49.34 51.18 52.95 54.79 53.30 54.89 56.40 56.23 60.12 2.8 3.2 2.2 
Kenya 16.56 22.03 22.70 23.32 24.02 24.68 25.35 26.02 26.69 27.. 36 28.04 3.8 3.3 2.7 
Somali 6.71 9.38 9.51 8.62 8.05 8.30 8.62 9.01 9.49 9.8I I0. I3 3.9 2. I 2.5 
Sudan 1&68 23.04 23. -. -55 24.06 24.58 25.10 25: 63 26.16 26.71 27.. 27 27.86 31 2.4 2.1 
Uganda 12.81 15.. 27 15.77 16.. 33 16.89 17.46 18.03 18.60 19.17 19.74 20.32 2.4 2.6 3.2 
Source: Africa Development Indicators 1998199, World Bank, Washington DC, p. 7. 
Horn, water is the most valuable resource that has no substitute. The catastrophes 
which countries of the Horn have undergone, and are still experiencing, have left them 
with no alternative but to immediately deviate from their previous mode of traditional 
agricultural production and adopt a much more modern system of irrigation. However, 
conversion to modem production systems is no easy matter as it entails considerable 
investment in the construction of dams, the acquisition of machinery and the 
availability of trained manpower. Nevertheless, alarmed by the deteriorating 
conditions, some countries were forced to embark on small-scale irrigation schemes 
and became a factor that contributes towards the exacerbation of both inter-state and 
intra-state conflicts. These will be discussed below under their respective headings. 
Inter-state conflicts 
Generally, scarcity of water in the sub-region has motivated lower riparian owners to 
gain full control of the river sources so that they could be guaranteed the free flow on 
which their survival depends. For example, the Egyptians have totally depended on 
the Nile for drinking water and agriculture for hundreds and thousands of years. 
Ownership of the Nile waters, which was considered as a `historical right' handed 
over to them by the Almighty, was taken for granted. However, the colonial powers 
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that controlled the Nile basin did not share the same view and entered into a series of 
agreements dealing with the use of the Nile waters. No less than ten treaties have been 
concluded. Those signed by Great Britain on behalf of Egypt and its colonies that are 
worthy of note are the agreements concluded with Italy (1891), Ethiopia (1892), the 
Independent State of the Congo (1896), Italy and France (1896). A further agreement 
was also concluded with Egypt in 1929. The final agreement was concluded between 
Egypt and Sudan after independence in 195911 in which `a review of the treaties on 
the consumptive utilisation of the Nile and Lake Victoria will show how Egypt has 
strenuously sought to ensure security of the water flowing down the Nile' 12(see Map 
10). 
Although, with the exception of Egypt and Sudan, all the Horn countries 
depend on agriculture for their livelihood, in the past they relied on rain-fed 
production for sustenance- Since the conclusion of the last agreement (1959), the 
population has more than doubled and reliance on rain-fed agriculture has become 
impossible, as there were too many mouths to feed. The 1959 Sudo-Egyptian 
Agreement, which out of the flow 84 km3 allocated 55.5 km3 to Egypt, 18.5 km3 to 
Sudan and the remainder 10 km3 assumed to be lost by evaporation, did not include 
the rest of the upper riparian countries. Moreover, the remainder of the co-Nile basin 
countries did not recognise the 1959 agreement. P. P. Howell commented: 
To refer to `full utilisation' and `full control of the river' when there were only two states 
involved in the agreement rather than all the basin states, especially the upper riparian owners, 
seems anomalous- There is no evidence that Ethiopia, which contributes so much of the gross 
annual flow at Khartoum, or the East African states, were invited to any of the negotiations. 13 
The inability of international law to define the right and use of international waters in 
a precise and concise manner that is acceptable to all member states of the 
international community has opened a loophole for individual countries to define and 
interpret the issue of shared waters according to national interests. For example, as 
noted above, with regards to the waters of the Nile basin, there is a one-sided 
interpretation by lower riparian owners who claim the waters of the Nile as their 
historical right -a right that does not specify the amount of entitlement. The reply of 
11 RR Howell and J. A. Allan (eds. ), The V ile: Sharing a Scarce Resource (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), p 
321, 
12 
13 Ibid., p. 3 33. 
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the 1920 Commission when `faced with the question of how much water Egypt was 
entitled to ... simply suggested 
that Egypt must claim the quantity of water necessary 
to irrigate the five million feddans under cultivation in 1916-17. There is no natural 
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figure discernible in history'. 14 However, the principles referred to in the draft, even if 
they do not have a binding power, have gained a fair degree of acceptance which 
could, in the meantime, serve as a guide for those who choose to solve their problems 
amicably through a negotiated settlement at regional level. Any reasonable 
interpretation should take the changing circumstances into account and consider an 
equitable and reasonable solution at the time the issue is raised. Such an interpretation 
would demand negotiation between all the parties concerned. Unfortunately, bold and 
ambitious plans that require more of the Nile waters are being put in operation- Egypt, 
for example, has constructed dams without obtaining the consent and approval of 
other riparian owners who are also desperately in need of this resource to raise 
production in order to meet the food supply requirement needed as a result of 
population increase. 
The narrow-view concept is clearly demonstrated by President Anwar Sadat's 
statement when he made his position clear regarding the Nile waters in 1978. He 
said, `we depend upon the Nile 100% in our life. We shall never hesitate [to act], 
because it is a matter of life and death'. 15 Sadat's threat was answered by Mengistu's 
counter threat in 1979 when Mengistu `denounced Sadat's plans to export Nile 
waters to Egypt via a Sinai canal and threatened to reduce Blue Nile flows in 
retaliation' 16- showing how disagreements over apportionment of water could lead 
to intractable interstate conflicts. Continuous population growth at a current rate of 
2.1% pa, expected to reach 85 million by 2020, has forced President Mubarek to 
irrigate and utilise desert areas by transporting water through canals from the Aswan 
Dam and the delta, These multibillion-dollar projects are known as the New Delta 
canal and Al-Salam canal respectively. According to The Economist, the two canals 
are expected to siphon at least 7 billion cubic metres out of the 55.5 
km3 allotted to 
Egypt by the ill-represented 1959 agreement, putting the issue of supply of tap water 
under question. 17 In an earlier article the same journal discloses 
how 
Ethiopia which supplies the bulk of the water, suffers from dreadful famines and would 
dearly 
like to store water and so increase its food production. Thus, Egypt 
is vulnerable.... Mubarek 
was sterner with Sudan. This summer he felt it necessary to remind 
Sudan's Islamic regime 
14 Jbid_, p. 377. 
15 O1i-w r Bennett Green tf ar: Environmental 
Conflict (Pains Publications Ltd, London. 1991), p. 99. 
16 Natasha Beschorner, `Water and Stability in the Middle Eist' (IISS, 
Adelphi Paper-273. London, Winter 1992/93), p 60- 
17 .s Deserts' (The 
Economist, 12 April 1997), pp. 68-70; `Egypth; ater: Counting Chickens - New The Greening of EgyFf' 
Money is Allowing Coo to Emd` on Bold 
Projects to Increase the Flow of the Nile (rt Erica Confidential. Vol. 39, No. 12. 
12 June I998). 
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that any interference with the river would not be tolerated a warning that was noted well 
beyond Sudan's borders. is 
Economic development was arrested within the countries of the Horn during the 
height of the inter-state wars. Since May 1991 the situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea has 
much improved and the major concern became how to feed the population rather than 
security. Attention was drawn to economic development, mostly based on the 
utilisation of the numerous rivers originating from Ethiopia for irrigation. Like Egypt: 
... one can hardly discount the demographic changes in the Sudan, Ethiopia.; Uganda and 
Kenya (the present combined total of 120 million is expected to double and reach 240 million 
by the year 2020) as well as the expansion of water-based development programmes in these 
countries which will impact on the demand and utility pattern of the Nile waters, ultimately 
diminishing the absolute volume that flows to Egypt. Cairo has thus a legitimate ground for 
19 concern. 
The sane article also quotes how, in March 1994, the Arab League published a report 
`accusing Israel, together with their parties, of exerting pressure on Ethiopia to 
construct a dam [sic] on the Blue Nile to control the flow of the water to Sudan and 
Egypt'. L° Abiodun Alao, in his analysis of the security of the region, underlines the 
sensitivity of the water issue as a. cause for an inter-state contlict by commenting 
Ethiopia appears to be the reservoir of the region's water resources. Over the years, the 
instability in that country had prevented it from making use of this resource, so making it 
possible for most of the neighbouring states to maximise their usage of it. Now Ethiopia has 
signified its intention of making further use of its water resources, giving an indication that 
21 some form of regional tension can be expected. 
All the nine upstream nations have, at some time or other, declared their intention to 
intensify land use by irrigation. Ethiopia is already contemplating irrigation projects, 
and `almost 50 sites have been identified for hydroelectric power in the Nile basin 
area. of Ethiopia. Plans have been published for irrigated agriculture which would take 
60 million cubic metres of water reducing the discharge of the Blue Nile into Sudan 
and Egypt by four billion cubic metres a year'. 2` Through its delegate to the 1977 UN 
World Water Conference, Ethiopia issued a diplomatic warning by stressing 'the 
sovereign right of any riparian state, in the absence of an international agreement, to 
is `Water in the Middle East - As Thick- as Blood (The Economist, 23 December "5 January I996), pp. 73 -74. 
19 Berhane Woldegabriel, Eritrea and the Politics of the Nile (Africa Development Communications Network, African edition >, 
London August-September 1996), pp. 36-37. 
20 Ibidý p. 37. 't Abiodun Alao, 'Anarchy and Tranquillity in the Horn of Africa' (Braxsev's Defence Year Book . London. 1994). p. 246. 
22 Otiver Bennett, Green När: Environmental Conflict (Piros Publications Ltd, London 1991), p. 98. 
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proceed unilaterally with the development of the water resources within its 
territory';. 23 
While incompatible claims over water rights are still in existence and various 
activities that invite confrontation are happening simultaneously, the actors do not 
seem to be making sufficient efforts to address the issue and avoid misunderstandings 
that could lead to future conflicts. Although the framework agreement on the Nile. 
signed in 1993 by President Mubarek of Egypt and President Meles Zenawi of 
Ethiopia, opened a window of opportunity to settle the matter amicably, `the technical 
committee established under its provision has made little progress since its Egyptian 
members Will not sign the minutes because of references to equitability and issues of 
allocation'. 24 The same source reveals that Ethiopian ministry officials have expressed 
their disappointment by arguing that Egypt's Peace Canal, which carries Nile water to 
the Sinai, `is in breach of legal principles on the shared use of international rivers 
because it diverts water from the Nile basin' 25 Describing the atmosphere of the 
meeting, the same article discloses that: 
tension is rising between Ethiopia and Egypt, the latter being the largest consumer of Nile 
waters and its tributaries which represent almost the entire resources of surface water for the 
country. This Egyptian dependence vis ä vis Ethiopia, which is going to increase given Cairo's 
growing water needs, has worsened relations between the two countries. Especially since the 
announcement that Ethiopia is constructing two small hydroelectric barrages, one across the 
Blue Nile and the other across its tributary the Dabus river, near Bahir Dahr, capital of the 
Amhara region but whose electricity supplies will be for Tigray Regional State. 
26 
The same article also indicates that the journal has also received information `that the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation leader (and head of the Palestinian administration) 
Yasser Arafat personally asked Meles Zenawi if Ethiopia would agree to Nile waters 
being diverted to Gaza. and was told this was not acceptable' 42 
Because of the scarcity of water in the region and its surroundings, the Nile 
basin has become an object of interest for countries that even have no connection with 
the river whatsoever - countries which are outside the continent of 
Africa. As 
23 Jbid, P. 99- 
24 `Ethiopia: Battle of the Nile' (Indian Ocean \ ewsletter, 





explained above, construction works, which are bound to affect the flow of water,, 
are in progress. Much valuable time, which ought to have been spent on seeking to 
resolve the problem, has been pitifully wasted through complacency because Egypt 
does not accept the principle of equitable share of waters of a common river with 
other riparian owners as it views the Nile as a gift from God. Unless all concerned 
countries take immediate action to resolve the issue, the deteriorating situation might 
lead the countries of the sub-region into a conflict that may not be easily remedied. It 
is, however, encouraging to note that, under the auspices and leadership of United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), `all the co-basin countries of the Nile 
including Ethiopia, are now discussing how best to develop an environmentally-sound 
plan for the Nile basin that would be acceptable to all the co-basin countries. The third 
meeting of the Nile basin countries took place in August 1992 in Nairobi,. 29 So far, 
however, regrettably, `regional talks have invoked much grandstanding but little 
practical progress. 30 
Another country in the region, Somalia, depends heavily on the waters of 
Wabi Shebelle and Genale (Juba) for its agriculture. Both rivers originate in the 
highlands of southern Ethiopia. In the past, annual rainfall was quite sufficient to 
satisfy the needs of the scantily distributed population of southern Ethiopia- 
Nowadays, population migration to the south in search of new agricultural land has 
stretched rain-fed agriculture to the limit and resort to irrigation to complement 
traditional farming methods has become essential -a course of action considered by 
many to be right and proper. The construction of Melka Wakena dam in Arssi 
province, out of the five feasible sites on river Shebelle, is an indication of the trend 
of development targeted by the government. The only constraint, if any, to the 
realisation of this ambitious dream would be fiscal. Past developments and future 
plans have not been discussed with the neighbouring country, Somalia. Even if the 
Ethiopian government was to refer it for negotiation, agreement would not be reached 
as the area of development, mostly focused around Code, is part of Somalia's 
Irredentist territorial claim of the Ogaden. With the irredentist claim buried deep 
under the sands, due to Somalia's military defeat, Somaliland's breakaway from the 
28 It 
.3. 
ld be noted that the construction of dams to conserve and facilitate water ihr im°n could also be used adverseh in 
flcxxi c jynstream riparian areas 
during confrontations. Capability to txxnb generator aubines at dam sites could also serve as a 
weapon to threaten adversaries- 
For example, the Dam at Demazin in Sudan situated close to the Ethiopian border is one of the 
sites that Ethiopia could target 
in time of inter-state conflict. 
29 
, 4sit K. Bislovas, pp- 
197-198. 
30 Ethiopia: Trumpeting the Hom' (, Ijrica Confidential, Vol. 3 No. 10.9 May 1, p. 
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union and the disintegration of southern Somalia into clan-based sub-regions 
controlled by warlords, no form of meaningful negotiation seems to be feasible in the 
immediate feature. On the other hand, Ethiopia's development plan cannot wait until 
the situation is normalised in its neighbouring country either. Development schemes 
put into operation without consultation as a result of a force majure may therefore 
sow the seeds of future conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over water rights. 
Thus, although the hypothesis Instability in the Horn is caused by the 
activities of external actors is proved, however, it should be noted that in the abov e 
two cases the factor of the cause of conflict is environmental and not military -a 
result of unexpected consequences that the proponents of narrow-view realist theory 
failed to forecast. 
Intrastate conflicts 
Civil war in Sudan 
One of the principal causes of the civil war in South Sudan was the objection to the 
construction of the Jonglei canal -a project whose aim was to drain the flood water of 
the Sudd and redirect it to join the Nile further downstream at Malakel in order to 
conserve approximately 4.7 km3 of water which otherwise would have been lost 
through evaporation, to the detriment of the people living in the area: 
The canal has not been completed, but detailed surveys were undertaken to determine a whole 
range of effects, many of which will be shown to be disadvantageous to the inhabitants of 
Jonglei Area. We have seen that the toich or river flooded grasslands are an essential seasonal 
resources during the driest months of the year. 31 
The ecological damage to the area and the loss of pasture on which livestock and 
wildlife thrived during the dry season was not taken into account. The resentment 
over denial of the right to practise their traditional way of life and the danger that 
ecological change might force them to uproot from their nativeland to unknown 
destinations prompted the people of the Sudd into a bitter conflict with the Muslim 
regime of the north. Many ecologists were not fully satisfied with the measures taken 
to safeguard the environment. Southerners viewed the whole idea of the construction 
of the canal with deep suspicion. Rumours of mass settlement 
by Egyptians on the 
land reclaimed from the swamps, which were widely circulated in 
October 1974, 
3' 
triggered serious riots in Juba. John Garang, the leader of the SPLA1SPLM, who 
31 P. P. Howell & J. A. Allan (eds. ). The Nile, p. 257. 
32 A 
. 
T. )ve, The C: he»res Geogr(JPk of . 
4! fricer ((A-ford Üniv msi Freys, ( -fons, I996), pp. 175-176. 
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wrote his Phi) thesis on economic development of South Sudan, was highly critical of 
the Egyptian and Sudanese governments' plan for water development in the Upper 
Nile_ According to him `development schemes such as the extraction of oil from 
Bentiu via Chevron projects and extraction of water via the Jonglei canal' 3 that were 
implemented in the south did not benefit the local population. 
Civil war in Somalia 
It should also be noted that one of the causes of the present civil war in Somalia is 
over land which is situated in the riverine area territory that heavily depends on the 
waters of the Juba and Shebelle rivers. The local people living in the area, the 
Rahweyene, have been dispossessed of their land and displaced by the Haweyies and 
Ogadenis. Some have migrated to neighbouring countries and some have sought 
refuge in distant lands as far away as Europe and America. The rest have formed their 
own clan faction and are fighting to repossess their land. Some sources indicate that 
the Ethiopian government is supplying arms to Ali Mahadi, the RRA (Rahawein 
Resistance Army. ) and the SNF (Somali National Front) of General Omar Hajji to 
assist them in their struggle against Islamic court militias and Al Itahad al Islami. The 
latter faction has been conducting cross-border operations inside Ethiopia and has 
been responsible for the bomb attacks in various towns, including the hotel bombing 
in the capital city, Addis Ababa. According to Africa Confidential, in January 1997, 
`Ethiopia sent some 80 tonnes of arms to factions in Somalia: most was to boost Ali 
Mahadi's struggle against Islamic court militias but several lorry-loads went to the 
SNF to help prevent Itahad withdrawing deeper into Somali'. 34Thus, in the case of 
southern Somalia, we see how the control of suitable land for irrigated sugar and 
banana production, the major foreign currency earners, has become a cause of 
domestic conflict and insecurity and how Ethiopia is exploiting the existing situation 
by providing assistance to anti-Al Itahad factions in order to contain Islamist activities 
within Somali territory. 
Drought 
General 
Although the overwhelming cause of famine, displacement and refuge in the Horn has 
bee,, civil war, drought has also played a role in exacerbating the problem within both 
Sudan, edited and intrexiuced by 1-*4an our Khalid (Kegan Paul International Ltd. 33 
,FG ig, 
The Call forDemocrcrv in the 
1992) 
34 'Ethiopia/Smatia: Addis and Al Itahad' (1frica C: onfdential, Vol. 38, No. 13.20 June 1995. ). p. 8. 
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countries. The droughts of 1973-74 and 1984 were very harsh and can be singled out 
as critical factors contributing towards migration and the deterioration of security 
throughout the sub-region- 
Migration 
The drought of 1973-74 in Somalia caused mass migration of the population to 
Ethiopia and Kenya while the 1984 drought in Ethiopia was the principal cause of 
migration to Sudan. These excessive movement of people put not only a strain on the 
recipient countries which they could not cope but also became a cause of conflict over 
the share of scarce resources bringing instability to the entire region. 
Inter-state conflicts 
During the 1974-75 drought in the south-western part of Ethiopia which borders 
Kenya and Sudan, the drought forced Nyamatong cattle herders to migrate: 
They moved out of the Omo River region in south-west Ethiopia and seized the lands of the 
Toposa herders in Sudan. The Toposa moved onto the lands of the Larim people and into a 
valley of northern Kenya used by several pastoralist tribes. The reverberations of this 
movement are still going on across the various national borders. 35 
This shows how the displacement of a tribe by another as a result of drought can 
provoke a chain reaction and become a source of clashes involving tribes living in the 
adjacent territories of Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. 
Intra-state conflicts 
Conflict in Ethiopia 
It was the drought of 1973-74 in Wollo province of Ethiopia - whose seriousness and 
consequent devastation to human and animal life was played down by the government 
until exposed on television by Jonathan Dimbleby - that sparked the 1974 revolution 
and became an influential factor in ending Emperor Haile Selassie's 50-year reign. It 
opened up the country to communist influence which plunged Ethiopia into an 
unprecedented arms race with its neighbour, Somalia, that finally led to the atrocious 
1977-78 Ethio-Somalia war. 
Conflict in Sudan 
Similarly, the drought of the early 1980s drove Zaghawa nomads and Arab groups of 
the Sudan southwards into central Fur region in search of water and pasture. As their 
move this time was envisaged to be of a permanent nature by their 
hosts, they were 
perceived to be more of a threat than victims of the environment. 
35 Ibid., P. I93. 
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The element of racial prejudice became further entwined with the environmental roots of the 
conflict with the formation of an alliance of 27 Arab nomad tribes and their declaration Of war 
against the `Zurug' (black) and non-Arab groups of Darker, The response of the Fur Aas to 
form their own militias, at first for self-defence and later as part of a short lived but significant 
linkage with the SPLA. 36 
The search for fertile land brought the nomads into open confrontation with the Fur, 
and, by 1989, the estimated death rate reached 5,000 Fur and 400 Arabs. Thousands 
were displaced and 40,000 homes were destroyed. 37 
The severe draught of 1984-86, which caused the Beja to lose 80% of their 
cattle, drove the Beja nomads and other ethnic groups to move northwards to look for 
a settlement in Port Sudan. The Beja regarded the port town as their own land and, 
when they saw the Arabs and others whom they considered as guests reaping the 
benefits of trade to their detriment, they clashed with the traders, portraying them as a 
bad omen that had caused environmental degradation and the loss of their livelihood - 
the herds. 38 
Pastoralism 
As noted earlier, a large portion of the sub-region is given over to pastoralism. Such 
and areas could, however, be fully exploited by pastoralists to maintain a sustainable 
existence if range management rules were introduced and were properly supervised. 
In the absence of such management, the administration of grazing areas is left to the 
pastoralists who lack organisation, and consequently individuals are left free to pursue 
their livelihood in any manner that they deem fit. The people live mostly on milk and 
meat, and the sources of these invaluable substances are animals which, of course, 
depend on water and grass. Consequently, pastoralists spend most of their time 
roaming from place to place in search of these scarce resources. That is why they are 
also known as nomads, Their guiding star is always the concentration of clouds in the 
sky that brings hope of rainfall and moisture that signifies pasture and water. In 
extremely dry seasons they rely on water wells. They rear animals such as camels and 
goats that can tolerate thirst and live on literally any form of vegetation. 
If the increase in human population does not keep pace with the increase in 
animal population, the sustainability of pastoralism is likely to be affected and may 
36 Peer Vemey et al, Sudan: Conflict coud_ltinorities, p, 30- 
37 Ibid. 
38 Reidutf K Molvoer, `Environmentatty Induced Conflicts'y A discussion based on Studies from the Horn of Attica' (Bulletin of 
peace proposals, Vol. 22 (2), London, 1991), pp. 175-188. 
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become unfeasible. Any imbalance between the two will affect sustainability. In the 
event that the animal population decreases, their product will not be sufficient to feed 
the pastoralists, let alone support the national economy. On the other hand, an 
increase in the number of animals creates a shortage of pasture through overgrazing 
and entails long-distance movement in search of new pastureland - if necessary, deep 
penetration into the territory of neighbouring countries. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, pastoralists suffered more from famine than other people. Grazing 
was eaten out. Many families lost their herds and had to seek refuge in famine relief camps 
where food aid was distributed to them; the people of the semi-arid lowlands of Ethiopia and 
Somalia as well as the zone south of the Sahara were particularly affected. The disaster 
attracted the attention of the whole world to the problems of life in such marginal 
environments, " 
As noted above, the crucial element in pastoral production is balancing the herd 
numbers with the availability of pasture and water. However, this has not been 
possible due to the pastoralists' entrenched belief that individual wealth and social 
standing is measured in accordance with the number of cattle that a person owns. As a 
result, pastoralists compete to possess the highest number of animals, irrespective of 
the loss of heads of cattle they repeatedly encounter due to their failure in maintaining 
manageable numbers, This practice has significantly contributed towards the 
degradation of land thus reducing its productivity from year to year. It is further 
exacerbated by the participation of town dwellers, occupied in private business or 
working as government employees, who purchase a number of herds and leave them 
in the custody of friends and relatives to thrive and multiply. 
In the month of August, at the height of the rainy season, the Awash river used 
to flood the and area with rich soil that provided the pastorals with fertile grazing 
grounds. When the area was developed by foreign investors to grow cotton, sugar, 
banana and alfalfa, mostly destined for export, the Afar tribe was forced to move into 
less fertile areas which became overgrazed. When drought affected the Wollo Region 
in 1972= 25-30% of the Afars died. Again, in 1984 when drought struck the region, the 
Afars had to move into neighbouring districts in search of pasture and water, resulting 
in clashes. Regarding the incident Lloyd Timberlake commented: 
in 1984 1 watched the Afar starving again. Some of the tribe had brought hundreds of 
thousands of their cattle up into the large, dead-ended Borkena Valley in the Wollo highlands. 
The cattle had grazed the pasture to bare ground, and were dying. Armed clashes were 
39 A. T. Grove, The Changing Geography ofAfrica, p. 72. 
210 
breaking out between the Afar and the settled farmers. The traditional agricultural and 
environmental safety values had been destroyed by development- The result was starvation 
and conflict, 40 
Development strategy along the Awash basin failed to consider the ecological impact 
on the nomads living in the valley and its surroundings. For example, when the 
government studied the feasibility and prospect of planting alfalfa for markets 
overseas, had it planned to integrate the Afar pastoralists in the development scheme, 
it could have minimised the effects of the 1984 drought. In the event, they had to 
migrate into neighbouring areas where they were not welcomed because their would- 
be hosts were also suffering from the same ordeal. 
Maintaining the equilibrium without the guidance and assistance of an 
efficient government is unthinkable. What is more, supervising and guiding a nomadic 
society would not be an easy affair, especially in the Horn area where insecurity is 
widespread and the influence and capacity of government is very limited. 
Desertification 
Although prolonged and extensive drought accelerates the process of desertification, it 
should be borne in mind that it is not the only factor that makes land unsuitable for 
agriculture and pasture. The herdsmen and farmers, who usually put the blame on 
nature, are equally responsible for paving the way to desertification by their improper 
use of the land. Whenever the environment is abused for a long period through 
overcultivation, overgrazing and wantonly destroying trees without replacing them, 
fertile land is bound to turn into barren land and, ultimately, desert. Farmers and 
herders are not the only culprits. Governments that fail to initiate and implement 
appropriate environmental policies also cannot absolve themselves from 
responsibility. Large government schemes which displaced traditional farming 
methods by introducing mechanised farming along the Nile and elsewhere in the 
Sudan were simply attracted by the short-term potential of the poor soil without taking 
into account the long-term impact and consequences. 
Deforestation 
Deforestation, recognised as the principal cause of soil erosion, has played a major 
role in degrading land value in the Horn. Nigel Cross, describing his experience while 
travelling on road to Korr, observed: 
40 Lloyd Timberlake,. 4frica in Crisis, p. 87. 
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In the Sahelian zone of northern Kenya, a solitary tree of uncertain age offers some shade to 
villagers and passers-by. Otherwise the landscape is bare, a sandy windswept plain, cluttered 
with rocks, Thirty years ago there were plenty of trees and shrubs, but two rival sets of 
missionaries moved in, digging wells, building clinics and schools and clearing scrubs for an 
airstrip. Rendille nomads congregated in an area that formerly lacked water for their herds. 
Today, within a radius of 10km or more, nearly every tree and bush has been cleared. The 
main fodder plants, such as the small and spiky indigofera spinosa have been browsed to 
death; acacia tortilis is stripped down to make stockades for animals and huts for semi- 
permanent camps. A new desert is in the tnaking. 4' 
Woodland areas that protected the soil from erosion and provided habitat for many 
endangered animals and species have been wantonly hacked down for firewood 
without replacement. Charcoal makers have also denuded forest areas within a short 
space of time. Timberlake, who described the alarming events taking place in Ethiopia 
in the 1980s, observed that `charcoal makers in the Rift Valley in Ethiopia are 
converting the acacia forest to semi-desert at the rate of 60 000 hectares per year, .4 `' 
Some forty years ago, land between the Awash river and the lake districts on the road 
to Awassa, a distance of 100 krns, was mostly an uncultivated bushy area which 
supported plenty of wildlife. Now there are hardly any trees left in the rift valley and 
the charcoal-making area has moved further inland. Its scarcity and the extra 
travelling distance to the area of concentration have increased transportation costs and 
consequently raised the price of charcoal more than twofold. 
The Ethiopian highlands, which at one time accommodated the drought- 
affected population in the lowlands, have now been abandoned because of land 
degradation and overpopulation, forcing the excess inhabitants to seek refuge in the 
lowlands, particularly the south. Reiduif Molivaer in a research article, which he 
wrote for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, describes the rapid 
deforestation of Ethiopia as follows: 
40%0 of Ethiopia was covered with trees at the beginning of the 2e century, by the 1980s only 
3.4% remained (according to government estimates during a workshop on appropriate 
technology which I attended in 1983). To reverse such a trend is not easy. Overuse or 
inappropriate use of land due to overpopulation and/or unsuitable agricultural methods is a 
major cause of land degradation. 43 
41 NigelCmss. The SolheL The Peoples' Right to Llevelopmenl (Expedite Graphic Limned; London, 1990)- 
42 Lloyd Timbcrlakc, Africa in Crisis, p. 102; The, author has been travelling on the A%iash-Awasa road for a good many }can, 
at times on a we d basis tci stspc isc his father's farm which was situated m Inc and has witnessed what 
lsas been 
&scribed by Timberlake. 
43 Reidulf Molvaer, "Environmentally Induced Conflicts? -A Discussion Based on Studies from the Horn of Africa (Bulletin 
of Peace Proposals, Vol. 22, NO. 2, Oslo, June 1991), p. 185. 
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Mekie, the capital of the Tigrai region, which now stands in absolutely barren land, 
was once the heartland of thick tropical forest inhabited by all sorts of big game 
animals- Assorted samples of jungle trees still stand in the courtyard of Ras Gugssa, 
which now serves as a restaurant specialising in traditional food, situated on the north- 
eastern part of the city. How this group of trees were saved is a miracle that needs a 
case study of its own. Apart from these remaining trees, the only other evidence of the 
past existence of a forest around the city is past reminiscence related through a 
popular country folk-song, which describes the area as the den of lions, the translated 
version of the song title being `The lion roars at. Mekel e' . 
When the drought of the 
1970s and 1980s struck the people of Tigrai, they had no alternative but to seek refuge 
in neighbouring provinces and the eastern part of Sudan. Unless the new abode in the 
south is environmentally protected in consort with international bodies, its fate will be 
no different from that of Mekele whose past history will only be remembered as a 
legend now living in a denuded barren land. 
Famine 
Although environmentally related famine derives from prolonged and recurring cycles 
of drought, it is accentuated by the presence of armed conflict in the area. When 
people find life to be unbearable and insecure, movement into an area of safety and a 
place where they can feed their family and herds becomes inevitable. In an area riven 
by internecine conflict the choice of an alternative abode is very limited. The only 
avenue open to them to escape the ravages of famine is to cross over a national 
boundary, enter into hitherto unknown territory and hope to survive on humanitarian 
assistance that is dependent on the goodwill of their neighbours and the international 
community. The reception that. awaits them could be positive or negative depending 
entirely on the outlook and decision of the neighbouring state. If their hosts are of the 
same tribe or ethnic origin the people can usually expect a hospitable reception- On 
the other hand, if a hostile tribe or even a different ethnic group inhabits the new 
abode, then the probability of being welcomed could be very low. The final outcome 
depends on the host country's political power, goodwill and economic ability to 
absorb the new comers. Often, national interest enters the equation. If those seeking 
shelter happen to blame their government's policy for the catastrophe that has befallen 
them and they are clearly willing to wage an armed struggle against that government, 
they are likely to attract the sympathy and support of the host country. On the other 
2 1; 
hand, if the visitors' desire is to settle permanently and they show no wish to return, 
there is a strong likelihood that their presence will clash with that of the local 
community, thus threatening the security of the host nation- 
The droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, which struck the region for a prolonged 
period, brought in their wake famine that triggered unprecedented mass migration. In 
the Horn region the total number of refugees and displaced people, out of which some 
are the victims of environmental consequences, amounts to nearly 9 million, the 
largest in the modem history of Africa ` `# The gravity of the Ethiopian drought of 1984 
drew public attention in October of that year when the harrowing scenes were the 
subject of an eight-minute live transmission covered from Kouram by Michael Buerk 
for BBC television. The coverage drew an emotional and sympathetic reaction from 
the West which responded quickly with food and medical aid. `' 
Although emergency food aid played a significant role in saving thousands of 
endangered lives, it should not be taken for granted that it will always be available on 
a permanent basis. The real answer to recurring drought and famine is the resettlement 
of those who have become destitute into a more fertile area and to only assist them 
until they are able to produce their own food. Guided by this principle, the Ethiopian 
government in 1984 tried to ameliorate the situation by moving the population to the 
southern and western regions of the country and resettling them there. However, the 
resettlement scheme, which was intended to combat the calamities of aridity and 
recurrent famine in Tigrai and northern Wollo regions, was affected by the TPLF's 
hostile anti-resettlement propaganda which depicted the scheme as `an attempt to 
destroy the social base of their movement rather than a genuine relief programme, and 
a scheme to provide forced labour for state farms in the south'. 
46 The population was 
seduced and completely taken in by the TPLF propaganda and refused to participate 
in the government's programme. In this particular case it is quite apparent that the 
major cause of the movement was the instinct for survival. What is important to note, 
however, is the ability of the TPLF to convince the population that the government's 
programme had other agendas beyond resettlement, and its ability to move them 
westwards across the border into the Sudan where they managed to get the assistance 
of the UNCHR and NGOs. The TPLF's aim of resettlement was twofold. First, 
it was 
44 John Markakis, Resource Conflict in the Horn ofAfrica, p. 16. 
45 Lloyd Timberlake, Arica in Crisis, p. 17. 
46 Raymond W. Copson, pp. 97-98. 
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to save the population from dying of hunger and, after survival was assured, to use the 
refugee camps as a source of manpower to fight the Ethiopian government. In areas 
under their control they also distributed relief food to rural areas, an act which brought 
them much closer to the population, while simultaneously eroding the people's bond 
with the government. The relief food was distributed by the Eritrean Relief 
Association (ERA), which came into being in 1975 and the Relief Society of Tigrai 
(REST) which was created in 1978 operated from bases in Sudan: 
A group of Christian-based NGOs established an Emergency Relief Desk in Khartoum, 
through which supplies were funnelled to ERA and REST and into uerriIIa-held territories. 
The famine of 1984-85 brought increased demands, and even the preference on the part of 
some of the needy, encouraged by REST, to trek long distances to Sudan rather than go to 
Ethiopian government-run relief stations with the risk of forcible resettlement -47 
In the case of the EPLF, like its comrade-in-arms the TPLF, it was the ability to move 
quite freely in the rural areas and give substantial effective assistance in food and 
medical supplies in dire moments that gave the EPLF an edge over the Derg to further 
cement its relationship with the population. Its frequent presence among the people 
denied the government the ability to move within Eritrea province freely- As a result, 
the government's influence was dwindling from day to day and its control was limited 
to just a few towns and cities. The EPLF used their relief camps around Kessela 
across the border to serve as sources of manpower and food supplies. The Ethiopian 
government tried to stop the relief assistance activities of NGOs and international 
organisations within Ethiopian territory by claiming the act to be an intervention- 
However, since these areas lay totally out of government control and the Ethiopian 
government had no ability to conduct a relief supply under its supervision, the donor 
agencies were reluctant to heed the government's appeal when famine was wiping out 
a large proportion of the population, and humanitarian intervention was widely 
accepted as a proper measure by most of the international community. As a result, 
their support was channelled through the EPLF and The TPLF, thereby giving the 
insurgency movements a higher status, at times comparable to a de facto recognition 
as a state. Thus, in the Ethiopian case, we can see how the effect of famine indirectly 
forced people to seek refuge in a neighbouring state and, after recuperating from the 
ills of famine, how those who were fit were politicised to join the insurgency 
47 l? Peter cxýd%zquYi, The Horn of: 
fiic a. pp. I? _. :_. 
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movement. They played a crucial role in strengthening the TPLF's and EPLF-s ability 
to challenge government forces. 
The famine in northern Somalia is partially responsible for swelling the 
number of refugees at Hartisheik in the midst of the Haud grazing area, situated some 
30 kms inside Ethiopian territory. The refugee camp at Hartishetk not only saved 
thousands of people who would otherwise have died as victims of famine, but also 
facilitated the recruitment of numerous potential fighters for the SNM So, we can say 
that, indirectly, environmental famine, although not the major cause, has to a limited 
extent contributed towards worsening the security situation in northern Somalia. 
Likewise, the famines of 1984-85 and 1988-89 in Darfur forced the Baqqara 
people to move further south to settle in an environmentally healthy climate. This 
situation brought the Baqqara people into armed conflict with the northern Dinka 
tribe- The government took advantage of the situation and tried to create a gulf 
between the two communities to further its own interest in weakening the foothold of 
SPLA in the area. `Thus the armed conflict of the raiding murahaliin (tribe militias) 
was both military and commercial in character, as the murahallin sought to use force 
to refurbish their own herds hit by drought further north, and supply the commercial 
meat market as far away as Omdurman' _4s 
From 1986 onwards, many thousands of Dinka found themselves forced out of 
their home area; some moved further south within the region, others trekked 
eastwards towards Ethiopia, while thousands more found their way north to Sudan's 
main towns, including the capital where they took refuge in the outskirts under pitiful 
conditions. 'The death toll has been estimated to be as many as 2 million, and about 
one-third of the southern population was displaced either within or outside the region. 
Total deaths estimates from famine and disease for 1988 alone have been put as high 
as 250-500 QUO'. °9 
Again, we see how a movement initiated by environmental disaster and 
reinforced by armed clashes led towards loss of property, famine and 
finally into 
migration as far as Itang in Ethiopia in search of handouts from 
donor countries. The 
condition of refugees who trekked into Ethiopia from as 
far away as northern Bahir 
Gaza], some 800 kms away, was, to put it mildly, simply horrendous. Harassed and 
deprived of their food and cooking pots they walked empty-handed all the way to 
48 Ibid., 180. 
49 Ibid_ 
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refugee camps. Akobö, a collecting station right on the Etho-Sudan border witnessed 
horrible scenes. People arrived there half dead with scarcely any flesh on their 
skeletons after wading through a final stretch of heavily waterlogged marshland- The 
weak could not cover the long distance and those who were strong and fortunate 
arrived almost dead from hunger and exhaustion- An Ethiopian team who flew out 
there in a helicopter to monitor the situation and supervise security measures at the 
collecting station reported their observations with great alarm. They carried 56 
women and children on their return journey and dropped them at the refugee centre at 
Itang. When asked how they managed to survive the long ordeal without access to 
food, the refugees replied that they were forced to eat grass and leaves from trees like 
cattle. Some who were lucky and possessed the strength to hunt and fish were able to 
subsist on fish and wild game. After a few weeks' recuperation most of the males left 
the camp and made their way to SPLA training camps to fight against government 
forces in order to repossess their property and free themselves from the Muslim north 
who consider themselves as Arabs. 50 
The SPLA never had a recruitment problem nor did it need to politicise or 
indoctrinate its population as all the refugees were seeking revenge and a quick return 
to their homelands. Its only problem was logistics- Hence, we see how elements of the 
population, who were forced to leave their land as a result of dispossession by 
northern tribes, begged for arms to fight their enemies in order to reinstate their rights. 
It should be noted that the Baqqara were initially forced to move southwards not 
because of a desire to grab the southerners' land but as a result of environmental 
degradation, A simple environmental problem that could have easily been resolved 
through dialogue and peaceful negotiation between the communities was exploited by 
the government which armed the Baqqara and encouraged them to suppress the 
southern tribes, an act which developed into an armed conflict and resulted in mass 
migration. Thus the environmentally forced movement, which was fully exploited by 
the government, indirectly contributed to the deterioration of the security situation in 
Sudan. 
50 Author's note: the author was leading a team in the border area and, during the course of his duty, encountered this lamentable 
episode. The preliminary report which 
he dispatched by telegram from the scene met with a quick response and RR(-- officials 
with food and medicine were flown 
by air from Gambella a town situated some 50 limns further inland from Itang. 
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Pests and Diseases 
The Horn countries lie between the tropics whose climate is conducive to the breeding 
of numerous small creatures, some of which are harmful- Of those that are harmful, 
some damage crops and others infect humans and animals because they carry 
diseases. Although they cannot be classified as the principal causes of environmental 
degradation they nevertheless contribute substantially by affecting food production 
and exacerbating famine conditions. Their indirect contribution therefore affects the 
level of food security and those that are relevant are mentioned below- 
Map 1 1. The Spread of the Desert Locust (1987) 
Desert locusts are usually confined to the arid recession area, but if water and vegetation conditions are 
suitable they have been known to invade heavily settled cultivated regions far outside the deserts. 
Control of the insects in the breeding grounds has been made difficult in the 19g05 by armed conflicts 
and also by the banning of the use of certain insecticides, such as dielrin, because of their 
environmental side-effects. Towards the end of 1987 swarms from Chad, Niger, and Sudan moved 
across the Sahara into Algeria and Morocco. 
Source: A. T. Grove, The C/ia ging Geography ofAfrica (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996). p. 55. 
Locusts 
Plagues of locusts are common in the continent. When conditions are conducive to 
breeding they multiply and move to green areas for food. They have a huge appetite 
`a grown locust needs to eat its own weight of food every day, so a large swarm and 
will eat all the green leaves and crops over several square kilometres, the food 
supplies of many thousand people. `51 Map II shows the breeding areas for July- 
'1 A. T. Grove, The Ch raging G 'ograp4 ofAMccj, p. 54. 
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September 1987 and also indicates the recession and invasion areas in the entire Horn 
region. There are a variety of locusts but the types that frequent and converge in the 
Horn area are the desert locust and the migratory locust _52 
In 1985 the migratory locust, found in many African countries, erupted into 
Sudan and Ethiopia. The fact that its arrival coincided with that of drought in the heat 
of the civil war made them a significant contributor towards famine-related havoc and 
insecurity in the sub-region.. Control of the insects at the breeding ground has been 
difficult due to instability. In addition, cross-border cooperation and collaboration in 
exchange for information and pooling resources, which is vital to eradicate locusts or 
to minimise damage to crops, is virtually non-existent as the countries are either 
engaged in inter-state wars or are clandestinely aiding and abetting secessionist 
movements to destabilise neighbours. 
Mosquitoes 
The mosquito, which has several species, transmits malarial parasites by infecting 
human and animal blood and causes death in areas where medical remedies are 
unavailable. The Horn of Africa happens to be one of these areas. In the Sudd area of 
south Sudan and the Gambella region of western Ethiopia, malaria and other 
mosquito-related diseases are rampant. These regions are endowed with numerous 
rivers that could be suitable for irrigation if proper dams and canals were constructed. 
However, at present, the fertile area is waterlogged as a result of flooding from the 
White Nile, and the Sobat river and its tributaries has become an excellent mosquito 
breeding ground. The presence of malaria has made the area inaccessible and has 
protected insurgents from harassment by government forces. The locals, who have 
developed resistance to continuous bites, are the only ones who can inhabit the 
mosquito-infected areas. SPLA forces have exploited their resistance capability to full 
advantage. 
The humidity of the Krambella region, which is bisected by four rivers (Karo, 
Abobo, Gilo and Akobo) running parallel westwards at an equidistance of 
approximately 50 lams, was greatly detested by the settlers who were moved to the 
area by the government from the highlands of northern Ethiopia (Tigrai and Wollo 
provinces) to escape the calamities of drought. The highlanders could not endure the 
harsh hot climate nor were they able to resist the mosquito bites. They did not 
5-V fbi&, 55. 
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volunteer to be moved to a remote area which is over 1400 kms from their place of 
origin. On discovering the inhospitality of the climate and the prevalence of disease, 
those who were fit to walk escaped from the settlement area and attempted to trek 
back home or to look for a new abode in a more favourable climate. Some even 
crossed the border and joined the settlers in Sudan.. They were aided and abetted by 
the OLF, TPLF and Sudanese security elements in their endeavour to abandon the 
settlement area, being earmarked as potential insurgents to fight against government 
forces. In the above case we see how adverse climatic conditions contributed to 
wrecking a settlement programme and how, by skilful propaganda manipulation, a 
substantial force was encouraged to join insurgency elements, thus becoming a 
contributory factor towards exacerbating insecurity in the sub-region. 53 
Tsetse fly 
The tsetse-fly is an insect that transmits sleeping disease by biting people and animals- 
It sucks their blood and injects it into others. It thrives best in savannah grassland. The 
mosquito-ridden areas mentioned above also happen to be savannah zones. Control 
measures are far from satisfactory and the fly's existence has made places 
uninhabitable for people and animals, particularly cattle. Its elimination requires 
extensive clearance work. and the burning of savannah grass. Such ventures, would, of 
course, expedite deforestation and have an adverse environmental effect. 
Rinderpest 
Rinderpest, a cattle disease that is also transmitted by the tsetse-fly, has depleted the 
animal population, severely affecting pastorals who depend on keeping a sufficient 
number of cattle. Although inoculation is very effective, its proper administration 
requires quarantine regulations to control cattle movements. This has not been 
possible, due to the fact that government authority over the nomadic population has 
broken down, resulting in uncontrolled border crossings in search of pasture. Here, 
intergovernmental cooperation in eliminating a common enemy is non-existent. -54 
Under prevailing circumstances, sustainable economic development would not 
be feasible in these areas and the people have to rely on aid, thus becoming a burden 
on their state and the international community. Seasonal migration to escape the 
scourge of the tsetse-fly also brings the pastorals into conflict with highland farmers, 
i; Author's note: the atcthor was on work duty in the area on numerous occasions and has conferred with 
local authorities on 
means of alleviating some of the problems, 
interviewed some of the settlers «ho abandoned their settlement camps and 
has «ritnessed a good number of incidents. 
94 AT. Grove, The C h'91019 Geography of. fricu, pp. 59-62. 
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thereby endangering the security of the region. Incidents in Gambella area - clashes 
between Anuwak and Nuer tribes - illustrate the dangers associated with seasonal 
migration; these could escalate unless closely supervised by government authorities- 
Conclusion 
Of all the environmental factors discussed above, water is the most sensitive issue, 
and could erupt into inter-state conflict. The fact that there is no international law to 
abide by and the fact that individual countries, particularly Egypt, are taking 
controversial unilateral decisions concerning multi-billion development schemes 
using Nile waters without consulting co-basin owners is not a good omen. If a 
peaceful solution on an equitable share of the Nile waters is not found in the very near 
future there is a strong likelihood that water-related environmental issues could be a 
principal factor in triggering a major inter-state war in the Horn of Africa proving the 
hypothesis: In environmentally deprived areas shortage of resources provokes 
war and disproving the maxim of narrow-view Realist theory assertions that blatantly 
argues the cause to instability is military threat coming from outside national borders 
- introducing a new dimension to the perception of security study in International 
Relations- Its relevance and threat to future security in the Horn can no longer be 
underestimated, and many academics and experts on the area have already voiced 
their apprehension on this issue. 
From the above analysis, it would be quite wrong to conclude that insecurity 
in the Horn of Africa directly derives from environmental degradation. However, the 
fact that environmental issues have played a significant role in exacerbating political 
and economic factors is a hard, indisputable fact. 
Strange to say, environmental factors, particularly famine-related refuge 
movements, are not always detrimental. In some circumstances, coincidentally, they 
also seem to have a positive aspect, as shown below. The fact that refugees were 
harboured, assisted and nurtured by a one-time antagonistic neighbour has proved that 
government indoctrination to regard their neighbour as a dire enemy to be false. In the 
case of Ethiopia and Somalia, the population was indoctrinated by such government 
propaganda. Fortunately, the refugees, to their surprise, experienced just the opposite 
to what had been continuously pumped into their minds. They discovered the truth the 
hard way. They now have no need to distrust their neighbours and have realised that 
they have things in common. The only distrust they now feel is towards their 
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autocratic and greedy leaders. They have realised the virtue of the common saving -a 
friend in need is a friend indeed'. This positive attitude is also widely shared by the 
refugees living in Western Europe, the USA and Canada - if this is intelligently 
exploited could enable the reduction of confusion among societies and mistrust 
between states opening the venue for peaceful settlement of security issues that are 
bedevilling the sub-region- 
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Chapter 6. 
International, Regional and Non-governmental Organisations 
In the preceding chapters an attempt was made to show how factors other than 
military issues can affect state security. Whenever applicable, these factors have been 
utilised to examine the underlying causes of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. 
International and regional organisations also utilised these factors in their conflict 
management analysis and subsequent strategies. However, their endeavours to resolve 
conflict issues are curtailed by the legal authority (constitution) mandated to them 
upon their creation - particularly concerning intervention in domestic conflicts that 
contravenes the inviolable right of state sovereignty -a shortcoming which is not 
fully comprehended by the citizens of the conflict-ridden countries. Due to lack of 
knowledge, they still put reliance on divine and outside intervention and do not expect 
any remedy from within, an attitude that has weakened internal attempts to confront 
security problems. 
This chapter will examine the legal inhibitions that paralysed past 
performances of international, regional and non-governmental organisations from 
resolving conflict issues of the Horn. After identifying the shortcomings, it will 
suggest some additional mandates required to enable these organisations to 
successfully implement stability in volatile regions such as the Horn where juridical 
states predominate in which state organs are partially operative or non-existent. In the 
course of examination, the institutions' strength and weaknesses in managing conflict 
will be reviewed by relating them to realist theory (wider-perspective) to see if it 
offers an explanation to security problems of the Horn sub-region. Those 
organisations that will be discussed are the UN, EU, OAU, IGAD, the Arab League 
and NGOs (both humanitarian and developmental). 
The UN 
Although the UN was established at the end of the Second World War to maintain 
international peace and security, it should be borne in mind that international and 
regional organisations have legal limitations upon their ability to intervene in the 
affairs of sovereign states. The fact that the UN is a free association of sovereign 
states, which are at full liberty to accept or reject UN resolutions, has restricted its 
power to pass resolutions that are binding on all its members. The core of the problem 
is that member states are not willing to concede their sovereign rights to the 
?2i 
international body. Any resolution that gets their blessing is usually one that does not 
adversely affect the national interest of Security Council members. In theory, it ought 
not to be too difficult for the Security Council to reach a unanimous decision on 
security issues, but such instances happen to be quite rare, especially during the Cold 
War. Arriving at a unanimous decision in a world divided by irreconcilable ideologies 
- particularly amongst the most powerful members of the Security Council - has been 
virtually impossible. Usually the veto is used extensively to promote national and 
group interests. That is why world security, even after the creation of the UN, went 
through a tumultuous and rocky period shrouded by tension, uncertainty, as well as an 
arms race which put life and civilisation at grave risk throughout the era of the Cold 
War. 
The issue of intra-state conflicts was not raised by the UN founding fathers at 
the time because domestic conflicts, as we know them today, were rare occurrences 
and hardly needed international attention to resolve them. After the birth of the UN, 
armed struggle to attain national independence and UN membership as a sovereign 
state became an issue. However, because of its exclusion from the UN Charter, 
internal conflict remained totally outside the UN's domain and the organisation 
refrained from intervention. It only became an issue of concern in the post-Cold War 
era when conflict changed in nature. Civil wars became so intense that their spillover 
effects affected the security of neighbouring states -a circumstance that prompted a 
reassessment of the situation. When civil wars caused widespread and insurmountable 
suffering to the population - particularly women and children - often resulting in 
migrations of refugees that cost numerous lives and endangered the peace and security 
of neighbouring states, the world organisation could not remain aloof and dismiss 
such incidents as irrelevant. Wide media coverage - particularly television 
programmes that broadcast live from battle zones - aroused feelings of sympathy in 
the Western world and pressurised the world community to re-examine Article 43 of 
the UN Charter in order to seek a wider interpretation that would justify involvement 
in domestic affairs under exceptional circumstances. As a result, the Security Council 
decided to interpret Article 431 more widely in order to accommodate and cover 
intervention for the purposes of humanitarian relief. 2 Such a practice demanded a 
IUN Charter. Chapter HI: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts o1. -1`gession in which 
Art. 43 authonses the Security Council to intervene militarily to maintain international peace and security (bttp: 
/)www. iin_cxýt/ 
aboutun/charter/chaater7. htm). ý. 
3. 
2 Boutros Boutros-Crhah.: in Agenda for Peace; Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping (United Nations, NcH 
York, 1992). 
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complete departure from the past peacekeeping tradition whose guiding principle had 
been based on securing the consent of the parties concerned prior to involvement and. 
if consent was obtained, maintaining impartiality and using minimum force only in 
self-defence - criteria which are very restrictive and, in effect, did not permit 
intervention. 
Internal wars generally take place in undemocratic states where public opinion 
is stifled. UN member states are reluctant to commit their forces in civil wars where 
national interests are not at stake, particularly in countries where the rule of law is 
inoperative and a state of anarchy dominates. They prefer to limit their involvement to 
humanitarian related issues only, leaving military intervention to regional 
organisations. 
According to the Security Council interpretation of Article 43 of the Charter, 
the circumstances in Somalia after the state system collapsed in 1991 warranted 
intervention to avert further killings and to establish an administration that would 
enforce law and order3. For the first time, humanitarian relief distribution became a 
valid excuse to intervene on behalf of the suffering: 
Four and a half million of the seven million Somalis `were in need' of immediate foreign 
assistance to survive. About three hundred thousand Somalis had died within the previous 
twelve months, while over one million had fled the country in search of food and security in 
neighbouring countries. 4 
When situation in Somalia deteriorated further and became beyond the capability of 
UNISOM I to distribute humanitarian assistance thus constituting a threat to 
international peace and security, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, 
authorised `the Secretary-general and Member states cooperating to implement the 
offer to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment 
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia'. ' An interim Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) under US leadership was formed, dispatched to Somalia, created the 
necessary environment and as a result aid agencies were able to distribute food to all 
regions. After UNITAF accomplished its mission of securing the environment for 
relief aid delivery it was relieved by UNOSOM II which was established by R814 on 
26 March 1993. 
3Se; 
unty Council Resolution 767 (1992), 'gravely alarmed 
by the deterioration of the him anitarian situation in Somalia and 
underlining the urgent need for quick 
deliver" of humanitarian assistance in the whole country' authorized the Secretary -General 
'to establish four operational zones in Somalia as part of the consolidated 
United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNUX)MI 
lhtfi //výý"ý un org/Docs/ses/), p- 3- 
4Fred Marte, Political Cº tiles in Jnterncitional Relations: The Cold War and Africa 1945-1990 (VLF University Press. Amste da. m_ 
1994), p. 264. 
Security Council, 'Resolution 794' (1992), (http: //www. un. org/Docs/scces/1. 
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US special units' assistance to UNOSOM II continued until an operation to capture 
Aydeed that cost some American lives dismally failed. However, further US 
involvement in an area where there was no vital national interest at stake, was not 
acceptable to the American public and, consequently a quick exit from Somalia of all 
US military personnel became inevitable. 
While UNOSOM II's intervention saved many lives in Somalia, it 
unfortunately failed to institute a government that could enforce the rule of law. The 
reason for this failure is attributed to several different factors and opinion is divided 
on the issue. Some, such as the former Under Secretary of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), Mohamed Shanoun, attribute the failure to the UN's delay in taking 
action while others put the blame on the UN forces' heavy-handedness and inability to 
handle the local situation properly due to their lack of understanding of local customs 
and traditions. 6 
The Somali debacle also had an adverse effect on the willingness of other UN 
member states to involve their military forces in future intra-state conflicts. On 
reconsideration, they preferred to leave involvement in civil war issues to regional 
organisations and powers. After the experience in Somalia, civil war issues became 
very much feared. Adam Roberts, noted their fear as follows: 
It is sometimes suggested that the United Nations should avoid intervening in civil wars. It is 
argued that the United Nations was not designed to tackle civil wars, its charter does not deal 
with them, and many involvement in civil wars have been both costly and unrewarding. 
Internal armed conflicts are notoriously bitter and difficult to resolve. 7 
To make their proposition more attractive (and acceptable), Western countries have 
volunteered to assist logistically in the training and equipping of African 
peacekeeping forces to be used in the event of domestic conflicts. This is reflected by 
US policy when the US government decided to assist African countries in organising 
eight battalions of peace troops each comprising 500 to 800 men. The objective was: 
to work with African states to create effective, rapidly deployable peacekeeping units (8 to 10 
battalions) that can operate under the auspices of the United Nations, the Organisation of 
African Unity or as a free standing, multinational force in the event of humanitarian crisis or 
traditional operations. 8 
6 Mohamed Sahnoim, Somalia: The _1fissed 
Opportunities (U. S. Institute of Peace. Washington. 1994), p. xiii. He commented -If 
the international community had intervened earlier and more effectiY°el` in Somalia, much of the catastrophe that has unfolded 
could have been avoided'; Ibid., p. 263. 
Adam Roberts, 'The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping' in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson s. ith Pamela Aall (eds. ), 
;M anaging 
Global Chaos (United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 19%), p. 308. 
8Thomas W. Lippman, 'U. S. Moving to Train African Peace Troops (international Herald Tribune. I Juh 1997). 
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With the strongest and richest member state, the USA, taking such a stance, a 
number of pertinent questions can be raised. Is it legitimate for Western countries to 
abandon physical involvement in Third World internal conflicts after accepting a 
wider interpretation of Article 43 that justifies humanitarian intervention? Is there still 
a chance that the gravity of the situation could force the UN to have second thoughts 
and revise its Charter to accommodate intra-state conflicts? If not, can the regional 
organisation, the OAU cope with the responsibility of ensuring the peace and security 
of the continent on its own? What are the advantages and weaknesses of the OAU? 
Do all major European powers share the American view? What is the viewpoint of 
the African countries? Answers to these questions would be highly relevant to any 
attempt to suggest a solution to the incipient intra-state conflicts that have been 
engulfing the Horn of Africa in the aftermath of the Cold War. The following 
paragraphs will try to look into some of the problems. 
International Vs Regional Organisations 
As mentioned above, the possibility of the UN adopting a new structure that favours 
involvement in civil wars in the very near future is very low. In light of this, the 
alternative, which has already been indicated, is more active participation by the 
regional organisation the OAU. 9 Before assigning this arduous mission to the regional 
organisation, it would be highly relevant and quite proper to analyse the strengths and 
weaknesses of the OAU in conflict prevention, crisis diplomacy and conflict 
management. 
In terms of strengths, a regional organisation has an advantage over the UN in 
that it is not subject to rigid procedural constraints such as exclusive membership and 
the veto power exercised by the Security Council. A regional organisation is 
procedurally in a better position than the Security Council to act and respond to 
security situations that usually demand quick action. The latter is usually 
overwhelmed by superpower conflict and issues that threaten world stability and does 
not have the time, the will and moral fibre to entangle itself in civil wars that bear no 
relevancy to international security. The Security Council's delay in taking action is 
often cited as one of the principal factors escalating the Somali civil war - and such a 
delay could have been avoided had the OAU had the means and the political will, at 
9 Security Council Resolution 954 (1994), When up n failure of its mission in Somalia The Security Council deg idexi to 
terminate UNOSOM II, it in ited the Organisation of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference to continue their efforts in cooperation with the United Nations in the search for lasting peace in Somalia, 
(hjgt; LA c, w un ocg/Docs/ý p. 3. 
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the time, to intervene in intra-state affairs. 10 As has been seen in the past, the UN, 
which does not have forces under its direct command, can be forced to assemble 
peacekeeping forces from willing countries from extreme ends of the globe - an 
operation which entails long-distance travel and compels the use of cargo and 
passenger aircraft. By contrast, involvement on the part of a regional body could 
largely be accommodated by more economical land transport covering a much shorter 
distance. 
As already noted, one of the effects of a civil war is the flood of refugees 
engulfing neighbouring countries and becoming an economic burden on the host 
country. Such an event inevitably has a detrimental effect on the sustainability of 
development and, logically, danger of own strategic interests are bound to motivate 
neighbouring countries to seek an earlier solution to the problem. Thus, it can be 
assumed that they will volunteer to contribute peacekeeping forces if asked by a 
regional organisation. Their motivation would be to stop or limit cross-border mass 
migration that could trigger civil disturbance and, in extreme cases, civil war in the 
host country itself. In addition, members of a regional organisation are well aware and 
conscious of the customary law, culture and practice of the country earmarked for 
intervention and would therefore be in a better position to handle the internal affairs 
of states more coherently than countries from outside the region. As Ruth 
Wedgewood commented, `... regional action allows ad hoc discretion, a sui generis 
solution that resists generalisation. Action by the UN Security Council carries the 
mantle of universalism'. 11 
The participation of neighbouring countries, placed under the auspices of a 
regional organisation to execute a peace and security mission, could also have a 
dampening effect on tribal and ethnic sympathies (in circumstances where tribal and 
ethnic affiliations create harmonious relationship with neighbours) that are usually 
regarded as the primary cause of civil wars in post-Cold War conflicts. 
12 
`Ties of sympathy and familiarity' amongst regional leaders could also ease 
tensions and pave the way for informal talks that could be invaluable in conducting 
preventive diplomacy. Former Under-Secretary of the OAU, Mohamed Shanoun, 
speculates that `appropriate regional mediators could have cobbled together a political 
settlement' in Somalia. 
13 
tU Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The itlissed Opportunities (U. S. Institute of Peace, Washington- 1994), p. xiii. 
1]Ruth Wedgewood, in Managing Global Chaos (eds. ), pp. 276-277_ 
12Tbid., p.. 277. 
t Mohamed Sahnoun, Somalia: The Afissed Opportunities (U. S_ Institute of Peace. Washington, 1994); Ibidd, p. 278. 
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Although a regional organisation is endowed with numerous advantages, this 
does not mean that it has no weaknesses. It is an association of member states which 
have conflicting strategic interests who wish to use IGAD's forum to cloak their other 
motives. In order to deal with regional security problems, at the outset, the sub- 
regional organisation should be able to resolve existing political problems which are 
the causes of interstate war (Eritria Vs Ethiopia). In addition, fomenting internal 
dissention in neighbouring territories (activities pursued by almost all members) 
which creates internal instability should seize. Only when stability is assured and trust 
is built between member states attention can be diverted towards economic 
development - the main agenda of the IGAD charter. 
Intervention to normalise internal chaos in member state territories does not 
necessarily always involve military intervention. The appropriate remedy in a 
particular case might be economic sanctions or blockade and siege. Where such is the 
case, effective sanctions or a blockade cannot be achieved by the regional 
organisation alone. It requires the full and active participation of all countries and, in 
such circumstances, the UN is far better placed than any regional organisation 
whatever its military capability might be. This is one of the weaknesses of regional 
organisations. The other weakness is regional organisations' distaste for intervening in 
domestic conflicts, their rationale being based on the strong belief in the protective 
shield of sovereignty. Interference in the domestic affairs of other states is outlawed 
by regional organisation's charters because of the fear that such steps open the door to 
intrusion in their own internal affairs. They do not wish to set a precedent that, one 
day, could come back to haunt them. Ruth Wedgewood, referring to this issue, rightly 
notes that `as a consortium of heads of state, the Organisation of African Unity 
follows unwritten rules of restraint, a reciprocal deference that inhibits criticism'. '` In 
light of the above observations we will now look at how the OAU fares in managing 
the conflicts of its region, with particular reference to the Horn of Africa. 
The OAU 
One of the main concerns of the OAU's founding fathers was to preserve the 
sovereignty of individual states -a point which is emphatically expressed in the 
Charter. This widely held view was summarised by President Tsiranana of the 
Malagasy Republic when he stated: 
14 Ibid 
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We intend to conserve the total sovereignty of our states... I should underline that our 
adherence means by the same token a rejection of a formula for a federation of African States 
because federalism presupposes the surrender of a large part of national sovereignty. 
Similarly, we would reject a confederal formula seeing that the authority we superimpose on 
the states might impose demands which would be unacceptable for certain of us_ I' 
A minority group including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea, 
however, believed that the independence of individual states could only be guaranteed 
through the political and economic unity of the entire continent - something similar to 
that of the United States of America - and `pleaded for a political union and the 
creation of a strong United States of Africa'. 16 Nkrumah argued vehemently that 
`African Unity is above all a political Kingdom which can be gained by political 
means. The social and economic development of Africa will come only within the 
political Kingdom, not the other way round. ' 17 
The battle of ideas was carried to the conference of May 1963 in Addis Ababa 
and consumed most of its valuable time. Furthermore, the atmosphere of the 
conference was shrouded the assassination of Sylvanus Olympio of Togo which had 
taken place in January of that year. As a result, concern about interference in the 
affairs of other states was mounting, thus serving as a potent argument against the 
proponents of political unity. As the overwhelming preference favoured a loose form 
of organisation with limited cooperation, the hard-liners had to settle for a 
compromised unity. Their only consolation was the total agreement by all members to 
support liberation movements in eradicating colonial and imperial rule from the face 
of the continent. As K. Mathews rightly stated, `... the liberation and decolonisation of 
Africa, particularly southern Africa, has been the central theme and perhaps the only 
force that has kept the OAU united'. 18 This view was incorporated in Articles 11 (1) 
and III of the Charter. Thus the OAU was formed, and its purposes and structure 
focused on accommodating the worries and desires of the founding members rather 
than concentrating on constructing a strong regional organisation that met the need 
and aspirations of its people. A look at Article III of the Charter, which clearly 
stipulates seven principles to be adhered to, will suffice to demonstrate its 
obstructiveness: 
15 K. Mathews. 'The Or üzation of African Unity' in Dominico Mazzeo (cri. ), African Regional Organizations (Cambridge 
University Press, London, 1984), p. 55. 
16IbU, p. 52. 




a) the sovereign equality of all the members; 
b) non-interference in the internal affairs of states; 
c) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for the 
inalienable right to independent existence, 
d) peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or 
arbitration; 
e) unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well 
as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other 
state; 
f) absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories 
which are still dependent; 
g) affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs. '9 
With the exceptions of sections (f) and (g), the sections are designed to either protect 
state sovereignty or to make interference in other states affairs illegal. For example, 
section (e) goes out of its way to spell out and condemn political assassinations of all 
forms - something that does not normally appear as an independent principle in 
charters - while deliberately avoiding addressing their causes. It seems to be more 
concerned with ensuring the safety, well-being and the permanent retention of the 
posts of those in power rather than addressing the security and well-being of the 
continent. K. Mathews concludes his study of the regional organisation by remarking 
that: 
... there exists a 
definite need for positive action for a stronger OAU, equipped politically and 
militarily to guarantee the security of the continent and the fundamental rights and welfare of 
the African masses. Politically disunited and militarily defenceless in a ruthless world, Africa 
with her enormous reserves of natural resources holds out an open invitation to international 
adventurism, a second Berlin. 20 
In light of the above weaknesses, the only effort which the OAU contributed towards 
stability during the Cold War period, was its attempts to mediate between opposing 
parties, which mostly ended in utter failure. The OAU's first-ever peacekeeping force, 
sent to Chad in 1982, resulted in a bitter experience that made the regional 
organisation reluctant to involve itself in later military operations. 
21 
In 1991 a conference sponsored by the secretariats of the OAU, the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa and the African leadership jointly drafted a 
historical document, known as the Kampala Document that proposed the 
establishment of a permanent Conference on Security, Stability, Development and 
t9Rhid 
, p. 58. 20lbid, p. 82. 
ý1Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa p. 156 
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Co-operation and called for the establishment of a continental peace-keeping 
machinery and the drastic lowering of military expenditures by African states'.?, '. 
Besides emphasising the importance of individual security, the document also offered 
useful principles that could serve as a springboard to address regional security issues. 
It states: 
(a) conflict prevention and containment: greater attention should be 
paid to measures to prevent or contain crises before they erupt 
into violent confrontations; 
(b) internal and external security for Africa must derive from a 
framework of common and collective continental security; 
(c) African governments must individually and collectively be guided 
by the principle of good neighbourliness and a peaceful resolution 
of conflicts; 
(d) national and continental self-reliance in certain strategic areas 
covering both military and non-military, including popular 
participation in national defence, is vital for African security. 
With the number of civil wars on the continent soaring and the inspiring Kampala 
document posing a formidable challenge which needed addressing, the OAU could 
not remain indifferent to security issues and sit idle indefinitely. The issue of human 
rights worldwide became so sensitive that, in 1992, in its communique, from the 
Summit of African Heads of State and Government in Dakar, Senegal, the OAU for 
the first time acknowledged, that `there is a link between security, stability, 
development and cooperation in Africa'. The OAU Secretary-General Salim exploited 
this theme and a plan worked out for the establishment of an OAU conflict 
management mechanism. Its implementation, however, was handicapped by the 
OAU's shortage of funds, lack of an established department within its headquarters 
with the ability to effectively command and control peacekeeping operations, and the 
absence of political will on the part of member countries to actively participate in 
regional infra-state conflicts. These handicaps will take time to address and, under the 
prevailing circumstances, the best the OAU could do was to delegate its power to sub- 
regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the IGAD. 
Given the circumstances of its creation and the support it could muster from 
regional and international organisations, the sub-regional organisation, ECOWAS, is 
-nEdmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds), Africa in the Ayew International Order, pp. 11-12. 
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to be highly commended for the efforts it made to bring peace to Liberia through 
ECOMOG, (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) and now to Sierra Leone, though not 
without some shortfalls which have drawn international and regional comment. 23 
The sub-regional organisation, the IGAD, which represents the Horn 
countries, was initially set up to coordinate the economic and development efforts of 
the sub-region. However, it has lately also tried to incorporate security aspects as 
well. For example, it tried to bring peace and stability in Somalia and Sudan. Its 
efforts, achievements and future prospects in enhancing peace and security will be 
investigated in the following paragraphs. 
The IGAD 
The IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development), previously known as the 
IGADD - the additional `D' representing drought, was formed in 1986 to exploit the 
potential for self-help and cooperation at the regional level. The single `D' which now 
represents development also incorporates drought within its present vocabulary. 
Cooperation in development project did not materialise as intended due to existing 
political animosities between member-states -a factor that has to be addressed in 
advance in order to create trust before the establishment of viable economic ventures 
at regional level. Its headquarters are in Djibouti, a country considered to be more 
stable than the rest of the members of the sub-region. Its member states now comprise 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, therefore embracing 
all the countries of the Horn of Africa. 
As IGAD sought to increase cooperation, the fact that some of the member 
countries were involved in inter-state conflicts - which created deep animosities and 
soured all forms of relationships - began to retard close association. While memories 
of past antagonisms were fresh in the minds of member states, it became quite 
difficult to resume normal and harmonious relationships which were free from 
suspicion. As a result, in the early days of its existence, the IGAD was politically 
inactive and only served as a forum where heads of states and governments met. The 
only worthy function it performed was the role it played as a venue for the 
rapprochement between Mengistu and Siad Bane in 1988. Although the 
rapprochement can be principally attributed to the deterioration of domestic security 
which urgently demanded a decrease in inter-state confrontation to mobilise 
2; Adebayo Oyeb ide, 'The End of the Cold War: Implications for Conflict Management and Resolution' in Adebayo Chvebade 
FindAbiodun Alao, 4fricaAfier the Cold [far (Africa WorlldPress, Inc., Asmara, Eritrea 1998), pp. 171-172. 
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resources, the role played by Hasan Gouled Optidon, chairman of the IGAD, in 
bringing the two arch enemies to the negotiating table deserves due credit and 
acknowledgement. 
In 1993, following both Siad Barre's and Mengistu Hailemariam's falls from 
power, when Eritrea joined the IGAD as a new member, the 'new generation' African 
leaders (Isayas Afworki, Meles Zenawi and Museveni) began to actively participate in 
the organisation. Only after this infusion of fresh blood and invigorating spirit, which 
rekindled a spark of hope did the IGAD begin to take an active role in resolving the 
security problems of its sub-region. It vigorously tried to carry out the responsibilities 
given to it in brokering peace 1. between the Sudan government and the SPLA 2. 
reconciling the divided people of Somalia to the re-establishment of state authority. 24 
However, the IGAD's initiative to mediate in these conflicts has encountered many 
difficulties as its `member states themselves had a stake in the outcome' . 
'' 
The new composition of leaders was also not tension-free due to the change in 
circumstances that developed in the sub-region in the aftermath of the Cold War. The 
civil war in Sudan became a grave concern for neighbouring countries. In particular, 
`concern combined fear of the potential of Sudan as an Islamic proselytiser'. - At an 16 
early stage (1991-1997), while the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea was 
cordial, the relationship between Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and the El Beshir regime 
of Sudan was extremely poor. At times, the confrontation almost led to an all-out war. 
41-Havat on 27 March 1996 and Addis Ababa radio on 26 March 1996 reported that 
Sudan was amassing a new military force of 12,000 troops equipped with armoured 
vehicles and helicopters on its borders with Ethiopia. According to Radio Omdurman, 
on 21 October 1996, in response to Eritrean `provocations', the Sudanese National 
Assembly approved a political and military response, a move that created a state of 
tension in the sub-region. 27 Again on 26 August 1997, the London-based newspaper 
Al-Quds al Arahi reported that: 
The Sudanese government is expecting an imminent attack which could lead to an all-out war 
with its neighbour Eritrea, while people arriving from eastern Sudan have confirmed that a 
media establishment has been destroyed in Kassala Province. 28 
24 Husien M. Adam `St nali Civil Wars' in Taisier M. Ali and Roherrt O. Matthews (eds. ), Civil Wars in ;1 frica (McGill- 
( Xwen's University Press, Montreal 1999), p. 190. 
25 bid, p. 131_ 2 mir. 279 frica Research Bulletin- 12185,1-31 March; 1242-5.1-? 1 Oktober 1996. 
28BBC Stumrnarv of World Broadcast, Source: AI-Quds al-Arabi, London, in Arabic 20 Aug. 97. 
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Although such antagonistic relationships have hampered the smooth functioning of 
the IGAD, it did not prevent it from making efforts to seek a solution that would bring 
peace to the sub-region. Presidents Arap Moi of Kenya and Gouled Aptidon of 
Djibouti, who have not sided with the anti-Sudan alliance, have on a number of 
occasions chaired meetings in their capitals to resolve the Sudanese problem. 
Nevertheless, as the meeting between the IGAD's regional leaders held in Nairobi in 
July 1997 showed, the atmosphere was still shrouded by suspicion and animosity. As 
the Africa Research Bulletin commented: 
... relations 
between Eritrea and the Sudan are at their lowest, with the former accusing the 
latter of planning to assassinate its leader, Mr. Isaias Afworki, while the Sudan accuses Eritrea 
of plotting war against it. Eritrea is the base for the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), one 
of the rebel movements that is fighting the Sudanese government. 29 
Likewise, relations between Uganda and Sudan were no better. The two countries 
accuse each other of assisting rebel movements out to topple the governments in 
Kampala and Khartoum. '30 
In 1994, the IGAD drew up a six-point document known as the Declaration of 
Principles (DoP) which was designed to serve as a basis for future peace agreements 
to resolve the Sudanese problem. The main principles of the Declaration are the 
separation of state and Church, recognition of Sudan as multi-ethnic society and, in 
the event of disagreement on unity, the affirmation of the right of the south to self- 
deterYmination following a referendum. All rights declared in the DoP are to be 
guaranteed by a constitution that embodies internationally recognised human rights 
standards and is protected by an independent judiciary. The right to self-determination 
is to be invoked only if agreement on unity cannot be reached -3 
1 
Sudan has refused to sign the Declaration claiming that it tampered with 
matters of sovereignty. In order to circumvent the IGAD's peace process, the el 
Bashir regime manipulated the renegade commanders of the south, who split from the 
SPLA and signed a peace agreement known as the 21 April Agreement, declaring that 
it will respect the right to self-determination to the people of South Sudan in four 
years' time. Surprisingly, it was not twilling to make this commitment to the IGAD. 
Furthermore, the 21 April Agreement is subsidiary to the 10 April 1996 Agreement 
because Item One of the General Principles, says: 'The general principles contained in 
the political charter signed in Khartoum on April 10,1996 shall be part of this 
29 
rica Research Bulletin - 12747,1- 31 July 1997. 
-10 lbid 
31Ministry of Foreign Aftiurs, the Republic of Kenya, Drat Declaration of Principles 
(Nairobi. Kenn a, 20 Marl 9) 3). 
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document and shall guide and explain its provisions. ' Bona Malwal argues that- the 
1996 charter supersedes the 1997 version. In 1996 the parties to the 10 April Charter 
committed themselves to maintaining the unity of Sudan, a fact which further brings 
into question the clause on a self-determination referendum. '32 
The most sensitive issue in the conflict between north and south was, and still is, the 
interrelation between religion and politics. Item 6(a) of the April Agreement in Chapter 
reads 'Sharia law and custom shall be the source of legislation' and clearly manifests how the 
NIF dictated its terms and ensured the continuity, preservation and dominance of Sharia law 
throughout the whole of Sudan. When we compare the IGAD's DoP with that of the 21 April 
Agreement, we see a headlong collision of principles with no possibility of amelioration. What 
is more, the main opposition party led by Colonel John Garang was not a party to the 
Agreement. 33 
On realising the weakness of the 21 April document and the deterioration of his 
country's economic and security situation, el Bashir conferred with President Moi to 
call for an IGAD meeting after avoiding the forum for a period of three years. That is 
how the IGAD meeting of July 1997 took place in Nairobi. El Bashir's aim was to 
rally support for the 21 April Agreement. A heated debate ensued and Bashir failed to 
convince the members. When he became aware of his failure, he had no other 
alternative except to abide by the terms of the DoP. However, soon after he left the 
meeting, he stated that he would not be bound by the terms of the DoP principles. He 
again tried to sideline the Nairobi Agreement by involving Nelson Mandela as a 
mediator in the South Sudan problem. Neither John Garang nor the National 
Democratic Alliance welcomed Mandela's mediation effort, while that of the IGAD 
was still in progress. 
They accused the Turabi-Bashir regime of consistently failing to seek peace and stressed that 
the peace process must be kept within the framework of the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
development.... Nairobi, whose previously cordial relations with Khartoum have been cooling, 
was said to be furious about Mandela's apparent upstaging of President Moi and cancelled a 
planned IGAD meeting. 34 
Furthermore, the unsolicited activities launched by the ruling Sudanese regime to 
export Muslim fundamentalism among its neighbours was considered as an imminent 
danger and became a good reason to form an alliance against a common threat and 
enemy - the Beshir-Turabi fundamentalist regime of Sudan. The close relationship 
32Bona Malwal, `21 April Agreement between the NIF and the Renegades Fail to Impress' (Sud(n Democratic G, rette, No. 85, 
June 1997). 
33&ina Malwal, `1GAD Dismisses 21 April Agreement of Khartoum as a Basis for Peace' (Surlrny De mrxrntie G=ene. No. 87_ 
August 1997). 
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between the leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and John Garang emanates from the 
belief that, if they want to successfully defend their national sovereignty, they can do 
it more efficiently by forming a group alliance rather than face the threat individually. 
The group alliance has extended beyond IGAD membership to include Kegwame of 
Rwanda and Kabila of DR Congo, the former Zaire. 
The IGAD's other attempt at mediation consisted of holding a conference in 
Addis Ababa of the numerous contending Somali faction leaders on 3 January 1997 
with the aim of reconciling them to the formation of a national government: 
26 faction leaders attended and they created a 41 member National Salvation Council with the 
mandate to organise a transitional government. The NSC is headed by an eleven-person 
National Executive Committee (NEC) with five co-chairmen, all carefully balanced, by clan 
and factions. The NSC has 9 members from each of the major clan families (Darod, Hawiye, 
Rahenweyne and Dir) with five seats for smaller groups. ... Ambassadors from the Inter- 
Governmental Authority on Development attended various Sodere sessions. 35 
The two important faction leaders, Omar Arte, President of Somaliland and Hunein 
Aydeed, self-declared President of Somalia, rejected the invitation for different 
reasons. The former, which seceded in 1991, was leading a de facto government and 
seeking international recognition while the latter was against the reconciliation 
conference being held by Ethiopia, a country which Aydeed has repeatedly accused of 
interfering in Somalia's internal affairs. TM 
Although the NSC (National Somali Congress) has agreed to hold its congress 
meeting in November 20001 at Bossasso, a small port town on the central coast of 
Somalia, the outcome of any meeting which fails to incorporate Arte and Aydeed 
should not be expected to fulfil the aspirations of its people, the OAU, the UN and 
non-regional and international organisations. 
Summary 
Much of the burden to bring peace in Somalia rests on the Somali nationals 
themselves. As noted by Hussein Adam, `most probably the Somali civil wars will 
have to be resolved internally by the parties concerned, but sub-regional actors, 
motivated by a spirit of neighbourliness, could be facilitators' 37 However, this spirit 
of good neighbourliness could be expected only if neighbouring states are fully 
convinced that Somalia's irredentist claim is a thing of the pest. Otherwise the 
possibility of expecting genuine assistance from immediate neighbours whose foreign 
33 'The Soddere Spit' (4f ica ConfFdentiaL Vol. 38, No. 2, January 1997), pp. 2-3. 
37 'Somalis: Looking for Leade s- Dangerous Gifts' (African C&vk en(k t Val. 38, No. 18,12 September 1997). 
37 Husain M. Adam, 'Sam ti Civil Waco' in Taisier M Ali and Robert O. Matthews (ode. ), Civil Wan fr Africa (McGill- 
Quom's University Press, Mont aal 1999), p, 190. 
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policy is centred on the establishment of a weak and divided Somalia39 is so remote 
and unrealistic that putting reliance on their assistance could be comparable to 
attempting to squeeze a camel through the eye of a needle. 
Although the IGAD is the delegated body representing the OAU to broker 
peace agreements in the Horn of Africa, it is not by any means the only actor which is 
making an effort to mediate between opposing parties in Sudan and Somalia. There is 
lack of a coordinated action among the actors for a very obvious reason. Each is 
trying to direct the mediation process in line with national and regional interests. 
Since the activities of the different actors in brokering peace agreements play an 
important role in either exacerbating or ameliorating the security problems of the sub- 
region the issue will be discussed in the following paragraphs in some detail. 
When we assess the success/failure of the IGAD, we see that a regional 
economic development policy - the main objective - could materialise only if the 
causes of conflict are properly addressed and a solution is found for their resolution. 
Under prevailing conditions, when its members are in open conflict, expecting them 
to co-operate in regional economic strategies would be a blatant wishful thinking. In 
this aspect we can say that the IGAD's efforts are a failure. 
However, despite this disadvantage the attempts made by IGAD to mediate in 
regional peace resolutions (Somalia and Sudan) deserves some credit. At least it is 
serving as a forum where deadly enemies discuss common issues such as the 
environment and economic problems. Since regional stability and economic 
cooperation attracts foreign aid and the pre-conditions set by IOs and donor countries 
act as a counterweight, irrespective of the prevailing animosity between themselves, 
member states cannot afford to tamper with IGAD's existence. Moreover, the service 
it rendered as a forum for the rapprochement between Mengistu and Barre in 1988 
could be ascribed as a success. 
The Arab League 
Some of the Horn countries - Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan - happen to be members 
of both the OAU and the Arab League. Whenever there seems to be a clash of interest 
amongst the regional organisations these countries, which hold dual membership, 
sometimes find themselves in embarrassing situations. Under such circumstances, 
their loyalties are divided and if they have to make a choice based on national interest 
38 `Somalia: Building blocks' (Afric(x Co ifrdentia Vol. 40, No. 19,24 September 1999), p. 7. 
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which gives them a better advantage, they are bound to lose the favour of the 
organisation which they have offended. The issue of divided loyalty is clearly 
manifested by the official organ of the Ministry of Information of Somalia which 
described Somalia's entry to the Arab League `as a glorious day, asserting that the 
place of Somali nations is with the Arab nations'. It also assured the League members 
that its entry to the Arab League `will enable the Arab world to make greater impact 
on the African continent. Somalia will be a bridgehead uniting the Africans and the 
Arabs->. 39 Circumstances dealing with sensitive security issues which reflect on 
regional well-being are frequently prone to rigorous criticism and encourage some 
members of the organisations, and at times the organisation itself, to take sides. Such 
issues become very difficult to resolve because they tend to invite outside actors as 
players in a regional conflict. 
As noted earlier, the Bashir-Turabi Sudanese government and the faction 
leaders of Somali, after duly accepting mediation sponsored by the OAU and the 
IGAD, have at the same time tried to seek a solution from the Arab League or used it 
as a lever to influence outcomes in their favour. Arab League members, such as 
Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and the Arab Emirates, have also shown an 
interest in affairs of the Horn and have independently taken the initiative in mediation. 
Arab mediation on African security issues is perceived by the OAU, and in 
particular by the black African states, with a critical eye - an intrusion in regional 
affairs. Behind the cloak of mediation, they believe that there is always the pursuit of 
Arab national and regional interest to the detriment of the majority of the African 
countries, especially those living south of the Sahara. The binding factor of the 
African states that enjoy dual membership is not geography, race or culture but the 
creed of Islam which they share in common with the Arab League countries. Given 
this religious affiliation, when they are confronted with security and economic 
problems, it has been a regular practice by the Muslim countries of the Horn to shuttle 
among Arab capitals to seek political support and economic assistance. 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which consider themselves to be regional powers, 
have a stake in the Horn of Africa and therefore monitor events very closely as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. In particular, both countries consider a strong 
neighbour across the Red Sea, particularly a Christian state such as Ethiopia, to be a 
threat to peace and security and have always treated any relationship with this country 
39 ' kmialia and the Arab World' (Published by the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, Mogadishu_ June 1974. p. 
7. 
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with deep suspicion; they have also interpreted its relationship with Israel as a threat. 
`Nothing that happened has diminished the Horn's importance for them. Indeed, with 
the retreat of the superpowers they have ever-greater reason to be vigi. lant. '4" In 
particular, the environmental situation in which Egypt finds itself makes it difficult for 
it to take an impartial stance. Whenever possible, they try to direct the outcome of 
IGAD's mediation to accord with their thinking and to be in line with their national 
interest. 
Egypt, which is situated outside the Horn region, has applied enormous 
pressure to be admitted as an IGAD member to ensure that its right to Nile waters is 
respected. In fact it has claimed that `it's already a member, which it isn't'. -" In 
order to ascertain hegemony `Egypt's interests are to cut Ethiopia down to size and to 
`regain' its (mythical) control of Sudanese politics'. 42 Conversely, its interest in 
Somalia is to see a strong united Somalia as a counterbalance to Ethiopia, an ancient 
rival - an interest now supported by Eritrea, an IGAD member. 
On the other hand, Ethiopia's `long-term interest is, as always a weak and 
divided Somalia', 43 also another IGAD member. This shows the complex and closely 
knitted entanglement that the IGAD is currently experiencing in its attempt to fulfil its 
assigned duty of looking after the economic and political interests of its region- 
Libya, too, has an interest in the sub-region. It attempted to make a union with 
Sudan but failed. It is now competing with Egypt to broker a peace agreement 
between different factions in Somalia and between the INF regime of Sudan and the 
opposition alliance the NDA. Egypt did not counter the Libyan initiative because the 
latter, after assessing the Libyan situation, has come to believe that there is no clash of 
interest between them. In fact, according to Africa Confidential, Libyan interest 
coincides with that of Egypt. Their common denominator is scarcity of water. Gaddafi 
`also worries about water: The Great Man-Made River Project is said to have only 
twelve more years to flow, which means that if Libya is, one day, to buy Nile water 
from Egypt, it doesn't want an independent Southern Sudan astride the White Nile. 
Egypt, therefore, as a possible source of future water supply, believes this policy 
safe'. 44 
40Peter Woodward, p. 205. 
41 Ibid., p. 5. 
42 Ibid., p. 6. 
43 Ibid, p. 7. 
44`Sudan/Africa: Blow up' (Rica C onfuienliaL Vol. 40, No. 19,24 September 1999), pp. 5-6 
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Somalia and Djibouti, which have a sea access to the Horn of Africa, are 
followers of the Muslim religion. Moreover, their geographical disposition has put 
them under the scrutiny and made them the focus of attention of the Arab countries. 
As a result, they have benefited from Arab financial and economic assistance. Their 
close association with the Arab countries has induced the rest of the IGAD countries, 
who are predominantly Christians, to maintain close relationships to safeguard 
national interest and contain Muslim penetration and expansion Ethiopia's firm stand 
to preserve its culture and identity has been demonstrated by the numerous wars that it 
has waged against Muslim interventionists since the sixteenth century when Muslim 
incursion into the sub-region began. Its stance still remains the same: 
Unlike some Western governments, Premier Meles Zenawi's at least has clear motive of its 
role. It wants to restore its dominance in the Horn, not least in the face of Arab League states 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen. Above all, it wants to eradicate the Islamist influence 
of Khartoum's National Islamic Front government and its Somali p. ut ges. If it cannot have a 
friendly Somalia it prefers a weak one. It did nothing to involve Somalia communities in 
Sodere and this, plus its incursions into Somalia to attack Al Itaiiad al Islami have 
strengthened anti-Ethiopian feelings among many Somalis with no Islamist sympathies. °S 
Thus, we see the threat to IGAD's unity does not entirely come from within 
(competition and disagreement between member-states) but also from neighbours who 
think the strength of the Horn (militarily and economically) is detrimental to their 
very existence as repeatedly reiterated by Egyptian leaders; although, the goals of 
IGAD are to direct the economies of the sub-region through cooperation and 
coordination to attain sustainable economic growth - an act that diminishes the 
ground for internal unrest and violence and a phenomenon that is in accord with wider 
perspective Realist theory. 
NGOs 
NGOs (non-governmental organisations), as their name clearly implies, are purely 
functional organisations that are voluntary, apolitical and independent of government 
control. They are charitable non-profit-making organisations that mostly deal with 
humanitarian relief aid to alleviate the suffering of destitute people whose plight has 
been caused by conflict or environmental hazards such as drought, flooding, 
deforestation and soil degradation. They act `as mere palliatives to reduce the effects 
45`Sammlia: Looking for Lcadas - DBqProas Gif s' (Africa Conf? dendal Vol. 38, No. 18,12 September 1997), p. 7. 
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of deteriorating social and economic conditions that they seek to alleviate. ' 4,6 There 
are two types of NGOs - humanitarian and developmental. Both types of NGOs 
operate in the Horn of Africa but, as the area is conflict-ridden, humanitarian relief 
activities heavily outnumber development-related aid programmes. Each will be 
discussed below. 
Humanitarian NGOs 
Humanitarian organisations are those that focus on giving humanitarian aid to those 
whose lives are endangered as a result of a natural or human catastrophe on temporary 
basis until the looming danger is diverted. The Horn of Africa, renowned for 
generating a very high flow of refugees - approaching I million - has drawn in 
numerous NGOs which have done a creditable job in saving thousands of endangered 
lives under daunting conditions. Among the prominent NGOs operating in the sub- 
region are the Red Cross, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam and Action Aid. 
Their presence has been much welcomed by both governments and insurgents 
provided that they did not interfere with domestic politics. Without NGOs' aid, it 
would be very difficult for the governments to remain in power and for the insurgents 
to conduct prolonged guerrilla activities that can draw international media attention- 
Humanitarian NGOs therefore inevitably find themselves operating in a conflict 
environment where there is heavy price to pay when undertaking humanitarian 
activities. If they want to reach the needy, displaced and starving population whose 
lives they desperately want to save, they must be prepared to face acts of coercion and 
maltreatment. They must also be ready to satisfy the material and financial demands 
of both adversaries. It is a daunting task that requires great moral courage. In Somalia, 
where power still resides in the hands of warlords and faction leaders, NGOs had to 
pay tax and escort money to reach their destination - money which certainly helped 
the rebel amass wealth and recruit more forces. As Yaka Tandon commented, `Many 
of them are doing "good work" in these fields, no doubt, and yet they unwittingly help 
perpetuate the very conditions that they seek to alleviate' . 
47 Not only does 
humanitarian work contribute towards exacerbating the existing unstable security 
situation but it also dims the hope of managing the chaos, particularly in Somalia, in 
the immediate future. 
46 Pasha Taudon, 'Reclaiming Africa's Agenda: Good Governance and the Role of the NGOs in the African Context' 
(. Australian Journal of lnterm ionud: airs, Vol. 50, No. 3,1996), p. 293. 
47 Ibid. 
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The above scenario can also be observed in other parts of the Horn of Africa. 
In Sudan, for example, had relief centres not been established in the area of SPLA 
control, recruitment, food and medical supplies would not have trickled into insurgent 
hands -a circumstance which has definitely contributed to the ability to fight an 
effective and prolonged war against the regular government forces. In Ethiopia, EPLF 
and TPLF forces would not have been able to get the collaboration of the masses nor 
would they have been able to supply their fighting forces with sufficient food, 
medicine and clothing had they not been supplied with aid from NGOs based inside 
Sudan. According to an Aid Official `Everywhere there is a food chain there is 
conflict in southern Sudan. '.. 48 Likewise, the governments of Ethiopia, Somalia and 
Sudan would not have been able to support surrogate insurgent movements effectively 
in their efforts to destabilise neighbouring countries in order to reduce their 
opponents' military capabilities with the aim of protecting their national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. 
However, as events show, if humanitarian NGOs did not operate the 
consequences would be much worse for the population. At least, by supplying food to 
those who need it most, they are averting a catastrophe that contributes towards 
preventing instability. Going back to the Horn region, unless humanitarian relief 
supplies are distributed on time to those who need it, the situation on the ground, 
especially in Somalia, seems very bleak. Unfortunately, the hasty departure of UN 
forces from Somalia without restoring law and order left NGOs to shoulder the burden 
and operate under risky circumstances which could be defined as dangerous, 
demanding and nearly impossible. However, irrespective of the growing number of 
NGOs willing to involve themselves in war-prone areas, humanitarian relief aid 
should operate under a defined programme which limits the period of aid supply and, 
at some stage, either withdraws or transforms its aid programme towards one that 
targets sustainable development. NGOs cannot go on dishing out food supplies 
indefinitely and introducing a culture of permanent dependency that is very harmful to 
the moral, future development and economic growth of the country. Neither is this 
the wish of the thinking element of the population. If NGOs continue their support 
indefinitely, without imposing some form of conditions, they must fully understand 
that they would be working in the interests of recalcitrant warlords rather than 
relieving the population from the misery into which it has fallen. Undoubtedly they 
48 John Prendergast, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia (Pluto Press, London, 1997), pp. 54-». 
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are in a dilemma. Nevertheless, NGOs are in a situation which forces them to make a 
very difficult choice and, whatever their choice may be, they should always aim at 
relieving their clients from permanent dependency. Their ultimate goal should be to 
help the people achieve self-sufficiency and earn self-respect. 
In light of the existing circumstances, what would be the options open to 
NGOs currently operating in Somalia? They can abandon their mission as the UN did 
and leave the people at the mercy of avaricious warlords or stay indefinitely, bearing 
the cost of interference. However, they have to convince donor organisations and 
countries, which are already weary of donating, of the necessity of their continued 
presence, which would not be an easy task. On the other hand, they can decide to stay 
temporarily, hoping that the peace efforts sponsored by the regional organisation, the 
OAU and supported by the UN, will eventually bring the formation of a state that can 
maintain law and order and enhance peace and security in Somalia. The latter seems 
to be the more logical and attractive alternative. 
Developmental NGOs 
Developmental NGOs participate in the economic development programmes of Third 
World countries helping them attain sustainable growth. Participation in the latter 
field is only feasible in areas where security is guaranteed and there is sufficient 
evidence to show that the recipient government is committed to the principles of 
democracy and conditionalities imposed by donor countries and financial institutions. 
The introduction of such conditions is recent and came into existence after the end of 
the Cold War. Some aspects of its terms, particularly those that are political, are 
considered by many Third World countries as an intrusion into their right of 
sovereignty and are bitterly opposed. Their imposition is highly resented and they are 
accepted only because of a lack of better alternative. 
While humanitarian NGOs are forced to conduct their affairs under precarious 
conditions in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia and Sudan, development- 
related NGOs operate under more secure circumstances. The requirement of recipient 
countries to abide by the strict conditionality rules imposed by the I W, World Bank 
and donor countries have given NGOs extra leverage over government authorities to 
implement democratisation programmes. However, measures taken to meet the 
preconditions has made governments unpopular and, in some cases, rendered their 
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position untenable. The downfall of Numeiri is partially attributed to his strict 
implementation of the conditions set by the World Bank. 49 The World Bank extended 
its demand by suggesting a `Global Coalition for Africa' (GCA) be formed, giving 
NGOs an active role, in consort with others, in formulating strategies in African 
development programmes. In this respect it said: 
The proposed global coalition for Africa would be a forum in which African leaders (not just 
from the public sector, but also from private business, the professions, the universities, and 
other NGOs) could meet with their key partners - the bilateral and multilateral agencies and 
major foreign NGOs - to agree on general strategies that would then provide broad guidance 
for the design of individual country programs. -50 
Implementing the above strategy means power sharing in decision-making which 
further weakens government control over state affairs. In particular, state 
responsibility for the welfare of its citizens will be minimal, thus detaching it from 
grassroots contact. Its role will be limited to that of maintaining law and order. It 
cannot do this merely by flexing its muscles. It needs to offer a carrot, rather than a 
stick, to its people to secure their loyalty. This role has been partially taken over by 
NGOs which, have tried to take an active role in formulating aid polices. While they 
have succeeded in some countries they met with stiff resistance from others. 
Academics, such as Yasha Tandon, hold the opposite view and suggest an alternative 
approach: 
African democratic forces should learn from the experience of Southeast Asian countries and 
China. They need not emulate their ways and institutions. What Africans need to learn from 
these countries is the manner in which they are prepared to stand up to the hegemonious 
pretensions of the west. These countries (especially the four tigers and China) have 
deliberately built in a `democracy deficit' (as the West sees it) in their systems as a means of 
accelerating economic growth. That way they have at least kept the political processes firmly 
within national control, whatever one might say about the democratic credentials of their 
regimes from a Western standpoints' 
Unfortunately, Africans do not have such a defence mechanism and, until they 
develop one of their own or discover one by unravelling their history and culture, they 
can learn a lot from the Asian experience. The Japanese system of transferring 
technology to its neighbours to achieve quick economic growth deserves praise and 
should draw African attention. In fact as Yasha Tandon rightly put it: 
... the 
West, on the other hand, has continued to pillage Africa without giving anything in 
return that could sustain Africa's own efforts to build its economies. To this day, the West 
49 peter Woodward. Sudan 1898-1989: The Unstable Slate (Lester Crook 
Ibid., p. 194 . 
Academic Publishing, London, 1990), p_ 178- 
51 yasha Tandon, 'Reclaiming Africa's Agenda', p. 300. 
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uses `democratic conditionalities', as well as a host of other conditionalities, to impose an 
African economic market-based model of growth and a political model of governance that is 
foreign to African conditions and disrespectful of African indigenous traditions. 52 
There is widespread resentment against the imposition of preconditions in order to 
qualify for humanitarian or financial aid. The concept that sustainable growth is only 
achieved through democratisation is debatable. Those who favour the Lagos Plan of 
Action over `good governance and conditionality' are not few. They strongly argue 
that the answer to Africa's present problem is regional food self-sufficiency by 
applying the Lagos Plan of Action whose main elements have been summarised by 
Bade Onimode as: 
" achievement of regional food self-sufficiency through domestic food production " 
not just food security that can be achieved through volatile food aid and food 
imports; 
" satisfaction of critical needs for food, safe drinking water, clothing, housing, health 
are, education and transport; 
" elimination or alleviation of poverty; and 
" achievement of effective regional integration through national and collective self- 
reliance. 
The perception expounded by Musevini and Isayas Afworki, 53 as described in the 
preceding chapter, requires a cool mind and a degree of tolerance on the part of 
development NGOs. African governments should, of course, be held accountable for 
their actions. NGOs can help in this respect by participating in education and rural 
development thereby raising the level of consciousness of the indigenous population- 
Donor countries should ensure that aid money is well spent. However, the way to 
ensure that the aid they donate is well spent is not by alienating government 
participation. They should, at the same time, understand the nature of African security 
problems which mostly emanate from ethnic nationalism and religious paternalism. 
Until clan and ethnic loyalty fades away and is replaced by state nationalism, a 
democratisation process that focuses on the introduction of pluralism as a 
conditionality is not taking the reality of the current African situation into account. 
That is why leaders like Musevini of Uganda and Isayas Afworki of Eritrea campaign 
for no-party democracy. 
52 Thi& p. 302. S3 `A measuredhepresentative democracy' which permits election but excludes the formation of a multi- party system until the 
political awareness of the population transcends commitment to ethnic and religious 
loyalty. 
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The lesson drawn from the Asian `tigers' did not go unheeded. Countries such 
as Eritrea, which suffered heavily during their struggle for independence and had to 
undertake extensive reconstruction work, despite needing foreign aid badly, were not 
ready to concede government power to aid agencies like NGOs. They did not wish to 
abide by the rules that enabled NGOs to transcend government authority and, when 
they found out that the activities of foreign NGOs were too intrusive, they did not 
hesitate from expelling them in 1996 and 1997 from Eritrea. 54 
In Ethiopia, too, aid agencies have been harassed and those without legal 
registration have been told that they will face prosecution while those in Kenya have 
been strongly warned against involving themselves in politics. " In order to be more 
effective, NGOs need to work in consort with governments. The NGOs' main role 
should be to assist governments and not to replace them. 
The main occupation of the Horn countries, as noted earlier, is agriculture. 
Therefore, any development in the sub-region has to be focused on the rural areas. 
However, there does not seem to be an appreciation of this prevalent factor on the part 
of NGOs and donor countries. They concentrate on prestigious projects that consume 
a large proportion of the aid money that do not benefit the farming community which 
comprises approximately 90% of the entire population. Lloyd Timberlake, who has 
travelled extensively in the region, in highlighting the issue comments: 
Africa is dying because its ill planned, ill advised attempt to `modernise' itself it has cut itself 
in pieces. The cities where the governments live have been torn from the countryside, and 
development budgets have gone to filling those cities with hotels, factories, universities and 
cars. This has been aid paid for by milking the seven out of every ten Africans who live on the 
land, by taking much from labour and produce and giving them back little in money or 
support. In these policies, Africa has been advised, financed and assisted by Northern 
governments and aid agencies. 56 
There is also resentment about aid money being spent on paying salaries to expatriates 
who are mostly employed in unnecessary bureaucratic jobs. They do not believe that 
sizeable funds raised as a result of high media publicity - aid money donated to 
alleviate suffering - should be spent on creating jobs. Timberlake's observation on 
this matter is as follows: 
Advising Africa has become a major industry, with Europeans and North Americans 
consulting firms charging as much as $180,000 for a year of an expert's time. At any given 
;y Prof Habtamu Bihonillign, Ethiopia cAUl Eritrea on 'Rvu7xi Three "( ttp: //news. Asmarino. com/Habtom<_lc; t 1 . asp, 
pp. 5-6. 
is summary of World Broadcasts, (AIJ3181 A/2,21 March 1998), Sou : Radio Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, In English 1030 gmt, 
19 March 1998; BBC radio, Nairobi, in English 1600 gmt, 19 March 1998- 
56 Lloyd Timberlake, erica in Crisis, pp. 3-4. 
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moment, in sub-Saharan Africa, at least 80,000 expatriates are working for public agencies 
under official aid programmes. More than half of the $7-8 billion spent yearly by donors goes 
to finance these people. Yet in the two and a half decades since African independence, Africa 
has plunged from food self-sufficiency to widespread hunger. Is Africa getting the right 
advice? 57 
Since each NGO usually operate alone and there is no central power acting as a 
coordinating body, there is an unnecessary duplication of effort which results in some 
areas benefiting and some being totally neglected. Had there been a central office to 
plan and coordinate efforts, much of the money spent on the duplication of manpower, 
transport and material could have been saved and allocated to areas of greater need. 
Summary 
Despite these shortcomings, the good work conducted by NGOs in volatile areas such 
as the Horn region deserves acknowledgement and commendation. Apart from saving 
human lives, the role some NGOs play in overseeing that conditionalities such as 
respect for basic human rights and implementation of the process of democratisation 
imposed by donor countries and international institutions are practised - an action 
which assists in creating a fair and just society - is indirectly contributing towards 
stability particularly in countries where state machinery has collapsed and the only 
credible outside presence and involvement is that of NGOs. The problem of Somalia 
is a case in point. 
By any measure, it is not my belief that NGOs should be totally subservient to 
governments in power and should always abide by their decisions. However, 
governments' attitudes differ from state to state, and NGOs should avoid head-on 
collisions. They should be tactful and try their best to work in consort with 
governments. Any defiance that might be necessary and essential to push matters 
forward should primarily come from the beneficiaries and protagonists themselves - 
that is the grassroots and the civil society. NGOs should always play a supportive role 
and should not entangle themselves by attempting to run state affairs. `Effective 
democracy' cannot be attained without an authority that can maintain law and order 
under African circumstances. When ethnic rivalry and tribalism is thriving it is not 
possible to emulate Western-style liberal democracy and implement it per se without 
taking into account local culture and tradition- The host countries are willing to accept 
economic preconditions but they are against the political conditions imposed upon 
57 Ibid., p. 3. 
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them - measures that will make them powerless and unable to control internal 
conflicts. 
If we take the Asian example as noted above, we can clearly observe how 
Asian values contributed to national economic growth. Western conditions imposed 
upon them were not fully met. The `tiger economy', which avoids political 
conditionalities, seems to be a better choice under the circumstances prevailing in 
Third World countries. Therefore, the role of NGOs in Africa in general, and the Horn 
sub-region in particular, should address the sensitive issue of recognising state 
participation in the welfare of its people. If they do this, they are most likely to get 
the support they need to perform their mission and, at the same time, to expedite the 
democratisation process in the region. Sympathetic attitudes towards the concerns of 
African leaders are developing. Even President Clinton, a staunch supporter of 
democratisation based on the principles of Western liberal democracy, showed a 
change of heart during his March 1998 extended visit to sub-Saharan Africa. In his 
address to the regional leaders during the Entebbe Summit on 25 March, attended by 
the presidents of Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, the 
Ethiopian prime minister and the Zimbabwean finance minister, he acknowledged that 
`there is no fixed model for democratic institutions or transformation' -a statement 
which delighted his audience and demonstrated a marked reversal of foreign policy 
outlook from that which he outlined in his 1994 State of the Union message. 58 
The above discussion and analysis shows how the prospect of peace in the 
Horn could be either assisted by active participation or dimmed by the inaction, 
inability and intrusion of international and regional organisations the UN and the 
OAU. With regard to NGOs the pertinent issue is how to keep the balance between 
imposing conditionalities and acknowledging the responsibility of states to keep law 
and order within their territory. However, the issue that carries more weight would be, 
self-awareness and realisation by the citizens of the region of the limitations of the 
UN and the OAU in intervening in domestic security problems and therefore be 
prepared to take an active role in the affairs of their country and the sub-region in 
order to establish stability. The author's proposals will be discussed in the Conclusion 
of this thesis under the sub-heading `Recommendation'. 
Above, we have discussed the conditions set by IOs/NGOs, which in order to 
qualify for aid, have to be met by developing countries. These impositions (practice of 
Ss Swunan- of World Broadcasts. (AU 3186 A/2,27 March 1998), Source: AFP news agency, Paris. in English 1747 gmt 25 
March 1998; The Indian Ocean Newsletter, (No. 805,28 March 1998), p. 1. 
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the democratic system and establishment of an accountable government) are devised 
to promote democracy in conflict ridden countries - an action which is considered by 
many academics would enable them to resort to peaceful means such as debates, 
negotiations and the ballot box to resolve their security problems. Such a move would 
also enable them to re-direct their military spending towards economic development 
which allows them to raise the quality of life of their populations. What IO&NGOs 
are implicitly trying to achieve is: apart from military means, by focusing on political, 
social, economic and environmental issues stability could be achieved in 
underdeveloped countries. They argue that instability is mostly caused by the neglect 
of these factors which require prompt addressing. Thus, we can say that, in the context 
of the Horn, the presence of IOs/NGOs plays an important indirect role in bringing 
stability in the sub-region proving the wider-view hypothesis that states: In 




The Horn region is a geographical sub-region, characterised by violent conflict, in 
which numerous peace efforts by prominent figures, representatives of national, 
regional and international organisations have failed to bear fruit. This issue of 
instability raises two questions: can international relation's security theory account for 
this instability and insecurity? And can it assist in finding a solution to the apparently 
intractable instability that is currently bedevilling the sub-region? 
This study took up the challenge; it investigated several IR theories relating to 
security, framed hypotheses and tested them against the background of the Horn 
countries in an attempt to answer these questions. Those tested were narrow- 
perspective and wider-perspective realist approaches to security theory. 
Realist approaches to security: The narrow perspective 
The narrow perspective of realist theory asserts that threats to national security are 
exclusively military and come from outside national territory. Thinkers of this school 
paid no heed to domestic security problems as their idea of the state was based on the 
concept of the Westphalian nation-state - that is, a fully integrated state which had 
gone through internal upheavals long before and created an integrated society that laid 
the foundation of the modern state. In their view, the issue of domestic insecurity as a 
threat to national security did not warrant attention as it was considered to be 
irrelevant to security studies based on a Western model of statehood. In respect of this 
narrow perspective, this thesis tested three hypotheses to see whether the theory could 
explain the problems of the Horn region. 
Hypothesis 1: Instability in the Horn is caused by the activities of external actors. 
To test the applicability of the narrow perspective, the Ethio-Somali war or Ogaden 
war (1977-78) and the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000) were 
investigated. This investigation clearly showed that the Ogden war was a conflict 
characterised by an external military threat to national security. It also demonstrated 
that the war was preceded by an arms race in order to amass sufficient arsenals to 
raise the offensive capability of the contender's armies. 
In 1977 Somalia used its newly acquired offensive capability to best effect by 
launching a 'blit. kr"ieg' attack to pursue an irredentist claim while Ethiopia was 
already embroiled in a civil war as a consequence of the 1974 revolution, and the 
251 
balance of power therefore favoured Somalia. After losing the battle at Jigjiga (a 
strategic town in the Ogaden), Ethiopia forged a new alliance with the Soviet Union 
which supplied it with superior weapons and, assisted by Cuban mechanised forces, 
was subsequently able to launch a counter-attack and liberate its occupied territory, 
the Ogaden. When the Ogaden conflict was investigated under the test set by the 
hypothesis, it proved beyond doubt the narrow-perspective realist theory's value and 
relevance as a guide to analysing issues of insecurity deriving from inter-state 
conflicts. 
The thesis has also shown that outsiders participate in the internal politics of 
states of the region by providing support to their local 'clients' in one form or another. 
As observed during this investigation, a lack of effective community integration, as a 
result of deep social divisions (including rivalry between religious and ethnic groups), 
provided important opportunities for outsiders to intervene in local politics. The 
involvement of Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan in support of opposition movements of 
neighbouring states - either designed to divert military activity away from them or in 
the pursuit of national interest - are examples of states making use of receptive groups 
within another state in order to further their own national security interests. Likewise, 
the indirect intervention of extra-regional actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, 
Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Israel, in the domestic affairs of the Horn countries as 
illustrated in Chapter 2, was also made possible by exploiting social divisions in 
communities. 
Moreover, over the years, reliance on outside forces to secure national 
sovereignty has become so deeply rooted that it became the norm for governments of 
the region to forge alliances with outsiders or neighbours in order to combat potential 
threats or substantially reduce the probability of their occurrence. Evidence shows that 
frequent alliance formations and shifts have taken place in attempts to maintain or 
shift favourably the balance of power in the region. 
Returning to inter-state conflicts, Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis which 
demonstrated Sudan's close cooperation in the 1980s with the EPLF and TPLF 
liberation movements against the Mengistu regime of Ethiopia, show how the EPLF 
and TPLF were forced to confront Sudan after they took power. The reversal of 
alignment occurred when Sudan became a 'pariah' state that sponsored 
international 
terrorism and attempted to export Muslim extremism to neighbouring countries. In 
retaliation, in 1994, Eritrea and Ethiopia 
began to host anti-Sudanese liberation 
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movements in collaboration with Uganda. In 1998, a change of circumstance brought 
an end to the acclaimed Ethio-Eritrean alliance; the two entered into conflict over a 
border dispute and each tried to court the friendship of Sudan, their one-time enemy. 
Another example illustrating the classical shift of alliances is the case of 
Libya, which concluded frequent alignment and realignment agreements with a 
number of countries of the sub-region. Although Libya's foreign policy is normally 
associated with religion and ideology, this practice is abandoned whenever national 
interest demands otherwise. Libya - the principal arms supplier to the ELF (a Muslim 
faction) during the 1970s - abandoned the ELF when it saw that its national interest 
would be served best by forming a tri-party agreement (1981) With Ethiopia and the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). As was shown in Chapter 2, Libya 
supported Somalia (a Muslim state) during the Ethio-Somalia war but withdrew its 
support when Barre formed alliances with the US and Saudi Arabia. In order to 
maintain the regional balance of power, Libya retaliated by forming an alliance with 
Ethiopia to assist anti-Barre and anti-Numeiri movements such as the SSDF and the 
SPLA. Conversely, as soon as Numeiri was overthrown, another alignment was 
formed with the Sadiq at Mahadi regime of Sudan and the SPLA was not only 
abandoned but also became a victim of Libyan aircraft attack. 
As demonstrated by numerous examples in the thesis, alliance formations to 
counter threats and promote national interests in the region followed a pragmatic 
view. Whenever circumstances dictated, it was usual to change alliances, 
unconstrained by religious or ideological allegiances, in order to get a better deal. As 
was shown in Chapters 2 and 3, Libya preferred to assist the SPLA against the Islamic 
regime of Numeiri, while Saudi Arabia withdrew its assistance from Sudan and gave 
support to the EPLF (a predominantly Christian movement) when the latter 
confronted the el Bashir regime over encroachments and expansion of Muslim 
extremism in neighbouring states. As Morgenthau' has pointed out, religion and 
ideology do not matter when it comes to issues of national security; both countries, 
Libya and Saudi Arabia, favoured national interest over religious and ideological 
allegiances. 
1 Hans J. Morgenthau (revised by Kenneth W. Thompson), Politics Among _Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace 
(Mc(iraw-Hill, lnc. 1993). p. 200- -A purely 
ideological alliance, unrelated to material interests, cannot but be stillborn, it is 
unable to determine policies or guide actions and misleads 
by presenting the appearance of political solidarity where there is 
none. 
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As Morgenthau has noted `alliances within a balance-of-power system are 
frequently uncertain in actual operation, since they are dependent upon political 
considerations of the individual nations'. 2 What mattered most to states in the region 
was the maintenance of the balance-of-power system. If a situation arises that tilts the 
balance of power, defection is certain to follow in order to put the system back on 
track, thus creating uncertainty on the longevity of alliances. As a result, shifting of 
alliances in the Horn has been frequent. 
From the activities investigated, it can be deduced that outsiders' principal 
reason for involvement in the internal politics of neighbours is to ensure at all costs 
that a hegemonic state - other than themselves - is not established in the Horn region. 
The evidence illustrates their strong conviction that the emergence of a single power, 
with the ability to restrict their influence and room to manoeuvre in the region, cannot 
be tolerated. In other words, the strategy they have adopted or devised for the Horn 
region is to nip state power in the bud before it achieves state strength allowing it to 
pursue regional hegemony. 
This tendency for outside forces to be politically intrusive and change sides at 
will could be attributed to the indirect nature of their assistance and the fact that they 
therefore do not suffer the harsh consequences of war, giving them a favourable cost- 
benefit balance. Nevertheless, their contribution in exacerbating insecurity in the sub- 
region should not be underestimated, as any conflict - be it inter-state or intra-state - 
could not be sustained for a prolonged period without outside support. 
While external threats and arms race can be sufficiently explained by orthodox 
realist security theory (narrow-perspective) as was shown in Chapter 3, other 
domestic factors such as demand for secession, self-determination, democratisation - 
factors which are not explained by realist theory - are the principal causes of conflict 
in the sub-region. Even the Ethiopian/Eritrean war -a war between two independent 
states - is not fully explained by narrow-view security theory as the real causes 
happen to be economic, uncompromising leadership and competition for resources. 
Therefore, in order to address domestic security problems of the sub-region, wider- 
view security theories will be examined later in this chapter to see if they can give an 
explanation- 
2 [bid, p. 209. 
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Hypothesis 2: The procurement of modern arms and the build-up of strong military 
power maintained national sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Horn of 
Africa. 
As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, while the superpowers were actively involved, 
Ethiopia and Somalia were able to reasonably contain the activities of their local 
rivals. However, as soon as the superpowers withdrew from the region, they were 
unable to bear the cost of maintaining large armies, leading to a collapse of 
government power that resulted in their leaders fleeing their countries and seeking 
refuge in Nigeria and Zimbabwe. Thus, although the hypothesis is apparently proved, 
as when military power was neglected national sovereignty was lost, in reality the 
reasons for its loss are different from those predicted by realism. The challenge Horn 
countries confronted came from within and not from outside state territory. Narrow- 
view theory would predict territorial conquest by an outside enemy that fails to 
explain the inherent domestic security problems of the Horn region. 
Moreover, the ruling elite failed to comprehend that the military personnel 
they relied upon could sympathise with the causes advanced by the liberation forces 
and defect to join them in defiance of autocratic rule. The thesis has shown how the 
militia and military conscripts who comprised most of the Ethiopian army - 
involuntary forces who were forcibly inducted from rural areas - deserted their units 
in substantial numbers (whenever circumstances favoured) in the late 1980s to join 
the rebel armies or to return to their villages. 
It has also shown that the motivation to exercise political rights by the people 
(an internal dimension) could not be stifled or subdued indefinitely by simply relying 
on possession of modern arms and military power, which disproves the above 
hypothesis's statement. As shown in this investigation, trying to exercise autocratic 
rule leads to downfall. The experiences of Numeiri, Mengistu and Bane, leaders who 
were ousted from power by internal revolt, 3 are good examples which show that the 
most frequent threats to state sovereignty in the region come from domestic 
contenders and adversaries rather than from outside forces. 
Hypothesis 3: 'Omnibalancing' 4 counters ail forms of threats to state security. 
As was shown in Chapter 2, Ethiopia and Somalia did not have the capability to 
sustain an inter-state war (the Ogaden war) without outside support. Outside support 
4 James B. M. N. Rughreheh-Rnnakku, The Chaotic Horn nfAfrica (Green Shoot Publishers. Swaziland 1995), }ß. 48-49. 
In this context 'omnibalancing' means playing off one superpower against the other to get maximum arms reward. 
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enabled them to conduct a war of aggression, defend national territory, subdue their 
adversaries and hold on to power by sole virtue of military power. However, at the 
end of the Cold War, some of the arms supplies received by both countries fell into 
rebel hands either through defection of government forces or capture by the rebels 
during operations, thereby boosting their capacity to fight these regimes. In addition, 
the proliferation of weapons in the region made it possible to acquire them easily and 
cheaply. These factors became instrumental in enabling ELF and EPLF opposition 
forces to wage a war of secession in Eritrea and enabled the EPRDF in Ethiopia to 
contest government power with the aim of establishing a progressive political order. 
Eventually, by conducting protracted civil wars, the opposition forces 
managed to take power from the incumbents and establish governments of their own 
choosing. In the case of Ethiopia, in 1993, Eritrea, which had conducted a war of 
succession for over thirty years against the Haile Selassie and Mengistu regimes, was 
allowed to form an independent state while the rest of the country was divided into 
ethnic regions that enjoyed federal status -a system which recognised ethnic and 
religious groups as political entities. In the case of Somalia, the inter-clan rivalry that 
dominated Somali society prior to independence rekindled under the leadership of 
tribal warlords, eventually leading to the collapse of the state and descent into anarchy 
reverting the state to its traditional mode of leadership in which clan loyalty is 
recognised as the dominant power and structural organising device. 
As was shown in Chapters 2 and 3, although resort to the balance of power 
principle (alliance formation with a superpower) enabled Somalia to occupy its 
claimed territory (the Ogaden), enabled Ethiopia to retrieve its occupied land, and 
Sudan to maintain the domination of the north over the south by relying heavily on 
military power, the incumbents were nevertheless unable to completely eliminate their 
adversaries and only managed to subdue their activities. As shown in the thesis, as 
soon as the superpower alliances disintegrated, the opposition forces achieved 
victories in Ethiopia and Somalia while in Sudan the struggle to achieve self- 
determination continues to this day, showing that 'omnibalancing' is a limited strategy 
undermined by global events. As seen during this investigation, alliance 
formation did 
not enable the state to completely stamp out domestic threats. 
In addition, despite the fact that 'omnibalancing' assisted in maintaining 
control of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, 
local leaders' relationship with the 
superpowers was viewed by nationalist and patriotic elements, who 
despised their 
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rulers as imperialist stooges, with disdain. They wanted to oust those in authority from 
power by every available means. Thus, in the context of the Horn, as was shown in 
Chapters 2 and 3, 'omnibalancing' undermined government legitimacy by motivating 
opposition forces with a nationalistic fervour to challenge and confront government 
power. 
Realists' and others' approach to security: wider perspective 
As was shown in Chapter 1, the change of the nature of security during the latter 
stages of the Cold War - when domestic conflict took ascendancy over inter-state 
conflict - led a number of social scientists (realists and others) to disagree with those 
who view security threats narrowly, although they did not entirely reject its value. 
Their major disagreement with the narrow perspective was over its exclusiveness in 
that it ignored other threats, apart from the military, as causes of conflict. Although 
few in number, those with a wider view argued vehemently that other factors, besides 
the military, also contribute towards the causes of conflict. While accepting the 
military threat as a major factor contributing to insecurity, proponents of the wider 
perspective go a step beyond this limited definition and consider political, economic, 
social and environmental factors as additional contributory elements to instability. 
During and after the Cold War, the increasing number of conflicts emanating 
from domestic problems also influenced other non-realist thinkers. They believed that 
the change in the nature of conflict required a review and a new approach to the 
definition of security. While surveying security cases across the world, particularly in 
Third World countries, they identified the root cause of conflict to be political (an 
autocratic or dictatorial leadership, political systems that deny pluralism); economic 
(lack of resources); social (divisions within communities); or even environmental 
(forest depletion which degrades soil fertility and intensifies the instability of food 
supplies). 
As was shown in Chapter 1, academics such as Falk, who represent the non- 
realists group blamed the realists' state-centric view of sovereignty as the principal 
cause of distortion. Falk described their view as a `blindfold (denying the 
contradictory practise of geopolitics) and a set of blinkers (rendering conceptually 
invisible the transnational initiatives of civil society)'. 5 Another thinker, Nye, puts the 
5 Richard Fall:, On Human Governmsce -Toward a New Globarl Politics (Polity Press, Oxford 1995), p. 99. 
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blame on failing to come to terms with the changing dimensions of international 
security problems. He cites realists" (ethnocentrism' as a major drawback, and to 
liberalise IR security studies from its 'severely deficient' approach, he proposes that 
the focus should be on 'grand strategy', not on state security. 6 Others, such as Thomas 
and Homer-Dixon, focused on economic7 and environmental" factors to show that 
these factors also precipitate conflict. 
As the wider perspective embraces all narrow-perspective concepts this 
section only considers the additional factors mentioned above. The thesis tested three 
hypotheses derived from wider-perspective security theory to see whether they can 
better explain the security problems confronting the Horn region. 
Hypothesis 1: Distinct identities and divisions between communities within a nation 
or a state -a domestic problem - can provoke civil war and, in extreme cases, cause 
the collapse of the state 
As was shown in Chapter 2, the claims of a distinct 'identity' (history, culture, 
language, beliet) played a significant role in motivating the ELF/EPLF in Eritrea to 
pursue a war of secession. As was shown in the thesis, the Eritrean claimed different 
identity from the Ethiopian people by invoking a different historical background. As a 
former Italian colony and a UN trusteeship under the auspices of Great Britain, they 
argued that they were entitled to independence like all colonial countries that were 
granted independence during decolonisation. When they exhausted all peaceful means 
they resorted to a secessionist armed struggle to realise their ambition. 
The thesis also showed that the southerners in Sudan were marginalized as a 
result of practising a different religion from the Arabs of the north. It also depicted the 
southerners as the underdogs who were totally subjugated to the Arabs' wishes 
because of their race. These factors - denial of equal rights - justified their armed 
struggle by invoking their right to exercise self-determination -a right that has gained 
wide international recognition. 
Divisions within communities in the Horn region were not limited to states 
that comprise heterogeneous societies. Homogeneity did not prevent Somalia from 
being dogged by internecine conflict. Somalia, a homogeneous country comprised of 
6 Joseph Nye, `The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges' (Adelphi Papers, No. 235. London Spring 1989), p. 25. 
7 Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations, pp. 8-9; Neta C. Crawford, 'Once and 
Future Security Studies' (Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2. Winter 1991), p. 303. 
8Caroline Thomas, The Errvironment in International Relations (The Royal Institute of International At? airs, London 1992), pp. 
137_39: Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict' (International Security, V"ol 19. No. I 
Summer 1994), pp. 6-19; Richard Ullman, 'Redefining Security' (International Securi(v, Vol. 8, No. 1,1983), p. 15' 
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an integrated society - was an extreme case; it became embroiled in inter-clan and 
sub-clan conflicts that divided the state into numerous mini-states. 
Contrary to the traditional realist perception, this thesis has proved that 
divisions between communities within a nation or a state -a domestic problem - is a 
major cause of state and regional instability in the Horn region proving the hypothesis 
stated above that Distinct identities and divisions between communities within a 
nation or a state -a domestic problem - can provoke civil war and, in extreme 
cases, cause the collapse of the state. 
Hypothesis 2: In economically and environmentally deprived areas, an acute 
shortage of resources provokes war. 
The semi-arid Horn region suffers from an acute shortage of farmland, pasture and 
water. As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, extensive population movements in search of 
these rare and depleted commodities are common in the sub-region. Competition for 
possession, or unhampered use of these commodities has brought highlanders and 
lowlanders, farmers and pastoralists, into conflict. 
The motivation for internecine conflict demonstrated above came from a 
desire to control suitable agricultural areas that would enable clans and sub-clans to 
obtain food security. As was noted earlier the victims (Rahweyenes) retaliated by 
confronting the aggressors (Haweyies, Majerteens and Ogadenis) by fighting 
vigorously to protect their arable land from falling into the hands of the invaders. 
Thus we see how the desire to control resources led the state of Somalia into 
seemingly intractable conflict. 9 
Moreover, socio-economic problems, such as unemployment, poverty and 
poor education led many to turn to banditry as a means of subsistence. Surprisingly, 
as was shown in the thesis, faction leaders did not hesitate even from looting 
humanitarian aid supplies flown in by donors at high cost to save people's lives. The 
alternative which humanitarian aid representatives found was to pay ransoms to 
factional armed bands (technicals) to escort the supply trucks in the hope this would 
prevent them from being badly molested before they arrived at their destination. 
10 
Contrary to the realist narrow perspective, this investigation of the Horn 
region has shown that acute shortages of resources, such as land, pasture and water 
9 Mohamed Haji Mulchtar, The Plight of the A -pcxstoralist Socie4, of Somalia (Review of African Political Ecconcxny', Vol. 23. 
No. 70, December 1996), pp. 550-5 1. 
10 Thomas J. Callahan, Some Ohser ations On Somalica's Past cmud Future, p. 2; Peter Woodward, The Horn ofAjrica. p. 18 
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holes, has provoked domestic conflicts which spill over national boundaries and 
provoke inter-state conflicts in the sub-region. However, although the presence of 
these factors is necessary to exacerbate insecurity, as shown above, these factors, 
unless combined with other factors, by themselves are not sufficient to be a reason for 
major causes of conflict. 
In addition, as shown in this thesis, economic hardship and environmental 
degradation, which substantially reduced the quality of life, has exacerbated domestic 
instability in the Horn region. As the region is not well endowed by nature and is 
frequently affected by drought and conflict, food self-sufficiency cannot be achieved, 
making outside dependence unavoidable. As was shown, insecurity of food supplies 
was one of the principal causes underlying the Somalian inter-clan conflict that led to 
state collapse. Its consequence was a massive flight of refugees into Ethiopia and 
Kenya, heightening tension and increasing political instability in these recipient 
countries. II 
Other resource conflicts which resulted in population displacement and 
refugee flight in the sub-region were: the Bagarra pastoralists' seasonal raids on 
Dinka farmers; the struggle between government forces and the locals over the 
possession of oil-rich areas in Sudan; frequent clashes between the Afar pastoralists 
and commercial farms over access to water and grazing areas in the Awash valley in 
Ethiopia. Investigation of the Horn conflict has shown that economic and resource 
factors such as scarcity of food, pasture12 and control of oil reserves'3 have instigated 
friction between communities and caused conflict between states and communities. 
As was shown in Chapter 4, economic marginalisation was one of the main 
reasons for Somaliland's breakaway from Somalia in 1991. Despite the fact that 
Somaliland contributed 70 per cent of Somalia's officially recorded export earning 
from their exports of livestock, all development schemes were concentrated in the 
south thereby denying equal employment opportunities to the northerners. 14 In Eritrea, 
the `economic decay and the high-handed actions by the central government' of 
Ethiopia during the 1950s and 1960s was a principal factor that, out of desperation 
II , An estimated 400,0 Somalis have sought refuge in Kenya., 300,000 are refuge in Ethiopia, and se%wal hundred thousand 
are scattered in the Gulf States, Europe and North America. ' Ken Menkhaus and Terrence Lyons, What are the Lessons To Be 
Learned From Somalia?, p. 4. 
12 Peter Woodward, The Horn of. Africa, p. 23- 
13 , Sudan: Oil Stokes War - Christian Aid Reveals the Price to be Paid for the Oil Bonanza' (, Afica Research Bulletin 
14715,16 March-15 April 2001); Economist International, 'War, famine and oil in Sudan' (14 April 2001). 
14 John Drysdale, Somalihmci, pp. 17-34. 
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and resentment, forced the Christian highlanders - who in the past had supported 
union with Ethiopia - to join secessionist movements in large numbers. '' 
This thesis has shown that, during the 1980s and early 1990s, when food 
shortages were an acute problem in Ethiopia, the forced conscription of large numbers 
of peasants, left many rural farm plots unattended and consequently substantially 
reduced food production. Its effect was catastrophic; it diminished peasant support for 
the Ethiopian revolution -a force that had initially aligned itself with the 
revolutionary regime for ending land tenancy and liberating farmers from exploitation 
by greedy landowners. 16 
In a region where water is considered to be a rare commodity, the 
apportionment of the Nile waters, an international river shared by nine countries, has 
become a grave security issue that has drawn international attention. As was shown in 
Chapter 5, there is ample evidence that the rapid population growth in the region 
(which is expected to double by the year 2050) will significantly raise individual 
countries' demands for water. This alarming rate of population growth" and the 
decrease in the annual water flow due to rapid environmental degradation (particularly 
the depletion of forests) has become a source of anxiety amongst the Nile basin 
countries. Furthermore, some of the riparian states, such as Egypt, have emphatically 
claimed that the Nile water is a gift from God which they are not willing to share 
equitably with other basin countries. " Others, such as Ethiopia (an upper riparian 
country that controls the sources of the Blue Nile) have started building dams for 
irrigation purposes in order to assert their inalienable right to water and to satisfy their 
need for security of food supply. As was shown in Chapter 5, unless a well-integrated 
water management system (which requires the close cooperation and collaboration of 
all nine Nile basin countries) is introduced, the probability of war provoked by 
disagreement on how to share the scarce Nile waters is predicted by many political 
analysts to be very high. 19 
15 Christopher Clapham, 'The Horn of Africa: A Conflict Zone' in Conflict in Africa by Oliver Furlev (ed. ), p. 76. 
16 Peter Woodward, The Horn of Erica, p. 94. 
1997), pp. 1 -2_ 17 IlSS Strategic Comments, Global Waxer Shortages: Proof c? f Future Conflict? (Vol. 5, Issue No. 6 July 
is P. P. Howell and J. A. Allan (eds), The Vile: Sharing a Scarce Resource (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), p. 
327. 
19 Oliver Bennett, Green War: Environmental Conflict (Paros Publication Ltd., London 1991), pp. 98-99; 'Ethiopia: Battle of the 
Nile' (Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 769, Paris, 14 June 1997), p. l; Natasha Beschorner, `Water and Stability in the Middle 
East' (IISS,, lelphi Papers - 273, London, Winter 1992/93), p. 
60; Comment: 'Water in the Middle East - As Thick as Blood 
(Tlte Ecornomist, 23 December 1996), pp_73-74; Abiodun Alao, 'Anarchy and TranquillitN in the Horn of Africa' (Bras evs 
Defence Year Book , 
London, 1994), p. 246; Emad, McKay, 'Water a Resource to Die for' (. News Africa. 9 October. 2(K)0), pp 
10-13; Robi . 
McKie, In this Century, We Fought over Oil. In the Next it will be Water (Observer. 6 December 1998. 
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Thus, we see how economic and environmental issues, when combined with 
other factors, could precipitate threats to national security proving the validity of the 
hypothesis which states: In economically and environmentally deprived areas, an 
acute shortage of resources provokes war. 
Summary 
This thesis's investigation of both variants of realist security theory (narrow-view and 
wider-view) has shown that realist security theory explains much of the security 
problems of the Horn of Africa. As the region experienced inter-state as well as intra- 
state conflicts, the testing of the narrow-view hypothesis, as shown in the cases of 
Ogaden war and the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war, outside military threat to be the 
principal cause of instability in the region. In both cases the relevance of narrow-view 
Realist theory to explain the cause of conflict is undisputable. 
When we assess the relevance of Realist theory's investigative power, we can 
say realism offers an incomplete answer to the Horn region's instability problems. 
However, we see a distinct disparity between narrow-view and wider-view Realist 
theories in explaining the threats to security in the Horn region. Out of the two 
variants, because of the region's nature of conflict (mostly domestic inflamed by 
uncompromising leadership, social, economic and environmental problems as shown 
in the preceding chapters), the wider-view concept of threat to stability seems to be 
more relevant to explaining the causes of conflict in the Horn . 
20 However, because of 
the complexity and interrelated nature of Horn conflicts, classic realist theory still 
falls short of indicating a lasting solution to these conflicts. In particular, the evils of 
ethnicity and competing religions - principal causes of social divisions - have kept 
communities apart, hampering integration among societies. This disadvantage has 
been exploited not only by incumbent leaders to control power but was also used by 
regional powers to advance national interest, further complicating the nature of 
conflict in the sub-region (see Figure 7.1). 
`o The negative proofs of the wider-view- hypotheses have not been discussed because proving the positive hypotheses has 
automatically eliminated their relevance. 
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Figure 7.1. Action Taken by Outside Actors and 














N. B. Stability in the Horn, shown at the top of the diagram, existed at the time of independence when 
colonial powers still retained some forces until phasing out was complete. Although their successors 
tried to build a strong army in order to have full control of their territories, the national economy did 
not allow them to do so as their predecessors did. They were able to secure only the power at the centre 
at high cost -a venture that drained most of the national budget. This action led to the fast deterioration 
and breakdown of the social services (education, health) and the infrastructure they inherited from their 
colonial masters creating disenchantment and social upheaval which subsequently opened the door to 
foreign intervention. Events thereafter followed the cycle shown above, which shows stability and 
instability meshed together and indicating the era of stability as a thing of the past and provoking the 
vicious circle of insecurity. 
Nature of regional conflict 
Conflicts are multi-dimensional 
Investigation of outside threats and domestic conflicts of the Horn region shows that 
the causes of conflict are multi-dimensional where the relevance of different factors is 
varying from place to place. Factors that play a prominent role in explaining the 
causes of conflict in a particular case may take a secondary role in another case and in 
some cases may not even be relevant. For example, while territorial claim based on 
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ethnic nationalism (irredentism), resource competition (pasture, water wells) and 
foreign intervention take a primary role in explaining the causes of the 1977-78 Ethio- 
Somalia war, religion (implementation of the Sharia in the mostly Christian and 
atheist south), denial of equal opportunities, displacement and expulsion from 
ancestral land (to leave space to northerners for farming and oil exploration) take 
precedence over other factors in explaining the cause of conflict in the Sudan. If ve 
take the case of the recent 1998-2000 Eritrea/Ethiopia war we see that economic, 
resource (blockage and denial of Assab port) and competition for hegemony in the 
region - rather than border dispute as indicated widely by the international media - 
were the root causes of conflict. It is undeniable that division within society, a major 
problem in the region, plays a prominent role in exacerbating insecurity and 
addressing these divisions would undoubtedly assist in reducing the level of mistrust 
and suspicion between communities. However, it would be inappropriate to rely on 
selected factors only in explaining the pattern of regional conflict since the causes of 
conflict are multi-dimensional and their application varies from place to place 
depending on the problems of the area under investigation. Therefore, in the case of 
the Horn, paying attention to all factors of insecurity and not focusing on a few 
isolated factors would be essential. 
Con fI icts are interrelated 
Although inter-state war has become much rarer, civil wars have continued with an 
added impetus and vigour. There seems to be no easy way out of this problem. As the 
problems are very closely interrelated, it demands visionary leadership which is able 
to see a solution to confrontational issues as a whole rather than in part. In other 
words, efforts at attaining stability should take place on a regional level because the 
countries' political problems, as well as their economies, are interdependent and 
interrelated. In particular, `support for dissidents in neighbouring countries, a long 
established feature of the political landscape in the Horn' 2t has been the underlying 
factor that kept conflict alight continuously across the sub-region's porous frontiers. 
Therefore, because conflict in the Horn is not contained within national borders, 
resolution of conflict in the sub-region cannot be handled by states individually, 
making a regional approach to control conflict worth considering. 
21 James Mayall (ed. ), The New Intervention 1991-1994 (Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, 1996), p. 100. 
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Conflicts are complex 
As shown in this thesis, the distribution of ethnic populations across national 
boundaries, which increased the potential for conflicts to spill over and affect 
neighbouring territories, introduced a new dimension to conflict in the sub-region. In 
the Horn, a region where borders have no meaning, a conflict initiated in one country 
has a rippling effect that spreads across the region and is very difficult to control. 
This spillover characteristic is well illustrated by the Afar case. As shown in 
Chapter 3, the Afars who reside in three adjoining countries - Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Djibouti - aspire to the creation of a Greater Afar state. In each of the three countries 
there are Afar liberation movements. As shown by the investigation, whenever a 
conflict arises in any of these countries, Afars living in neighbouring states always 
give assistance to their kin. Moreover, in most cases, whenever the conflict in a 
neighbouring country is seen to be to their advantage, neighbouring states also support 
opposition forces to ensure that the incumbent government does not achieve 
hegemonic status. 
Another example, which has close similarities with the Afar case, is the 
Ogaden conflict. The only difference is that the members of this group (WSLF) are 
Somalis and their aim is to liberate the contested territory and form a government of 
their own or join with Somalia to form a Greater Somalia embracing all Somali 
nationalities under one banner. Thus we see how the nature of the regions conflict is 
interrelated, complex, and intractable whose characteristics hamper national efforts to 
resolve insecurity problems. 
Problem of democratisation 
As shown in Chapter 3, many social scientists have suggested the democratisation 
process as the best remedy to attain peace and stability. Although this can be true, 
such a process cannot be implemented as a blueprint in areas where political 
awareness is very low and where there are beneficiaries from social chaos and 
instability. Civil society, the appropriate body that could have effectively addressed 
such shortcomings, is inactive in the Horn region due to harassment and adulteration 
by the influences of ethnic loyalty. This disadvantage has been skilfully exploited by 
the incumbent leaders to control power and by outside forces to advance national 
interest. 
Irrespective of international pressure applied on incumbent regimes to hasten 
the process of democratisation, intervention to destabilise neighbouring states through 
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proxy wars by supplying arms to secessionist movements is on the increase. Recent 
events show that Eritrea, after giving adequate training, infiltrated Oromo insurgents 
by air via SPLA controlled areas in South Sudan to destabilise Ethiopia. In 
collaboration with Djibouti, Eritrea also transported arms to the Transitional National 
Government (TNG) to fight anti-TNG forces supported by Ethiopia. 22 
Many peace settlements brokered at national level, or attempts made by 
renowned individuals, regional and international organisations have not been 
successful. The reason being, on parallel lines, there are other forces whose national 
interests dictate that the Horn region should always remain unstable. These forces, 
which benefit from instability, always intervene by exploiting the divisions between 
societies in the region. Residents of the region are not fully aware of this simple but 
inexpensive strategy. Until full awareness is achieved, foreign intervention is most 
likely to follow this strategy and as a result incessant chaos and volatile conflict will 
ravage the region. As an alternative to civil society, the feasibility of diaspora 
participation in hastening the speed of state-building and the harmonisation of 
relations between states has been argued for in relevant chapters of the main text. The 
analysis of the diaspora's importance in raising awareness and applying pressure on 
incumbent regimes is discussed below- 
Diaspora involvement and future prospects 
The diaspora is not without some misgivings about the prospects for peace. It is also 
tainted like existing civil societies by the influence of religion and ethnic loyalty. 23 
However, the longevity and adverse effects of civil wars has roused some elements of 
community groups from their slumber (indifference) and urged them to form some 
sort of alignment to intellectually challenge the atrocities of the ruling regimes. 
Individually, the majority of the conscious element of the diaspora realise the dangers 
to the region and believe that they cannot sit aloof when the relationship between 
communities is deteriorating from day to day putting the future existence of the state 
I, il `Eritrea: Politics before economies' (, Africa Confidential, Vol. 43 No. 7,5 April 2002; `Eritrea: Disarmed but not demobbed - 
People grow poorer and less free but the regime stands by its guns' (Africa Confidential, Vol. 43 No. 13,28 June 2002); 'A 
Southern Time for War, a Northern Time for peace' (The Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 996,18 May 2002); 'Somalia: And the 
anus flow on - New arms imports are Nicely to fuel new fighting, despite the UN embargo' (Afica Confidential, Vol. 43 No. 12- 
14 Ame 2002) 
23 The ethnic divide not only affected those living in the Horn's mainland but also the communities living abroad. This is eesih 
observed in European capitals and big cities in America. The pressure has even influenced congregations of the same faith 
(Orthodox Church) to split and form their own ethnic congregation where services are conducted in ethnic dialect. Even priests 
and deacons who claim that their occupation is in the service of God are not immune from inflaming further split This tragic 
episode can be witnessed in the boroughs of the city of London where relatively speaking community groups have the 
opportunity of better education, are supposed to be emancipated from the evils of ethnicit' and the interference of religious 
extremism in directing the affairs of the state- This is the dulemma the inhabitants of the Horn are lining with at the present 
moment. 
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in doubt. The very fact that ethnic and religious fervour have become the guiding 
principles of communities - even in their countries of refuge - has accelerated the 
concern to do something to alleviate the problem. Some tried to form little groups and 
voice their concerns by circulating papers. Some tried to sell their ideas at community 
meetings with no avail. As the formation of concerned groups did not absolve 
themselves from ethnic and religious vices their effort was fruitless and in some cases 
even accentuated the ethnic divide. 24 
The answer to tackling the division within communities lies in finding a 
solution to the question of `how to reconstruct cohesion between communities? ' The 
first step is to straddle the ethnic boundary and form groups that represent at least the 
major communities. 25 There have been some encouraging signs although the 
development is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, the alignment of few members of 
different Eritrean communities in Europe and America (e. g. Group 13) to challenge 
government authority over stalling implementation of the constitution to withhold the 
process of democratisation, has engaged the attention of a sizable number of the 
population that includes prominent members within the government structure 
resulting in strong opposition that shook the foundation of the incumbent regime. 26 
The publication and dissemination of materials (by members of the Ethiopian 
diaspora) that awakens the indigenous population is also a trend in the right direction. 
24 The membership of the groups was mostly based on academic qualification comprising people from the same ethnic group. 
They believed that their academic qualification would enable them to draft constitutions and party manifestoes that would get 
acceptance by all. In some cases it had the opposite effect to what it was intended to accomplish It encouraged members of other 
ethnic groups to form their own ethnic groups as a counterweight to challenge adversaries. The rationale being response to non- 
representation and participation in formulating the future destiny of a multi-ethnic society that does not guarantee the sharing of 
power and resources (e. g. ownership of land over 90% of occupation being agriculture/ pastoral farming) - the root causes of 
mistrust and suspicion. 
25 The author has met a number of individuals from various ethnic groups and religious sects (mostly professionals and 
university graduates) in London, a capital that harbours all community groups and religious sects. His overall assessment of these 
discussions is, prior to engaging in debates of democratisation, national unity and economic development an answer should be 
found to the question: how do we bury the problems of mistrust and suspicion? The discussions the author had, bluntly singled 
out strong opposition to leadership by a minority group (e. g. the Amhara or Tigrai), as witnessed in the past and at present. 
Unless this issue is resolved they view efforts of building trust among different nationalities in Ethiopia would be ineffective. 
Besides opposing rule by minority group, Orono intellectuals suggest the dominant ethnic Oromo (comprising 40%) should 
control leadership as a precondition if any meaningful outcome is to be achieved; otherwise they purport discussion about a 
unified Ethiopia is a waste of time. 
26 An intellectual group of the Eritrean diaspora known as G13 %Tote an open letter (also known as the Berlin Manifesto) 
criticising the leadership and demanding the introduction of a democratic system. Their action not only motivated widespread 
debate but also encouraged senior government officials and Assembly members to confront the leadership over the issue of 
procrastination and delay in legislating a democratic system. `In early October, some prominent intellectuals, regarded as party 
supporters and styling themselves the Group of 13 (G13), wrote a critical letter to the President. They included Bereket Habte 
Sctasaie, Chairman of the constitutional drafting committee. Their text became public. Their specific demand stiere: abolition of 
the special court which deals with political and corruption cases and allows no legal representation and no appeals; release or trial 
of all political prisoners; and full implementation of the constitution, including multi-party elections. Under this long-range 
pressure, president Issayas reluctantly accepted the Assembly's decision to hold multi-party elections on schedule in December 
2001'. 'Eritrea: Winter in Asmara - President Issayas Is Freezing Some of His Key Officials Out of Politics' (Africa 
C: onfdenfial, Vol. 42, No. 4,23 February 2001), p. 6; 'Eritrea: The Intelligentsia Rebel' (Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 922,22 
October 2(00), p. l; 'Eritrea: Sherifo Given the AX (Intimre Ocean _Vewsletter, No. 938,17 February 2001), p. 7. `Eritrea: 
Suddenly, Dissent - After Ten Years Democracy Stirs' (The Economist, 25 August 2001), pp. 51-52. 
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The theme of most of the publications focuses on highlighting the evils of ethnicity 
and religion as the basis of attaining political power and tools of stifling the process of 
democratisation. 27 In addition, growing opposition, criticism within own parties 28 and 
diaspora pressure assisted by international bodies, has forced governments in power to 
seek peaceful means to defuse tension. For example, the Ethiopian government 
launched a series of secret contacts with the opposition by using diplomats from 
Norway and Germany to facilitate a meeting in Oslo. 29 
Due to huge refuge movement and mass migration the diaspora of the Horn 
represents all types of social groups and class, and as the case is with some regions, 
does not represent the elite group alone. In addition, the close cultural tie that is 
maintained between families in the region is also maintained between the diaspora 
and their relatives at home most of whom are farmers representing the majority of the 
grassroots. This is demonstrated by the frequent remittance sent to families by the 
diaspora which further strengthens their linkage and an act which is welcomed by the 
state because it gives the state access to hard currency. So, in the context of the Horn, 
we can say the linkage between the diaspora and the grassroots has a firm base that 
cannot be dislodged easily. 
In addition, new initiatives are taking place to accelerate diaspora 
involvement. A noteworthy step which is taking place at present is exploitation of 
school alumni establishments' resources. 30 These groups of former students are a 
potential source for the formation of multi-ethnic diaspora groups which can play a 
significant role in bringing awareness to nationals of the dangers of fragmentation of 
the state. The urgency of tackling the derogatory influence of ethnicity has recently 
brought former Wingate school students together at a meeting in Washington DC on 4 
27 Publications such as The Ethiopian Register (Published in Avon, MN) and Thiopia Magazine (Published in Addis Abeba) 
serve as mouthpieces of the diaspora in disseminating the evils of ethnicity and authoritarian rule. Some of the publications have 
landed the editors and its journalists in jail. 
28, Ethiopia. No Comfort for Meles Zenawi' (The Indian Ocean ! newsletter, No. 987,9 March 2002); `Ethiopia Opposition 
Grows to Meles Z. enawi' (The Indian Ocean Newsletter. No. 997,25 May 2002); `Ethiopia. Attack of the Tribes' (The Indian 
Ocean Newsletter, No. 996,18 May 2002). 
29 'Ethiopia: Secret with the Opposition' (The Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 987,9 March 2002) 
30 In the past higher and secondary education was centred in the capital city Addis Ababa which facilitated free boarding to all. 
Boarding was abandoned in the early 1980s when student activities in politics increased and their danger was recognised by 
incumbent regimes. As the provinces only catered for elementary education, all students had to move to the capital city. Addis 
Ababa, to pursue secondary education. The system of free boarding made secondary schools and higher institutions a reservoir of 
ethnic mix where genuine friendship among students developed and thrived- In most cases former school relationship is still 
maintained untainted by ethnic propaganda. 
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July 2002 to form an association of old students (alumni). Reliable sources indicate 
that other groups are following suit to form their own alumni. 3' 
The importance of students in mobilizing the grassroots should not be 
underestimated. This is demonstrated by the accomplishments and activities of the 
Ethiopian students in the 1970s when they participated in the National Literacy 
Campaign. Their activities, which concentrated in rural village areas, was an eve 
opener that enabled millions of the grassroots not only to read and write, but also to 
dismantle the land tenancy system and play a major role in transferring ownership of 
land to the farmers who hitherto were landless tenants. The formation of student 
alumni among the diaspora, which has close connection with the local alumni, 
therefore, will further enhance the diaspora's effort to bring awareness to the 
grassroots of society. 
The analysis of the events mentioned above clearly shows the usefulness of 
the diaspora as a counterweight to ethnic politics by exposing the dangers of ethnicity 
(ethnic nationalism) as a source of instability and economic degradation. If the 
diaspora plays its cards skilfully and, through collaboration with other forces-32 
engages itself actively in the politics of the region in a non-threatening way, it could 
lay down the groundwork for collaboration between regional states. This is the 
missing link that could bridge the gap and allow friendship to foster between 
neighbouring countries. 
Once the nucleus is formed in as many countries as possible (the formation of 
alumni seems to greatly undermine the importance of clan, ethnic and religious 
loyalty), it will stand a better chance of attracting sympathy and help from numerous 
worldwide organisations that support the establishment of peace and stability. With 
the advent of school alumni, the pertinent question of divided loyalty seems to be 
addressed because its composition will comprise dedicated intellectuals, unmarred 
and untainted by ethnic loyalty, who are willing to sacrifice their time for the common 
good of all citizens of their nation and region as seen in the case of the emerging 
31 According to telephone conversations the author had with the founding members (the author himself being a former Wingate 
school student) the first meeting held on 4 July was very successful. He was also told from Addis that the Wingate alumni move 
sprang from the request initiated by the alumni in Addis Abeba. This evidence clearly shows the interconnection of the diaspora 
alumni with that at home and through it the capability of reaching other like-minded bodies and the grassroots. 
32 Active participation by the diaspora does not mean that outside actors do not have roles to plan. They have important 
contributions to make, but their role must always be secondary- Outside actors such as international organisations, NGOs. 
governments that have close affiliations with the countries of the region and internationally renowned individuals «-ho have 
dedicated their time to peace can play an active role by giving advice and assistance. Some of the roles that they can play or 
render are shown in figure 7.1. 
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diaspora alumni in Washington DC. The organisation of the diaspora of whatever 
composition should transcend the ethnic trap and try to recruit members from all 
ethnic groups. Intellectuals from the sub-regions who identify themselves as patriots 
should, at the very least, be prepared to make this sacrifice. The wisdom of the 
common saying `united we stand, divided we fall'33 could spread wide and inculcate 
the minds of the grassroots to undermine the political value given to ethnic loyalty 
and religious virtues whose philosophy is based on separation and the formation of 
mini-states by dismantling existing states. 
Recommendation 
Before anticipating the establishment of stability in the region, two factors first have 
to be implemented: 
1. At the national level - the introduction of a measure of democracy that 
allows access to resources and enables society to exercise its right to 
individual liberty. 
2. At the regional level - the development of a perception by the populace 
that violence does not bring stability; the only way to achieve stability is 
through peaceful means. 34 
Fulfilment of the above two factors - particularly the latter, which requires an 
awareness-raising programme for the whole population could be achieved by the 
participation of the diaspora as shown in the above analysis. 
Mistrust is a pitfall that has contributed much towards the exacerbation of 
conflict in the region. The vicious cycle of violence shown in Figure 7.1 could be 
normalised only if it is preceded by building trust between communities and nationals. 
In the current political climate, if properly exploited, I am confident that such 
involvement by the diaspora in collaboration with international organisations could 
defuse division between groups and societies (see Table 7.1). It could also reduce the 
level of insecurity and shorten the time variant needed to create an emancipated 
nation-state that is free from the complexity and evils of ethnicity, religious 
extremism and fierce competition for possession of scarce resources in the volatile 
region of the Horn of Africa. This approach has not been tried in the past and, in the 
33 The literal translation of the Amharic version (official language of Ethiopia) `Dir bivabir anbessa yasir a very common 
saying is 'a network of threads can trap a 
lion. ' 
34 Peacef d means is achieved through diplomacy, negotiation, arbitration or adjudication. 
270 
absence of a viable civil society, this thesis recommends its inclusion as an alternative 
or additional factor to be considered in security studies. 
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Table 7.1. Suggested Action Required to Enhance Stability in the Sub-region 
Elite Group and Diaspora International, Regional and Non-governmental Organisanons 
" Create national-group bodies " Provide financial aid 
" Participate in the setting up of regional " Give professional advice 
groups " Make facilities available 
" Maintain close contact with international " Assist participation of members in forums about 
organisations and the media Third World development 
" Coordinate programme of action with " Apply economic and political pressure on 
local institutions, councils of elders national governments to introduce an unimpeded 
2 and all progressive organisations process of democratisation 
" Concentrate on educating the masses " NGOs to help in educating the masses to bring 
on democratic rights and ways of awareness of democratic rights and act as a link 
achieving them with donor countries and international 
organisations 
3 " Play an active role in election " Participate in election monitoring 
processes 
" Discuss and reach common 
ground that solicits regional 
cooperation, publish materials on " Participation by the UN. OAU, IGAD, EU and the 
4 which overwhelming consensus was international media 
established and distribute them 
jointly with the UN, OAU and IGAD 
" Encourage and assist in the 
5 establishment of discussion forums " NGOs' active participation essential 
on regional cooperation in institutions 
of national countries 
" Coordinate their activities with inter- " UN, OAU, EU_ IGAD, and Friends of IGAD give 
6 national and national organisations professional, financial and moral assistance to 




Most of the interviews I conducted were referred to as unattributable for reasons noted 
in the Introduction. Among others, those interviewed include four ex-ministers, three 
ambassadors, two leaders of liberation movements, two opposition party leaders, a 
lieutenant general, a major general, two brigadiers generals, two colonels, three 
community leaders, five senior government officials, two highly respected elders, a 
number of diaspora intellectuals and former civil servants most of whom worked as 
senior defence, security and party officials in government ministries and party 
headquarters. They all have first hand knowledge of government policies related to 
security issues of their nation and region. The countries represented include Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The interview was conducted between 1998 and 
2001. 
Author's own experience 
My professional career since the beginning of the 1980s as Chief of Operations of the 
MOD', Deputy Chief of Staff, Vice Minister of Defence, member of the National 
Congress and member of the National Security Committee which met periodically to 
access national and regional security has given me unlimited access to top-secret 
documents involving national and regional security. In particular, the post of head of 
operations of the MOD not only gave me access to top security documents, but also 
made me responsible for preparing contingency plans to meet national threats to the 
security of the state. The contingency plans are discussed at MOD level then 
presented to the National Security Committee (of which I became a member in 1988) 
chaired by the head of state. Once they get approval, they become the basic 
documents of state security and are kept in a highly secured place in the operations 
department at MOD. 2 In other words, I was responsible to prepare operational plans, 
force goals which define the size and type of forces specifying the type of armament 
the units should be armed with to enable them to counter foreign aggression and civil 
war fomented by outsiders. This is a continuous duty which requires revision and 
I Apart from planning and directing operations during the time of war, the peacetime duty of the Head of operations is to assess 
threats to national security based on the collated intelligence report presented to him bý the Head of Intelligence of MOD. 
2 They are labeled as top-secret documents. To my knowledge there is no more sensitive national document than the national 
security documents at MOD %hi h enjoys a higher status. 
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upgrading depending on intelligence reports concerning the acquisition of new 
armaments and the build-up of forces in neighbouring countries. The custody and 
updating of these documents was my day to day responsibility. 
In my professional career, I was participant in a number of bilateral and 
regional conferences dealing with defence pacts and military agreements, all dealing 
with security matters. In particular, I had the opportunity to participate in regional 
peace negotiations between Ethiopia and its neighbouring countries either as a 
member of a delegation (Sudan) or in the case of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY), Uganda and Somalia as head of delegations. For Example, the 1988 
agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia: 
1. on the normalisation of relations and the disengagement of forces 
from border areas 
2. the exchange of prisoners 
were concluded under my leadership and the documents signed bear my signature. In 
addition, I was also involved in internal peace negotiations whose aim was to end civil 
wars. For example, when the head of state, Mengistu, fled Ethiopia in May 1991,1 
was nominated by the caretaker government to be part of the delegation led by Prime 
Minister Tesfaye Dinka to broker a peace agreement with opposition movements in 
London -a meeting arranged by the American government whose objective was the 
formation of a transitional government which included opposition movements. 
My professional career has also brought me into close contact with heads and 
representatives of various guerrilla leaders and liberation movements. Particularly, 
politically sensitive documents, which involved liberation movements, were under my 
custody. For example, I was the government representative with whom the SPLA 
worked with since its creation in 1983 till May 1991. 
In general, I can confidently say that analysis of national and regional security 
issues was a routine professional duty that has brought me into regular contact with 
those who were responsible with security matters dealing nationally and regionally 
and availed me the access, opportunity to view, examine and comment on national 
and regional security issues. As a result, I have accumulated an in depth knowledge of 
the balance of power dynamics of the sub-region whose prominent characteristic is 
frequent shift of alliances. As a result, my thesis has benefited from my past 
experience, access to sensitive documents, discourse with opposite numbers on 
sensitive security problems, extensive visits to sensitive areas in the region and 
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firsthand knowledge of intricate security issues most of which are not even 
documented because of their sensitivity. These have been shown as footnotes in 
relevant chapters of the main text. I am confident that my past experience could 
effectively counter-balance the shortcoming of fieldwork visits I was forced to gig e 
up due to personal safety and movement restrictions. 
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